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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS
FRANCE, 1727-1744

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BRITISH
DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS
1689—1789

VOLUME VI—FRANCE, 1727-1744

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PREFACE

THE instructions and selected dispatches contained in this volume are drawn, as before, from office copies in the Newcastle papers at the British Museum and the State Papers in the Public Record Office. The only point calling for remark is that down to 1734 Newcastle's correspondence on French affairs was apparently placed by him in a *fonds* which eventually found its way to the British Museum, and that after that date, Spain seems to have become in Newcastle's opinion, so much more important than France that the ordinary correspondence with Paris was separated from the Spanish and therefore was kept with the other papers of his department and so passed into the Record Office. The exception to this rule is the correspondence marked "Most secret, to be opened only by himself," which contains information or comments on information supplied by Bussy, the clerk in the French foreign office who was in British pay. This Newcastle must have kept by itself, for most of it is in the British Museum, not with the other Paris correspondence in the Record Office.

The papers in this volume cover the embassies of Horatio Walpole and the first Earl Waldegrave at Paris, as well as the Congress of Soissons; but it has also been thought desirable that representation should be given of the correspondence of Lord Harrington, Secretary of State for the Northern Department and Horatio Walpole, when ambassador at The Hague, during the mission of Jeannel thither in the winter of 1734 to 1735, inasmuch as Anglo-French relations were the primary concern of that curious negotiation.

Moreover the British policy as regards Dunkirk, the wearisome correspondence on which occupies so great a space in the papers of the time, is conveniently summarised in the instructions issued to the British commissioners at the port. These will be found, as in the first volume, in an appendix. It should not be forgotten

that this miserable dispute is in the background of the history of the relations between the two Courts throughout this period, and plays its part in corrupting friendly feeling between them.

The reader should bear in mind that the despatches published in the text of this volume are official despatches only. The practice which sprang up after the appointment of Horatio Walpole to Paris, of an exchange of private letters between him and Newcastle, continued in full vigour throughout Waldegrave's embassy, and indeed throughout Newcastle's tenure of the seals of the Secretary of State. Much of the most informative evidence for the opinions of the ambassadors and the Secretary of State is to be found therefore, not in the official despatches, but in the private letters, which should be studied along with the despatches from the office itself.

As in the previous volumes, the office held by any individual mentioned in the text of these despatches, will be found in the index, opposite his name.

Since the publication of the last volume of this series of *Diplomatic Instructions*, new references to the State Papers in the Record Office have been provided, and the opportunity is here taken of indicating the new references of those State Papers that have been used in this volume together with the old.

Old Reference	Alternative Reference
<i>S.P. Foreign, France</i>	<i>S.P.</i> 78
<i>S.P. Foreign, Holland</i>	<i>S.P.</i> 84
<i>S.P. Foreign, Confidential</i>	<i>S.P.</i> 107
<i>S.P. Domestic, Regencies</i>	<i>S.P.</i> 43

It will be seen that in the following pages the new references have been used. As in the two previous volumes of this series, the dates, unless otherwise indicated, are in Old Style; and the references to Archdeacon William Coxe's *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole* are to the edition of 1798. I should like to acknowledge, as before, the readiness to help extended to me by the officials of all ranks at the British Museum, the Public Record Office, and the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Paris; while I have to thank our President, Sir Richard Lodge, Professor Basil Williams, and our Director, for some valuable suggestions for the removal of faults; but I need hardly say that the responsibility for those that survive falls on no other shoulders but my own.

L. G. W. L.

INTRODUCTION

FEW demises of the Crown have been less of a revolution than that which brought George II to the throne. New sovereigns, if they have not, like George I or George III, reversed their predecessors' policy, have been hailed, like Queen Victoria or King Edward VII, as the harbingers of a new era. But George II, much as he may have wished to be rid of his father's friends, could do little save close the reign of the Elephant and the Maypole ; and the ministers whose dismissal he anticipated with no little pleasure, were continued in power under the influence of the arguments of Queen Caroline and the superior financial promises of Sir Robert Walpole. Foreign policy therefore was to undergo no official change, yet the summer of 1727, which witnessed the signature of the preliminaries of Paris and the death of George I, saw in the current of European diplomacy the first eddies which indicated the turn of the tide in the relations between Great Britain and France.

The death of Catherine I and the adhesion of Sweden and Denmark to the Hanover allies had decided Charles VI to sign the preliminaries of Paris, which took the form of an armistice for seven years and the suspension of the Ostend East India Company during that period, while by a familiar device all other difficulties were referred to an European Congress. But it is one thing to sign preliminaries ; it is another to carry them out. Calculating on ministerial or Jacobite trouble in Britain under the new King, the Emperor showed no undue haste to carry out his provisional promises, for he quibbled about the Ostend Company, and supported the recalcitrant King of Spain, who refused to withdraw his troops from before Gibraltar, detained a valuable ship, the *Prince Frederick*, which had been captured and ought to have been released, and disputed the British right of trade in the West Indies. Fleury, whose friendliness for Great Britain had been

greatly strengthened by an autograph letter from the new King and by being consulted in the extremely delicate matter of the late King's will, freely promised support against what he unhesitatingly described as *mauvaise foi*¹ on the part of Spain.

The Franco-British alliance therefore seemed as strong as ever, and Horatio Walpole on his return to Paris saw no reason to be dissatisfied with the overtures that Fleury was making for a reconciliation between Louis XV and his uncle across the Pyrenees. Ministers in England, however, were more doubtful, and the rumours that spread of a change in the ministry following upon the fall of Armenonville strengthened their anxieties. Could it be true that Morville was to be succeeded in office by Chauvelin, a man of the school of Huxelles, and therefore, unlike his predecessor, no friend to Britain? Walpole, who was confident no change in the foreign policy of France was contemplated² and had gently sounded the Cardinal upon the appointment,³ seems not only to have reassured the ministry at home (see p. 7), but to have been further reassured himself as a result of his first interview with the new Keeper of the Seals.⁴ Differences of view, however, were not long in making themselves apparent. When, on the reconciliation of France and Spain, Chauvelin asked Walpole to propose that the King's fleets off Spain and in American waters should not be reinforced, Walpole absolutely refused to comply,⁵ and this divergence on

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32751, fo. 29v. Robinson to Newcastle, Paris, 17 July N.S. 1727.

² *Ibid.* fo. 205. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 16 Aug. N.S. 1727.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 251. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 16 Aug. N.S. 1727, very private.

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 294v. Walpole to Townshend, private, 26 Aug. N.S. 1727. "Therefore I think His Majesty has no reason to be the least uneasy at the various surmises and reasonings that may be made to the disadvantage of England on account of this change, by some as Jacobites, by others as naturally enemies and jealous of the happiness of our nation, and by all of them as entirely ignorant of the true state of matters here, which, I am persuaded, will still be carried on with the same spirit and upon the same principles, but with greater vigour and dispatch, for Mr. Chauvelin is certainly, by the confession of his enemies, a person of ready parts, of quick apprehension and of great application in business" Contrast with this the story told by Coxe in his *Memoirs of Horatio Lord Walpole*, London, 1802, p. 164.

⁵ *Ibid.* fo. 464. Walpole to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 16 Sept. N.S. 1727. For his reasons at length, see *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 360, ff. 86-89, Walpole to Fleury, Fontainebleau, 15 Sept. N.S. 1727.

the manner of treating Spain soon led to undisguised unpleasantness between the two men. For, though Walpole continued to believe in the firmness of the Cardinal, and to hold that the reconciliation between France and Spain would have no effect upon the friendliness of the relations between Britain and France, by the end of the year he was deeply suspicious of Chauvelin. In the tedious negotiations leading up to the Convention of the Pardo in March 1728, Rottembourg, the French ambassador at Madrid, in spite of plain orders from France and Britain, at the last moment admitted a protocol which entirely surrendered the British position about the *Prince Frederick* (see p. 13). This so moved Walpole that he made a speech to Fleury of "above half an hour,"¹ and he began to suspect a secret correspondence between Rottembourg and Huxelles,² while Fleury's hesitation to act vigorously kept him awake at nights.³ He had his reward in seeing the obnoxious clause reshaped, but his position with regard to the French Court was that if "His Eminence certainly thinks with me in every respect," nevertheless "I doe by no means like his new suite."⁴ It was therefore with apprehensions as to the future of the alliance that Walpole returned home at the end of the year for his parliamentary duties, leaving Waldegrave in charge. Under him matters became worse: he found Chauvelin a quarrelsome negotiator who revealed the declaration about the *Prince Frederick* to the Imperial ambassador,⁵ while Fleury was cool with Waldegrave because Keene's powers to sign the convention in Spain had not been sent,⁶ and roundly scolded him when they were.⁷ All this was attributed to Chauvelin, whom from henceforth both Walpole and Waldegrave regarded as their *bête noire*, the more so as with the Cardinal his influence gradually supplanted that of Walpole. In any case the

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32753, fo. 281. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 17 Dec. N.S. 1727 (see Professor Basil Williams' article in the *English Historical Review*, Vol. XVI, 1901, pp. 314-15).

² *Ibid.* fo. 323v. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 18 Dec. N.S. 1727, private.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 404. Walpole to Newcastle (holog.), Paris, 21 Dec. N.S. 1727.

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 404v.

⁵ *B.M. Add.* 32754, fo. 203. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 13 Feb. N.S. 1728, private. Chauvelin's excuse was that it would shorten negotiations.

⁶ *Ibid.* fo. 247v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 18 Feb. N.S. 1728, private.

⁷ *Ibid.* fo. 276v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 21 Feb. N.S. 1728, very private.

appointment of a methodical, bellicose and patriotic Keeper of the Seals was not likely to make for harmony between France and the amateur, pacific and essentially opportunist ministry of Britain, and it was bound to estrange governments whose conceptions of foreign policy were so entirely different. For whereas the French were trained in a method which looked ahead to possible contingencies and framed policies to be adopted in hypothetical circumstances, the British were ever content to wait on events before deciding what line of action was best fitted to secure that aim which they had most at heart, security of the Protestant succession. Towards its realisation they pursued a policy of European peace, and of co-operation with continental powers. At all costs, isolation must be avoided, and the measure of the failure of British statesmanship under Walpole may be seen in the international position of the country in the years immediately preceding the rupture with Spain.

As to the Emperor, his feelings towards George II were not much milder than towards George I, and his policy, less passionate but more headstrong than that of the Queen of Spain, combined the British and the French in common antagonism to him. "The King," wrote Delafaye, saw "with regret the Emperor gaining such an absolute influence throughout Germany as may make him an overmatch for us and France too."¹ But although diplomatic relations were not resumed with Vienna till April, 1728, Townshend was not without hopes that he could procure not merely the suspension, but the total suppression of the Ostend Company (see p. 42). For the present, however, the chief thing to be done was to recover the ground lost in Germany in 1726, and undermine the menacing fabric of the Imperial influence. Hence a treaty was initiated with the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, whose defection in 1726 had been such a bitter blow to the Hanover allies (see p. 10). This reconciliation between these leading Protestant princes was to lead to the foundation of a league with Würtemberg (see p. 16), and under French auspices a treaty was agitated with the four Wittelsbach Electors of Cologne, Trier, the Palatinate and Bavaria,

¹ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 187, fo. 10. Delafaye to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 8 Aug. 1727. In turn, the King's bellicose outbursts, as reported by Broglie, alarmed Fleury who held that the peace of Europe was essential to the interests of France (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 361, fo. 178v. Fleury to Broglie, Fontainebleau, 11 Sept. N.S. 1727).

who it was hoped would eventually combine with the Würtemberg league (see pp. 41, 48, 54, 58). Much attention also was paid to suggestions for detaching the King of Prussia from the Imperial alliance. Should he be invited to the Congress? Both French and British agreed that he would be a nuisance (see p. 9) but later they concurred in tempting him by a marriage of the Prince of Wales to the Princess Royal of Prussia (see p. 23). All this, however, merely served to show the strength of the Emperor's position. Though Pentenriedter made advances to Fleury in Paris during the spring of 1728 (see p. 16), there was good reason to believe that Spanish obstinacy had derived much of its strength from the underhand support of the Emperor (see p. 21), who enjoyed the support not only of Prussia but of Poland also (powers soon to be joined in a defensive alliance) and eventually, on 11 May N.S. 1728, dismayed the Hanoverians by declaring the commission held by Hanover and Wolfenbüttel in Mecklenburg to be at an end, and by admitting the King of Prussia to the administration of that unhappy country (see p. 39).

All this, coupled with the question of the succession to Jülich and Berg (see pp. 38, 47), and the attempts of the Emperor to seduce Denmark from the Hanover alliance (*ibid.*) boded ill for harmony at the Congress of Soissons. No sooner had Spain, by the Convention of the Pardo, agreed to the preliminaries of Paris, than British ministers began expounding the principles upon which it was hoped that the Allies would be guided in the Congress (see pp. 19, 20). On one point both Hanover allies and Imperialists were agreed. There were far too many dangerous subjects waiting for discussion; the Emperor was by no means anxious to see the grievances of the princes placed before the Congress, while the British were as eager to prevent the words Gibraltar and Minorca from being uttered.¹ The sooner the Congress ended or was reduced to a sham, the better. No sooner therefore had it met in June, than the Imperialist representative took the lead in transferring its work to the envoys personally and in framing a provisional treaty between the Powers. By the beginning of August 1728, one of the British plenipotentiaries, William Stanhope, was reporting that, though he did not approve of the draft, he thought it a good founda-

¹ The anxiety of the French to gain an assent to the retrocession of Gibraltar is very marked in their diplomatic papers of 1728 (see *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 362, 363 *passim*).

tion to build upon,¹ and so rapidly was the work pushed forward that, in spite of the protests of the Spanish Ambassador, draft articles were forwarded to the European Courts on 21 August N.S. By these it was proposed that all treaties prior to 1725 should be confirmed, that those articles of the Treaty of Vienna of that year which had been considered an infraction of previous treaties should be settled, and that all lesser matters should be referred to commissioners outside the Congress.

But the conduct of the Court of Spain showed that one power at any rate was to be reckoned as no friend to a speedy conclusion. While it refrained from rejecting the draft in principle, it found fault with details and then lapsed into complete silence until April 1729. As the Emperor announced that he would not sign without Spain (see p. 44), and showed every disposition to fan the antagonism between Prussia and the Hanover allies (see p. 47), it is no wonder that tempers rose against powers that were so obviously amusing the Allies, or that the impatient British proposed once more their habitual remedy, a blockade against the accessible coasts of Spain. Gravely anxious as to the course to be pursued should the negotiations break down, yet unwilling to act before the arrival of the galleons with the treasure that might be used to compensate the Allies for their losses,² ministers urged the advantages of an ultimatum, and made no secret of the fact that His Majesty was "fitting out a strong squadron", for which a specious excuse was provided by the rumours of an intended Spanish attack on Jamaica (see pp. 49, 53). Plans of campaign were even discussed between the two Courts,³ but in May, Newcastle was glad to hear that the Spaniards were "in a better disposition" (see below, p. 54). Practically everything turned on whether Elizabeth Farnese could get better terms from the Emperor or from his opponents. The complaisance of the Hanover allies in agreeing to her *sine qua non* that Spanish troops should occupy Parma and the Tuscan ports greatly facilitated her conversion; yet Townshend had serious doubts, apprehending that even if he conceded the Spanish garrisons,

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32757, fo. 311v. Stanhope to Newcastle, Paris, 7 Aug. N.S. 1728.

² See Townshend's letter to Stephen Poyntz, Whitehall, 21 Feb. 1728-9. (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, p. 638.)

³ *Aff. Etr.* 365, fo. 165v. Broglie to Chauvelin, London, 7 March N.S. 1729.

the formidable match of Don Carlos and Maria Theresa, worthy to rank with that of Philip the Fair and Joan the Mad, might yet take place (see pp. 54, 58). Fortunately the Emperor, after some hesitation, remained obdurate in refusing to sacrifice his daughter to a Bourbon, and the Queen, considering herself slighted, threw away all hesitation in accepting the prize offered her by the Allies, and on these terms signed the Treaty of Seville on 9 November N.S. 1729.¹

This treaty marks an epoch in the history of these complicated negotiations, for it withdrew one of the props of the alliance of Vienna, and virtually left the Emperor alone in the west. His chief support was now in the north, where Prussia, encouraged by him and Poland, was making periodical threats against Hanover which called forth British appeals for help from France (see p. 59). In the south his sullen obstinacy in refusing the Spanish garrisons boded ill for peace, and in 1730 all Europe resounded with preparations for war to compel him to agree to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons into the Italian duchies (see pp. 65, 67, 71, 72, 76, 90, 91). But no hostilities ensued. The Allies could by no means agree on any plan of campaign. Broglie and Chauvelin seem to have been convinced that the British were determined to evade the fulfilment of their share of the operations, with the result that when, from December till August, each power put forward its own scheme, hot opposition arose from one or other of its Allies (see pp. 75, 76). The nearest approach to agreement was a projected attack on Sicily, to which the British were prepared to contribute and escort a force of eight or twelve thousand men, with provisos that a French force should invade North Germany for the protection of Hanover, which would be left unguarded if so large a body were detached to the Mediterranean, and that no attack should be made on the Netherlands (see pp. 72, 91). But this attack was a favourite French scheme, the advocacy of which was in British and Dutch eyes proof positive that the policy of Chauvelin and the French military party was to propose the one plan which they knew to be unacceptable and then throw the blame for inaction on the

¹ The student who wishes to follow the history of Anglo-French relations from the Treaty of Seville to the fall of Walpole in full detail should consult Professor P. Vaucher's *Robert Walpole et la politique de Fleury, 1731-42*. My indebtedness to this remarkable study will be everywhere apparent.

Maritime Powers.¹ To an advance down the Danube the British would not agree so long as no provision was made for Hanover. There remained therefore only Italy, and yet nothing was done, as Newcastle complained, to secure the adhesion of the King of Sardinia who held the passes of the Alps (see pp. 71, 87). When the period of grace allowed to the Emperor had elapsed, the French were still making difficulties over even the Sicilian expedition (see p. 84), and Chauvelin in a paper entitled *Idées générales*, while agreeing to operations south of the Alps, insisted on the previous consent of the King of Spain (see p. 87), and on a previous treaty among the Allies to preserve the *équilibre* in the event of their making conquests. The point served its purpose, for it provoked further discussion, and when in the autumn, French and Spanish combined² in insisting that the troops promised by George II should be British and not mercenaries³ the chicanery of the Allies was patent to the British ministry, and confirmed them in their belief that the radical change of policy which they had already initiated was justified up to the hilt.

Doubts as to the value of the French alliance had always been ready to spring to the minds of British ministers, and during the period of Spanish dilatoriness in negotiation, there were not wanting those who supported Sir Robert Walpole's view that it might be better to negotiate with the Imperialists rather than with the Spaniards,⁴ and of these Newcastle was not the least. On the other hand, Townshend's mistrust of the Emperor was invincible, and he held that the conduct of the Court of Vienna entirely justified their being left out of any negotiation or treaty (see p. 58), but none the less he realised that the alliance between Britain and

¹ See the letter of Horatio Walpole to Sir Robert, Paris, 7 July 1730 N.S., in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 5.

² See the correspondence in *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 194, and the intercepted despatch of Ossorio to the King of Sardinia (*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 107, no. 3) dated London 8 January N.S. 1731: "La France ne cesse de prêcher de tous cotés la nécessité indispensable de faire la guerre et de la faire aussi par diversion hors d'Italie, offrant à cet effet au delà de 100 m. hommes de ses troupes ; mais si elle persiste à demander que les allies fournissent de leur côté un contingent proportionné, c'est comme si elle leur demandoit l'impossible."

³ *B.M. Add.* 32770, fo. 128, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 19 November 1730, private.

⁴ See Newcastle's letter to Stanhope, Whitehall, 22 May 1729, in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, p. 641.

France was jeopardised by the Treaty of Seville and the reluctance of Fleury to guarantee the pragmatic sanction (see p. 60) and, in fact, the treaty played its part in advancing the crisis. For to Chauvelin its importance lay in that it rendered more imperative than ever the conclusion of the treaty with the four Electors¹ whereby the coalition against Austria could be built up and the aims of Prussia be defeated by guaranteeing the succession to Jülich and Berg to the rival house of Wittelsbach; and this project, which Townshend hid from Newcastle,² added fuel to the flames of the difference with Sir Robert who would hear nothing of subsidies in time of peace. Nothing indeed came of the proposal, for it was swallowed up in the final crisis in the ministry caused by the question whether or not a peremptory declaration (see p. 78) should be made to the Emperor in order that he might have a chance of coming to terms and avoiding the outbreak of hostilities.³ This Sir Robert Walpole secured, and on 15 May Townshend resigned, with the twofold result that advocates of an approach to Austria became supreme in the British ministry and Chauvelin's despatches threw off all pretence to friendly feelings towards England. Contrary to the opinion of his brother, Horace Walpole earnestly begged that France should be admitted to the negotiation, and however much he felt that it was impossible for him to work with Chauvelin, he protested against concealing the overtures in Vienna from Fleury.⁴ Chesterfield at The Hague likewise had his qualms.⁵ Matters however had gone too far: a month before Chesterfield wrote, Newcastle revealed the project

¹ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 367, fo. 141. Chauvelin to Broglie, Versailles, 28 November N.S. 1729.

² *Ibid.* fo. 138v. Broglie to Chauvelin, London, 17 November N.S. 1729: "Je ne tomberay pas dorénavant dans de pareils cas ayant la copie des articles secrets de M. de Chavigny que milord Townshend m'a donnés, dont il n'a fait aucune part à M. le duc de Newcastle, non plus du projet du traité, qui par conséquent n'en a pu instruire M. Horace Walpole. Ainsy vous aurés la bonté de garder le secret de ce qui se passe entre Milord Townshend et moy non seulement pour le public mais même à l'égard des ministres d'Angleterre."

³ Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. I, p. 337, and II, pp. 680-5.

⁴ *B.M. Add.* 32769, fo. 307v. H. Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 16 Sept. N.S. 1730.

⁵ Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 46. Chesterfield to Harrington, Hague, 26 December N.S. 1730.

of an Austrian treaty to Waldegrave (see p. 92), and though the negotiation was within an ace of breaking down, Robinson carried it to a triumphant conclusion and signed the great treaty on 16 March N.S. 1731.¹

Whatever we may think of the manner in which the rupture was brought about, or of Newcastle's opinion that the French, obsessed as they were by the desire to prevent the aggrandisement of the House of Austria, would have wrecked any attempt at an understanding with Vienna, if had the British communicated to them their negotiations (see p. 97), there can be little doubt that the change itself was inevitable. The course of events was leading both parties to a separation. On the British side there was not only the justifiable dissatisfaction with the objections raised by the French to any suggested plan of action against the Emperor, but friction appeared in a number of minor cases. Party politics in 1727 had revived the dispute about Dunkirk in which British persistence was such that in 1730 Fleury was reported as being "peevish almost every time it is spoke of."² In retaliation the British refused leave to the French to raise 750 recruits in Ireland;³ in the West Indies there were complaints about contraband trade in Dominica and Martinique, and claims were asserted for the island of St. Lucia.⁴ All these were petty disputes which a little good will could have adjusted. What brought the two powers to the

¹ The text is in A. F. Pribram, *Oesterreichische Staatsverträge*, Vol. I, together with the consequent treaties with Spain of 22 July N.S. 1731 and Holland of 20 February N.S. 1732.

² *B.M. Add.* 32770, fo. 60v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 3 November 1730, private. "The other day at dinner in a great deal of company, Dunkirk hapning to be mentioned, the Cardinal said: 'Ces Dunquerqueois sont des grands sots; ils sont sortis de leur port pour sauver un vaisseau anglois qui alloit périr dans leur rade, et l'ont sauvé. Les Anglois ne méritoient pas cela d'eux: pour moi, j'aurois laissé périr le vaisseau.' This he repeated twice between jest and earnest, addressing himself to me. I contented myself with answering in a jesting way that the Dunkirkers were better Christians than His Eminency, which put an end to the subject." (*Ibid.*)

³ *B.M. Add.* 32769, fo. 255. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, Windsor Castle, 28 Aug. 1730. This particularly exasperated the French (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 371 *passim*), and their sensitiveness on this point should have been remembered in 1738.

⁴ An agreement was made in November 1730 for the evacuation of the islands of St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominico and providing for their neutrality, but the recriminations continued.

parting of the ways was mutual mistrust. Not only did Chauvelin's intercepted despatches not tally with what he was saying to the British plenipotentiaries (see p. 97), but later on he was suspected of being the chief instigator of the opposition offered to any action proposed by the British against the Emperor (see p. 92). The King had therefore "every reason to be on his guard" against being a second time disappointed by his machinations (see p. 88). On the French side the economic condition of the country had been greatly strengthened by Fleury's pacific policy; trade was reviving, and demands for independence in foreign policy became louder and louder from a public which could influence the government in the plenitude of its power, while the dynastic reasons for alliance with Britain and jealousy of Spain were brought to an end by the happy event of 4 September N.S. 1729 when, as Horatio Walpole announced, the French Queen was "brought to bed of a Dolphin."¹ There were, besides, narrower considerations than these. Chauvelin had reason to complain of British methods in negotiation, for the growing divergence between Townshend and Walpole led to delay and the incessant suggestion of new points, so that he entirely lost his temper with the British ministry.² His malignity in early days has very possibly been exaggerated, and the correspondence of so experienced a diplomatist as Stephen Poyntz suggests that he was not as unmanageable as he proved to be in the hands of the "vivacious" Horatio Walpole; but with the resignation of Townshend, the appointment of a Stanhope to the Northern Department, and the unfettered supremacy of the Walpoles, a marked and permanent change comes over the temper of the French despatches.³ No one can read them without realising that in French opinion it was the fall of Townshend that brought the alliance to an end; when the negotiations at Vienna came to his ears, Chauvelin retaliated by ordering Broglie to enter into relations with the

¹ *P.R.O., S.P.* 78, no. 192, 5 September N.S. 1729.

² Cf. *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 369, fo. 141. Chauvelin to Broglie, Marly, 6 February N.S. 1730.

³ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 370, fo. 182, gives interesting evidence of French feeling towards Britain two months after Townshend's fall. In the draft of a despatch to Broglie Chauvelin described the action of the British ministry as marked by "duplicity and bad faith." In the margin Fleury wrote: "Je ne sais si vous deves aller jusques la avec un homme qui hait desia le ministere," and the despatch was softened to an expression of surprise. Yet its tone is harsh throughout, and it is worth noting that Fleury must have passed it.

Opposition; ¹ finally, the approaching conclusion of the treaty made him hint at war.²

If the British government realised that the treaty with Austria had effected a diplomatic revolution, they were slow to perceive that they would not be easily forgiven by the French. In January 1731 Fleury reproached Waldegrave on the subject and replied in February to Walpole's advances in positively acrimonious terms,³ and though Newcastle made Waldegrave communicate the news that negotiations were taking place (see p. 95), matters were not improved. When Castelar on 28 January N.S. made the surprising declaration that in view of the many delays in the execution of the Treaty of Seville, Spain no longer considered herself bound by its terms, Fleury attributed this to Castelar's belief that the Franco-British alliance had broken down. As if to show that it had not, Newcastle instructed Waldegrave to impart the draft of the Vienna treaty to the Cardinal alone (see p. 103), but as no Austrian comments accompanied the draft, it was derided as useless by both Louis XV and Fleury.⁴ Nevertheless, Waldegrave was sanguine that it was little but surface wrath that was being displayed,⁵ and argued that "if our treaty with the Emperor was concluded and the French see we don't want them, they must undoubtedly come to us."⁶ Isolation therefore would succeed even if fair words did not, and after throwing aside their original suspicions that Castelar's declaration was inspired by Chauvelin (see p. 97), the British negotiated assiduously with the Spaniard, keeping the matter secret from the French. Nor can they well be blamed in view of the notorious coolness that prevailed between the Cardinal and the King and Queen of Spain, whom His Eminence denounced as "Turks, barbarians, infidels, savages, cannibals, people without faith or virtue,

¹ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 371, fo. 305. Chauvelin to Broglie, Versailles, 29 December N.S. 1730.

² *Ibid.* 373, fo. 104. Chauvelin to Chammorel, Versailles, 22 February N.S. 1731.

³ See the correspondence in *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 375, ff. 54, 63, 79, 95, 128, 131.

⁴ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 375, fo. 95. Fleury to Walpole, Versailles, 14 March N.S. 1731.

⁵ See e.g. Waldegrave to Newcastle in *B.M. Add.* 32771, fo. 186v., Paris, 31 Jan. N.S. 1731; fo. 315, Paris, 15 Feb. N.S. 1731; fo. 380, Paris, 28 Feb. N.S. 1731; 32772, fo. 405, Paris, 16 May N.S. 1731; 32773, fo. 169, Fontainebleau, 25 June N.S. 1731, most private.

⁶ *B.M. MS. Add.* 32772, fo. 57, Paris, 22 March N.S. 1731, private.

their words were no more to be depended on than the wind.”¹ They were at last undeceived. Waldegrave's letters showed that Fleury had a grave reason for not overlooking the offence of the British. Without consulting him they had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and he suspected, absurdly enough, that the Treaty of Vienna contained a clause by which Britain promised to assist in compelling France to recognise it.² Nor did Broglie help to smooth things down in London.³ The Abbé Rota reported to Waldegrave that the French were so angry that they thought of sending for the Pretender,⁴ and in June there was intercepted a letter to Rotterdam from Pecquet, the *premier commis* in the foreign office, plainly contemplating active hostilities against Great Britain in two years' time.⁵ Newcastle therefore ceased to welcome any signs that the Cardinal was in a better temper (see p. 105), and ordered Waldegrave to keep a close eye upon the French ports,⁶ to co-operate in all things with Kinsky, the Austrian Ambassador (see p. 105), and to keep in close touch with Gedda, Castelar, and the two Sicilian priests who were giving invaluable information about Latin Catholic countries.⁷ On both sides every action became the cause of violent suspicion. Reams were written about the activities at Dunkirk of Colonel Lascelles whom the Cardinal “can't endure,”⁸ while at the same time the French were alarmed at the British fitting out a squadron which they said was to escort Don Carlos and his Spanish troops to Italy where, the Duke of Parma having died in January, the curious farce of the Duchess' alleged pregnancy was now coming to an end. When Waldegrave approached Chauvelin for the extradition of John Thomson of the Charitable Corporation, a violent

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32772, fo. 402. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 16 May N.S. 1731.

² *B.M. Add.* 32774, fo. 165v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 17 August N.S. 1731. Most private.

³ *B.M. Add.* 32772, fo. 195. Newcastle to Waldegrave, Newcastle House, 1 April 1731, private. “Broglie is abominable and his behaviour indecent. If we remain on any tolerable terms with France, he must be recalled.”

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 181. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 10 April N.S. 1731, private.

⁵ *Ibid.* fo. 547.

⁶ *Ibid.* fo. 350. Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 24 April 1731.

⁷ *B.M. Add.* 32773, fo. 175. Newcastle to Waldegrave, Hampton Court, 18 June 1731.

⁸ *Ibid.* fo. 368v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 10 July N.S. 1731, most private.

scene led the Ambassador to complain to Fleury, who nevertheless refused to extradite the criminal.¹ The British complained of the French molesting Barbadoes ships in the West Indies,² and realised from intercepted letters why it was that although Fleury spoke fair to Waldegrave, the actions of the French Court were everywhere at variance with the Cardinal's protestations,³ which would have been more weighty had he not attempted to prove Chauvelin, the author of the incriminating letters, to be a friend of England.⁴ In the north the French were trying to overreach us and their negotiations with Bavaria and Saxony also needed observation (see p. 107).

The year 1732 was but a lull before the storm. The British, satisfied now that Spain had adhered to the Treaty of Vienna, were content to rest on their oars; the French, irritated by a sense of isolation, talked big to the British, and put out feelers towards Spain. And so, having little else to do, the two governments squabbled about Dunkirk, exchanged views about the Jülich and Berg succession without coming any nearer to a conclusion (see p. 111), and suspected the designs of each other in the North and in the South.⁵ In August, Chauvelin's talk was so bellicose "as would make a man sick", and though the Cardinal was milder, he was considered to be so much under Chauvelin's thumb, who "contradicts him often in Council", that no reliance could be placed on him.⁶ In December the Cardinal gave evidence of "his partiality to the Spaniards as well as his animosity against the

¹ *B.M.* 32775, fo. 100. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 14 November N.S. 1731, most private; and fo. 257v. Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 8 Dec. N.S. 1731, most private.

² *B.M.* 32773, fo. 110. Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 3 June 1731.

³ See e.g. *ibid.* fo. 429, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Hampton Court, 15 July 1731. Chauvelin even insinuated that the British were behind the Duchess of Parma (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 374, fo. 144, Chauvelin to Chammorel, Marly, 30 Sept. N.S. 1731).

⁴ *Ibid.* 32775, fo. 258, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 8 Dec. N.S. 1731, most private.

⁵ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 202, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 16 June 1732; *B.M. Add.* 32778, fo. 192, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 19 September N.S. 1732, most private, and fo. 276, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Kensington, 12 October 1732.

⁶ *B.M. Add.* 32777, fo. 480, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 9 August N.S. 1732, most private.

Emperor",¹ yet in view of French statements that the policy of Spain was a riddle (see p. 112), Waldegrave was sceptical as to his intentions to embark on a war in alliance with Spain. Matters undoubtedly grew worse between the Courts when Chauvelin was appointed joint prime minister, and Waldegrave was instructed to secure the recall of Broglie's successor, Chavigny, whom his relations with the opposition and his dependence on Chauvelin made doubly displeasing to the Government (see pp. 108, 109).² But in February, 1733, the death of the King of Poland drove all smaller issues into the background and scotched without killing the interminable correspondence about Dunkirk.³ In view of the crisis, Waldegrave was warned to be as assiduous in frequenting the Court as if the relations between France and Britain were on the old footing (see p. 112). In June, Newcastle set out the aim of Great Britain as being above everything else to check the warlike temper of France (see p. 113), which aimed at overthrowing the Pragmatic Sanction. When, however, Chauvelin, after many reproaches that the Maritime Powers, had they so chosen, might have prevented the Emperor from interfering in the affairs of Poland, went on to claim that France might in virtue of the treaties require Great Britain to support the candidature of Stanislaus,⁴ the argument was derided as "extraordinary" (see pp. 113, 117) and Chavigny, who asked George II in person for a statement of his intentions, received a snub accompanied by a sarcastic comment

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32779, fo. 173, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 6 December N.S. 1732.

² It is no exaggeration to say that Chavigny's correspondence with Chauvelin reads more like that of a Jacobite conspirator than the representative of a friendly power, and Chauvelin's replies may be searched in vain for anything like the stern rebuke such conduct merited. (See *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 376-80 *passim*.) This applies not merely to letters sent through the post which were purposely abusive (cf. *B.M. Add.* 32789, fo. 399, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 30 Dec. N.S. 1735, most secret), but to their letters sent by courier.

³ This wretched affair took a new turn in September 1732, when, at the instance of the Anglophobe Pecquet, the British demands for the observance of the Treaty of Utrecht at Dunkirk were countered by claims on Britain for its observance in Nova Scotia and elsewhere in America. The object was to spin out negotiations seeing that, as Pecquet impudently put it, "il ne nous convient pas d'achever de détruire un ouvrage qu'il nous faudroit peut-être dans peu ré-édifier" (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 378, fo. 111, Fontainebleau, 29 September N.S. 1732).

⁴ *B.M. Add.* 32781, fo. 292v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Compiègne, 12 July N.S. 1733, most private.

on the contrast between French eagerness for war in 1733 and their backwardness in 1730 (see p. 115).¹ If, however, the French feared to see the British side against them in the war, they were pleasantly disappointed, for the British, who cared for none of these Polish things, held the Austrian arguments and conduct to be just as bad as the French and therefore had a good excuse to "hold both parties in suspense" (see p. 120). At one time, however, it seemed as though Austrian moderation might secure the support of Britain, for the Emperor in July assured George II that he would not interfere with the election of the new King of Poland and ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of his troops in Silesia (see p. 120). Waldegrave was ordered to point out that as this was exactly what France had demanded, there was no occasion for war; while to make war upon the Emperor because the Czarina might interfere with the Polish election² was scarcely up to the usual level of French logic, and could only be inspired by a boundless ambition fraught with peril to the balance of power (see p. 121). When, however, the alliance between the Emperor and Saxony led to the replacement of Austrian by Saxon troops in Silesia, British arguments lost their weight,³ and the Emperor lost a chance of entangling the British on his side. In the end all efforts failed to restrain the French, who crossed the Rhine, having in the meantime strengthened their position by a disconcerting alliance with Sardinia (see p. 122), and reinforced it by the first family compact, the news of which was transmitted by Keene to Newcastle at the end of November.⁴

British policy had achieved little save to secure its own neutrality, and had failed to convince either French or Austrians that it was not partial to their enemies. Nevertheless the British continued

¹ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 382, fo. 61, Chavigny to Chauvelin, London, 6 July N.S. 1733, gives an account of this interview. One would not gather from it that anything had been said to wound French *amour propre* beyond George II's refusal to say what his policy would be in purely hypothetical circumstances.

² *B.M. Add.* 32782, fo. 164, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 9 Sept. N.S. 1733. "His Eminency is so peevish when one offers to expostulate with him upon the unreasonableness of attacking the Emperor for any steps taken by the Czarina that there is no more speaking to him upon that subject." As George II had used this argument in June to Chavigny, it is not surprising Fleury had heard enough of it.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 74, Waldegrave to Harrington, Paris, 15 August N.S. 1733.

⁴ *Ibid.* 32783, fo. 146, Keene to Newcastle, Madrid, 29 November, N.S. 1733, most private.

to pursue their new objective, which was now the restoration of peace. During the winter nothing much could be done, tempers being still too hot, but in February, Waldegrave was ordered to revert to a Dutch proposal and sound the French as to the good offices of the Maritime Powers (see p. 125). This was "a very nice negotiation",¹ for it was known that Chauvelin would regard any hint of mediation as an attempt to dictate terms to France (see p. 126), and what with the first family compact² and the Spaniards opening works before Gibraltar (see pp. 126, 128), the margin between peace and war became hazardingly narrow. Moreover, Newcastle suspected, not unreasonably, that Chauvelin's policy was to drive the Austrians out of Italy, force them to a peace, and then turn against Britain (see p. 127). Nevertheless both the French and the Austrians were approached. To Waldegrave, who was instructed to be most careful to avoid any appearance of mediation, Fleury replied blandly that he could not see that the Maritime Powers had that degree of impartiality which qualified them for the office of mediator, while Chauvelin pretended to be so much surprised as to be unable to understand.³ Much now depended on the Emperor; for a favourable answer from him might well have inclined the Maritime Powers to his side, but his highly indignant answer played straight into the hands of the peace party in Britain and revealed that the Imperial Court had not forgotten how to alienate its friends by putting itself in the wrong.⁴

A pause followed, for the Dutch blamed the British for this breakdown in the negotiations, but when Horatio Walpole had restored some degree of cordiality between the Maritime Powers, the conversations were resumed in May. The French suddenly became much milder,⁵ and at the instance of Fleury, Chavigny

¹ Delafaye to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 5 February 1733/4 (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 153).

² Fleury, it may be remarked, offered to "take the most solemn oath" that there was nothing in the French treaties with Spain and Sardinia that "tended directly or indirectly to the prejudice of England or its commerce." Yet one of the clauses of the family compact stipulated the recovery of Gibraltar. (*B.M. Add.* 32784, fo. 134, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 17 March N.S. 1734; and E. Armstrong, *Elizabeth Farnese*, p. 300.)

³ *B.M. Add.* 32784, fo. 83, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 24 February N.S. 1734, most private.

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 182, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 30 March 1733/4.

⁵ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 386, fo. 56, Chauvelin to Chavigny, Versailles, 19 May N.S. 1734.

was instructed to say that France would not only not reject British mediation, but would use her influence with her Allies. Mediation was therefore offered. The Emperor scolded the Maritime Powers for offering mediation as a cloke for escaping from the obligations they were under towards him by the Treaty of Vienna, which, however true, was neither conciliatory nor judicious. Fleury more discreetly replied in general terms, and when pressed to say whether the answer was given in the name of his Allies, took refuge in evasive expressions, which Chavigny made heroic attempts to show were precise (see p. 134). French ideas indeed taxed British credulity. For in the very forefront of their negotiations they made a stand for the honour of the King of France, a term which, when analysed, seemed to yield no result save that Stanislaus Leczinski must be King of Poland and must not be asked to abdicate, and it appeared incomprehensible to the British that Europe must continue to be embroiled in war for so impalpable a cause. When, however, the negotiations were once more on the verge of failing, Fleury suddenly made a surprising move, of which a hint may be found in Chavigny's conversation with the British ministers in July (see p. 136), and to which he was probably led by the fear that the British might effect a reconciliation between the Emperor and Spain and so isolate France.¹ He entrusted Gedda, the Swedish minister in Paris, with a message to Horatio Walpole at The Hague, offering a negociation with the ostensible object of hammering out a plan to be presented to both groups of belligerents as the agreed policy of France and the Maritime Powers; but when later he changed this proposal to an offer to send *un homme de confiance*, the British ministers instinctively drew back as if in doubt of the Cardinal's sincerity (see p. 137). Newcastle indeed hoped that the overture was a symptom of a rift in the lute between France and Spain, but feared that it was a device to split the Maritime Powers by offering something which the Dutch would accept but the British refuse;² and although ministers decided that the offer should not be refused (see p. 141), for fear of exposing themselves to the reproach of rejecting a peace overture unheard, it was with the utmost diffidence that they accepted the invitation

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32785, fo. 369v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 5 Sept. N.S. 1734, most private.

² *Ibid.* fo. 408, Newcastle to H. Walpole, Newcastle House, 3 September 1734, private.

(see p. 140). On the 20 October N.S. Fleury sent Jeannel, a friend of his and a relative of Bossuet, but a man who proved to be in abject terror of Chauvelin. He brought a letter from the Cardinal to Horatio in which were laid down the terms that Fleury thought fit to put forward after consultation with Chauvelin. But in a private note Fleury told Horatio that he would write in a day or two. This presaged a long letter, written entirely in the Cardinal's hand, of which no one had any knowledge at the French Court except the King, to whom was thus exhibited a most sinister example of that *secret du Roi* which he was later to practise with such devastating effect on the interests of his country. Indeed it was worse than the later system, for Fleury was intriguing behind his agent's back, not with a Frenchman, but an Englishman. Suffice it here to say that during the three winter months from November to January, Fleury persistently communicated to Horatio through Waldegrave, terms more acceptable to the British than those which he was officially prepared to concede. Where Jeannel was instructed to demand the establishment of Stanislaus as King in Poland, privately the impossibility of this was frankly recognised and various conditions were put forward to save "the honour of the King of France". The same discrepancy appeared in regard to Italy: the public terms demanded the expulsion of the Emperor, in private Fleury was prepared to give the Emperor what was left of the Milanese, together with Parma, Piacenza, Mantua and Tuscany, and to compensate Don Carlos by a marriage with the second Archduchess.

The first effect of these tactics was to bring Sir Robert Walpole round in favour of negociation.¹ In the teeth of opposition from Newcastle, Harrington, and even the King, he persuaded the Queen, and so the King eventually sanctioned the negociation.² Horatio, who was in grave doubts as to Fleury's sincerity, met Jeannel at the Pensionary's house, and immediately guessed that he was ignorant of the Cardinal's secret offers.³ The next result was that the Pensionary and Horatio not unnaturally formulated their terms on the basis, not of Jeannel's instructions, but of the Car-

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32786, fo. 216, Sir Robert Walpole to H. Walpole, Houghton, 10 November 1734.

² See Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 187 *et seqq.*

³ *P.R.O., S.P.* 84, No. 334, fo. 43, Walpole to Harrington, The Hague, 9 November N.S. 1734, most secret.

dinal's secret offers. Little difficulty was experienced over Poland and Italy, where the difference between the plan of Fleury and of the Maritime Powers was trifling, now that Fleury had given way on the fundamental points.¹ As regards the Pragmatic Sanction, the Maritime Powers pressed that if Francis of Lorraine were elected Emperor, the cadet branches of the house might succeed to the duchy (see p. 150), but on this George II was prepared to give way if need be. Far more debate arose over the question how this agreement could be enforced. Fleury was perfectly willing to assent to the proposal that if the Emperor refused to accept the plan, the Maritime Powers should remain absolutely neutral; but when these powers demanded that reciprocally France should remain neutral if Spain and Sardinia rejected the terms and the Emperor accepted them, he refused, on the ground that France had involved herself in an alliance with Spain and Sardinia, whereas the Maritime Powers were not committed to the Emperor in the same way.² After the exchange of project and counter-project, complete deadlock ensued at last when Jeannel received from Fleury and Chauvelin a proposal which did not come up to the level of the secret offers of Fleury. If it was not open to objection in the matter of the Pragmatic Sanction and the machinery for carrying out the plan except that it was not "made strong enough on both sides for securing the execution of it",³ there was now great divergence on the subject of Poland and Italy; and as Jeannel had been told that he had no power to alter a single syllable, the Pensionary and Horatio broke off the conferences,⁴ revealing to him the secret correspondence of the Cardinal. Loudly did Jeannel lament the manner of his treatment, so that Horatio in compassion agreed to send by his hand a secret letter to Fleury to keep the negotiation open, but no answer was received before Horatio had to leave Holland for England in order to attend Parliament.⁵

¹ See *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, No. 335, fo. 89. "Differences between the Pensionary's plan and the Cardinal's taken from His Eminency's letter to Mr. Walpole as reported by Lord Waldegrave in his Lordship's to the Duke of Newcastle of the 4th December 1734 N.S."

² *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, No. 340, fo. 30v., Fleury to Walpole, Issy, 6 January N.S. 1735, particulière.

³ *Ibid.* No. 341, fo. 51, Walpole to Harrington, The Hague, 8 February N.S. 1735, most secret.

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 52.

⁵ *Ibid.* fo. 93, Walpole to Harrington, "Breille," 11 February N.S. 1735, most secret.

Even before the breakdown of this singular negotiation, the speech from the throne at the opening of the session of 1735 had announced that a plan was about to be "offered for the consideration of all parties engaged in the present war as a basis for a general negotiation of peace." Disappointed in their attempts to secure an agreed plan with France, and with all their suspicions of the Cardinal more than confirmed, the Maritime Powers fell back on their former policy of mediation. Waldegrave and Van Hoey submitted a new plan to the Cardinal on 9 March N.S. The British ambassador, on his return from leave, was instructed to express the deep disappointment of George II at the failure of the secret negotiations, and to urge upon France the necessity for moderation in the event of the Emperor accepting the plan, the chief aim and object of which was declared to be the maintenance of an effective balance in Europe (see p. 158). Accordingly Spain was to be satisfied with the confirmation of Don Carlos' seizure of Naples and Sicily, in consideration of which Parma and the reversion to Tuscany were to be surrendered to the Emperor, who was to be given also the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, though this was not mentioned in Waldegrave's instructions. Above all, the instructions insisted on reciprocal neutrality and a suspension of arms. But the upshot of Waldegrave's conversations with Fleury was that "such a heap of inconsistencies did I never hear in my life",¹ so the British government, remembering that the Cardinal had written that if only he could have a personal interview with Horatio Walpole, all could easily be settled,² determined to make one last effort to obtain an agreed plan, and sent Horatio on a flying visit to Paris. In a long interview at Issy, held between two others at Versailles, Walpole went over the whole course of Jeannel's negotiations. He was in a strong position when he reproached the Cardinal for his astonishingly feeble conduct. "In pushing my strong representations," he wrote to Newcastle, "I found I had made a sensible impression upon him which I improved in the best manner I could, and I would remark to Your Grace that I brought tears to his eyes, did I not apprehend that the Cardinal's late conduct gives too much reason to suspect it to be

¹ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 207, fo. 108, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 9 March N.S. 1735, most private.

² *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, No. 341, fo. 70, Fleury to Walpole, Versailles, 1 Feb. N.S. 1735; lettre particulière, *manu propria*.

rather an effect of hypocrisy than of real concern." At the end of the interview he produced a fair copy of a projected agreement based on the Jeannel negotiations which he invited Fleury to sign and seal on the spot. But Fleury was not to be bounced in this way. He asked for eight days to consider and when this was refused, said it was imperative he should have the King's consent. "And so we took our leaves of one another, with the strongest recommendations on my part that he would not suffer himself to be diverted by others from the conclusion of so great and necessary a work, and with as strong professions on his part that he would act in this affair as if it were his *salvation*. Upon which, after what has passed with him so lately, I . . . do not lay any great stress." ¹ Three days later the Cardinal gave a definite refusal: he had seen the King and consulted the Duc d'Antin and they could not agree to let Fleury sign. Unkindly enough, Walpole asked Fleury whether he had shewn d'Antin the secret letters written to The Hague,² which "put him into great agonys" ³ seeing that Walpole was now offering terms more favourable to France than the Cardinal had proposed in the winter.

There was nothing more to do and Walpole retired to The Hague in high dudgeon. The British, gravely disappointed (see p. 163), flung out charges of "great and notorious breach of faith" ⁴ against the Cardinal, whose real shortcoming was mere pusillanimity. Fleury continued to talk of an agreement with the Maritime Powers for an exactly equitable settlement of Europe,⁵ but the cause of peace seemed hopeless when in May the French, on behalf of themselves and their Allies, absolutely rejected the plan proposed by the Maritime Powers in March. As this plan was based on Fleury's offers, it is not surprising that Horatio Walpole described such conduct as "abominable".⁶ The fact was, Fleury now had a policy of his own to carry out which needed time to mature. A concentration of British ships in the Tagus in connexion with the quarrel

¹ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, No. 341, ff. 136v. *et seqq.*, Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 2 April N.S. 1735, most secret.

² *Ibid.* fo. 170, Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 6 April N.S. 1735, most secret.

³ *B.M. Add.* 32787, fo. 86, Walpole to Newcastle, same date, holograph.

⁴ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 207, fo. 277, Newcastle to H. Walpole, Whitehall, 28 March 1735.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 207, fo. 265, Fleury to Walpole, Issy, 6 April N.S. 1735.

⁶ *B.M. Add.* 32787, fo. 225 v., H. Walpole to Newcastle, Hague, 20 May N.S. 1735, private and holograph.

between Spain and Portugal gave him an excuse for shaking his head and deploring this use of naval power, which did more harm than good to the cause of the armistice.¹ Meantime the ventilation of the idea of exchanging Tuscany for Lorraine was accustoming men's minds to that device, and when his plans were approaching maturity, he laid before Waldegrave a fresh proposal for communication to the belligerents by the King of Great Britain.² To Newcastle, who had been exceedingly pessimistic as to the chances of a general pacification (see p. 166), the proposal came as a pleasant surprise (see p. 168), and Waldegrave was promptly told to inform Fleury that if his offer was firm, authority would immediately be sent to sign a convention (see p. 171). The reason for this unwonted haste was the displeasing intelligence, which was enclosed with Waldegrave's despatch, to the effect that the French were engaged in a secret negotiation at Vienna behind the backs of the British.³ Such a contingency had been anticipated as early as 17 June (see p. 165), and taking all the evidence into consideration, there was every reason to believe the truth of the news, now that other means of bringing about a peace had been tried and had failed. From the British point of view the situation was fraught with danger. Fleury might well negotiate with the Imperialists on the basis of the Netherlands being ceded to France in exchange for the Italian principalities (see p. 166), and it was essential that the British should not be left out in the cold in these negotiations. Harrington at Hanover therefore proposed that the two threads of the negotiations should be plied into one string, and provided this could be done, he was prepared to accept Chauvelin's further proposal that pending the vacancy of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duke of Lorraine should occupy the Netherlands while Stanislaus was given Lorraine (see p. 172). This he hoped would create anew the Quadruple Alliance which would, like its predecessor in 1719, force Spain and Sardinia to accept a settlement of Italy at its hands. The proposal was not fantastic, for at the moment France and Spain were at variance over the undertaking

¹ Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 251, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 1 June N.S. 1735.

² Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 2 August N.S. 1735, most private (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, pp. 265-8).

³ This was one of the most substantial pieces of information that Waldegrave gleaned from François de Bussy, the French foreign office clerk, who was by now in British pay and is designated by the cipher 101.

of the siege of Mantua (see p. 174), but the idea did not bear much fruit. In Paris, Waldegrave was bewildered and apprehensive of the future;¹ at The Hague, Walpole was exasperated by the "unaccountable indolence" of the Dutch, who cared nothing for the balance of power unless it affected the Netherlands, and in mid-October further unwelcome news came that La Baune, the French secret envoy, had signed a convention at Vienna. At such a loss were the British ministers that they even snatched at the idea of bribing Chauvelin; but whatever his faults, Chauvelin was not a Bussy.² And although Fleury professed that La Baune "had done so ill that he could trust him no longer with matters of such consequence"³ a cessation of arms was arranged between France and Austria, and the preliminary articles were signed at Vienna, without the British being able appreciably to affect the course of events, unless it be that the critical question of the Netherlands was not seriously raised.

Such influence as the British had was devoted to the cause of inducing the Spaniards, who were prone to consider their interests jeopardised (see p. 176), to approve of the preliminaries.⁴ In the affairs of the peninsula indeed there lingered a wraith of the old friendliness between Britain and France, for in spite of the flutter caused by the British fleet being sent to the Tagus⁵ they acted as co-mediators in the petty squabble that had arisen between Spain and Portugal, and was to grow in 1736 to the dimensions of a serious crisis when hostilities broke out at Nova Colonia between the two peninsular powers (see pp. 178, 179). In this co-mediation the sympathies of Britain were as clearly for the Portuguese as those of France were for the Spaniards, and Chauvelin, on the possibility of whose fall speculation was as rife as ever, was freely accused of giving private instructions to Vaulgrenant at Madrid inconsistent with what had been agreed upon in common at Paris. Incidents like this did not serve to soften the asperity of Franco-

¹ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 209, fo. 157, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 2 Sept. N.S. 1735, most secret.

² See Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, pp. 262, 275, 290, 308, 309, 312-17.

³ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 210, fo. 184 v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 5 November N.S. 1735, most secret.

⁴ Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave, London, 1 January 1735/6 (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, 316).

⁵ Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 1 June N.S. 1735, private (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, 251).

British relations in more important matters. Fleury, angry doubtless at the rumours of the formation of a league between Sweden, Denmark and the Maritime Powers,¹ accused the British of "thwarting his designs everywhere" and provoked by this outburst a characteristic diatribe from Newcastle.² Nevertheless the shifty Cardinal less than a month later was setting his sails for a different course. Possessed of an antiquated estimate of the power of the House of Austria, and certain of the unfriendliness of the Queen of Spain, he made an overture to Waldegrave for reviving the old "strickt alliance between England and France", as it was the only system which could keep the peace of Europe against Austrian pretensions and Spanish restlessness.³

This offer ushered in a period of indecision in the relations between the two countries which was to last for two years. If Fleury's words meant anything, then he was willing to return to the European system which had prevailed between the formation of the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Vienna, in which Britain, France and Holland, by playing off Spain and Austria against each other, gave peace to western Europe; but after so much tergiversation, it can scarcely have been a matter of surprise that the British received this overture without enthusiasm (see p. 184),⁴ especially as even in their office as co-mediators the French offended them by refusing their proposals,⁵ and Waldegrave had yet again to complain of the studied insolence of Chauvelin,⁶ whose presence in the ministry was proof positive of French insincerity. Signs, however, were not wanting that that minister's position was becoming precarious. The Cardinal was reported anxious to come to an agreement,⁷ and the appointment of Orry

¹ Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, pp. 329 *et seqq.*

² *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 212, fo. 199, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 16 July 1736.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 214v., Waldegrave to H. Walpole, Compiègne, 3 August N.S. 1736, most private.

⁴ See also Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave, 29 Oct. 1736, private (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 384).

⁵ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 213, fo. 62, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 23 September 1736. In cipher.

⁶ *B.M. Add.* 32792, ff. 264-72, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 26 September N.S. 1736, private and particular.

⁷ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 213, fo. 86v., Waldegrave to Keene, Paris, 16 Oct. N.S. 1736. "He wants Lorraine and has not a chance to get the present possession of it unless Spain evacuates Tuscany."

to the council in November seemed to portend a change. On New Year's Day, Waldegrave reported that he had had the singular experience of a conversation with an exceedingly civil Chauvelin whom, he noticed two days later, the Cardinal treated "as a meer clark, stopping him at once when he offered to put in a word, even to make the thing clearer, and this the Cardinal did with an air of superiority I never saw in him before."¹ On 20 February N.S. the long hoped for change took place, and Chauvelin was exiled to Grosbois with every circumstance of disgrace.²

The fall of Chauvelin, who was succeeded by Amelot, but with far less influence, promised to remove the chief obstacle to the reconciliation between Britain and France, and ushered in a period of apparent cordiality. Both sides appeared to congratulate each other on a good riddance, and the British ministers hoped that Pecquet, who had been influential in getting Chauvelin appointed, might also be removed. Nor was the comic element wanting at this time, for a few days before Chauvelin fell, Fleury inquired of Waldegrave what was his opinion of Bussy and especially of his probity. Waldegrave, all on tenterhooks for fear his most secret agent's venality had been discovered, replied that in Vienna, where they had served together, "he seemed very honest," and he was but partially relieved when these questions proved to be merely the forerunner of a suggestion that Bussy should go as an *homme de confiance* to London, until Cambis, the ambassador-designate, should arrive.³ But it did not fall either to Bussy or Cambis to conduct the negotiations of the year 1737, for the British, to whom the Cardinal was the capital figure in their relations with France, found it advisable to hear from the Cardinal himself what his plans for the future might be. Waldegrave was therefore instructed, in a long despatch, to find out what the Cardinal meant (see p. 187). A vague reply was the precursor of a number of hints thrown out by Fleury of his continued desire for a renewal of the alliance

¹ *B.M. Add.* 32793, ff. 327 and 329, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 2 and 3 January N.S. 1736/7, private and particular.

² For a discussion of the possible reasons for the dismissal see Vaucher, *Robert Walpole*, pp. 184 *et seqq.*

³ The story is told with much humour by Waldegrave to Newcastle in his "most secret and particular" holograph despatch in cipher dated Paris, 7 February N.S. 1736/7 in *B.M. Add.* 32794, ff. 109-11.

between the two countries,¹ and it was not until the beginning of January 1738, on the eve of Waldegrave's departure on leave, that Fleury put his proposals in writing. He then handed to Waldegrave a paper entitled "*Renouvellement d'alliance*" which provided for the inviolable union of the two powers, mutual guarantee of lands the possession of which by each power was *libre et non contestée* at the signature of this projected treaty, a mutual guarantee of good offices in the event of either party being aggrieved, and mutual help to maintain the treaties of Westphalia. Now, although throughout 1737 Fleury's hints had fallen on deaf ears, by the end of the year the British, uncomfortably isolated since the signature of the preliminaries of Vienna, and increasingly apprehensive of the lowering menace of the Spanish dispute, found an offer of a French alliance more appetising than before. It was decided therefore to encourage the Cardinal (see p. 193), and when Waldegrave returned to Paris in April, he was given a draft counter-project (see p. 201), which, avoiding the ambiguous phrases of Fleury's heads, was set out in treaty form and provided for mutual guarantees of Lorraine, of British possessions "as well within as out of Europe", and for good offices not merely if the other party were attacked by foreign enemies, but in the event of civil disturbance. Direct references to the Treaties of Westphalia were omitted, and it was explained that these treaties were implicit in the clauses providing for the mutual guarantees of the parties' rights and possessions. In reviewing Fleury's original project strong objections were raised by the British to the unprecedented phrase of guaranteeing only lands the possession of which was *libre et non contestée*. Did this phrase apply to Gibraltar and Minorca? Fleury protested that he had in mind the current dispute between Great Britain and Spain over the frontier of Georgia, and that he was guarding himself against being drawn into that business. To meet this objection Newcastle proposed to except Georgia and the dispute with Spain from the project, requiring in this matter nothing more than neutrality on the part of France (see p. 206), but it was of no avail. Little more than a week after his return, Waldegrave had to report

¹ The fact was that Fleury was much more interested in the Jülich-Berg question ("la plus importante dont l'Europe soit occupée présentement" (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 394, fo. 92v.) than the British who, as Cambis remarked on his arrival in England, were far more occupied with internal than with foreign affairs (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 395, fo. 257v., Cambis to Amelot, London, 10 Oct. N.S. 1737).

that the Cardinal had not had "leisure to consider" the project, and added that "their dilatory ways and their silence put me quite out of patience."¹ In June he was deeply suspicious of the Cardinal,² and at the end of the month the French definitely broke off the negotiations, on the ground that when first the Cardinal had made the overtures, the British refused to do anything to prevent the Emperor's designs of subjugating Germany and the world,³ a frivolous excuse to hide the fact that the two Courts had definitely parted, and were now in opposite camps.

For this rebuff, which left Britain without a single friend in the world, the British ministers had none but themselves to thank. Forgetting the French outcry over a similar bill in 1730 they allowed the Royal assent to be given to an Irish bill to make it a capital offence for an Irishman to enlist in a foreign army,⁴ after having satisfied Cambis that the bill should not pass. The French took mortal offence (see p. 206); Cambis was ordered to transact no business with ministers and to keep away from Court as much as was compatible with the barest civility, seeing that no reliance could be placed on British promises, and French requests would clearly receive no consideration unless the British were compelled thereto by weakness.⁵ This was why Waldegrave, returning to Paris without satisfactory explanations, found that nothing could be done to promote the alliance; but the blunder had more serious consequences. Although on the matter of Spanish "depredations" the French had a substantial account against the Spaniards, and in December even Maurepas had suggested that Britain and France should make "cause commune" in the matter,⁶ France now veered

¹ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 217, fo. 257, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 10 May N.S. 1738, most secret.

² *Ibid.* No. 218, fo. 170v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 11 June N.S. 1738, most secret.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 261, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 2 July N.S. 1738, most secret.

⁴ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 397, fo. 71, Amelot to Cambis, Versailles, 8 Feb. N.S. 1738. "Un ouvrage . . . réellement trop opposé au retour d'amitié que Sa Majesté a lieu d'attendre de la part du Roy de la Grand Bretagne." As this despatch was intercepted (*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 107, No. 21) it cannot be urged that ministers had no warning, though possibly they were deceived by the fact that the despatch came through the post.

⁵ *Ibid.* fo. 204, Amelot to Cambis, Versailles, 25 March N.S. 1738.

⁶ *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 216, fo. 158, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 24 Nov. N.S. 1737, most private; and *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 395, fo. 392, Cambis to Amelot, London, 22 Dec. N.S. 1737.

completely round, and made overtures to Spain for an alliance.¹ Supported now by French sympathy where formerly they might have expected French pressure, the Spaniards refused to abate their pretensions, the negotiations were prolonged, and the course of events was set straight for war. It was a long price to pay for an unnecessary Irish measure.

Waldegrave, indeed, had no illusions as to the intentions of the French,² who married Madame Royale to Don Philip, meditated encroachments on the colony of New York,³ seized the British ship *Elizabeth* in Dame Maria Bay in French San Domingo,⁴ contrary as it was urged, to the treaty of 1686 (see p. 210), and when a convention was drafted containing a list of places in French territory where British ships might water (see pp. 210, 212), put impossible conditions on the use of Dame Maria Bay and Tiburon Bay, which were said to be the most commodious for British ships to use in their navigation between Great Britain and the West Indies.⁵ By signing the definitive treaty of Vienna 1738, by concluding an alliance with Sweden and by mediating between the Emperor and the Turks, France completed the isolation of Great Britain, and Fleury had gained for his country the place of arbiter of Europe. A scramble for allies followed, in which the British scored but one solitary success when in April 1740 they secured the services of the King of Sweden as Landgrave of Hesse Cassel.⁶ The Cardinal could afford therefore to adopt a lofty tone, and when in March 1739, Waldegrave expressed the hope that the trade convention would soon be concluded, he replied with some asperity that the British had caused delay by raising a number of new points, that he was quite tired with the difficulties about the value of the *Fleuron*, a French ship detained by the British, and that he would

¹ *Aff. Etr. Espagne*, 447, ff. 196, 303, 340.

² *P.R.O., S.P.* 218, fo. 167, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 11 June N.S. 1738, most private.

³ *Ibid.* 219, fo. 147, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall, 13 November 1738.

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 151.

⁵ Permission was to be obtained first from the nearest commandant who might be "twenty leagues" away, and objections were raised "upon the silly pretence that we shall destroy all the wood in those places and leave none for the French." (*P.R.O., S.P.* 78, No. 219, fo. 219v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 10 December N.S. 1738, postscript in cipher. Cf. also *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 403, ff. 76 *et seqq.*)

⁶ See Chance, *Diplomatic Instructions, Sweden*, Vol. II, pp. xii and 82.

not proceed further with the convention until he was satisfied on that matter.¹ In May the French complained of the Dieppe fishing boats being interfered with off the coast of Ireland,² and when Cambis returned in September from a visit to France he protested by word of mouth and in writing to George II against the delays in giving satisfaction to the various French grievances.³ As to the ministry at Whitehall, they had long made up their minds as to the danger involved by the dominant position of France. In a long tirade to Waldegrave in January 1739, Newcastle recapitulated the grievances of the British against the French in the wider spheres of foreign affairs, their schemes for upsetting the balance of power, their intrigues about the succession to Jülich and Berg, and he lamented that since the Treaty of Vienna, they had only used their influence to further their schemes in the north and to upset the Pragmatic Sanction (see p. 213). Waldegrave was therefore but expressing his chief's opinions when he declared the Cardinal to be false and that in no ordinary degree. Fleury continued to deny with unblushing earnestness that he had given the Spaniards any encouragement to break with Britain;⁴ on the other hand, the trustworthy Keene reported that all his informants, one of whom was the Nuncio, agreed that France was behind Spain,⁵ while to Newcastle the conduct of France was only explicable by assuming an offensive alliance between that Crown and the Spanish (see pp. 217, 219). When, therefore, the rupture with Spain took place, Waldegrave was primed by the anxious Newcastle with appeals to Fleury to remain neutral (see p. 222); but the best that Walde-

¹ *P.R.O., S.P.* 78, No. 220, fo. 81, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 1 March N.S. 1739, private.

² *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 404, fo. 297, Amelot to de Vismes, Versailles, 28 May N.S. 1739.

³ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 405, fo. 139, Cambis to Amelot, London, 10 Sept. N.S. 1739, where is an account of the explosion of the Royal wrath on this occasion. The draft memorandum is on fo. 87 and is interesting because one half of it is in Fleury's hand and is much more strongly worded than the original proposal, which he remarked "nous engageroit presque à ne point prendre de parti contre l'Angleterre."

⁴ *Ibid.* fo. 255v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Compiègne, 26 June N.S. 1739. The proposition does not need refutation, but reference may be given to La Marck's instructions in *Recueil des Instructions, Espagne*, ed. Morel-Fatio & Leonardon, Paris, 1899, Vol. III, p. 201.

⁵ *B.M. Add.* 32801, fo. 64v., Keene to Newcastle, Madrid, 22 June N.S. 1739.

grave could say about the Cardinal was that he had "a mind to deceive both sides."¹ Fleury's protests against the proceedings of Haddock (see p. 230), and French naval preparations at the end of the year (see p. 231), made a bad impression; most serious of all, "nobody", said Waldegrave, "would go to greater lengths to help the Pretender than the Cardinal, were he satisfied of a probability of success in an undertaking of this nature", and in this connexion the appointment of Tencin to go to Rome boded no good.² The only chance against a Franco-Spanish alliance lay in the supposedly irresolute and pacific disposition of the Cardinal, and hence appeals to him to remember that if a general war came he would be the author of it (see p. 227) become pressing, but it was of no avail, Waldegrave warned the ministry that "the voice of the people on this occasion has as much if not more weight with the Cardinal than anything I could say",³ and it became increasingly clear that he would not oppose a policy of war.

Up to a point, the Cardinal's position should have been perfectly intelligible to the British. Beginning with declarations of apprehension lest anything be done to the prejudice of French interests overseas by Britain,⁴ he made this phrase more precise at the end of the year by words that if the British made themselves "masters of anything considerable there, he could not then help taking the necessary measures on such an occasion."⁵ To this a defiant answer was returned to the effect that King George II relied on

¹ *P.R.O., S.P.* 78, No. 220, fo. 258v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Compiègne, 26 June N.S. 1739.

² *B.M. Add.* 32801, fo. 12, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 5 June N.S. 1739, private and particular (in cipher). It will be remembered that it was just at this juncture that Walpole made his overture to the Pretender who had sufficient acumen to see through the device. (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 405, fo. 17v., O'Brien to Fleury, Paris, 15 July N.S. 1739. Cf. also Vaucher, *Robert Walpole*, 455-8.)

³ *P.R.O., S.P.* 78, No. 222, fo. 50v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 24 January N.S. 1740, most secret.

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 221, fo. 273, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 23 November N.S. 1739, most private.

⁵ *Ibid.* fo. 353, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 4 January N.S. 1740, most private. Cf. Van Hoey's report to Fagel (*P.R.O., S.P.* 107, No. 35) dated Paris, 30 Nov. N.S. 1739. "They expect here every day to hear of some considerable enterprise made by the English in the West Indies, and you may easily judge what uneasiness it must occasion here that that powerful nation shall extend itself more and more in that part of the world which is the source of riches, the sinews of power and the soul of trade."

the justice of his cause and the forces at his disposal against all comers (see p. 232). Thereupon orders were sent to Brest for twelve men of war to be got ready for sea and to Toulon for six.¹ Ten days later Waldegrave repeated the same warnings from Fleury,² and on 3 April N.S. sent news that eighteen men of war were ready for sea at Brest.³ At the same time fresh light was thrown on Fleury's intentions by Waldegrave's discussion with him over the capture of Porto Bello. "He hinted as if he was not sorry for our success, since the Queen of Spain would see by it she was not invincible in the West Indies, adding with an air of pleasure and approbation: 'Your people have done mighty wisely. They have carryed off what they thought worth their while, they have rendered the place defenceless and have quitted it,' which last seemed to be the object of his approbation," adding that such conduct gave him a good argument against the Anglophobes who reproached him with looking on while the British helped themselves to the Spanish possessions in America. "In fine he imagined that from our not keeping so important a post as Porto Bello we would keep none."⁴ Nevertheless French armaments continued, and on 24 May N.S. Waldegrave reported orders to Toulon to have twelve men of war in readiness. The Cardinal repeated his warnings in July and once more expressed his approbation of the British capturing and then evacuating Chagres.⁵ These definitions of policy, however, did not impress the British, for on 15 July, Newcastle openly said the Cardinal was not to be trusted, and told Waldegrave in diplomatic language that the French might do their worst (see p. 233). In reply Waldegrave expressed his conviction that the Cardinal had "never had the least notion that anything he ever said to me could be looked upon as a declaration or demand upon any intention of His Majesty for pursuing the war against his enemies."⁶ A month later and a crisis came. On 11 September

¹ *P.R.O., S.P.* 78, No. 222, fo. 114, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 2 March N.S. 1740.

² *Ibid.* fo. 157, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 12 March N.S. 1740, private.

³ *Ibid.* No. 222, fo. 241v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, 3 April N.S. 1740, private.

⁴ *Ibid.* No. 222, fo. 233, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 3 April N.S. 1740 private.

⁵ *Ibid.* No. 223, fo. 207, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 28 July N.S. 1740.

⁶ *Ibid.* No. 223, fo. 268v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Compiègne, 10 Aug. N.S. 1740, secret.

N.S. Waldegrave had an interview with the Cardinal in which Fleury threw off the mask: "It was incumbent upon him to protect his own commerce and prevent as much as in him lay to our making ourselves masters of all the West Indian trade" which he declared it was evident was the object of the British.¹ Further it was his duty as minister to the French King "to hinder as much as he could our becoming more powerfull than we were already." Consequently the Brest and Toulon fleets had sailed, and Bussy² was instructed to make the same declaration in London, which Waldegrave "hinted" to the Cardinal was little less than a declaration of war, but he was assured it was not meant as such.³ In any case the fear and anger of the British ministers knew no bounds (see p. 235), and when on 18 September, Bussy formally carried out his orders,⁴ Newcastle so far forgot himself as to utter the obvious untruth that Waldegrave had never reported that "the Cardinal had often declared to him that the King of France would not suffer that England should make itself new settlements in America" (see pp. 231, 238). In spite, however, of a provoking French manifesto directed against Britain, French expectations of an immediate declaration of war were disappointed. If Bussy is to be trusted, the British feared it would be the signal for the conclusion of the commercial treaty between France and

¹ *Ibid.* fo. 385v., Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 11 Sept. N.S. 1740. The French were very nervous about this expedition which was reported to be aimed at Havana, Buenos Ayres or the Canaries. The last objective, though denied by Bussy, was believed in at Versailles and was considered more detrimental to French interests than either of the others (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 407 and 408).

² Bussy had returned to London as *chargé d'affaires* on the death of Cambis.

³ *Ibid.* fo. 388, Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 11 Sept. N.S. 1740. From the memorandum in Pecquet's hand in *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 408, fo. 30, dated 20 August N.S., it is clear that the news of the departure of the fleet was expected to provoke a declaration of war.

⁴ Bussy received news of the sailing of the squadron from Amelot on 1 Sept., but on 30 August he had apparently had a talk on the subject with a ministerial confidant (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 408, ff. 88 and 88v.). He apparently informed the British ministry of the fact (contrary to his express orders), on 3 Sept. (see below, p. 235) and on 4 Sept. the news of Fleury's declaration arrived from Waldegrave. Bussy's instructions to communicate the French declaration did not reach him till the 16 Sept., the post office at Calais having detained them until a sure hand could be found (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 408, fo. 109, Amelot to Bussy, Fontainebleau, 27 Sept. N.S. 1740), and he handed over the declaration two days later.

Spain,¹ and it was probably fortunate that the absence of the choleric King in Hanover enabled tempers to cool before any hasty measure was adopted.

This was the last important transaction in which Waldegrave was involved. His health had been declining rapidly under the influence of asthma and dropsy, and he obtained leave of absence. His departure marks the virtual rupture of diplomatic relations, for though his chaplain and secretary, Anthony Thompson, continued to represent Great Britain at the Court of France, no business of real importance passed through his hands and his duties were to transmit all the news he could lay hold of and endure Newcastle's homilies on the importance of his post. Diplomatic relations indeed were not actually broken, even though Walpole fell and Fleury died, and George II led British troops to victory over the French at Dettingen; but when Amelot refused the British request for the expulsion of the Young Pretender from France in February 1743/4, the unpardonable sin against the House of Hanover was committed, and Thompson was ordered to quit the Court of France without taking leave (see p. 241).

¹ Cf., however, Pecquet's memorandum alluded to above: "10. Point de traité nouveau avec l'Espagne."

HORATIO WALPOLE

1727-1730

ON the death of George I, Horatio Walpole, acting on Fleury's advice, returned hastily to England, and was all but disgraced for leaving his post without permission. He shared however in the restoration to power and confidence eventually accorded to Sir Robert, and came back to his post as ambassador in Paris, armed with fresh instructions. During his absence he had left Thomas Robinson in charge of the embassy. In the following year, when in England on parliamentary duty, he left his work to Lord (later Earl) Waldegrave, then on his way to take up the post of envoy at Vienna. Early in 1730 he left the embassy in charge of Stephen Poyntz, one of the plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Soissons, and in September he returned finally to England. His mission in its latter years saw a marked deterioration in Anglo-French relations owing in no small degree to the incompatibility of temper between him and Chauvelin, who described him as "vif jusques à l'extrême" and in more detail: "Avec beaucoup de bonnes qualités il a l'habitude de parler beaucoup et de mettre même de l'humeur dans les affaires. C'est une chose bien incommode pour ceux qui traitent avec lui, mais on en tire parti pour mieux developper ce qu'il ne diroit pas de sangfroid" (*Aff. Etr. Angl.* 371, fo. 86, to Broglie, Chatillon, 8 Oct. N.S. 1730: see also P.R.O., S.P. 107, no. 2). On the other hand, Walpole recognised this defect, and on finally handing over the embassy to Waldegrave he wrote to Newcastle: "It may be more advisable to let me . . . leave the business in Lord Waldegrave's hands whose flegm and temper is much properer to a negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin than my vivacity" (*B.M. Add.* 32769, fo. 186, Paris, 28 August N.S. 1730).

(*P.R.O.*, *F.O.* 90 (*Kings' Letters*) 15A, p. 128.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HORATIO WALPOLE APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE MOST
CHRISTIAN KING.

St. James', 2 July 1727.

[Formal, *vide* Stair's instructions of 29 April 1717.] ¹

(*Ibid.*, 15A, p. 135.)

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR HORATIO WALPOLE, APPOINTED
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE
MOST CHRISTIAN KING.

St. James', 2 July 1727.

Whereas upon the demise of Our late Royal Father, the Cardinal de Fleury, in whom Our good brother the Most Christian King does at present place his chief trust and confidence in the administration of his affairs, did in a most earnest manner request you to come forthwith and acquaint Us personally with the present state of affairs at the Court of France, and to receive Our pleasure with relation to the settling whatever might concern the common interests of the Allies of Hanover, as well as to give Us the strongest assurances of Our good brother the Most Christian King's determined purpose and intention not to depart from the engagements he is under by that alliance, and to maintain and cultivate with Us

¹ In *P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, No. 187, there is on fo. 2 an earlier draft of these instructions. The first clause has some interesting variations in that it has a preamble ("Whereas We being satisfied with the services which you have rendered to Our late Royal Father as his minister and afterwards in the quality of his Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Our good brother the Most Christian King, have thought fit to send you back to him with the same character, when you have received these Our instructions," etc.), and in this preamble the words "Royal Father" have been substituted for "most dear Father of blessed memory."

The fourth clause was drafted originally on the model of Stair's instructions but its final form is as follows:—"You shall take care that all the stipulations in the treaty between Our late Royal Father, His Most Christian Majesty and the States General signed at The Hague the 4th day of January 1717 and in all other treaties now in force between Us and the Most Christian King be complied with on his part as We on Ours shall always perform Our engagements to him by the said treatys."

The clauses to be found in Stair's instructions concerning Jacobites, Dunkirk, the Pretender, Sweden and Muscovy (5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15) are omitted from Walpole's.

the same friendship and intimate union which he had with Our late Father, We being well satisfied with your having performed this service and with the accounts you have accordingly laid before Us of the present situation of affairs in France, and the assurances you have brought Us from the said King at the Cardinal's desire, do hereby direct you upon your return to that Court to express to the Cardinal the sense We have of this early mark of his care and concern for the preservation of the good understanding between Us and the said King, and to assure him that We are no less desirous to improve the same, looking upon the good harmony that has been between Our respective States as what has contributed more than anything to the good success of those measures which We intend to pursue, as having already brought the general affairs of Europe out of the troubled and dangerous state in which they were, into so prosperous a situation that We have now a near prospect of seeing the publick tranquillity restored, and the balance of Europe settled upon a lasting foundation. And you shall upon all occasions take all possible care to confirm him in the persuasion that nothing can contribute more than the said friendship and union between Us and the Most Christian King to Our mutual security and to the preserving of Our respective credit and influence abroad, the good effects of which have already appeared in so eminent a manner.

You shall not fail to repeat to him the assurances which We have already given him in the letter We were graciously pleased to write to him of Our particular esteem and regard for his merit, and of the reliance We have upon his zeal and affection for Our person and government, as well as upon his great abilities and his probity and integrity, of which he has given so many proofs during the whole course of his ministry, and that he may always depend upon the continuance of Our good will towards him. You shall also take care to keep up the intimacy and confidence which you have hitherto had with him and which has proved so usefull to the success of the affairs of Our Crown at that Court.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32751, fo. 119.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 17 July 1727.

Very private.

Since my last the King has seen advices from the Court of Wolfembuttel by which it appears they are in some measure apprised of the contents of the late King's will,¹ and that there are those about the Duke of Wolfembuttel who are endeavouring to persuade him to act a right part in this matter towards His Majesty ; but as it is uncertain what resolution that prince may take, considering the hopes and expectations he may have of being supported by the Court of Vienna, both out of gratitude for his late attachment to them and out of resentment for His Majesty's continuing the present strict correspondence and alliance with France, His Majesty thought fit that you should be informed of these circumstances that you may be the better able to dispose the Cardinal to do whatever may hereafter be thought proper for maintaining the King in his just rights and prerogatives. That Your Excellency may be fully apprised of the justice of this case, and of the illegality and invalidity of the will, I here inclose to you the opinion of His Majesty's Hanover ministers upon it, who, you may imagine, have considered this question so thoroughly, and are so well informed of the laws and constitutions of the Empire that there can be no doubt but that which at first view appeared in itself so unreasonable, is also destitute of all manner of foundation in law. And you will find they are so fully convinced of it that they even advise that His Majesty should declare the will null and void.

Your Excellency will have seen in the extract I sent you the 12th inst. of a letter to Mr. de Morville that the Emperor is endeavouring to induce the several princes of the Empire to consent to his establishment of his succession, and that it is thought he will propose the marriage of the eldest Archduchess with the Prince of Lorrain. His Majesty would have you, also as from yourself, sound the Cardinal and endeavour to discover what are the sentiments of France upon this head.

¹ In point of fact, the Duke possessed a copy which he later surrendered.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 192.)

Whitehall, 1 August 1727.

. As the Court of Spain has plainly acted contrary to the preliminary articles by refusing to deliver up the ships and effects taken from His Majesty's subjects, so the Court of Vienna is now attempting the same thing, as His Majesty is informed, in a more flagrant manner ; for they are actually fitting out two ships at Ostend to send to the East Indies on pretence, as they say, to bring back the effects they have in those countrys, but in reality to carry on the trade there some time longer. This is so contrary to the preliminaries whereby the Ostend trade is suspended in all events for seven years, and only a liberty allowed for those ships that were then abroad, of which a particular account was to be given, to return home, that His Majesty would have you speak to the Cardinal upon it, and beg him forthwith to let the Court of Vienna know that this is so manifest a breach of their engagements that the Allies must insist upon those ships being forthwith countermanded, or else they shall be obliged to take proper measures to stop their voyage. His Majesty I hope will very soon have a sufficient number of ships to reinforce Admiral Hosier and Sir Charles Wager, Sir John Norris being expected home every day with the Baltick squadron, and I have the pleasure to let Your Excellency know that both the King of Sweden and the King of Denmark have very readily consented that His Majesty should withdraw his fleet from those seas.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 215.)

TOWNSHEND TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 8 August 1727.

Private.

. They have the same accounts at The Hague that you have at Paris, of the Emperor's using all his endeavours to get himself authorised to act at the Congress for the body of the Empire, but that he did not find the German princes to whom he had hitherto applied, so ready to give into his views on this head. They certainly are very much in the right to be jealous of the consequences of giving such an authority upon this occasion to the Court of Vienna, which is continually making use of every

handle that can be laid hold of, to encroach upon their liberties and privileges; and surely it imports the Allys and above all, France, to support and encourage this opposition which seems to be begun among those princes to the Emperor's design of gaining an absolute power over them; and the two Crowns should not omit doing what is proper, in order to keep up this spirit among them His Majesty is therefore of opinion that for this purpose, it would not be amiss for the Allys to think of forming, in conjunction with the Crowns of Sweden and Denmark, with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, and such other princes of the Empire as would unite with us, some concert for maintaining at the Congress the just rights of the Germanick body, the supporting them being become necessary even for preserving the balance of Europe.

His Majesty thinks that one effectual means of curing such jealousys would be for England and France in conjunction with our two friends¹ in Holland, to make without loss of time a previous concert upon the several points to be brought before the Congress, and the manner in which the business there shall be transacted, as also what powers they shall invite to send their ministers thither, which, notwithstanding the nature of the Government of Holland, you know may be done, without betraying the secret, by confining what we shall communicate there to the Pensionary and the Greffier only. Sweden expects to be invited to the Congress, in which that Crown ought certainly to be gratified. His Majesty would have Your Excellency consult the Cardinal whether the King of Prussia should have the same invitation on the part of the two Crowns; you will see in Colonel Du Bourgay's letter that he has already named Mr. Kniphausen to be his plenipotentiary at the Congress, a gentleman whom I know to be no imperialist, but rather more inclined to France than to England. His Majesty would have you also take the Cardinal's opinion, whether it would be right to bring about his coming to England, France and Holland before he repairs to the Congress, according to the hint given in Mr. Bourgay's letter.

¹ The Pensionary and the Greffier (Slingelandt and Fagel).

REFLEXIONS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF CHAUVELIN 7

(B.M., *Add. MS.* 32751, fo. 290.)

Whitehall, 14 August 1727.

Private.

I layd before the King Your Excellency's private letter of the 6/17th and 8/19th of this inst., containing a very full and particular relation of the transactions concerning the removal of Mo^r. de Morville from the office of Secretary of State, and the appointment of Mo^r. Chauvelin to succeed him, and your account of them has given His Majesty a great deal of satisfaction. You may, if you think it necessary upon this occasion, assure the Cardinal of the King's intire relyance upon his probity, and unalterable disposition for preserving the union between the two Crowns, and carrying on the present measures. What the Abbé de Mongon endeavoured to insinuate to Your Excellency to his prejudice¹ made no impression upon His Majesty, neither is the King at all uneasy at the new Secretary, nor does it appear to His Majesty to be a bad circumstance in this affair that he is perfectly a beginner in foreign business, since he must on that account be the more disengaged from any sitem or notions of his own, or of other people, and the more likely to follow implicitly the Cardinal's sentiments and directions. . . . :

I have seen a letter from the Holstein minister at the Court of Spain to a friend of his here, telling him, among other things, that Count Konigseg had assured him, that the Emperor was endeavouring to settle with the Court of France the business to be treated at the Congress, which would relate only to the Ostend Company, Gibraltar, the trade to the East and West Indies and the affair of Sleswig. How far this assertion of Count Conigseg's is to be attended to, you will best judge; but I cannot help making this observation upon it, that the Emperor will have acted a very wise part, if he can, before the opening of the Congress, be secure that no points which can give him trouble, shall be moved there, and he and Spain be left at liberty to give us and the Dutch all the trouble they think fit. He will not, if this should be the case, care how long the negotiation lasts. The agitating the questions of Gibraltar, the Ostend Company, and the trade to Spain and

¹ Viz. that he was returning to Spain on mutually bad terms with Fleury (Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 19 August 1727, N.S. very private, *B.M. Add.* 32751, fo. 243).

the West Indies, and that concerning Sleswig, will occasion great uneasiness here, and, what is still worse, the King and the nation must be at the expence they are now at, whilst these matters are undecided; it should therefore seem most reasonable that we, France and Holland should be prepared to stir some points, in case we find the Imperial Court not disposed to act a reasonable part, which might intimidate them, and consequently induce them to do us justice; and I fancy the Emperor's having no heir male to succeed to his Empire and to his hereditary dominions, the jealousy conceived in relation to the intended marriages of the Archduchesses, and his arbitrary proceedings in the Empire, may furnish matter sufficient to make him wish to put a speedy end to the Congress in a reasonable way.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32751, fo. 307.*)

Whitehall, 17 August 1727.

I send you by His Majesty's command copys of a letter I have received from Mr. Finch and of some papers that were inclosed, giving an account of the methods that are using by the French for repairing the harbour of Dunkirk. I add a copy of a letter from Mr. d'Ittersum, and the *Craftsman* of last Saturday, by which you will see what alarm this proceeding gives in Holland, and what use is made of it here by those who do not wish well to His Majesty's Government. I likewise inclose a copy of my answer to Mr. Finch.

The King intends to send privately a person to Dunkirk, who being perfectly acquainted with that harbour and with the works that have been made for demolishing it, will be able to make a true judgement of those which are now carrying on there, and of the effect they will have, and to make a full and exact report of the whole to His Majesty, who, till he has a perfect information of the state of this matter, will forbear to make any instances in form upon it to the Court of France.

In the meantime the King thought it proper that so much as we know of it should be communicated to Your Excellency, together with Colonel Armstrong's opinion, which you will also receive herewith, by which you will see that the repairing the sluice of Furnes would be a direct infraction of the treaty of peace between us and France. . . .

(Ibid., fo. 350.)

Whitehall, 21 August 1727.

Private.

. His Majesty read with a good deal of satisfaction the account you give of your first interview with the new Secretary of State. The Cardinal's view in advancing him at once to such great preferments, seems to be a very wise one, for though Mo^r. de Morville, had he continued in employment, must equally have conformed to His Eminence's sentiments and have acted under his influence and direction, yet wanting spirit and capacity, he could never have taken upon him the chief direction of affairs, which, in case of the Cardinal's death, must therefore have been left under great uncertainty ; but we now have a much better prospect, if so unfortunate an accident should happen, of seeing the present measures steadily pursued by a successor in the ministry so well qualified as Mo^r. Chauvelin will be in all respects after he has been some time under the Cardinal.

As to a plan for the conduct of our negotiations there,¹ His Majesty is very easy on that head, and very sensible of the Cardinal's regard for him in delaying the drawing one in form till the difficultys with Spain are overcome, in which His Majesty is more nearly concerned. What induced His Majesty to propose the doing it was chiefly to satisfy our friends in Holland, and that we may be prepared to stirr some points that may disquiet the Emperor, if we should find him going about to protract that negociation and to make it serve for no other purpose but to give trouble to us and the Dutch. The Cardinal may take his own time for it, and in the mean while it would not be amisse if, as he proposes, you would be turning it in your thoughts. If it should be found impracticable to stir up the princes of Germany to take a part in any shape at the ensuing congress in support of the laws of the Empire and for redress of their grievances, the negociation there in that case, will lye in a very narrow compass : the trade with Spain and the West Indies, Gibraltar, the Ostende Company and the affair of Sleswick will be the only points that can come to be treated there, and thus no farther scheme or concert will be necessary than how to end these several matters soon and to the honour and advantage of the Hanover allys so that whilst the

¹ At the Congress.

affairs of Germany are under these uncertaintys, Your Excellency may, if you think it advisable, go so far as to adjust with the Cardinal, in confidence, in what manner the negociations upon these heads may be conducted and brought to a speedy conclusion at the Congress.

As to the inviting the King of Prussia to send ministers to the Congress, you will find by my answer to Mr. Dubourgay that His Majesty is much of the same opinion as the Cardinal upon that subject.¹

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32752, fo. 406.*)

[NEWCASTLE] TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 2 November 1727.

Very private. [Unsigned.]

The King has commanded me to send Your Excellency the inclosed project of a treaty between His Majesty and the Duke of Wolfembuttle,² concerted here with Count Dehn ; which you will, in the greatest confidence, communicate to the Cardinal. As to the general engagements of it, they are of such a nature, as cannot but be very advantagious to the Hanover allys and to His Majesty in particular, by making the Duke of Wolfembuttle's country as it were a barrier against any attempts of the Emperor, who has certainly flattered himself with the hopes of making Brunswick a place of arms in case of a rupture ; which scheme will by this be entirely defeated ; and the detaching of this Prince from the interest of the Court of Vienna, to which he seemed so much devoted, may prove of use by encouraging others to follow his example.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32753, fo. 97.*)

Whitehall, 23 November 1727.

[Unsigned.]

. I cannot sufficiently express to Your Excellency the satisfaction and approbation with which His Majesty read your

¹ Viz. That he will be a nuisance.

² The treaty was signed on 25 November 1727, at Westminster (see Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IV, pp. 254-60 for the text).

account of your conference with the Cardinal, in which you plainly shewed him that the true occasion of the refusal of Spain at first to execute the preliminaries and afterwards the clogging it with these conditions was an artifice of the Court of Vienna in hopes thereby to raise some difficultys which might create a coolness between His Majesty and France, and lessen that union which had been the chief obstacle to their ambitious views. The King hopes that the Cardinal will be convinced that there is no way to obtain the execution of the preliminaries and consequently to bring about a peace, but for the Allys of Hanover to talk with that steadiness and resolution that becomes them when they are treated in the manner they have lately been.

It is needless to make many observations on Mo^r. de la Paz's paper. It is in every part so offensive, and does so thoroughly overturn the preliminaries, that no expedient can be struck out from it. Your Excellency however may observe to the Cardinal that all the pains that he took to form the preliminaries in such a manner that the chief points in which the Allies of Hanover were concerned should not be left to the chance of the future decision of a congress, are by this, especially as far as relates to His Majesty, intirely defeated, and particularly the 2^d article, which was designed to secure the possession of Gibraltar to His Majesty, and always so explained by the Cardinal, is by this proposal so thoroughly overturned that not only the affair of Gibraltar is to be brought before the Congress, but His Majesty to abide by the decision of it.

The other points are equally injurious to the King, as the submitting to the Congress whether the *Prince Frederick* is lawfull prize, and in case it should be determined to be so, the repaying to Spain the value of it, and whether Spain should be indemnified for the loss they may have sustained by the detention of the galeoons; and the guaranty insisted to be given by the Emperor and France to oblige His Majesty to the performance of these conditions, and the not contenting themselves with the general guaranty in the 7th article of the preliminaries carrys with it the most unjust insinuation against the King, as well as shews that their only design was to engage France, if possible, to take a step which His Majesty would have the justest reason to be offended at.

Since therefore after six months negociation, and all the concessions made on the part of the King that are consistent with

his security and that of his subjects, the Court of Spain is farther from executing the preliminaries than they were at first, His Majesty is persuaded the Cardinal will think that it is by no means proper to lose any more time by fruitless negotiations and that the only way to convince the Courts of Vienna and Madrid that they have not by their artifices been able to divide His Majesty and his Allies, is to shew the Emperor and Spain that they will be no longer trifled with in this manner. And therefore the King hopes that, pursuant to what Your Excellency has hinted, the Cardinal will be of opinion that orders should be forthwith sent to Mo^r. Rottembourg, M^r. Keene and Mo^r. Van der Meer with directions to them to offer to the King of Spain the orders to His Majesty's admirals and to my Lord Portmore, as what would sufficiently answer and execute the contents of the preliminaries if accepted and exchanged with the like orders from the King of Spain to his admirals and commanders in Spain and in the West Indies; and in case His Catholick Majesty should still stand out and refuse to give the proper orders on his part, Count Rottembourg should then acquaint him that since it is impossible to accommodate matters by means of that natural relation and confidence which ought to subsist between France and Spain, His Most Christian Majesty must stand by his engagements with his Allies and concert with them the proper means for executing the preliminaries which have been accepted and signed by all the contracting parties; and a day may be fixed by Your Excellency and the Cardinal for the ministers of England, France and Holland to leave Madrid in case that Court should not comply before that time.

. The Cardinal can have no objection to the taking this method of proposing these orders to the Court of Spain for the execution of the preliminaries except he will be of opinion still to continue the negociation by making another effort, which His Majesty thinks should by all means be avoided, for as long as they believe the Cardinal will negotiate, so long will they be starting new difficulties, in hopes, as I said before, that some way or other, though the present point has miscarried, they may create some coolness between His Majesty and his Allies.

As the Court of Vienna is undoubtedly at the bottom of this, as appears plainly by all that Count Konigseck has done, and with a view, as Your Excellency observes, to create a jealousy between His Majesty and France, the King thinks that, pursuant to the

7th article of the preliminaries, the Hanover allys should forthwith summon the Emperor to joyn with them in obliging the Court of Spain to a just and immediate execution of the preliminaries, which for six months together they have delayed, and now by their final answer have refused.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32753, fo. 345.*)

Whitehall, 8 December 1727.

. Your Excellency will easily imagine how great must be His Majesty's surprise and concern that Count Rottembourg should not only negotiate, but enter into an engagement so contrary, as Your Excellency rightly observes, to the orders he had received from the Court of France of the 3^d and 10th of November upon which Mo^r. Rottembourg pretends to ground what he has done ; and also that Mr. Keene could possibly be so ill advised as to joyn in this extraordinary proceeding.¹

The King intirely approves what you have said upon this occasion to the Cardinal and to the Garde des Sceaux, and the further representation you intended to make to the Cardinal, insisting upon the execution of the preliminaries with no other condition but the referring to the Congress any counterband trade supposed to have been carryd on by the *Prince Frederick*, or contravention by that ship to the Assiento Treaty. His Majesty would therefore have Your Excellency immediately acquaint the Cardinal, that the behaviour of Count Rottembourg, in taking upon him in the name of His Majesty and France to consent to conditions so injurious to His Majesty and so contrary to the sentiments of his own Court, does in the King's opinion make it absolutely necessary that His Most Christian Majesty do forthwith disavow the proceeding of his minister ; and as His Majesty is persuaded he has acted intirely without orders, such measures should be taken as may effectually convince the Court of Spain of it ; and Your Excellency may also in the strongest manner assure the Cardinal, that His Majesty does not only disapprove the part that Mr. Keene has acted, but does declare it to be without the least colour of order or instruction from him ; and consequently that the King does

¹ Rottembourg's letter to the Marquis de la Paz will be found in Rousset, *Recueil historique*, Vol. IV, p. 34. See also Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, Vol. III, p. 379.

not, and shall not, look upon himself to be any way obliged or bound by it.

The terms consented to by Count Rottembourg are too notorious to need any explanation, being, as Your Excellency observes, much the same as are contained in the Marquis de la Paz's letter of the 14th November, only turned into another shape; and as His Majesty is persuaded that no negociation, at least in the hands of Count Rottembourg, will or can bring this matter to a good issue, the only thing, in the King's opinion is to stick to the preliminaries and the orders formerly sent for the execution of them. And as these delays are not only highly prejudicial to His Majesty's affairs on account of the session of Parliament's drawing near, but will also tend in the greatest degree imaginable to lessen the reputation of the Hanover alliance, by creating an opinion in both friend and foe how little consistency there is among us, Your Excellency will be pleased to talk to the Cardinal in such manner upon this extraordinary event, that His Majesty may know how far he may depend upon the promises that have been so often repeated to him, and that those who are employed by the Court of France may not act contrary to the engagements of that Crown, and to the repeated professions of their Court whenever any proceedings of this sort come to be complained of.

Your Excellency will observe that in the Marquis de la Paz's letter, great care is taken to establish the authority by which Count Rottembourg pretends to have acted, by not only stiling him Plenipotentiary from the Most Christian King, but also by reciting the orders to him, of the 3^d and 10th November, by which he would justify what he has done; and as the orders of these dates that were communicated to the King, and which His Majesty is persuaded are the only ones that were sent him, are to a quite contrary purpose, His Majesty thinks the Court of France is highly concerned, in vindication of their own honour, to disavow and disapprove the conduct of their minister, in not only acting contrary to those orders, but even presuming to make them the foundation of his proceeding, that their fidelity to their engagements may not be in the least suspected. And the Court of Spain should be forthwith given to understand, that His Most Christian Majesty does not look upon himself to be any way engaged by an act of his minister, not only without orders, but directly contrary to those he had received. As it is most probable, that the extract of Count

Broglie's letter could not give the least pretext for what Mo^r. de Rottembourg has done, so I can assure Your Excellency, as you may do the Cardinal with great truth, that neither His Majesty nor any of his servants have ever given Count Broglie the least reason to imagine that His Majesty would consent to any other terms than the execution of the preliminarys, with the single condition of referring to the Congress, as I said before, the contraventions in the case of the *Prince Frederick* (if any have been) to the Assiento Treaty.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32753, fo. 457v.*)

Whitehall, 14 December 1727.

. As His Majesty is therefore very desirous to carry the Dutch with him in everything he does, my Lord Townshend writes to Mr. Finch that orders may be sent to the Dutch ministers at Paris, to make, in concert with you, the proper declaration to the Court of France, which His Majesty thinks should be : to let the Cardinal know, as I have before mentioned, the dependence that England and Holland have upon him ; that it is upon this principle that His Majesty and the States have acquiesced in the orders sent to Count Rottembourg ; but that they hope, if a full and satisfactory answer be not now given, the Cardinal will think it proper to put an end to a negociation which has been carried on for seven months, without the least success, and that therefore Mo^r. de Rottembourg, Mo^r. Van der Meer and Mr. Keene may have orders to break off all negociation, in case the Court of Spain does not now comply. You will in a friendly but strong manner lay before the Cardinal the inconveniences that have and must arise to the Allies from these repeated disappointments and delays, which make it necessary to support almost the expence of a war, without doing the same prejudice to those that are against us, and must encourage our enemys and discourage our friends ; and you will endeavour to make him sensible how fatal it will be to the Hanover alliance not to act with a proper unanimity, concert and resolution ; and if you should find the Cardinal not disposed to come into this way of thinking and acting, you will then learn from him what he himself proposes, and in case of a refusal or delay from Spain, what part France will act, and what scheme he has for the performance of their engagements towards His Majesty

and his Allies. All this the King thinks should be done in the strongest manner towards him, with as many personal compliments to the Cardinal as is possible and yet with as much firmness with respect to His Majesty's honour and interest.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32754, fo. 208v.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.¹

Whitehall, 2 February 1727/8.

. You will see by this proposal of Mr. Pentteridter that his chief business is to flatter the Cardinal and endeavour to insinuate himself into his friendship and confidence, and therefore Your Lordship will watch his motions the more narrowly. As to what he mentioned concerning the Duke of Holsteyn,² it would extremely embarrass and protract the negotiations at the Congress to have any such matter proposed there, and Your Lordship knows that prince has not behaved in such a manner towards the two Crowns as to deserve any favour from them; therefore the King would have you be careful to guard the Cardinal against it, and endeavour to prevail with him to give no manner of encouragement to the Imperialists to bring this matter to the Congress.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 33006, fo. 1.*)

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR HORATIO WALPOLE, AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.

St. James', 27 February 1727/8.

Upon your return to Paris you shall take the first opportunity of communicating to Our good cousin the Cardinal de Fleury, a copy, herewith put into your hands, of the treaty of amity and union made between the Dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel and Wirtemberg, the 24th day of July last.

You shall let the Cardinal know that We make this communication to him with that confidence We will always use, being extremely desirous in every proposal that is made to Us, and in every step We take, to have his sentiments and his concurrence, as being

¹ For a notice of this nobleman see below, p. 83. At this time he was acting as *chargé d'affaires* in H. Walpole's absence on parliamentary duty, awaiting an opportunity to proceed to Vienna as plenipotentiary.

² See J. F. Chance, *Diplomatic Instructions, Sweden*, I, pp. xxix-xxxviii, and *The Alliance of Hanover*, index, s.vv. Holstein and Schleswig.

the true way to make the present harmony between Us and the Most Christian King the most lasting and most beneficial to Us and Our Kingdoms mutually.

You shall inform the Cardinal that the minister from the Duke of Wolfenbuettel at Our Court insists that the main view of the treaty is good, 'though the engagements taken in it are very loose and general, and that it may, as occasion shall offer hereafter, be made a foundation for building something more usefull, it being intended only at present as an attempt toward associating a considerable number of Princes in the Empire, to defend and support the rights and immunitys of the Germanick Body against any usurpations or encroachments on the part of His Imperial Majesty. He therefore has often and earnestly pressed Us to enter into the said treaty as Elector, intimating at the same time that if We should join in that engagement as King, and even if France, 'though a guarantee of the Treaties of Westphalia, should come into it, the Emperor might pretend to take it amiss of the contracting princes, as if they sought the support of foreign powers, and joined with them in matters merely relating to the Empire; whereas We, as Elector, have a right to join in the maintenance of the libertys and privileges belonging to the several states of the Empire, and His Imperial Majesty could have no just handle to be displeased on that account.

Upon the perusal of the treaty, you will find several articles and passages in it concerning the prerogative of the ancient princes of the Empire, which We, as Elector, cannot consent to, but in case we enter into this treaty, We must make some proper reservations as to that head.

But you will observe to the Cardinal that, if he should be of opinion that it wou'd be for the interest of the two Crowns that We should enter into this treaty only as Elector, We think it necessary, in order to obviate many inconveniences that may attend our making such a step, to propose concerting some previous measures with France.

The 5th article of the Treaty of Hanover provides in general for the maintaining the privileges and libertys of the Germanick Body, and for helping each other mutually in that affair. What shall be agreed to be fit for Us to do as to this treaty made at Wolfenbuettel, ought to take it's rise from and be founded upon that made at Hanover; We conceive that in this manner, the

inconvenience of Our entering into this treaty, as Elector, may be avoided.

The method We judge the most convenient for that purpose is, that a secret treaty or convention should be made between Us and the Most Christian King, reciting the engagements with respect to the Empire as contained in the 5th article of the Treaty of Hanover, explaining the purport of the treaty between the Dukes of Wolfenbittel and Wirtemberg, and desiring Us, for the promoting the good ends mentioned in the abovesaid article, to accede, as Elector, to this latter treaty, France promising at the same time to furnish her quota and to give Us the same assistance, in case any trouble should happen on account of the treaty signed at Wolfenbittel as His Most Christian Majesty is obliged to by the treaty concluded at Hanover. And as by this means, Our engagements with the princes of the Empire, as Elector, become a consequence of the Treaty of Hanover, at the instance of France and with their concurrence as to succours, and a mutual assistance in case of need, We will upon these conditions consent to enter into the aforesaid engagements for the good and advancement of the common cause.

These are Our present sentiments upon this affair, which you are to impart to the Cardinal as a mark of Our utmost confidence in him, letting him feel at the same time that as We freely open Our most secret thoughts to him, so We should be glad to receive his opinion upon the whole matter with the same freedom and ease, being persuaded that nothing can contribute more to the mutual advantage of the two Crowns than such an unreserved communication of the inmost thoughts and most secret views of each other. You will therefore give the Cardinal to understand that We will make no advance in this transaction without his consent and concurrence and that, according as it shall be agreed between Us, We shall be ready to take part in this Treaty now, or after the peace is made, or not at all ; and this Our resolution We shall pursue in all things, being earnestly desirous not only of preserving the present harmony between Us and France, but also of strengthening and increasing it for all times to come.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32754, fo. 502v.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 14 March 1727/8.

Private.

. His Majesty thinks that England France and Holland should immediately resolve among themselves not to agree to anything at the Congress but what is conformable to the preliminary articles and the several engagements that those three powers are under to each other or to any other power. If this resolution were once taken, our business would not only be extremely shortned, but made very secure, and His Majesty and his Allys would not only know what they are to depend upon, but have a moral assurance that the affairs of the Congress must end well and the Emperor and Spain be obliged to content themselves with what is reasonable and just.

This rule will sufficiently secure Gibraltar to His Majesty and the abolition of the Ostend Company, since those two points are expressly comprehended in the declaration given by Mo^r. de Morville to you, the Hanover Treaty, the accession of the Dutch to it, and the preliminary articles, all which were given and made principally and chiefly with this view. The affairs of the North, and particularly Sleswick, will be made very easy by this rule, since England and France are under the same obligations with relation to them, and the guaranty of Sleswick to the King of Denmark is as binding upon France as it is upon England. And as the King thinks this cannot be refused either by France or Holland, so neither will the Emperor have the least reason to complain if this be strictly adhered to and if the Cardinal considers that at the time that the guaranties were given by England and France to the King of Denmark, the Emperor was not only well with those two Crowns but was acquainted with and consented to this transaction with Denmark, and it was then much for his advantage and interest that the affairs of the north should be accommodated, that England and France might be at liberty to serve him in the south as they did by procuring Sicily for him. The Emperor can never alledge any engagements that he may have since taken in favour of the Duke of Holsteyn against this, since it is very well known that those engagements were taken and his treaty with Muscovy entered into purely in opposition

to the interests of the Hanover allies, and in order to carry on the designs he had formed in conjunction with Spain for overturning the balance of Europe and depriving the Allies of their just rights and possessions. So that there is a wide difference between the engagements the Emperor is under, taken in that view and at that time, and those of England and France which were in great measure for the benefit and advantage of the Emperor himself, and were certainly taken with his privity. And as the Emperor can have no just pretence to object to the guaranty of Sleswick given by the two Crowns, so if Your Excellency considers how much the late Czar contributed to the King of Denmark's possessing himself of Sleswick and how long and how strenuously he supported him in it, you will see the Muscovites can have no manner of reason to object to a transaction agreeable to what they themselves had formerly done and thought so right and just. But if any notion of an equivalent should be started, His Majesty must insist to know from whence it is proposed to be had, and that neither he nor France should be expected to contribute to it, and in that case the King would be far from opposing it, provided it could be done to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32755, fo. 123.*)

Whitehall, 26 March 1728.

Private.

. Though the Cardinal has not opened himself very freely upon the two great points of the guaranty of the Emperor's succession and the marriage of Don Carlos with the eldest Archduchess, yet from what he himself said, and more particularly from what M^o. Chauvelin let fall, it is pretty plain that the Cardinal is not of opinion, that England and France should embarrass themselves with any engagements in favour of the Emperor's succession, but at the same time that the match with Don Carlos under proper regulations for preserving the balance of Europe, would not be disagreeable to, or at least not opposed by the Court of France.

Since therefore, these seem to be the Cardinal's sentiments, His Majesty thinks it may not be improper for M^r. Keene to take an opportunity of congratulating the Queen of Spain upon the prospect there is of matters coming to a happy conclusion, by the reciprocal orders for the execution of the preliminaries having been adjusted ;

and at the same time to assure her, of the great regard that His Majesty and France have for Her Catholick Majesty and of their desire to renew the strictest friendship with her ; he may add, as from himself, that he is persuaded, that the prejudice she may have entertained against the two Crowns as being averse to the aggrandizing of her family, is so far from being well founded, that whatever views she may have of that kind, even that of a match for her son Don Carlos with an Archdutchess, provided the same may be so regulated, as that the balance of Europe may be preserved, they will be so far from opposing it, that they will readily concur in it. His Majesty thinks this must have good effect in whatever way the Queen of Spain takes it ; if she enters so far into it as to desire to know of Mr. Keene what authority he has for saying this, he may then acquaint her, that he grounds it upon his knowledge of the regard and friendship that His Majesty and the Court of France have for Her Catholick Majesty and her family, and in general upon the ways of thinking of the two Crowns upon this subject ; but that if she has anything particular to say upon it, or, if she desires it, he will then write to know more certainly His Majesty's sentiments on this head, which will give us an opportunity of returning such an answer, as in all probability, would be much to the satisfaction of the Court of Spain. And one of these two things would necessarily arise from it, that either the Queen of Spain, who has the business of the marriage solely at heart and is chiefly actuated by that in her whole conduct, would effectually press the Emperor to come to an immediate execution of all his promises, and would no longer depend upon his word ; and if the Emperor (as it is most plain he would, by what Mr. de Penterridter has said) should, from his apprehension of the ill consequence that the doing anything of this kind at present would have among the Princes of the Empire, decline giving the Queen of Spain the satisfaction she desires, that might at once convince her how she has been deceived by the Court of Vienna, and probably fling her into the hands of England and France ; or, if the apprehensions of this should engage the Emperor to comply with the Queen of Spain's demands, his doing it would disappoint all his views in the Empire. If on the contrary the Queen of Spain should be willing to rely intirely on the Emperor's promises, and should neither desire nor accept the concurrence of any other power to secure the execution of them, it would however remove the rancour

and bitterness which she has on this account always shewn against the two Crowns, and make her more easy in the points that may come before the Congress that have no particular relation to her interest or that of her children, when she knows in general, that she might depend upon the friendship of His Majesty and France ; neither does the King think, that this would lay the two Crowns under any obligation that would be either burthensome or inconvenient to them ; for as nothing is proposed to be done but under proper regulation for securing the balance of Europe, we shall always be the judges of those regulations, and consequently if they are not such as will remove every objection, we shall be under no engagement in this respect, and whenever that point comes to be considered and debated, it will bring the princes of the Empire under such a dependance upon England and France for the making of the necessary provision for their security, as must give the two Crowns a prodigious influence over them.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32755, fo. 385v.*)

Whitehall, 29 April 1728.

Private.

. His Majesty has commanded me to send Your Excellency in the greatest confidence, the inclosed copys of two letters from Mo^r. Gedda to Count Horn and from Mo^r. Chauvelin to Mo^r. Casteja for your own information only, and to be made use of in such manner that neither the Cardinal nor any other person whatsoever may ever have the least suspicion that you have seen them. You will find the contents of them very curious, and that Mo^r. Gedda is of opinion that the Court of Vienna would be for hastening the conclusion of the Congress, but that the French ministers are rather for protracting it. You will also see that Mo^r. Chauvelin thinks that good use may be made, upon a proper occasion, of the engagements which he apprehends His Majesty to be under with regard to an equivalent to be given to the Duke of Holsteyn for the Dutchy of Sleswick. Your Excellency will from this hint endeavour to prevent any notion of this kind of Mo^r. Chauvelin's having any effect upon the Cardinal, and you will shew him that the affair of Sleswick is of more consequence than Mo^r. Chauvelin seems to think it, and that His Majesty can never consent to be burthened with any part of the equivalent to be

given to the Duke of Holstein, since the Court of France is under the same obligation to Denmark that His Majesty is. You will also, knowing the disposition of Mo^r. Chauvelin upon this head, take a proper opportunity of letting the Cardinal feel that His Majesty is as much concerned to have France act a right part towards him upon this point as upon any other whatever.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 555.)

Whitehall, 14 May 1728.

Very private.

. I was obliged to deferr till now the pleasure I take in acquainting you with His Majesty's perfect approbation of the steps you took upon Mo^r. Chauvelin's showing you so loose and unsatisfactory a paper as his rough draught of instructions for the French plenipotentiarys at the Congress, prescribing them a conduct no way suitable to the engagements under which France is to His Majesty or to the strict and intimate union that ought to subsist between the two Crowns. The King was pleased to take particular notice of the success you always have in destroying the ill impressions which others endeavour to make upon the Cardinal, whereof the manner in which he behaved in the conference which Your Excellency and Mr. Stanhope and Mr. Poyntz have had with him to communicate the draught of your instructions for the Congress, is a singular instance.¹

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32756, fo. 47.*)

Whitehall, 21 May 1728.

Very private.

His Majesty has commanded me to send you the inclosed extract of a letter from Brigadier Dubourgay, by which you will see that the Emperor is doing all he can to secure the King of Prussia strongly to his interest, and even to get his guaranty for His Imperial Majesty's succession in whatever way he may settle it; and that, in order to induce His Prussian Majesty to come into these measures, he is, as you will see by the inclosed letters and papers, admitting him into the conservatorship of the Duchy

¹ Cf. Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, ed. 1798, Vol. II, p. 623, Newcastle to William Stanhope of the same date.

of Mecklenbourg, and disturbing the Dutch in their garrison of Embden,¹ of which they have been in possession these hundred years, purely to flatter His Prussian Majesty. You will find that Mr. Dubourguay sometimes thinks it adviseable to tempt the King of Prussia by such offers as might be agreeable to him from entering so deep into the Emperor's party, and at other times fears that His Prussian Majesty is so far gone in that way that even any overtures that His Majesty or his Allys should make to him, would not be able to divert him from it.

Your Excellency will see, by my Lord Townshend's letter to my Lord Chesterfield, what His Majesty's thoughts are upon the affair of Mecklenbourg and Oost Frise, and how necessary the King thinks it will be for His Majesty and the Dutch to call upon their allys for their assistance in support of the rights of the States and the constitution of the Empire, which are so openly attacked by the Court of Vienna. The King of Prussia, by working himself into the Dutchy of Mecklenbourg may become a very troublesome neighbour to His Majesty, Sweden, and all the princes in Lower Saxony, and the Dutch have all the reason imaginable to suspect him on their side ; and therefore His Majesty has been thinking whether, in order effectually to disappoint the Emperor's views, it might not be practicable to find out some method, either to bring the King of Prussia back to the interest of the Hanover allys, or at least to create such a jealousy in the Emperor of him, as should take off all manner of confidence and dependance that His Imperial Majesty might otherwise have in him. The only way of doing this with any probability of success is, in the King's opinion, to renew the affair of the marriage of Prince Frederick with the Princess Royal of Prussia : but in this His Majesty sees great difficultys, not knowing how such a step, after the King of Prussia's behaviour, may be relished in France and Holland. However the King thinks that in communicating these extracts, letters and papers to the Cardinal, Your Excellency might, as from yourself, say, that if any method could be found out, of making the Emperor jealous of the King of Prussia, which considering the uncertainty of his Prussian Majesty's temper, might not be im-

¹ For the question of Emden and East Friesland see Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IV, pp. 281-509 ; Chance, *Diplomatic Instructions, Denmark*, pp. 73, 74, and *Alliance of Hanover*, pp. 481-2 ; Droysen, *Geschichte der Preussischen Politik*, Vol. IV, ii., p. 328.

possible, it would do the business at once ; that for that purpose you have been thinking ¹whether it would be proper to propose the match to the King of Prussia, to try if by that means he could be brought back to his old ally¹ ; ²that if His Majesty would suffer the Queen to write to the Queen of Prussia, to acquaint her that the marriage shall be certainly concluded the next spring, without entering into any complaint relating to the King of Prussia's present conduct, or any negotiation of either side ; it might even make such an impression upon the King of Prussia, who would then see the certainty of succeeding in what he has had so much at heart, as to² discourage him³ from taking any further measures with the Court of Vienna, or if it should not have that effect, when the Emperor thinks⁴ the King our master is in earnest to make the match, he will be constantly suspecting the King of Prussia, and not think it worth his while to flatter him any longer, when at last it may be to no purpose. You may also say, that if the Cardinal agrees with you in this thought, you will then presume to suggest it to His Majesty as your joint opinion. But in mentioning this to the Cardinal, Your Excellency is to use the utmost caution to do it so as that he may not suspect that you have any instructions for it from hence.

If the Cardinal, who has been very justly exasperated against the King of Prussia for his behaviour to the Hanover allys, should neither relish your proposal, nor make any of his own for regaining that prince, Your Excellency will then desire him to inform you what methods he himself thinks may be taken, to prevent the ill consequences of the King of Prussia's being thoroughly embarked in the Emperor's interest. . . .

¹⁻¹ Added in m. in George II's hand.

²⁻² Cypher.

³ Cypher.

⁴ Amended by George II from 'feels'.

WILLIAM STANHOPE, later LORD HARRINGTON
HORATIO WALPOLE
STEPHEN POYNTZ
1728-1730

OF these three statesmen, who were appointed plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Soissons, there are accounts in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, while a bitter sarcasm of Queen Caroline's at Stanhope's expense is in a well-known passage of Lord Hervey's memoirs. He like Walpole, had to return at the beginning of 1729 to England for parliamentary duties. In the course of that year he was ordered to go to Spain to negotiate a treaty between that power and the Hanover allies, and refused unless he were promised a peerage. Though this was refused, he was persuaded to go, and received his coronet as a reward for negotiating the Treaty of Seville. On the resignation of Townshend on 15 May 1730, he was made Secretary of State for the northern department and returned to England, being succeeded by Lord Waldegrave as plenipotentiary to the Congress. Of the career of Poyntz, a very good type of the professional diplomatist who was not in the first flight of statesmen, there is a sketch in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. He remained continuously at his post, and returned with Walpole to England in September 1730.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32756, fo. 63.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM STANHOPE, HORATIO WALPOLE AND
STEPHEN POYNTZ, PLENIPOTENTIARIES TO THE CONGRESS TO
BE HELD AT SOISSONS

St. James', 30 April 1728.

Whereas the alliance made at Vienna in the months of April and May in the year 1725 between the Emperor and the King

of Spain, and some proceedings on their part that followed thereupon, having given just occasion to apprehend, that those two powers had entered into such engagements as might turn and set aside the provisions that had been made by former treatys for establishing and preserving the balance of Europe, and for securing to the several princes and states thereof their possessions, rights and priviledges, particularly in regard to their commerce, it becomes necessary for the opposing of any designs of so dangerous a nature, that an alliance should be formed between other powerful princes and states, who were equally concerned to prevent the pernicious consequences of those engagements, and accordingly a treaty of defensive alliance was concluded the third day of September following (N.S.) at Hanover, between Our late Royal Father, Our good brother the Most Christian King, and Our good brother the King of Prussia, to which Our good brother the King of Sweden and Our good friends and allys the States General have since acceded ; and whereas the said defensive alliance has been attended with such success towards removing the just apprehensions occasioned by the engagements entered into by the two powers first above mentioned that certain preliminary articles in order to a general pacification were signed in the month of May and June last between Our late Royal Father, Our good brother the Most Christian King, and the States General on the one part, and the Emperor and the King of Spain on the other, and an act for the execution of those articles and removing the difficulties by which the same had been obstructed, was afterwards signed at the Pardo on the sixth day of the last month (N.S.) by the ministers of all the contracting powers, copys whereof will be herewith delivered to you ; and it has been since agreed, by and between the ministers of the said powers now residing at Paris, that a Congress shall be held at Soissons, and shall commence and be opened on the twentieth day of May next ensuing (N.S.) for the perfecting this great and good work of restoring and establishing the general peace and tranquillity of Europe,

Having received these Our instructions and your other dispatches, you shall forthwith repair to Paris, and there concert with the Ministers employed in that negociation on the part of Our Allies and the other Princes therein concerned, the method to be observed in the carrying it on : and from thence you shall proceed to Soissons, so as to be there by the time appointed for the meeting of the

Congress as aforesaid. And as the preventing of a war, and the great progress that has been made towards a general pacification, is (under God's providence) entirely owing to the steady union and perfect harmony and concert that have hitherto subsisted between Us and Our Allys, the Most Christian King and the States General, you are to lay down and establish as a fundamental and unalterable rule in all your negociations and transactions, that We and Our said Allys are to form one entire body to take joint measures, and act with perfect uniformity, and that accordingly Our respective ministers at this Congress are in every thing and upon every occasion to hold the same language, to make no proposition without a previous concert among yourselves, nor to receive any without communicating it immediately to each other; neither are you to return any answer to such propositions as you shall receive, till it has been previously concerted and agreed to by all the ministers of the three powers; and every paper you deliver shall be written in the name of you all, and have your joint consent and approbation.

As the treaty of defensive alliance concluded at The Hague on the 4th day of January 1717 (N.S.) between Our late Royal Father, Our good brother the Most Christian King and the States General of the United Provinces, together with the aforesaid treaty of defensive alliance made at Hanover the third of September 1725, and the preliminary articles beforementioned are to be the basis and foundation of Our negociations at the said Congress; you shall strictly adhere to the same, and you shall not admit of any proposal contrary to any of the points and matters therein settled; neither shall you agree to any thing in prejudice of any of Our rights or those of Our allys, or that is contrary to the engagements which We and Our said allys are under to each other, or to any other power.

Although by the first article of the preliminaries¹ a suspension only for seven years be agreed upon of the priviledge or octroy granted to the Ostend Company and of all commerce from the Austrian Netherlands to the Indies; yet, as at the very time of making that stipulation, this was understood by all parties to be only an expedient for the saving of the Emperor's honour, and that it was to end in the entire suppressing of that company and of all commerce from those countrys to the East Indies; and that

¹ The text of the preliminaries can be found in A. F. Pribram, *Oesterreichische Staatsverträge, England*, Innsbruck, 1907, Vol. I, pp. 457-64.

the very establishment of such a company and carrying on such commerce from thence is contrary to the Treaty of Munster, and even to the conditions on which the Emperor possesses that part of the Low Countrys, you are to insist, that in the treaty to be made at the Congress a total abolition of the said company and commerce be expressly stipulated ; and you shall not consent that any ships belonging to that company be allowed to go to the Indies, nor any return from thence, except those nine that are specified in the list which was given in by the Imperial Minister at The Hague in August last, pursuant to the fifth article of the preliminaries.

You shall, according to the 2nd article of the preliminaries take care that in the treaty to be made We and Our Allys may be maintained in those rights and possessions that We or any of Us have or ought to have enjoyed by virtue of the Treatys of Utrecht, Baden, and the Quadruple Alliance, and of any other treatys and conventions that preceded the year 1725 and that the same do remain untouched.

Our right to the town of Gibraltar is so clear and so firmly established by the Treaty of Utrecht, and since confirmed by several other treatys, and by the preliminary articles, and by the act for the execution of them, that it is not to be imagined after all that has passed upon this subject, that the King of Spain should think of having that place restored to him ; but if, contrary to all expectation, he should renew that demand by his ministers at the Congress, you shall return an answer, setting forth Our right and title to the said town, and declaring in the strongest and most positive manner, that you cannot by any means consent that the Congress should enter into any discussion or examination of this matter, which would be directly contrary to the express words and meaning of the preliminaries and highly injurious and dishonourable to Us.¹

You shall follow the same method in the answers you shall give to any demand which the Spanish minister may possibly make upon any other point, that either is already determined by the

¹ It will be remembered that Stanhope was in favour of conciliating the Spaniards by the cession of Gibraltar in order to secure commercial concessions, and that Townshend while agreeing with his view of the intrinsic value of the place said public opinion would never allow its surrender (see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, pp. 628, 631).

express words of the preliminaries, or which, in the course of the negociations for the settling them and the act for the execution thereof, have been explained and understood by the parties concerned to be of such a nature as not to be the proper subject of a demand, or fit to be brought into debate, such as the pretension on the part of the King of Spain of an indemnification for the loss and damage he or his subjects may have suffered by the galeoons having been blockt up by Our squadron lying before Portobello, which demand was mentioned in the declaration signed at Madrid the 3rd December last, by the Count de Rottembourg, but having been refused by Us and Our Allys as being without any foundation, was omitted in the act since signed at the Pardo ;¹ and the better to support your refusal of allowing that demand (if it should be made) to be received and debated at the Congress, you will shew the unreasonableness of it, by setting forth the necessity there was to take the proper precautions and make such preparations as were requisite for preventing the ill consequences of the offensive alliance, which the Duke de Ripperda, when first minister to the King of Spain owed to Our Ambassador, to the Ambassador of the States General, and to several other ministers from foreign princes then residing at Madrid, had been made between the Emperor and the King of Spain, for taking by force Our town of Gibraltar, and for supporting the Ostend East India Company, which last was confirmed by His Catholick Majesty's letter to the States General, and the declarations that his minister at The Hague made to them on that subject, besides which there was at that time undoubted intelligence that several projects had been under deliberation at the Court of Spain, for invading Our dominions and setting the Pretender upon Our throne. And in consequence of one of those projects, a considerable body of the Spanish troops was ordered to march to the coasts of Galicia, and this was further confirmed by the publick encouragement that was given at the Court of Spain to the Pretender's adherents ; an order was also then published at Cadiz, in the same manner as had been done about the time of the rupture between Our Crown and that of Spain in 1718, allowing and encouraging the fitting out of privateers to cruize against the enemys of Spain : all which proceedings of that Court do sufficiently justify the stopping in America the treasure which it was known was intended to be seized and applied

¹ The text of this will be found in Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IV, p. 45.

to those purposes by the King of Spain, though the far greater part thereof belonged to Our subjects and those of Our Allys, so that the King of Spain was plainly the aggressor ; and the sending the said squadron to the West Indies was judged by Our Allys a necessary step for preventing the execution of the designs then carrying on ; and therefore We and Our Allys might with greater reason expect an indemnification from the Emperor and Spain, the expences on Our part upon this occasion, having been intirely owing to the conduct of those two powers by their entring into such destructive and unwarrantable treatys and measures, which demand We have however forborn to make, being willing rather to sit down with that loss than to revive the memory of past injurys and thereby obstruct that perfect reconciliation between the several contracting powers, which is the chief end and design of this Congress, and towards which We are desirous to contribute all that can reasonably be expected from Us. And therefore if no demand of this kind should be made on the part of Spain you will not make use of any of these arguments, which are only suggested to you upon such a supposition.

You shall take care that in the treaty to be made, it be effectually stipulated, in pursuance of the second and third articles of the preliminaries, and the act signed at the Pardo the 6th of March last (N.S.), that all the priviledges of commerce, which Our subjects and those of Our Allys enjoyed, be restored to that usage and regulation which are conformable to the treatys antecedent to the year 1725, and that accordingly all the ships and effects belonging to Our South Sea Company, which were seized in the several parts of His Catholick Majesty's dominions in America or elsewhere, in manifest breach of the Assiento contract made on the 26th March 1713 between Our Royal predecessor Queen Anne and the King of Spain, be delivered up to the agents of Our said company, if such restitution shall not have been already made ; and that all proclamations and orders of what nature soever, which shall have been issued to the prejudice of their commerce and contrary to treaties, by His Catholick Majesty or his Viceroy, Governors or other officers, be recalled and annulled, and that justice shall be done them upon their several complaints of the wrongs and injury which they have suffered, and of hardships that have been laid upon them in breach of the said Assiento contract and of the convention made at Madrid the 15th/26th May 1716 between

Our late Royal Father and the King of Spain for the explanation thereof ; and if the proper orders for that purpose have not been given by the King of Spain, pursuant to the said preliminaries and act since signed at the Pardo, you will see, that in the treaty to be made, sufficient care be taken, that what has been agreed to on this head shall be effectually complied with. If on the other hand, the King of Spain or his subjects have any complaints to make of any counterband trade, carryed on by Our South Sea Company or their agents, or others employed by them, or other contraventions on their part to the said Assiento contract, or convention, you shall allow of their being received and discussed at the Congress, and you shall abide by what shall be there decided on that head, taking care upon the whole, that the commerce of Our said company may by the treaty which you are to make be effectually re-established upon the foot it ought to be according to the said contract and convention, and to the 12th article of the treaty of peace made at Utrecht between the late Queen Anne and the King of Spain in the year 1713.

And whereas the examining into the complaints of Our South Sea Company of the wrongs and injurys done them on the one hand, and into the charge which the Court of Spain may pretend to bring against them or their agents, of having carryed on an unlawfull trade or having otherwise acted contrary to the said contract and convention, may possibly, on account of the great distance of the places where such transactions may be alledged to have happened, or for other causes, require a longer time than can be allowed during this Congress, which We desire to bring to a conclusion as soon as possible, you shall in such case procure an article to be inserted in the treaty to be made as aforesaid, referring the discussion and determination of those matters to commissioners to be nominated and appointed respectively by Us and by the King of Spain, who shall have sufficient powers and authority for that purpose.

Whereas by the 40th article of the Assiento contract before mentioned, it is, among other things, expressly stipulated, that in case of a war declared by Our Crown against that of Spain, or by the Crown of Spain against Ours, the Assientists shall be allowed a year and a half from the time of such declaration to withdraw their effects, notwithstanding which it has happened twice that in manifest breach and violation of the said treaty the

ships and effects of Our South Sea Company have been seized and detained and part of them sold by the King of Spain's viceroys, or governors or other officers in America, even before any such declaration of war, or immediately after, to the great loss and damage of Our said company; you shall take particular care that in the treaty to be made at the Congress, there be inserted an article or clause, conceived in the strongest, clearest and most positive and express terms possible, declaring His Catholick Majesty's disapprobation of such proceedings, and making the most effectual provision that can be thought of for preventing for the future any breach of the said contract in a point so essential and of so great importance.

You are to insist that in the treaty to be made as aforesaid, effectual care be taken of the restitution of the effects belonging to several of Our subjects trading to or residing in the King of Spain's dominions, which have been seized; and also that justice shall be done upon the illegal and unwarrantable imprisoning of Our Consuls in some of the ports of Spain, and upon the complaints of Our subjects of the depredations made upon them in America, and of other wrongs and injurys done them by the King of Spain and his subjects in breach of the treatys of peace and commerce made at Utrecht in the year 1713 between the late Queen Anne and the King of Spain, and of other treatys subsisting between the two Crowns. And for your information therein, We have ordered to be put into your hands all such petitions, memorials and other accounts thereof as have been laid before Us.

And whereas by the 38th article of the treaty of peace, commerce and alliance between Our Crown and that of Spain, made at Madrid the 13th/23rd day of May 1667,¹ and ratified and confirmed by the above mentioned treaty of commerce between the late Queen Anne and the King of Spain made at Utrecht the 28th November/9th December, Our subjects are to enjoy in the territories of His Catholick Majesty the same priviledges, securitys, libertys and immunitys, whether relating to their persons or their trade, with all the beneficial clauses and circumstances as had then been granted, or should thereafter be granted to any other kingdom or state whatever, you shall take care that effectual provision be made in the treaty to be concluded at the Congress as before mentioned, that Our subjects shall enjoy the same priviledges and

¹ See Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, Vol. VIII, p. 32.

advantages, in every respect, in His Catholick Majesty's dominions, as are granted to the subjects of the Emperor by the treaty of navigation or commerce between His Imperial Majesty and the King of Spain, made at Vienna the first day of May 1725 N.S.¹

As to the restitution of prizes taken at sea on either side during the late disputes between Us and the King of Spain, great difficultys appearing in the execution of what is stipulated in that behalf by the preliminary articles, We have by the aforesaid act made at the Pardo the 6th of the last month consented that the same should be referred to the consideration of the Congress, and you are accordingly to admit of this point's being there discussed and determined, and to abide by the decision of the Congress thereupon. But if this discussion should be likely to require a considerable time, We being unwilling that the conclusion of the Congress should be delayed on that account, do hereby direct you in that case, to agree that commissioners be appointed on both sides to be duly authorised and empowered to examine into those matters, and finally to settle and determine the same.

Having thus signified to you Our pleasure upon the several matters that occur to Us relating to the preliminaries which do more immediately concern Us or Our Allys, We do hereby further direct, that if, when those are settled and determined, any propositions shall be offered which may concern Us or Our Allys, and are not strictly within the intention and meaning of the preliminaries, or which may relate to those powers that are invited to send their ministers to the Congress, or to any other powers, whose interests or pretensions may affect the general peace and tranquillity of Europe, you may receive the same, and transmit to Us such proposals with the sentiments of the ministers of Our Allys upon them, whereupon you shall have Our further orders.

You shall be careful to maintain a good correspondence with the ministers of all princes and states in amity with Us residing at the place of Congress, and as far as you are able, you shall endeavour to discover their several transactions one with another, and to penetrate into the designs and dispositions of their respective masters.

As to the regulations to be observed in the Congress, you shall conform to what is stipulated by the 9th and 10th preliminary articles, and accordingly make what was the practise in that respect

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. II, 1728, pp. 127-77.

at the late Congress at Cambray your rule, so far as the same may be applicable to the present circumstances, there being now no mediator ; taking care however in what relates to the ceremonial to have a due regard to the preserving of Our rank and dignity, yet at the same time to avoid unnecessary disputes upon points not essential : and We do also strictly enjoin you to avoid all obstructions or embarrasements which might in any manner protract or disturb the Congress or delay the conclusion of it.

You will receive herewith three full powers, in one of which We appoint you Our Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiarys, in another Our Ambassadors and Plenipotentiarys, and in the third Our Plenipotentiarys only, whereof you will produce as there shall be occasion, that which shall be agreeable to what is practised by the ministers of other powers at the Congress, and which shall set you upon an equal rank with them : and whereas Our Royal Predecessor King Charles the second did, by his order in council bearing date the 26th day of August 1668, direct that his Ambassadors should not for the future give the hand in their own houses to envoys, according to what is practised by the ambassadors of other princes ; if you make use of either of those powers, in which the title of Our Ambassador Extraordinary, or of Our Ambassador is given you, you shall, in pursuance of the said order in council, observe the ceremonial therein prescribed, and take the hand of envoys in your own houses.

If any unexpected difficulties should arise in the execution of these Our instructions to you or in the course of your negociation, upon which you shall think it necessary to receive Our particular orders, you shall send Us an account thereof fully stating the case as it shall appear to you, informing Us at the same time of the manner in which it is understood by the other ministers at the Congress, and of the opinion thereupon of those of Our Allys ; upon which we shall signify to you Our further pleasure.

You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as you shall receive from Us or one of Our principal Secretaries of State with whom you shall constantly correspond.

(B.M., *Add. MS.* 32756, *fo.* 77.)ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT THE
CONGRESS OF SOISSONS.

St. James', 23 May 1728.

You shall demand the restitution of the effects belonging to Our South Sea Company, seized in America by the King of Spain's officers, before the beginning of the former war between Our Crown and that of Spain, in open violation of the Assiento contract, in pursuance whereof Our said company ought to have been allowed eighteen months for the withdrawing of their effects even after a publick declaration of war; which restitution was expressly stipulated by the treaty made at Madrid, the 13th of June 1721,¹ between Our late Royal Father and the King of Spain; yet the far greater part of those effects or the produce thereof remain to this day in the hands of the Spanish officers. And if His Catholick Majesty's ministers, should among the demands or complaints they may possibly bring against Our said company alledge that they have not, according to the Assiento contract accounted with the King of Spain for his quarter part of the profits of the trade carried on by them by virtue of the said contract, you shall reply that they have laid out considerable sums of money for His Catholick Majesty's use, but the making out such an account has been rendred impossible by the very seizing and detaining of their effects in the manner beforementioned, as well as by the many exactions, hardships and impositions that have been laid upon that trade by the King of Spain and his Viceroyes and Governors or other officers, which have hitherto kept the possessions and commerce of Our said company upon so precarious a foot that it would not be possible for them to give a certain account of their stock in trade in the West Indies and much less of their profits and losses, till their effects unduly seized have been fully restored to them, or the value of such as have been consumed or sold, according to what they would have produced if they had been disposed of by the company or their agents; so that the not making up of this account is owing to the Spaniards themselves, and not to any failure or neglect on the part of the company; but that as a particular inquiry and examination into these matters, and settling an account of many different articles and is to be made up out of

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IV, 1728, p. 98.

informations and vouchers to be had for the most part from the West Indies, will require much more time than it is to be hoped the Congress will last, you are ready to agree to the inserting an article in the treaty to be made for the referring as well this demand on the part of the Crown of Spain, of an account to be made up, as the other on behalf of the company of the restitution of their effects or the value thereof to be amicably adjusted by commissioners to be appointed for that purpose on each side, and duly authorized finally to settle and determine the same.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 80.)

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT THE
CONGRESS OF SOISSONS.

St. James', 24 May 1728.

Whereas on occasion of the present King of Sardinia's being put in possession of the Kingdom of Sicily, a declaration was signed at Utrecht the 25th February/8th March in the year 1712/13 by the ministers plenipotentiarys of Our Royal predecessor Queen Anne and of His said Sardinian Majesty then Duke of Savoy, importing that the subjects of Our Crown should continue to enjoy all those rights, privileges, libertys and intire security as to their persons, goods, ships, seamen, trade and navigation in the said Kingdom of Sicily, which by virtue of treatys made between Great Britain and Spain, they had enjoyed or ought to have enjoyed, making mention particularly of the treaty concluded at Madrid the 13/23th day of May in the year 1667, by the 38th article of which last mentioned treaty Our subjects residing in or trading to the said island are intituled to all privileges, securitys, libertys and immunitys whether concerning their persons or trade with all the beneficial clauses and circumstances which had been or should be granted to the Most Christian King, the States General of the United Provinces, the Hans towns or any other kingdom or state whatsoever; and whereas the said Kingdom of Sicily was by the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance, signed at London the 22nd July/2nd August 1718,¹ yielded to the Emperor in the state it then was; since which Our subjects residing there and trading to the said kingdom, have suffered several hardships, and been

¹ A. F. Pribram, *Oesterreichische Staatsverträge, England*, Vol. I, pp 366-68.

subjected to several exactions, which are not imposed on those of France and other nations, you shall endeavour to procure an article to be inserted in the treaty to be made at the Congress, for securing to Our said subjects the libertys, privileges, immunitys and advantages to which by the above mentioned treatys they are entitled, and which they constantly enjoyed whilst that kingdom remained in possession of the Crown of Spain, or of the present King of Sardinia ; it being extremely hard as well as unjust that Our subjects trading to that kingdom should be in a worse condition than they were before the Emperor's acquisition of it, considering the great share that Our Crown had in contributing towards it.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32757, fo. 302.*)

NEWCASTLE TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

Hampton Court, 26 July 1728.

. The King has received advices from several hands, that the Emperor and the King of Prussia are using all their endeavours to detach the Crown of Denmark from the Hanover allies ; Your Excellencys know how material it is to keep that power firm in our interest, and how great a share of the scheme and support of the Hanover alliance depends upon the convention with the King of Denmark, and the number of troops which in pursuance of it are to furnisht from thence ; and surely the Cardinal will not do anything that may fling His Danish Majesty into the hands of the Emperor, who is already but too strong and powerfull in that part of the world.

As to the succession of Juliers and Berg, it is not the concern of His Majesty more than that of France or any other power whose interest it may be to see the balance of power in Europe preserved, which would certainly suffer from the sequestering of so considerable a country into the Emperor's hands. This His Majesty thinks may be avoided, if that matter comes to be decided in the way proposed in my Lord Townshend's letter to the Pensionary, according to the treaty between the Elector of Brandenburg and the house of Nieubourg in the year 1666,¹ which is not liable to the inconveniencys mentioned in Your Excellency's letter ; for you will see by the inclosed extract of that treaty, that if any disputes

¹ A genealogical table showing the rights in this question will be found in Rousset, *Recueil*, VII, 1733, p. 340.

should arise about that succession, they are to be decided by a friendly arbitration, *modo compromittendi*, and upon that foot, the Prince of Sultzbach would, upon failure of the Elector Palatine, take possession of that country as next heir, which he would keep till the matter were determined in an amicable manner. However the King thinks any apprehensions or dangers that may arise upon this point may be more properly provided against in the treaty to be made, as the Cardinal proposes, with the four Electors of the Palatine house, who are more nearly concerned in it, and will therefore no doubt take care to have effectual provision made on this head. I must on this occasion repeat to you His Majesty's desire, that His Eminence will communicate to him the draught of this treaty, which must now be in good forwardness.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 400.)

TOWNSHEND TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

Hampton Court, 5 August 1728.

. The King must still desire that the Cardinal will give him some assurance that if any equivalent is to be given for Sleswick to the Duke of Holstein, no share of the burden shall fall upon His Majesty, and this, for the reasons formerly mentioned to you, the King thinks he may in justice expect from His Eminence and that he will be the less scrupulous of doing it because such an assurance may be given without the intervention of any other power and even so as to remain an intire secret, if His Eminence desires it.

The next point that I must mention to you is the affair of Mecklenburg¹ And as this is a point of a most publick nature and which may in its consequences embroyl all that part of Germany and consequently the whole Empire, it highly imports France, as well as His Majesty, to obtain some security from the Imperial

¹ The disorders arising from the Regency of Duke Charles Leopold had led the nobility of Mecklenburg to appeal for redress to the Emperor who had then appointed George I, as Elector, and the Duke of Wolfenbüttel to be Imperial commissioners for the Duchy. On the death of George I, the Emperor, arguing that the commission had lapsed, issued a decree (11 May N.S. 1728, for which see Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. VII, p. 19) foreshadowing the appointment of the King of Prussia in lieu of the Elector of Hanover. Against this George II protested, but the Emperor (see below, pp. 43, 48) continued as before. (See Professor Basil Williams in *English Historical Review*, XV, p. 270.)

Court on that head, in order to prevent the general tranquillity's being interrupted by the disputes that may arise from those quarters. You were directed to endeavour to procure a declaration from Count Sinzendorff pursuant to the draught then sent you inclosed. You must still insist upon having such a declaration, but in case you meet with difficultys in obtaining it, His Majesty, finding by your letter that Count Sinzendorff had assured the Cardinal that there should be no alteration in the Imperial Commission now subsisting in Mecklemburg, hopes His Eminence will at least obtain a letter to himself from Count Sinzendorff to that purpose, and if the Cardinal will transmit a copy of it to His Majesty with assurances in the name of the Most Christian King that in case the Court of Vienna should break this promise of Count Sinzendorff's France will assist the King in obliging the Emperor to make good his engagements on this head,¹ and with assurances that the execution of the said commission shall remain solely in the hands of the King and the Duke of Wolfenb[uttel] until the disputes between the Duke of Meklenb[urg] and his nobility are terminated,¹ His Majesty will be satisfied with such a letter and assurance on the part of France and insist no further on Count Sinzendorff's signing such a declaration.

There is one thing more which being of great importance to the Germanick body and intirely agreeable to the maxims of the Court of France, the King hopes that the Cardinal will the more readily come into it. The Emperor has for some time exercised a despotick power in the Empire, not inferior to that which was assumed by Ferdinand the 2nd which occasioned the long and destructive war that was ended by the Treaty of Westphalia. The Cardinal has been so sensible of this that he, as well as the King, has been desirous of taking all opportunitys to encourage the Princes of the Empire to exert themselves in opposing this exorbitant power of the Court of Vienna. These endeavours have met with such success that some of those princes have entered into conventions for this purpose, and are preparing heads of grievances to be brought before the Congress in hopes of having the assistance of France, as guarantee of the Treaty of Westphalia, towards obtaining redress. But considering the turn that affairs are now taking, it is impossible to think the Congress can continue so long as to have anything of this nature determined or even transacted there,

¹—¹ Added in margin in Townshend's hand.

so that those princes will ¹lose all their confidence in England and France, will¹ be thrown into the utmost despair and into the most abject slavery to the Court of Vienna in order to atone, as they will think, for their past misbehaviour, unless some sort of encouragement be given them. And therefore His Majesty thinks it would be highly for the interest of the Most Christian King as well as for the honour of the two Crowns that some method should be found out for giving those princes assurances on the part of France that that Crown, as a guarantee of the Treaty of Westphalia, will be ready at any time, upon a proper application from them or any other Princes of the Empire to receive and examine their complaints, and to have their grievances redressed.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32758, fo. 102.*)

Windsor Castle, 12 September 1728.

. The King was very glad to see the project of a treaty with the four Electors,² which was put into your hands by Mor-Chauvelin, and transmitted in that letter. His Majesty's chief view is to promote as much as possible the making a general peace, and the strengthening and perpetuating it by the most effectual measures. In this view His Majesty was often concerned to find, as Your Excellencies will have seen by the Duke of Newcastle's letters to you, that there was no prospect of bringing the grievances and disputes in the Empire before the Congress to be discussed and decided there; and the Pensionary and the Greffier, Your Excellencies may very well remember, have likewise frequently expressed their uneasiness on this head, and His Majesty saw very plainly that while those differences were on foot, and no provision was made for terminating them, or for preserving the peace of the Empire, there was no probability that the publick peace could long subsist, or that our labours at Soissons could have the desired effect of bringing about a lasting pacification. Wherefore it was a more sensible satisfaction to the King to find that the Cardinal had traced out another way, without the intervention of the Congress, to maintain the peace of the Empire, and consequently to secure more firmly that of Europe, by forming the project of the treaty with the four Electors.

¹—¹ Added in margin in George II's hand.

² Of the house of Wittelsbach, viz., Trier, Cologne, Palatine and Bavaria. For these negotiations see Professor Basil Williams, *E.H.R.*, Vol. XV, pp. 321 and 441.

The King upon perusing the said project, approves the view and design of it in general very well, and thinks it extremely necessary to provide for the peace of the Empire and the maintenance of its liberties and privileges, according to former treaties, and the fundamental laws of that body, in the manner proposed by that project, since the means of doing it by the sanction of the Congress are looked upon as liable to too many difficulties.

As to the separate and secret article of the project,¹ the King is intirely disposed and thinks it absolutely necessary to take measures for preventing any troubles on account of the succession to the dutchies of Juliers and Berg, and looks upon the main drift of that article to be entirely right, though His Majesty would have the wording of it altered, and drawn up more inoffensively to the King of Prussia, upon the account of our former engagements to that prince. The King saw that care had been taken in the whole project, not to use any expression that might give any just occasion of offence to the Emperor, and though His Majesty knows that he has as little reason as France to manage the King of Prussia or to be in any wise solicitous for his interests, yet His Majesty cannot help being of opinion that our engagements may be as effectual, though expressed in such terms as not to give the King of Prussia any just exception to what we do, the 14th article of the Treaty of Cleves being the basis of the secret article made with him, when he was a party to the Treaty of Hanover. This spirit of inoffensiveness the King takes to be the most prudent, and therefore His Majesty has ordered the separate and secret article to be modelled which, in that manner, is couched in such general terms as to take from the King of Prussia all just handle of offence, and at the same time to secure the Palatine house from being disturbed in the possession of Berg and Juliers.

P.S. You were extremely in the right in assuring Mr. Chauvelin, that His Majesty would never be content with the suspension of the Ostend trade for the term of seven years only, from the signing of the treaty. The answer from Spain is indeed conceived in doubtfull and uncertain terms, but seems to lay the greatest stress upon troops being put into the places promised to Don Carlos in Italy, upon which article you have already seen His Majesty's sentiments, which are favourable towards Spain; and the King inclines to think with Your Excellencies, that this point

¹ For this see ff. 112v-114.

of the garrisons may be managed in such a manner, as to bring the Court of Spain to consent to the rest of the project. His Majesty therefore does not doubt but Your Excellencys will take care, in case you enter into the consideration of signing separately with the Emperor, to have whatever shall be agreed on settled in such a manner, as shall give good grounds to hope, that either Spain will be obliged to comply with the terms proposed, or that the present confidence between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid will be broke upon their refusal, and that the same good correspondence shall not subsist between those two powers, as did after the Emperor had signed and ratifyed the preliminaries; and likewise that the Ostend trade and all the points in dispute between the Emperor and the King and the Dutch be settled to the satisfaction of England and Holland.

(*B.M., Add. M.S. 32758, fo. 195.*)

Windsor, 15 September 1728.

I send you¹ this messenger express without loss of time by the King's special command, who would have Your Excellency, and by you the Cardinal, immediately acquainted with a surprizing step the Imperial Court has made in the business of Meclenburg. His Majesty by the last mails from Holland received not only advices from Germany, but also from Wolfenbuttel a copy of the mandatory letter which the Emperor has writ to that Duke for putting in execution the last decree of the Aulick Council concerning the administration of the affairs of Meclenburg, and you have herewith inclosed an extract from that letter together with the sentiments of His Majesty's ministers and those of the Duke of Wolfenbuttle of what is to be done upon it for your use and to be communicated to His Eminence. Your Excellency will easily conceive how unexpected and how astonishing this stroke was to the King after all that has been lately passed in this matter and the assurances given by Count Sinzendorff to the Cardinal, that there should be no further proceedings in that affair; that the commission should remain upon the former foot, and consequently that the late decree² should be quietly dropped, and no new steps made to have it put in execution; and after the Cardinal's having taken that matter upon himself, His Majesty

¹ Horatio Walpole.

² Of 11 May N.S. 1728. See p. 39 *n*.

expected and thought he might rely upon these promises, but now he finds plainly that the Emperor had no such intention that notwithstanding all the advances about peace, he still meditates revenge, and as he sees that he has prevailed not to have the affairs of the Empire brought before the Congress, he goes on to prepare matters so that after the transactions of Soissons are over without meddling with anything that relates to the Empire, he may have it in his power to wound the King in a very sensible point, and to let him see what he must suffer for having dared to join with France in opposition to him. Wherefore His Majesty would have Your Excellency, upon the receipt of this letter, take the first opportunity of waiting upon the Cardinal and communicate to him the contents of the inclosed paper and of this dispatch, letting him know what has hapned; how extremely surprized the King is at it, and how evident it is that there is no trusting to the pacifick disposition of the Emperor, since he cannot help letting his resentment break out even at this juncture, and has it undoubtedly in his heart to do all the mischief he can to the King as soon as the business of the Congress is over; this was the reason why the King has pressed so earnestly to have this affair of Meclenburg brought before the Congress and settled with the other points of the treaty. But as the Cardinal was averse to have this or any other matters of the Empire discussed in that assembly, His Majesty acquiesced in his opinion, and depended upon the assurances His Eminency had drawn from Count Sinzen-dorff, that the matter of Meclenburg should be made easy, and that there should be no innovation in that commission.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32759, fo. III.*)

NEWCASTLE TO STANHOPE AND WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 6 November 1728.

. Your Excellencies will easily imagine that His Majesty was extremely surprized, considering everything that has past, to find that the Court of Vienna have sent orders to Count Sinzen-dorf, the purport of which, so far as he has communicated them, seems to be a resolution not to sign on any account without Spain, which, when it is once known there, as most probably it will be before that Crown sends any answer to the proposals that the Duke de Bournonville carryed with him, will confirm the Court of

Madrid in the obstinate way they are in. This in the King's opinion is the more surprising, since it appears by your letters that the very thought of a provisional treaty was first started by Count Sinzendorf, quickly after his arrival at Paris, and therefore probably in consequence of the instructions he had received on his leaving Vienna.

To this provisional treaty few material alterations that immediately concerned the Emperor have been made from the first draught, except what relates to the Ostend Company and the settling of the tariff in the Low Countrys¹ which, as the King apprehended, were long since agreed to; and indeed there was all imaginable reason to think so from Count Sinzendorff's earnestness to conclude upon that foot, and even to sign without Spain: and though this new resolution of standing by Spain may have been occasioned by the subsidies received from thence or the expectation of them, yet the bringing again into debate what relates to the Emperor himself, and was looked upon to be adjusted, is so extraordinary a proceeding that the King concludes it can arise from nothing but a resolution not to come to an accommodation.

His Majesty believes, that one way of terrifying the Imperial Court would be to let them see, that if the Congress should be resumed, those points² would infallibly come into debate and the Allies must then insist to have justice done upon them: but since the Court of Spain seems desirous to go back to the Congress, which might be attended with great delays and uncertainties, Your Excellencies will fling out this hint to the Cardinal in such a manner, that he may by no means imagine you mention it as if it were an eligible thing for the Allies to go back to the Congress, but only as what might frighten the Court of Vienna.

But the chief point that the King thinks is to be prest and insisted upon, is, that the Allys of Hanover should, upon the refusal of the Emperour and Spain, take a resolution jointly which should be communicated both to the Imperial Court and that of Spain, whereby the Allys should declare, that in case the Emperor and Spain will not come into the provisional treaty, as last adjusted by Count Sinzendorf with the English, French and Spanish ministers, and promised to be jointly supported by them all, and this within a term certain, for example, two months, the Allies will then break

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. V, pp. 134-9.

² The grievances of the princes of the Empire and the double marriages.

off all negociation, and take the proper measures to obtain redress upon their several grievances, and to procure for themselves that justice which they could not attain to by way of treaty and negociation. This His Majesty looks upon to be the only means left of bringing those two powers to a compliance. The other method has been tried long enough, and sufficiently proved to be ineffectual ; the Hanover allys have been in negociation these two years, and would be kept so still, if the Emperor and Spain should not be made sensible that there must be an end of it ; the fixing of a time in this manner is what has been very often practised, and generally with good success, when powers have had to do with others that would obstinately stand out, though they wanted means to support it, as for instance at the Treaty of Ryswick, that of Utrecht, the Quadruple Alliance, and lastly in settling the preliminarys, which was brought about by the Allys taking this method, the effect whereof was, that after several refusals, the Imperial Court, upon the fixing a time, soon changed their tone and came into what was proposed to them ; nay even the act signed at the Pardo was procured by something very like this. And if one considers the present condition of the Emperor and Spain, and the great necessities they are under for want of money, which appears by the accounts constantly received from both those Courts, and the difficultys the Emperor has reason to apprehend on the side of Hungary, it is not to be imagined but if the Allies will act with vigour, in the manner that His Majesty proposes, it will have its effect, and peace much sooner be brought about this way, than by continuing the negociation.

The points upon which the Court of Spain seems to stand out, as whether the affairs of commerce, the complaints in the West Indies and the restitution of prizes shall be settled in the Congress or by commissarys, to which last Monsieur Patino himself shews a disposition, are not certainly of weight enough to obstruct a general pacification. It must therefore be imputed to some concealed reasons, which can be no other than the Spanish Court hopes, when they have the galeons in their power, to be able to renew the pursuit of their former views and schemes. Nothing can more effectually prevent their flattering themselves with such vain notions and acting upon this principle by seizing the effects of the galeons, than the resolute measure His Majesty proposes, which on that account is well worth the consideration of the French

ministers, with whom the apprehension of such a seizure has so much weight, and they have found by experience, that all gentle methods, even offers from the Allies, of personal advantages to the Queen of Spain and her family, have been of no use at that Court.

. It cannot be denied, that if the Court of France had shewn the vigour they ought to have done, all this must have been over several months ago ; and His Majesty does not conceive, that in justice or friendship the Cardinal can refuse this, or that in interest or policy he should be inclined to do so : for the argument that is flung out by Mo^r. Chauvelin about the return of the galleons, is of all others the weakest, and when it comes to be known by the Court of Spain, as undoubtedly it will, must for ever prevent their complying with any reasonable terms.

(*B.M., Add. M.S. 32759, fo. 192.*)

TOWNSHEND TO STANHOPE AND WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 10 November 1728.

. By these letters ¹ you will see that though His Prussian Majesty has a great mind to get some hold of Meclenburg at this juncture by the means of this new commission, yet he is desirous of doing it with our Master's good liking, and in concert with him ; which, by the help of His Majesty, and that of one of our Princesses with the Prince Royal of Prussia, he hopes may be compassed. On the other hand, the behaviour of the Court of Vienna is very remarkable. Whilst Sinzendorff is giving good words at Paris, that Court is pushing on this affair and animating the King of Prussia, being sensible that if they can effectually engage him in this commission, which they imagine will set him at variance with the King our Master, Sweden, Wolfenbuttel and all the princes of Lower Saxony, he must then follow their fortune, and keep himself intirely attached to them and follow them in all their views and schemes. The King does not however suspect Sinzendorff upon this occasion ; but takes this behaviour on the part of the Emperor to proceed rather from those who are enemys to the Count. However from whatever quarter the springs and motives of these proceedings arise, His Majesty must, as His Eminency will, I am perswaded, agree, provide and arm against them. The

¹ From the King and Queen of Prussia.

Emperor reaps great advantage from this his conduct. Whilst Sinzendorff talks in a calm and accommodating style in France, and does by that means obtain terms favourable at least in appearance in behalf of those who have attached themselves to the Court of Vienna (as in the instance of the Duke of Holstein), the Emperor has other instruments employed in raising difficultys and creating disturbances from all quarters to those princes, who have shewed any partiality to the Hanover allys. In this manner the Duke of Wolfenbuttel in the commission of Meclenburg and in the affair of Mr. Munchausen, and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel in the affair of the County of Hanaw¹, have already felt the effects of the Emperor's resentments, and the indulgence shewn to Sinzendorff in admitting the article for appointing commissarys has given great uneasiness to the King of Denmark, a prince who may be of the greatest use towards preventing any disturbance in Lower Saxony.

Some measures therefore must of necessity be taken to put a stop to the advantages the Court of Vienna will gain by this method of proceeding

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 193.*)

NEWCASTLE TO POYNTZ.

Whitehall, 14 January 1728/9.

Very private.

. As Mr. Chauvelin has very wisely suggested to you that it would be of very great importance and service to the common interest to bring the Duke of Wolfembuttle and the princes of the Wirtemberg League to unite in some treaty with the four Electors, which might form a party without distinction of religions, strong enough to oppose the Emperor's arbitrary views at the diet, and ready to joyn with His Majesty and France in case of a war, the King thinks that considering the discussions to which the forming of a new treaty will be liable and the time it will take up it would be proper to propose the accession of the four Electors to the treaty already concluded between the Dukes of Wolfembuttle and Wirtemberg, to which His Majesty as Elector is a party, which is only a bare treaty of mutual friendship and alliance and has no conditions or stipulations which the Electors can object to, since the same care may be taken to save their prerogatives and privi-

¹ For this succession question see Rousset, *Recueil*, XIII, pp. 163 *et seqq*

ledges as Electors by an article, as was done by His Majesty in his accession. This in the King's opinion would have an immediate good effect without giving any just alarm to the Court of Vienna, there being nothing in this treaty that could occasion it, and would shew the Emperor, that the Princes of the Empire, both Protestants and Papists were jointly determined to support and maintain their rights and privileges whenever they should be invaded, and if the four Electors can be persuaded to take this step, we shall have more leisure to concert a compleat system for preserving the libertys of the Princes of the Empire and keeping the Emperor's power within due bounds.

(*Ibid.*)

Whitehall, 18 February 1728/9.

. His Majesty observing that the fitting out of our guardships had made a noise in France, approved entirely what you said upon that subject to the Marquis de Santa Cruz and to Mo^r. de Fonseca and Count Bassewitz, and was very well pleased with the manner in which the Garde des Sceaux spoke to Mo^r. de Santa Cruz upon this subject, and the assurances he gave him that there was not the least design of intercepting the galleons. His Majesty doubts not but that His Eminence will have entirely approved the motives upon which His Majesty has thought fit to make these preparations since they have not the least view towards any particular expedition, but meerly to shew that His Majesty is not to be surprized, and to satisfy his people at home and his Allies abroad that the King is in a condition to defend and support them.

The necessity of this precaution will appear the more strongly to His Eminence by the communication which the King would have you make him in the utmost confidence and under the same injunction of secrecy as you did upon a former occasion, of the information which you know His Majesty has lately received of the design upon Jamaica. Your Excellency will tell him that the King's reliance upon His Eminence is such that he keeps nothing a secret from him, and has therefore commanded you to trust him with the intelligence His Majesty has received from Spain from such hands as may be depended on, that the Spanish Court, far from being in a disposition to accept the provisional treaty or to come to any accommodation has lately had under consideration the

renewing of the siege of Gibraltar, but seeing no probability of better success in such an undertaking than they have had in their former attempts upon that place, Mo^r. Patino had made a proposal which was actually agreed to and to be put in execution as soon as the galleons arrived, that in order to recover Gibraltar from the Crown of Great Britain in exchange for Jamaica, the Spaniards should take that island from us, which he supposed might easily be effected by a squadron to be sent from Spain which is to be assembled at Cadiz, with some land forces to be put on board, and these to be joyned by what could be had from Cuba and other neighbouring Spanish colonies.

[Two private letters from Townshend to Poyntz on the policy to be pursued in the event of the negotiations with the Emperor and Spain breaking down, and the need of bringing Fleury to explain himself, dated Whitehall, February 21, 1728/9 are printed in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, pp. 638-40.)

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 190.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM STANHOPE, HORATIO WALPOLE AND
STEPHEN POYNTZ, AMBASSADORS EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENI-
POTENTIARY AT THE CONGRESS OF SOISSONS.

St. James', 31 March 1729.

You, the said William Stanhope and Horatio Walpole shall with all convenient speed return to Paris and upon your arrival there, you shall all three desire to have a conference with the Cardinal de Fleury whom you shall assure of the continuance of Our earnest desire and firm resolution to preserve and maintain the union and good correspondence so happily subsisting between Us and Our good brother the Most Christian King which We have upon all occasions cultivated and promoted for the security and welfare of Our respective dominions and the restoring and preserving the general tranquillity of Europe. And you will acquaint him that, as We have always had the most intire reliance upon the uprightness of his intentions for the publick good, his zeal for his own master's service and his friendship for Us, We have commanded you in the greatest confidence to declare to him Our sentiments upon the present situation of affairs, not doubting but he will with the same freedom sincerity and plainness let you know the

sentiments of His Most Christian Majesty, and suggest what in his opinion is proper to be done, for the bringing matters out of their present state of suspense and uncertainty, since by the arrival of the galeons, the time for making the courts of Vienna and Madrid explain themselves is now come.

You will lay before him the just uneasiness We and Our people are under from these long negotiations, and that after all the moderation that has been shewn on the part of the Allies and the endless chicanes and delays on that of the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, the Hanover allies cannot, consistent with their honour and interest, suffer things to continue any longer in the same situation, and therefore We do not doubt but His Most Christian Majesty will readily agree with Us that it is high time one way or another to come to some decision, and not to spend in fruitless conferences the season that is proper for action.

You will receive with these Our instructions a paper containing a state of these negotiations from the signing of the preliminaries to the present time, by which it evidently appears that the Courts of Vienna and Madrid have both, or one of them, from the beginning been continually amusing Us with delays and that although the vigour and resolution of the Allies of Hanover had brought those Courts to sign the preliminaries, the Court of Spain has constantly endeavoured to evade the execution of them. It is therefore highly incumbent upon Us not to suffer any step to be taken which might continue things upon this foot.

That would evidently be the natural consequence of agreeing to renew the negotiations at the Congress, should the Allies of Vienna propose it to Us, as possibly they may, particularly the Court of Spain, when they can no longer avoid returning some answer to Our representations, which is a measure We can never come into, nor are you, on any account whatever, to return to the Congress, for any other purpose but that of signing the provisional treaty or such other act as may be as effectual to bring matters to a final decision, and equally answer the ends of that treaty, and in particular those of procuring to Our subjects just and reasonable satisfaction for the losses which they have sustained by the depredations and unjust seizures of their ships and effects made by the Spaniards, and of securing Our undoubted right to Gibraltar and the Island of Minorca.

You will therefore let the Cardinal know that though We are

determined on Our part to execute the preliminaries, yet We cannot think that the Allies are now by any means obliged to return to the Congress in order to examine the rights and pretensions of the respective parties, it being expressly stipulated by the 8th article that this discussion shall be finished in the space of four months.

As the words and meaning of this article are clearly with Us and fully authorize Our breaking up the Congress, so the conduct of the Allies of Vienna must in the opinion of all the world, sufficiently justify Our refusing to return thither. For when the difficulties arising at the Congress had occasioned the framing of the project of a provisional treaty (the thought which was at first suggested by Count Sinzendorff) and when this project, after much pains and negotiation had, in concert with him, been modelled in such manner that even the Spanish plenipotentiaries did not disapprove of it, but promised to recommend it to their Court, yet though they have now had this project before them seven months, they have never returned any other answer but what was loose, uncertain and inconclusive, nor have they during the four months appointed by the preliminaries for the deliberations of the Congress, or at any time since, made any one step or proposed any method whatsoever for Our coming to an issue, although the Allies were on their part always ready to come into proper measures for that purpose. So that should we return to the Congress, We can expect nothing on the part of the Allies of Vienna but a continuation of the same dilatory and evasive proceedings.

But though these be Our sentiments and this Our fixt and unalterable resolution, you will acquaint the Cardinal that We do not propose it should be made publick till the case exists of such a demand being made by the Emperor and Spain, or that it shall be necessary for Us to declare Our resolution, but that as We have always dealt with him without reserve, We thought fit that you should make this communication to him in the greatest confidence, that, he being apprized of it, some method may be concerted by the Allies for bringing things to a conclusion, upon which We desire to know His Most Christian Majesty's thoughts as soon as possible.

It being impossible for Us to give you more particular instructions till We know with greater certainty what will be the resolution of the Emperor and Spain, and are more fully apprized of the sentiments of Our Allies, you will lose no time in acquainting Us

clearly and explicitly with the Cardinal's thoughts upon what We do hereby order and direct you to represent to him, upon which you will receive Our further pleasure, and you are to obey such further orders as you shall receive from Us or from one of Our principal Secretaries of State.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 193.)

NEWCASTLE TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

Whitehall, 5 May 1729.

. Your Excellencies will therefore take the first opportunity when you are expressing to the Cardinal His Majesty's great satisfaction in what is now done, to acquaint him that, in order to compleat it, the King has directed you to concert with His Eminence what ought to be the next steps immediately upon the Court of Spain's sending such an answer as shall make it necessary to have recourse to other measures, though His Majesty hopes that by their compliance, they will not be to be put in execution. And particularly you will learn from His Eminence in what manner he proposes that France should act against Spain, which His Majesty doubts not but they will be ready to do. Your Excellencies know that His Majesty is fitting out a strong squadron, which when compleat will consist of near twenty men of war, besides bomb-vessells and fireships, and is to be commanded by Sir Charles Wager.

Your Excellencies will be pleased to observe that this negotiation for bringing things to a final conclusion is at present carried on chiefly with Spain, and though nothing is done that can give the Emperor any just umbrage, yet no steps have been hitherto taken with him to shew His Imperial Majesty that, if he will not come in, he must expect the same methods will be taken with him as with the Spaniards, in case they continue obstinate. If the affair of the Ostend trade be the only objection to the Emperor's signing the provisional treaty, it is possible that difficulty may be removed by the expedient which the Cardinal proposes, if the Dutch will come into it ; but whether they will or not, considering the whole burthen of the expense must lye upon them, is very uncertain, and therefore the King is of opinion that some method should be thought on of giving the Court of Vienna to understand in the same way as has been done to Spain, that unless they will

come to a speedy conclusion upon the foot of the provisional treaty which they have all along seemed disposed to, the Allys will be obliged to use the proper means for doing themselves justice.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 193.)

Whitehall, 12 May 1729.

I laid [your despatches of May 6/17] before the King who was very glad to find by them that the Court of Spain seems to be in a better disposition towards His Majesty than they have hitherto been, as appears from the Marquis de la Paz's having altered his style in his letters to Mr. Keene, as the Spanish ministers at Compiègne have done the manner of their behaviour towards Your Excellencies. But as His Majesty can form no judgement from the conversation you had with the Spanish plenipotentiarys what will be the points which that Court will insist upon for bringing matters to an accommodation you will continue to give the strongest general assurances of the King's perfect disposition to be reconciled to their Catholick Majesties, without entring into any other particulars than those which have lately been transmitted to our ministers in Spain. In the meantime His Majesty would have Your Excellencies continue to keep the Cardinal up to the notion of settling the proper measures to be taken, in case the answer expected from Spain should not prove satisfactory.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 43, *no.* 9.)

TOWNSHEND TO THE PLINIPOTENTIARIES.

Hanover, 31 May/11 June 1729.

. As Mr. Keene's last advices give us reason to suspect that the Queen will insist upon the introduction of Spanish instead of Swiss garisons and that she will demand this as a condition *sine qua non*, and as the Cardinal has given Your Excellencies to understand that he would rather consent to this than break off with Spain, and as Your Excellencys desire to know His Majesty's intentions and commands upon this point without loss of time, I am ordered to acquaint you that His Majesty finding that the Cardinal is of opinion that Their Catholick Majestys may be gratified in this particular, and finding likewise by what the Pensionary and Greffier said to me and my Lord Chesterfield that it was their

opinion the Allies of Hanover ought to comply with this demand, in case the Queen of Spain should insist upon it, they making no question but that when His Imperial Majesty saw that England France Spain and Holland had agreed in the same determination upon that head, he would acquiesce and not pretend to give trouble on that account, His Majesty, for these reasons, is inclinable to agree to that expedient, provided that all the articles of the preliminarys and of the act of Pardo be faithfully and punctually executed, that the trade of His Majesty's subjects be effectually put upon the same foot it was by virtue of the treatys made before the year 1725, and that all the goods and effects in general belonging to the South Sea Company seized in the dominions of Spain, be immediately restored and the several cédulas formerly granted pursuant to treatys be renewed to them. And as His Majesty is highly concerned to see justice done to all his subjects who have suffered from the depredations of the Spaniards, he further expects that they should have redress and satisfaction with respect to their several complaints.

But as this engagement in favour of Spain goes beyond the stipulations of the Quadruple Alliance and may consequently draw upon the King the resentment of the Emperor and of his friends in the Empire, His Majesty must likewise insist that care should be taken that Spain, as well as the powers parties to the treaty signed at Hanover, should engage, in case His Imperial Majesty or his partizans on account of the affair of Meclenburg or on any other pretence should endeavour to take their vengeance on His Majesty's dominions in Germany, to assist His Majesty and secure him from any resentment on that side.

Having explained to Your Excellencies the terms and conditions upon which His Majesty may be induced to comply with Their Catholick Majestys request as to Spanish garisons, I am now to suggest to Your Excellencys a danger to which His Majesty apprehends we may be exposed unless obviated by some previous precaution taken by the two Crowns. May not the Emperor when he sees us determined to gain the Queen of Spain by gratifying her in the abovementioned demand, resolve in order to defeat us, to take the lead with the Queen of Spain and give the eldest Archdutchess to Don Carlos? It deserves therefore a very serious consideration how far we should agree to the Spanish garisons without obtaining from Their Catholick Majestys some

satisfactory assurance as to the person to whom they intend to marry Don Carlos. I cannot see if they seriously intend to renew their friendship with the two Crowns why they might not recal Mad^e. de Beaujolois¹, or why should not the two Crowns take some opportunity of declaring to the Emperor that in case he gives the eldest Archdutchess to Don Carlos, the two Crowns shall think themselves at liberty to enter into such engagements with the houses of Saxony and Bavaria as they think necessary towards securing the balance of power in Europe.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 193.)

Hanover, 31 May/11 June 1729.

. As to your dispatch in which you gave an account of what pass'd with the Cardinal relating to the new project of a treaty with the four Electors as deliver'd by Count Albert to the French ministers, His Majesty thinks the preservation of the libertys and privileges of the Princes of the Empire so essential towards maintaining the balance of power in Europe and towards establishing the general peace upon a solid foundation, that he is very desirous to enter into this alliance jointly with France. But as to the project itself and the several secret articles annex'd, it will require a little time to examine and compare them. The King however observ'd at first sight that though the Electors are very sparing in their offers relating to His Majesty's concerns in the Empire, yet they are extremely careful and solicitous to secure their own particular interests. His Majesty is also a little surprised that there should be any nicety with regard to the article to be inserted in this treaty in relation to the affairs of Mecklenburg. Your Excellency will not fail to acquaint the Cardinal (as you Mr. Walpole did Count Albert) that it would be most unreasonable to expect that His Majesty would enter into a treaty with the said Electors for preserving the laws and constitutions of the Empire without taking at the same time effectual measures for redressing a manifest breach made upon the rights and libertys of the Empire which actually exists at the time this treaty is to be concluded, and in which His Majesty is personally and most nearly concern'd. But were the objection made by His Eminency founded, the Electors have it now in

¹ Youngest daughter of the Regent Orleans.

their power to obviate any imputation of having acted irregularly ; for His Imperial Majesty having sent his instructions, which (as we are informed) are already in the hands of his commissarys at Ratisbon to bring the affair of Meclenburg before the Dyet, the Electors may not only give directions to their own ministers, but likewise induce such other princes as they can influence to send orders to theirs to declare in concert with the King's ministers and those of the Duke of Wolfenbuttel against the late decree of the Aulic Council¹ which establishes the new administration in Meclenburg, and after having once declared their sentiments upon this matter, it can never be look'd upon as irregular in them to enter into measures for securing the liberties and the constitution of the Empire from so fatal a blow, or if the Court of Vienna should delay bringing this affair before the Dyet, the Electors in concert with the King and the Duke of Wolfenbuttel may, as the Cardinal has already hinted, bring this matter themselves before the Dyet, so that it depends entirely upon the Electors themselves to obviate the objection which the Cardinal makes to their entring into an article relating to the affairs of Meclenburg in the manner the King desires.

Your Excellency[s] will also in the King's name make the strongest acknowledgements to the Cardinal for the care and concern he has shewn upon this occasion for His Majesty's interests in particular, and for the liberties and privileges of the Princes of the Empire in general, and you will assure His Eminency that His Majesty will ever retain a deep sense of his upright behaviour throughout the whole course of our negociations with France.

The King was extremely well pleased with the Cardinal's just and candid way of reasoning with respect to the difficulties His Majesty would be under in case the four Electors should insist upon his giving his guarantee for Juliers and Bergue in favour of the House of Sultzbach in prejudice to the King of Prussia, and you may assure the Cardinal that if the Electors will conclude this treaty upon such terms as may be agreeable to His Majesty and France, the King will most readily give them such a declaration as he has already made to France about not entring into any new engagement on that head in behalf of the King of Prussia.

¹ Of 27 January N.S. 1729. See Rousset, *Recueil*, VII, pp. 60-63.

(P.R.O., S.P. 43, no. 9.)

Hanover, 12/23 June 1729.

. I must defer to another opportunity sending Your Excellencys His Majesty's remarks on the project of a treaty with the four Electors, they being not yet finished. In the meantime I must observe to you that Their Catholick Majestys demand of Spanish Garrisons to be introduced into Tuscany and Parma has rendered that alliance more necessary than ever, since by that means the Emperor may be deprived of all hopes of engaging the Empire to oppose the introduction of Spanish troops into those dutchys under pretence of its being contrary to the Quadruple Alliance.

(Ibid.)

Hanover, 29 June/10 July 1729.

. His Majesty observing that Your Excellencies were very desirous to have His Majesty's sentiments as soon as possible upon the reasonings that have passed between Your Excellencys and the Cardinal and Mo^r. Chauvelin in relation to our closing with Spain separately and without the privy of the Emperor, His Majesty has ordered me to dispatch this courier to let you know that he agrees entirely with Your Excellencys and the Cardinal in your way of thinking upon this important point, and is fully satisfied that the behaviour of the Court of Vienna not only from the beginning of this negociation but for some years past, will entirely justify our not suffering the Emperor to have any share either in the negociation or in the treaty to be concluded between us and Spain; so that Your Excellencys, in case a favourable answer comes from Spain, will now find yourselves at full liberty and sufficiently authorised to proceed and conclude the treaty with that Crown upon the plan laid down in your dispatch, His Majesty making no question but that Your Excellencies will take particular care in the treaty to be made that the satisfaction to be given to England should go hand in hand with what shall be done with respect to the succession in favour of Don Carlos.

[For a private letter from Newcastle to Stanhope on the state of the Spanish treaty and suggesting Stanhope should go to Spain,

dated Kensington, 17 July 1729, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, p. 650.]

(*Ibid.*, no. 10.)

Göhrde, 12/23 August 1729.

. Mr. Sutton carries the King's letter to the King of Denmark and is instructed to insist strongly with His Danish Majesty that, pursuant to his engagements, a body of his troops of at least ten or twelve thousand men be ready to march to the King's assistance upon the first notice. Your Excellencys will likewise see by the copy of my letter to the Earl of Chesterfield what His Majesty expects from the States and the instances His Excellency is to make upon this occasion at The Hague. And it is His Majesty's pleasure that Your Excellencys should communicate Dubourgay's letter to the Cardinal and likewise acquaint him with the steps His Majesty has taken in consequence of these advices ; and having thanked him for the declaration mention'd by Dubourgay to have been made by the French secretary at Berlin, you will press him to give orders immediately for a good body of troops being put in a condition to march upon the first notice from hence in case the King of Prussia should proceed to a rupture with His Majesty,¹ and that the said troops may be disposed in such a manner as that they may with the greatest ease as well as expedition be brought to act against the King of Prussia either on the side of Cleves or in such other parts of his territories where it shall be most proper to attack him. You may likewise desire the Cardinal would send orders to Mo^r. Plelo to press the King of Denmark to have that body of troops in readiness for which France pays subsidys. But His Majesty hopes His Eminence will not think that step alone sufficient at this juncture, the King of Denmark not being himself in a condition to furnish within any reasonable time so great a number of troops as his own quota, and the body of troops with which he is to supply France would amount to by vertue of the convention. So that His Majesty does hope that France will not refuse to give orders for a body of their own troops to be ready upon their frontiers to march as occasion shall require in case of a rupture with Prussia, in the manner above mentioned.

¹ In consequence of the arrest of Prussian recruiting sergeants.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32764, fo. 307.*)

TOWNSHEND TO WALPOLE AND POYNTZ.

Whitehall, 2 December 1729.

. The King thinks there is a great deal of weight in what the Cardinal represented, that the guarantying of the Emperor's succession is an affair most nice and difficult in it's own nature, being perplext with many different circumstances, and lyable to various considerations, as the Cardinal very well observes, both with regard to the Empire, and to the Emperor's possessions in Italy, and that any step towards the actual doing of it at this juncture would most probably be attended with the immediate consequences both of depriving the Hanover allies of the means of engaging the King of Sardinia, should we come to want his assistance in case of a war in Italy, and also of making the Emperor still more absolute than ever in the Empire and in all probability might disoblige the Court of Spain. His Majesty on the other hand, gave the utmost attention to what was said by the Dutch ministers, of the great advantage of making use of the present opportunity to settle the affairs of Europe upon such a foot, as may not only prevent the danger of an immediate war in Italy, but secure the general tranquillity upon a sure and lasting foundation, by obtaining from the Emperor satisfaction to the Allies, and redress of the grievances complained of by the princes of the Empire, and of the encroachments he has made in Italy: and what was added by them of the use of such a guaranty to preserve the ballance of Europe and to keep entire the Emperor's hereditary dominions, that they may still be a bulwark to Christendom against the Turks, does, in His Majesty's opinion, very well deserve to be considered.

I must farther observe to you, that it is with the greatest satisfaction that His Majesty sees that the Dutch Plenipotentiaries declared that they intended nothing farther than to propose that this important affair might be made a matter of negotiation: but even this, as the Cardinal took notice, would alarm Spain and strengthen the hands of the Emperor; and therefore, far from promoting a general pacification, might overthrow all that has, with so much pains and patience, been accomplished at Seville towards the attaining of so desirable an end. The King therefore thinks that in this infancy of our renewal of friendship

with Spain, too much care cannot be taken to avoid everything that might give any jealousy to that Crown ; that our first concern ought to be to have the accession of the Dutch in our hands, and then, if, upon communicating our treaty to the Emperor, he should renew the proposition for the guaranty of his succession, and offer on that condition, to consent to all we have stipulated in favour of Don Carlos, the said guaranty, being what he has no right to demand or expect from the Allies, ought not to be given upon those terms, our treaty, so far as it regards His Imperial Majesty, containing no more than what he has already agreed to by the Quadruple Alliance, excepting the circumstance of Spanish instead of Swiss garrisons, which cannot, in truth, be looked upon as a variation of any consequence to him. However, in case the Emperor should make the offer abovementioned, His Majesty does not at present see any great inconvenience that could arise from the Allies assuring His Imperial Majesty, that when he shall have fully complied with what they ask of him with relation to Spain, and given the Allies satisfaction and redress upon the grievances that have so loudly and justly been complained of, and when these points shall have been finally adjusted and determined by treaty, they will then, agreeably to the proposition made by the Dutch plenipotentiarys, enter seriously into the consideration of the terms and conditions upon which it may be proper to secure the guaranty of his succession. The calm and easy situation in which the Emperor's complying with what we desire would place the affairs of Europe, might afford a proper opportunity for deliberating, with the coolness and attention, which so weighty and intricate a matter, as the guarantying of His Imperial Majesty's succession may require ; and upon all the considerations that shall occur in the debating of an affair, which, in its consequences, may affect in so high a degree the interests of the several powers of Europe, also particularly those of His Majesty and his Allies.

These His Majesty's sentiments, Your Excellencies will in the greatest confidence communicate to the Cardinal, not as any determination that His Majesty is come to, but as notions, which His Majesty conceived upon the first reading of your letter, upon a subject that so well deserves further consideration ; and Your Excellencies will, at the same time, assure His Eminence that the first and unalterable maxim and principle, upon which His Majesty will always regulate his sentiments and his actions, is that which

the Cardinal himself laid down as a foundation, of preserving inviolably a strict and indissoluble union and harmony among the Allies; which has hitherto been the means of conducting our affairs, with so much honour and success, to the prosperous condition in which they are at present, and of making so great a progress towards the establishing of an universal and durable peace and tranquillity.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32764, fo. 460.*)

TOWNSHEND TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

Whitehall, 16 December 1729.

Secret.

I send you inclosed a copy of a letter, which Count Broglie has writ to M^r. Chauvelin,¹ which the King thinks is of so very extraordinary a nature, and which may be attended with such dangerous consequences, that His Majesty has commanded me to send a messenger on purpose, that Your Excellencys might have as early notice as possible of what the French Ambassador writes, and take the properest methods you can think of, without letting the secret of your intelligence be suspected, to prevent the ill effects such a letter may have upon the mind of the Cardinal.

Your Excellencys will easily imagine, that it is impossible that Sir Robert Walpole should ever have held such discourse as the Ambassador attributes to him; and as it is most likely that Count Broglie had undertaken before he left France to bring His Majesty to consent to the subsidies and to finish the treaty with the four Electors² as the French court had projected it, he is now most violently angry upon his being disappointed, and to turn the blame from himself, has invented these groundless aspersions,

¹ This letter, dated 26 December, N.S., is in *B.M. Add. 32764, fo. 464*, and in *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 367, fo. 361. A summary of it may be given as that Walpole is opposing the payment of subsidies to the Electors in time of peace; that he wants to keep out of trouble but will provide ships to transport the Spanish troops to Italy; that he talks dangerously about France and inspires the Queen with his ideas, and that his protestations of good intentions are untrustworthy.

² A strong criticism of the treaty with the four Electors and of Townshend's policy in connexion with it will be found in a letter of Horace Walpole to Poyntz, written in France on 4 November 1729, N.S., in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, pp. 659 *et seqq.*

and thrown them upon Sir Robert. He has likewise asserted things relating to the King and the Queen which have no manner of foundation ; and particularly he has misrepresented what His Majesty said to him with relation to the subsidies, the King having told him that in case it came to a warr it was not impossible but that the Parliament might be brought to give subsidies according to this treaty, and in such case His Majesty would be willing to bear his part of the expence.

What the Count alledges of the neutral troops to be furnished by the Quadruple Alliance, and which he takes to be a parallel case, is farr from coming up to the point, for though that treaty was laid before the Parliament, yet no money being asked, the expence for those troops was not taken notice of by either House. But it is most certain that, if the circumstances of the Congress of Cambray had made it necessary to apply to Parliament for the succours mentioned in the Quadruple Alliance, they would never have been consented to ; and the late King has often told me, that he was so convinced of this truth, that if the case should ever come to bear, he must find out some method to make Spain bear the expence of those troops. This I frequently mentioned, by way of discourse, to Pozzobueno, who was then minister here from Spain, and to Mo^r. Gazola and to his successor Mo^r. Marquieti, ministers of Parma, whose answer always was, that I need be under no concern about this, for the King of Spain, I might be assured, would be better pleased to be at all the expence, and have Spanish garrisons ; but even if they must be Swiss, he would chuse to pay them himself under hand, in order to have the more influence over them.

Nothing can be of more importance to the King's service, than the preventing at this juncture these false insinuations from taking place with the Cardinal ; for should he entertain the least jealousy of our being in the sentiments Count Broglie represents, he would not fail to communicate his apprehensions to Spain, where their resentment against the Emperor would make all impressions of that nature take effect to a degree that might overturn all our success with that Crown, and consequently throw our affairs into greater confusion than ever. The behaviour of the Dutch at this time, with regard to the guaranty demanded by the Emperor, will make way for these insinuations ; Your Excellencys therefore must employ your utmost endeavours to prevent or cure the

mischief this madman has attempted to do, and no time must be lost in doing it.

Besides, Count Broglie's having taken what has passed with regard to the treaty with the four Electors for the ground work of all his aspersions upon the King, the Queen and others, shews his weakness, as well as his malice ; for the sincerity of His Majesty's intentions as to his engagements with France appears from the concessions he has made in that very treaty, which is now adjusted to their taste in all points, except that of subsidies, of which His Majesty consents to bear his share as to the Elector of Cologne, so that France may put His Majesty's integrity to the tryal, at the expence only of about 15,000*l.* per annum, the King being willing to pay one half to that Elector, which is no great sacrifice for France to make in an affair, which they seem to think of so much importance. If you have any apprehension that these jealousys raised by Count Broglie should make such impression upon the Cardinal, that he should write in the same manner to Spain, Your Excellencys will take care to give such informations and directions to M^r. Keene, that he may be upon his guard.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *No.* 195.)

NEWCASTLE TO POYNTZ.

Whitehall, 21 January 1729/30.

. I sent Your Excellency an extract of the Pensionary's letter to my Lord Chesterfield of the 3rd inst. N.S., and His Majesty having ordered His Lordship to send an answer to it, agreeable to what I wrote to Your Excellency upon that subject, the Pensionary wrote another letter of the 6/17th of which I send Your Excellency a copy, wherein you will see that he drops for the present the entering immediately into a concert for the mutual security of the Allies, and is extremely earnest that something should be said to the Emperor to cure the suspicions (as he expresses it) that His Imperial Majesty may have conceived of the engagements which the Allies have taken by the Treaty of Seville, as you will find more particularly explained in the paper that the Pensionary sent at the same time of which a copy is also inclosed.

The King thinking it of the utmost necessity to carry the Dutch along with us, and to remove every difficulty that might possibly

obstruct the execution of the Treaty of Seville, in which the faith and interest of the Allies are so much concerned, is willing to give into what the Pensionary proposes provided the Cardinal approves of it, that it does not retard the execution of the Treaty of Seville, that it be agreed at the same time to enter into a concert for our mutual security, and therefore my Lord Chesterfield is to return the inclosed answer to the Pensionary and to send him a draught of a declaration which may be made by the ministers of the Allys to those of Vienna. Your Excellency will see by the copys of these papers that at the same time that the King in some measure gives into the Pensionary's notion, His Majesty proposes that it should be done in such a manner as cannot give the least jealousy to the Queen of Spain, but on the contrary should convince Her Catholick Majesty that one of the chief views of putting it in this way is to know the Emperor's resolution, so as to be able to secure the execution of the engagements of the Treaty of Seville, either peaceably or otherwise, by the time limited, which must evidently appear to be the real intention of the Allies, if they now concert measures for their mutual security as well as for the execution of that treaty.

Your Excellency will find by my Lord Chesterfield's letter to the Pensionary that you are to make no mention of the offer to be made to the Court of Vienna till the Dutch ministers receive their orders for that purpose, and that then you are only to second them in what they shall say to the Cardinal upon it, that it may appear to arise, as it really does, purely from the Pensionary, and to convince the Cardinal of this you will then communicate to him in the greatest confidence, the enclosed papers containing an account of what has passed between the Pensionary and Lord Chesterfield upon that head. The Imperial Court by the answer they have lately given to Lord Waldegrave and the other ministers of the Allies at Vienna have themselves furnisht a very proper occasion for the making to them such a declaration as is proposed ; for since they have declared that the Emperor will stand by his treatys, it is very natural for the Allys to shew that they have not stipulated anything contrary thereto except in the case of Spanish garrisons. And at the same time that this satisfaction is given to the Emperor, His Majesty thinks it absolutely necessary that the Imperial ministers should be told that the Allies hope that after this declaration His Imperial Majesty will make no difficulty in

agreeing to what has been done but that in all events the Allies are determined forthwith to execute their engagements to Spain. Your Excellency will take care to do this in such a manner as may not give the Cardinal the least reason to suspect that His Majesty has any view towards separate measures, but only to bring matters to a short issue.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32765, fo. 143.*)

Whitehall, 22 January 1729/30.

I send you a copy of a letter that is come this morning from Brigadier Du Bourgay, by which you will see that the advices I sent you last night, relating to the designs and motions of His Prussian Majesty were not ill founded. Your Excellency will please without loss of time to communicate this letter to the Cardinal, and represent to him that, as these accounts and particularly the circumstances of Mr. Kniphausen's having laid aside all thoughts of his being able to divert His Prussian Majesty from these measures, give the greatest reason to apprehend that some sudden attempt may be made upon His Majesty's German dominions, to be supported by the Emperor and the King of Poland, His Majesty hopes that His Eminence will forthwith give the Prussian minister at Paris to understand in the strongest manner that any attempt made by the King of Prussia upon His Majesty's German dominions will be lookt upon by France as a *casus foederis*, and that they shall take part with His Majesty in opposing and resenting it. His Majesty also hopes that orders will be immediately sent to the French Secretary at Berlin,¹ to make the like declaration to the King of Prussia in the name of His Most Christian Majesty.

Your Excellency, as soon as you can procure these orders to the French Secretary, will be pleased to send them thither by a courier, and acquaint Mr. Du Bourgay with what you have done, that he may make such use of it as he thinks most for His Majesty's service.

The Cardinal saw the good effect of the steadiness of France upon the same occasion the last summer; and as all other considerations, except that of seeing his own danger, have not been sufficient to deter His Prussian Majesty from entering into such

¹ M. de Sauveterre, *chargé d'affaires*.

unjust and wild enterprizes, the doing this in a strong and expeditious manner will probably have the desired effect.

His Majesty thinks that His Most Christian Majesty should also give the King of Poland to understand, either by the Polish minister at Paris, if there be one, or by the French minister at Dresden, that his joining with the King of Prussia in disturbing the publick peace must draw upon him the resentment of the Allies.

His Majesty has sent orders to Holland, to make the same instances with the Pensionary; and it is not doubted but the Dutch will readily do what His Majesty with so much justice asks of them.

The King is persuaded that upon these advices, the Cardinal will also have particular regard to the behaviour of the King of Prussia in the plan of operations, which is to be concerted amongst the Allies.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32766, fo. 37.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM, LORD HARRINGTON, AND STEPHEN POYNTZ, AMBASSADORS EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY AT THE CONGRESS OF SOISSONS.

St. James', 18 February 1729/30.

Whereas We have judged it highly requisite that you, Lord Harrington, should forthwith return to the Court of France, both in regard to the great importance of the negociations depending there, and to the necessity there is, of Our Allys being perfectly apprised of Our sentiments and intentions upon the present situation of affairs; you shall accordingly, upon the receipt of these Our instructions, repair to the said Court, and on your arrival there you shall both immediately apply your selves to the putting them in execution.

And whereas We and Our Allys are engaged, by the treaty signed at Seville the ninth of November last,¹ effectually to introduce into the places of Leghorn, Porto Ferraio, Parma and Placentia, garrisons to the number of six thousand men of the King of Spain's troops and in his pay within the space of six months from the date of the said treaty, for the securing of the succession of those states to the Infant Don Carlos, and, in case this introduction should

¹ Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. V, p. 331.

be opposed, to use forcible means for that purpose, and even jointly to undertake a war if it should be necessary ; And whereas the Court of Spain have expressed great uneasiness that measures for that purpose are not yet taken, you shall represent to the ministers of France and Holland, the necessity of removing forthwith the apprehensions of the Court of Spain on this head, and you shall propose in order thereto, that joint assurances may be given on the part of Us, the Most Christian King and the States General, to the King of Spain, of Our firm and positive resolution, to perform punctually these Our engagements, and not to suffer Ourselves to be diverted from the execution of them, or to be amused by negociations, either at the Courts of Vienna or Florence, but that We will immediately concert the proper measures for effectuating the said introduction peaceably or otherwise, according to the treaty, as the case shall require, and that in case of any opposition to the said introduction either from the Emperor or any other power, the Allys will then jointly fall upon him or them wherever their respective situations and the circumstances of affairs make it most convenient, and that for this purpose the plan of mutual security, and for enabling the Allys to make the proper diversions in case of a war, is now concerting at Paris. But at the same time the Court of Spain should be given plainly to understand that without an actual opposition on the part of the Emperor, or refusal to consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, the Allys cannot engage in a war against him.

When it shall be agreed that these assurances be given to His Catholick Majesty, which should be done at a conference with his ministers at the French Court, and also by those of the Allys at the Court of Spain, you will propose that, as the Great Duke of Tuscany has now suffered so long time to pass since the signing of the Treaty of Seville and the notification of it to him without declaring his consent to the peaceable admission of the Spanish garrisons, but on the contrary making proposals tending only to delay and amuse the Allys, the Great Duke should be given to understand that the Allys are determined forthwith to execute their engagements with Spain, and not to suffer themselves to be amused with negociation : and you will concert with the French and Dutch ministers the sending to the respective ministers at Florence the proper orders for that purpose ; and We think it would be very proper at the same time to acquaint the Court

of Spain with the orders sent to Florence, representing however to His Catholick Majesty how advisable it is to use all proper means for procuring the consent of the Grand Duke to the admission of the garrisons, since in that case, the Emperor, if he should oppose it, would be the aggressor, and consequently could not claim the assistance of the Empire, or of any power with whom he may have only a defensive alliance.

To make good these assurances, which We are desirous may forthwith be given to the King of Spain, you are to press with the greatest earnestness the speedy finishing of the plan for the mutual security of the Allys, and for the making a diversion against the Emperor in case he should resolve to oppose the introduction of Spanish garrisons into Tuscany and Parma.

In the meantime you will concert with the ministers of France and Holland, when it may be proper to make a declaration to the Emperor in the words, or to the purport of that formerly sent to you, Mr. Poyntz, viz^t. “Qu’on assurera l’Empereur, que par “le traité conclu à Séville, les alliés n’ont fait aucun autre change-
“ment aux traités antérieurs que celui de troupes suisses en
“troupes espagnoles, et que l’introduction des six mille Espagnols
“n’a autre but que celui d’effectuer à l’Infant Don Carlos la
“succession qui luy est déjà stipulée, et que dès que l’Empereur
“aura consenti à la dite introduction et qu’elle aura été paisible-
“ment effectuée en exécution du traité de Séville, qu’on entrera
“sérieusement dans la discussion de la garantie de sa succession,
“comme aussi de tous les autres points qui restent indécis, entre
“les Alliés et Sa Majesté Impériale.”

And you will accordingly settle and agree with them upon the time and manner of making the said declaration. You will shew the French and Dutch ministers the justice and reasonableness of this measure both with regard to the Emperor, who, when he is thus assured that no engagements have been entered into against him, can have no just pretext to oppose Us in the execution of Our treaty, and to Our own honour, as the world will be thereby convinced of the justice and equity of Our proceedings; and you will make them sensible that this ought to be done without loss of time, since Our measures for the introduction of Spanish garrisons cannot well be finally settled ’till We know what effect this offer will have upon the Emperor, since a greater or lesser force must be provided according to the opposition that may or may not

be expected. And that the Emperor may not flatter himself that by his silence or by making proposals for a negociation he shall be able to keep matters in suspense and retard the execution of Our engagements beyond the term limited, at the same time that this declaration is made to his ministers at Paris and by the ministers of the Allys at Vienna, the Emperor should be given to understand, though not in the way of a menace, that whatever His Imperial Majesty may think fit to do, We and Our Allys shall certainly execute Our engagements within the time prefixt, and that in case of opposition, the Allys must take the proper measures for disappointing and frustrating it.

We are still willing to hope, that the Emperor will so far consider the equity of the engagements and proceedings of Us and Our Allys which have no other view but the securing of the publick tranquillity, and consult his own interest and safety as not to oppose the peaceable introduction of Spanish garrisons into the places of Tuscany and Parma ; but if, contrary to expectation, his refusal or silence should oblige Us and Our Allys to resolve upon supporting this introduction by force, you will then consult with the ministers of the Allys upon the proper measures for that purpose ; what number of ships and land forces shall be employ'd in this service ; and whether it will be most advisable to send them to Tuscany or to any other part of Italy. You will also concert with them the means to be used for engaging the King of Sardinia in Our interest ; where and in what manner the troops of the Allies, pursuant to the plan of security, may be best employed for making a powerfull diversion and preventing the Emperor from sending any number of troops to reinforce his army in Italy ; and you will likewise learn the sentiments of the French and Dutch Ministers, what should be said to the Court of Spain, in case they should absolutely insist upon forming a treaty of equilibre.

You shall follow such further directions as We shall think fit to send you by one of Our principal Secretarys of State, and conform yourselves to such former orders relating to other affairs depending at that Court as you, Mr. Poyntz, have already received.

[For a despatch of Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries deprecating an attack on the Netherlands and giving conditions for guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction, dated 24 March 1730, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, p. 680.]

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32766, fo. 426.*)

NEWCASTLE TO HARRINGTON AND POYNTZ.

Whitehall, 7 April 1730.

. Since the French ministers, after shewing so great an unwillingness to do any thing, did, in your last conference, promise to have an army of 40,000 men on the Rhine, and 18,000 near the Maese, besides the 12,000 promised to the Dutch, and the 18,000 in Dauphiné to watch the motions of the King of Sardinia, and also to furnish 25,000 men to joyn the Spanish troops that are designed to be sent to Italy, on condition that His Majesty and the other Allies will contribute to the charge of the embarkation, etc., His Majesty, to remove all possible doubt that might remain with the Court of Spain of his being desirous to come into any reasonable method that can be proposed for executing the treaty, has commanded me to acquaint Your Excellencies, that you may let the French and Spanish ministers know that His Majesty is willing to take some share in this expence, in case a general plan can be formed to the satisfaction of the Allies, that, at the same time that the war is to be pushed chiefly in Italy, the Emperor may neither be at liberty to send all his troops from his own countrys thither, and thereby continue the war as long as he pleases, nor to make any attack on the dominions of the Allies of Seville, for the part they are taking in the execution of that treaty. And you will also acquaint the Spanish ministers that His Majesty does not intend by this, that his quota for the introduction should be lessened, as, he concludes, it is not the design of any of the other powers; and therefore you may let them know that His Majesty has appointed the regiments of Clayton and Cosby that are at Gibraltar and Port Mahon, which will be commanded by Brigadier Clayton, to be in a readiness to joyn the Spaniards upon the first notice Mr. Clayton shall receive from Mr. Keene for that purpose; and two or three more ships of the line of battle will sail forthwith for the Mediterranean to joyn His Majesty's squadron already there, so that His Majesty's whole quota, both of men and ships, will be ready whenever they shall be called for, and the proper instructions will be sent to the Admiral who is to command His Majesty's squadron, and to Brigadier Clayton who will be at the head of the land forces.

Since the Court of France are for carrying on the war, if any

where, singly in Italy, His Majesty is surprized that no steps are taken towards gaining the King of Sardinia.

As Your Excellencies were to meet upon the consideration of a plan of operations, and no solid general plan can be well framed upon the foot of a neutrality in the Empire, His Majesty approved your not concurring in the orders proposed to be sent to the French ministers at Mayence and Ratisbon for the renewing the declaration at the Diet made in 1727,¹ since Mo^r. Chauvelin had been pleased to put so forced and extraordinary an interpretation upon it, and also suggested, that the plan of operations, which was concerted in 1727 had not been consented to by France, though, as you very well observed, it was proposed by the Marshalls of France. But as this declaration was given so long ago, the King has ordered that affair to be looked into, and as soon as His Majesty has considered what may be proper to be done in it, I shall not fail to send you His Majesty's further commands upon it.

In discussing upon the plan of operations, Your Excellencies may easily remove one objection, which Mo^r. Chauvelin made to that which was proposed, viz^t. that the French army would be between two armies of the enemy, as he said was their case at Höchstet, but France had then only the Electors of Cologne and Bavaria on their side, and a very powerfull alliance against them, and now they would, on the contrary, have with them England and Holland, and several other powers that were then their enemies ; and as to the princes of the Empire, some would be with us, and most of the rest would probably observe a neutrality.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32766, fo. 430.*)

Whitehall, 7 April 1730.

Most Secret.

Your Excellencies will find by my other letter, that His Majesty has consented, for the reasons mentioned in your most secret dispatch, to take upon him some share of the expence of the embarkation of the 25,000 men which are to be furnished by France.

His Majesty doubts not but Your Excellencies will have fully informed Mo^r. Spinola, who seems to be the only minister of confidence now with you from Spain, of His Majesty's firm resolution to execute the Treaty of Seville ever since it has been con-

¹ See Chance, *Alliance of Hanover*, pp. 626-8.

cluded. The steps the King has taken for that purpose, the several proposals sent to France in order to accomplish it, either peaceably or otherwise, the instructions that you, Lord Harrington, carried with you to France, and lastly the plan of operations suggested in my letter of the 24th past, ought, in His Majesty's opinion, to have convinced the Spanish ministers, that however the thing has been delayed, it is not to be imputed to His Majesty. The King has been very far from laying the blame upon any of his Allies; however, in justice to himself, the King would have Your Excellencies explain fully to Mo^r. Spinola His Majesty's conduct upon this head, and shew him that His Majesty's compliance with this last proposal is the greatest mark that the King can give of his readiness to come into any reasonable measure that can be proposed for satisfying Spain, and of the sincerity of His Majesty's intentions to perform his engagements, and to preserve the present good correspondence that is so happily restored between the two Crowns.

When you have fully convinced him of this point, it is to be hoped you will have created such a confidence in him, that you may the more freely talk to him, and learn directly from himself his sentiments, as well as acquaint him with your own, upon the several circumstances that have or may arise, which may seem probable to bring this affair to a conclusion. You will naturally have occasion, as from yourselves, to observe to him, from what has already passed in your conferences, how little probability there is that the Court of France will enter with vigour into any scheme that may be necessary for procuring the introduction by force; and therefore you will sound his opinion, whether the Court of Spain should not seriously think of coming into some proposition, which may effectually secure the immediate succession of Don Carlos in a peaceable manner, for which there seem at present two methods only to offer; either for the Allies to agree to guaranty the Emperor's succession in Italy to the Caroline Archduchesses, on condition that His Imperial Majesty should consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons and give satisfaction to the rest of the Allies of Seville in all other respects, or for Their Catholick Majesties to accept of the offer of the Grand Duke, lately made in writing by the Court of Florence, for the receiving Don Carlos there immediately in person.

As to the first, Your Excellencies are already apprized of His

Majesty's sentiments, though you are to mention nothing of them to Mo^r. Spinola, but only to learn his thoughts, whether, in order to obtain the peaceable introduction of Spanish garrisons, Their Catholick Majestys would have any objection to the giving that guaranty which the King of Spain has already done in effect, by his accession to the Quadruple Alliance, and which, by the declaration that Mo^r. Patiño and the Spanish ministers are every day making that the King of Spain does not aim at any new acquisition in Italy for himself or his family, provided the introduction of the garrisons may be effected, it is possible that His Catholick Majesty himself may not be averse to. But however, you will take great care, that he may not suspect, that what you shall say to him on this head, is by order from His Majesty, and not to give him any opinion of your own upon it, but only to endeavour to draw from him his thoughts, upon a point which probably may finish every thing at once, when there are so many difficulties in whatever has been hitherto proposed for the execution of the treaty.

As to the other point, you will also endeavour to find out Mo^r. Spinola's sentiments, whether the offer made by the Grand Duke and the Electress Palatine¹, in the answer given in form to the ministers of the Allys at Florence, upon the ultimatum proposed by Père Ascanio, for the security of the immediate succession of Don Carlos, by having him received and acknowledged in the most solemn manner by the Grand Duke and the Senate, and by Don Carlos's being admitted there during the Grand Duke's lifetime, and received as his successor, would be satisfactory to Their Catholick Majesties. The King observed that it made so great an impression upon Mo^r. Chauvelin, that he even thought that the treaty was already executed by it; and indeed the King is of opinion, though you must not mention His Majesty at all upon this occasion, that it seems to answer what is chiefly proposed, either by the Quadruple Alliance, or by the Treaty of Seville, being not only an acknowledgement of the succession of Don Carlos by the Grand Duke and the country, but even by the Electress Palatine herself, so that the Court of Spain should consider whether this would not as effectually secure Don Carlos's succession as the introduction of Spanish garrisons, which were designed only for that purpose; and it looks as if Père Ascanio himself was not averse to it, he being the person proposed by the

¹ Sister of the Grand Duke and widow of John William, Elector Palatine. (See Rousset, *Recueil*, VI, p. 233.)

Grand Duke to be employed in settling that convention to be made between the two Courts. But as the French ministers will undoubtedly not let this drop, Your Excellencies will do no more than learn Mo^r. Spinola's sentiments upon it.

If the Court of Spain should consent, either to what the Grand Duke now proposes, or to the giving the guaranty above mentioned to the Emperor, in all probability Don Carlos's succession may be immediately established, which, if not done in some such amiable way, considering the difficulties that every day arise, none of which proceed from His Majesty, nobody can tell when or how it may be brought about. I am persuaded I need not repeat to you this caution I gave you at first, that whatever you say to Mo^r. Spinola upon these points, must seem to arise from yourselves, and not as if you had any directions from His Majesty upon them.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32766, fo. 446.*)

Whitehall, 14 April 1730.

. His Majesty, in order to satisfy the engagements he is under with the rest of the Allies, for overcoming the opposition that is threatened to the introduction of Spanish garrisons into Tuscany and Parma, would have Your Excellencies let the ministers of the Allies know, that His Majesty will agree to send the quota expected from him amounting to above 8,000 men, with the necessary provisions and ammunition, as his proportion for accompanying 40,000 Spaniards, the 16,000 and odd hundred men to be furnished by France, and the 3,000 men which the Dutch offer to give, pursuant to their treaty of accession; but Your Excellencies will always understand it to be upon the foot you mention, of His Majesty's not continuing this expence whenever his dominions shall happen to be attackt. And you will make this readiness in His Majesty to bear so great a share towards effecting the introduction of Spanish garrisons, according to the Treaty of Seville, as valuable and meritorious, as it really deserves, with the Spanish ministers, and especially with Mo^r. Spinola, that you may maintain a perfect confidence with him, and bring about what was suggested to you in my last dispatch in order to a final conclusion of this affair one way or other.

It is very remarkable that among the several turns that the French ministers, in the treating upon a plan of operations, have

taken to avoid doing any thing themselves, and at the same time to put upon others the blame of the inexecution of the treaty, they encouraged the Spanish ministers to press, that the Allies should attack the Emperor in the Netherlands, and seemed to give into it themselves, notwithstanding what they have formerly so strongly professed to the contrary. It is very possible that upon the King's consenting to this last proposal of furnishing above 8,000 of his troops towards the expedition to Italy, they may again have recourse to the same artifice of having it proposed to act against His Imperial Majesty in the Netherlands; but to prevent this, you will, in such case, declare, that His Majesty's consenting to contribute this number of his troops towards a war in Italy, must be upon this absolute condition, that nothing be undertaken in the Netherlands as being what is not only least likely to be attended with success, but would probably have the ill consequence of dividing the Allies among themselves; and Your Excellencies will easily make the Spanish ministers sensible, that this unwillingness in the King to come into the making a war in the Netherlands cannot proceed from a backwardness to perform his engagements, since His Majesty is ready to agree to what is proposed for the doing it in Italy¹ which will more immediately and effectually contribute to the establishing of Don Carlos's settlement in that country, the principal object of the Treaty of Seville. But His Majesty does still look upon it as an express condition, that the French shall continue to make such a disposition of their forces wherever it shall be thought proper, as may sufficiently intimidate the Emperor to prevent his sending too great an army into Italy; and Your Excellencies should prevail with the French ministers to have this managed in such manner and carryed so far as to make the Emperor apprehend a real danger of his being attackt in his hereditary countrys.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32767, fo. 34.*)

Whitehall, 23 April 1730.²

. . . . His Majesty is therefore very willing that Your Excellencies should joyn with the French and Dutch ministers, in

¹ and in Germany *in margin in George II's hand, but struck through.*

² A letter on this subject from Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz of the same date will be found in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. II, p. 691.

representing in an amicable way to Mo^r. Spinola the difficulty and hazard of his project,¹ but, at the same time, that he may not imagine that this proceeds from any backwardness in the Allies to execute their engagements, the reduction of Sicily should be positively and clearly proposed to him, in case the treaty should not be executed by the peaceable admission of Spanish garrisons, and that the Allies should forthwith furnish such quotas both of ships and men to joyn the Spaniards as may be sufficient for that purpose ; which, for the reasons mentioned by Your Excellencies you may easily convince Mo^r. Spinola, will be an undertaking much more feasible in itself, and from the importance that kingdom is of to the Emperor and his Italian dominions, must oblige him to consent to the conditions stipulated by the Treaty of Seville in favour of Don Carlos ; and to shew how much in earnest His Majesty is to have this done, the King would have Your Excellencies suggest to the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux whether, in order to make it more practicable and to hinder the Emperor from sending any more troops from Naples into Sicily, which, if this project takes air, he will undoubtedly endeavour to do, it might not be proper for the English and French squadrons, that are now in the Mediteranean, to sail forthwith to the coasts of Sicily with orders to prevent the transporting any Imperial troops into that kingdom, and if this should be thought a right measure, there is no time to be lost in putting it in execution.

But though the King extremely approves this thought of attacking Sicily, if it should be necessary, His Majesty hopes that the French will, as they themselves have proposed, forthwith post their forces in such a manner as may enable them to joyn those of His Majesty and Holland and the Northern Allies, and thereby keep the Emperor and such of the Princes of the Empire as are disposed to joyn him, in suspense and uneasiness, in order to divert him from sending his whole force into Italy ; or even enable the Allies to act offensively, if the circumstances of affairs should make it advisable ; for without this, the Emperor would not only be at liberty to send frequent reinforcements into Italy, and thereby oblige the Allies to be at a constant great expence in supporting their army there, but might also have it in his power to fall upon the Allies in other parts, and so lay them under a

¹ An attack upon Naples.

necessity of recalling their troops from Italy, in order to provide for their own defence and security ; so that Mo^r. Spinola will see that he is as much concerned to insist upon this part of the plan as any other, since without it, any attempt against the Emperor in Italy might be lyable to difficulties and disappointments ; and therefore Your Excellencies will acquaint the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux with His Majesty's great satisfaction with what they have proposed in this respect ; and with His Majesty's hopes and expectations that it will be forthwith put in execution and that we shall soon hear that the French troops are actually disposed in this manner.

Though His Majesty does not doubt but that the Cardinal is in earnest to pursue this scheme, yet in order to confirm him in it, you will make him sensible how uneasy the nation here would grow to continue any longer in a state of uncertainty and inaction, and how unwillingly they may be persuaded if another year should be spent in fruitless negociations to furnish the supplies for a war, should it then become necessary ; since in all probability it might have been prevented by a firm resolution and vigorous measures taken in time on the part of the Allies.

Though the King does intirely approve the two things proposed in your conference with the French ministers, viz : the attack of Sicily and the forming of a plan of security and defence to be turned into an offensive one if it should become necessary, yet His Majesty was glad to find, that Your Excellencies were of opinion that the Cardinal would readily agree to make a peremptory declaration to the Emperor in the manner desired by the King and the States, in order to bring everything to an amicable accommodation, which, from the purport of it, as well as from the alarm that the Court of Vienna will be under, from the conferences that have been held at Paris with the Marshals of France, may very probably have the desired effect.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32767, fo. 118v.*)

Whitehall, 2 May 1730.

. His Majesty thinks it will be very right, as is mentioned in the plan, to know of the King of Prussia, in a proper time, what the Allies are to expect from him ; and in whatever disposition His Prussian Majesty may be, his seeing the Allies

determined to execute their engagements and in a condition to support them will be far from having an ill effect upon him. . . .

(*Ibid.*, fo. 129.)

Whitehall, 7 May 1730.

Most Secret.

I take the opportunity of Mr. Pelham's returning to Paris, to send Your Excellencys a copy of a pretty extraordinary letter from Mr. Chauvelin to Count Broglie,¹ written in a strain very different from the manner in which that minister and the Cardinal have talked to you, and showing a discontent and a diffidence of England, for which Your Excellencies well know the French have no manner of reason. It is very surprizing, that he should represent His Majesty as unable or backward to furnish his proportion towards the support of the common cause, and depending altogether on France for his own security, when on the contrary, the quota on His Majesty's part for the execution of the Treaty of Seville, has not only been promised, but the dispositions made here for their being immediately supplyd as soon as the scheme should be fixt of what was to be undertaken, and what number each party should furnish, and the French ministers are not ignorant that His Majesty has 20,000 Hanoverian troops of his own in the best order and condition, and 12,000 Hessians kept constantly in pay and ready to take the field to cooperate with those of the Allies, besides a good body that might be spared from home and from Ireland, if there should be occasion; and all that is desired of France, as you will have seen in my last letter is to have a sufficient body of their forces in readiness and so disposed, as that they may joyn those of His Majesty and the other Allies, whenever the circumstances of affairs shall make it necessary. But His Majesty is willing to believe, that this letter was written by Mr. Chauvelin only in a fit of ill humour to Count Broglie, whose correspondence of late has been much in that stile; but

¹ *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 370, fo. 10. Fontainebleau, 12 May N.S. 1730, e.g. Nous avons effectivement bien éprouvé les principes de la politique des Anglois et la connoissance que nous en avons ne contribue pas peu à nous rendre circonspects sur la manière d'exécuter le traité de Séville, en sorte non seulement que nous ne commençons pas seuls mais que même nos alliés nous secondent dans la suite de nos opérations et qu'ils ne puissent nous abandonner impunément.

that it does not express Mo^r. Chauvelin's calm and serious thoughts, and that the Cardinal is not capable of entering into so wrong a way of thinking. However the King thought fit, that this copy of it should be sent to Your Excellencies for your information ; and that upon this intelligence, which you will know how to manage, considering the manner of our coming at it, you may endeavour to find out how far these groundless notions and jealousies have caught hold of Mo^r. Chauvelin, and whether they have made any impression at all upon the Cardinal, and if they have, you may use the proper means to remove it.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32768, fo. 89.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALPOLE AND POYNTZ.

Windsor Castle, 22 June 1730.

His Majesty is resolved to remove every pretence for doing nothing this year and therefore has commanded me to acquaint you with his sentiments and intentions, which are,

That the quotas of the Allies for the expedition to Sicily being, as the King understands it, already settled at 14,000 men, of which England is to furnish about four thousand, the day for the general rendezvous of the united forces off of Toulon should be fixt, and not to be later than the 15th August, N.S.

That in the first place, to make evident the Emperor's opposition to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, the confederate forces should, as has all along been proposed, present themselves before Leghorn, and if the Spanish garrisons are peaceably admitted, the Treaty of Seville is then to be lookt upon to be executed ; but in case of opposition, that they are to proceed to Sicily and endeavour to reduce that island ; and it ought to be immediately considered in what manner the attack should be made.

Though His Majesty might with reason insist that all this should be done without entering into any consideration of any further treaty or convention, yet His Majesty, to shew how determined he is to do his part towards executing his engagements, even this year, has commanded me to acquaint Your Excellencies that a full power shall forthwith be sent you, *conjunction aut divisim*, to conferr and agree with the ministers of the Allies of Seville, upon a treaty or convention to be made for the execution of the sixth separate and secret article of the Treaty of Seville ; and as Mo^r.

Chauvelin says they will not insist upon the signing of such a treaty, but only the agreeing among yourselves what shall be the conditions of it, you will, by this, be enabled to explain the King's thoughts, so as that all they desire may be fully answered; and it is to be understood that the expedition to Sicily is by no means to be deferred, either for the conclusion of this treaty, or for the conferences that may be held in order to it, since the season of the year is so far advanced that the least time spent in negotiation may make it impracticable this summer.

Since in consequence of this attempt on Sicily, the war may spread itself in other parts, or even become general, Your Excellencies are hereby authorized to concert with the ministers of the Allies, what proportion it may in that case be right for each of the Allies to bear in the expence of it, and as soon as His Majesty knows what shall be proposed in this respect, Your Excellencies shall have the King's resolution upon it. In the mean time, you may assure them that His Majesty never imagined that he was not to bear his part; but it should also be agreed that after the expedition to Sicily shall be over, nothing shall be undertaken but in concert with all the Allies and with their concurrence.

If the Allies shall be obliged to attempt anything more than ¹ the reduction of Sicily, it will most probably be in Italy, not only from the present disposition of the princes of the Empire not to meddle in a war there, but also that the consequences of such a war may be the least inconvenient to the Allies in general. His Majesty therefore enters into the necessity of gaining, even at present, the King of Sardinia, if possible, and that no time should be lost in setting a negociation on foot with him for that purpose, and that subsidies of which His Majesty is ready to bear his proportion should be offered in case of a war, which would be a sufficient inducement to him, since the war would possibly be begun before the negotiation with him can be finisht, and the measures to be taken for engaging the King of Sardinia, should be one main view of the convention to be made in consequence of the full power that is to be sent you; but I must again repeat to Your Excellencies, that His Majesty must insist that the expedition to Sicily should not be delayed for any of these considerations, since you have full power to explain His Majesty's thoughts immediately upon them.

¹ that in *MS.*

As you are of opinion that a manifesto should be prepared before the expedition to Sicily is set on foot, you will be pleased, in conjunction with the other ministers of the Allies, to turn it in your thoughts, and get one ready without loss of time.

JAMES, EARL WALDEGRAVE 1730-1740

THIS nobleman, whose mother was the eldest daughter of James II by Arabella Churchill and who was consequently a nephew of Marshal Berwick, had other qualifications than merely his experience as *chargé d'affaires* in 1728 for the post of ambassador at the French court, for, in spite of having taken the oaths, he remained on very friendly terms with his uncle. For these reasons as well as for his "phlegm and temper" he was recommended by Horatio Walpole to be his successor. He did not succeed in improving the relations between the two Courts, for Fleury had not the personal reasons of gratitude that bound him to Horatio Walpole, while Chauvelin seems to have disliked him from the first, and to have been anxious to accelerate his removal to Vienna in 1728. He seems to have carried out his duties competently and conscientiously but without much originality, depending more on suavity of manner than on debating power. Though sometimes incurring criticism, he on the whole received the approval of the government, who after two requests, gave him the Garter in 1738, but not until after the fall of Chauvelin, a circumstance which caused him some regret. He finally left for England in October 1740, a dying man, and the duties of *chargé d'affaires* were carried out until the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1744 by ANTHONY THOMPSON, his chaplain and secretary, who was rewarded for his services by the deanery of Raphoe (see *Dict. Nat. Biog. s.v. Waldegrave*).

(*P.R.O., F.O. 90 (Kings' Letters) 15A, p. 237.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES EARL WALDEGRAVE, APPOINTED AM-
BASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE
MOST CHRISTIAN KING.

Windsor Castle, 22 June 1730.

[A repetition of Horatio Walpole's instructions of 2 July 1727.]

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32768, fo. 307.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE, WALPOLE AND POYNTZ.

Windsor Castle, 13 July 1730.

. His Majesty was extremely concerned to find that when you came to consider what method should be taken for bringing the Emperor to a compliance, notwithstanding the answer given in by the Imperial ministers is not only an absolute refusal of what was offered by the Allies, but even goes so far as to give us to understand that the Emperor will not on any condition consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, the French ministers should have forgot their promise of going on in that case forthwith with the expedition to Sicily, and that now any attempt of that kind is treated as too hazardous, without a diversion can be made elsewhere at the same time ; which cannot but surprize His Majesty, since the project of Sicily was first suggested by the French ministers themselves, and no other operation thought of by them at that time ; and whatever proposals of that kind had been made by His Majesty were rejected.

His Majesty cannot but apprehend that the shew the French make of an inclination to consult a general plan, and the giving hopes of executing another year what had been formerly offered by the King, especially since it is attended with a proposal from M^{or}. Chauvelin, that the Allies would join in acquainting the Court of Spain that they were agreed in general on such a plan, and we were setting seriously to work to put it in execution, can only be done with a view to dissuade that Court from undertaking any thing till this plan is finisht, and thereby to engage His Majesty in some measure to depart from the declaration he has already made to Spain and expose himself to a share of their resentment for the non-execution of his engagements. As the King will never suffer himself to be drawn into any step of this kind, Your Excellencies are, pursuant to the orders I sent you in my last, to acquaint the French ministers that the answer from the Emperor being now given in in form, and a more absolute refusal than could have been expected, His Majesty hopes, according to their promise, that they will forthwith agree to go on with the expedition to Sicily, which every day becomes more necessary from the temper we see the Court of Spain is in, it being evident that Their Catholick Majesties will not execute their treaties towards the

Allies with that exactness they ought, till we on our part have satisfied our engagements to them, and it is very hard that His Majesty, who is so greatly concerned in interest to see the just performance of our treaties with Spain, should be exposed to lose the benefit of them, purely because some of his Allies, who have not so much concern with Spain as we have, are not disposed to do their part or indeed perform what they themselves promised and proposed ; that the King cannot but be surprized that the expedition to Sicily, which these four months has been treated by them as the only, or at least the most adviseable attempt that could be made, should either be totally laid aside or depend upon other conditions, which gives His Majesty too much reason to fear that indeed it was never seriously intended ; that provided we go on forthwith with this, to save our credit with Spain, the King is very ready, as you are authorised to declare by my letters of 22nd June and 10th instant, to enter into an immediate concert upon the other points suggested by Mo^r. Chauvelin, and particularly that His Majesty is willing to join in the proper measures for gaining the King of Sardinia, and thinks it would be right for the Allies to bring, if possible, His Sardinian Majesty rather first to make his own demands, than for the Allies to begin with making him offers ; that, as it is that Prince's interest, which must engage him on our side except he can be sure of some certain advantage, 'tis in vain to flatter ourselves with hopes of success ; that therefore promises of new acquisitions, as they must be conditional and depend entirely upon a war, will be not much regarded by him, as we found by experience quickly after the conclusion of the Hanover alliance ; so that nothing will be so likely to gain him, and indeed liable to so little objection, as the absolute promise of subsidies, in which His Majesty is ready to bear his proportion ; and when we see what was granted by England the last war, (which we do not exactly know, not having the convention here) I shall acquaint you particularly how far His Majesty is willing to go. In the mean time, I believe you may venture to give hopes of the same subsidy that the Duke of Savoy had the last war.

And as to the other point, viz^t, the contingent of troops to be furnished by His Majesty upon the general plan, Your Excellencies may assure them of the King's furnishing the same that was proposed by the plan of 1727, it being always to be understood, that

a proper deduction from thence be made of what shall be furnished on His Majesty's part in Sicily and Italy.

Having now repeated to Your Excellencies His Majesty's orders upon this head, the Court of France must see, and Spain should be given to understand that the King does not insist upon the going on with the expedition to Sicily this summer, to decline bearing his proportion of what may be necessary to be done another year, but only that Spain may be satisfied, and the Emperor convinced that we will not for ever be amusing ourselves and them with negotiations and without doing any thing essential; and should France refuse to agree to what is now proposed by the King, Spain must see that their offers of doing great things next year, is only to avoid doing anything this; and when the time comes, it is to be apprehended they would, as they have been doing this summer, find some excuse for not acting then. It is very remarkable that upon their seeming to shew a disposition to act next year, they even go back from what they themselves have ever pretended to, and now insist that nothing should be done till this treaty is absolutely signed; which thing alone explains what they mean by all the rest; however Your Excellencies will make your instances in the strongest manner, and found them upon the answer now received from the Emperor, and the promise the French always made in that case to go on with the expedition to Sicily.

I send Your Excellencies for your information an extract of Mr. Robinson's letter of the 5th instant N.S. from Vienna; you will observe by it, that Count Sinzendorff's expedient, mentioned in his former letter, was the admission of English troops into Tuscany and Parma.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32769, fo. 38.)

NEWCASTLE TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

Windsor Castle, 27 July 1730.

. I come now to send you His Majesty's commands upon the *idées générales* &c.¹ put into your hands by Mo^r. Chauvelin; and though you are already by my former letters acquainted in general with the King's sentiments upon most points of them, yet that Mo^r. Chauvelin may not pretend to say that His Majesty avoids entering into this consideration, and that when he had pre-

¹ B.M., Add. 32768, ff. 279-89.

pared ideas of a general plan &c., His Majesty declined entering into it or giving his thoughts upon it, I send you the King's observations upon every particular article which are to serve for your instructions upon this head, and which must shew France on the one hand that if they hoped by this to have insinuated to Spain that His Majesty had declined entering into measures for settling the operations for a general war, they should be disappointed, and on the other must convince Their Catholick Majesties that the King is the most forward in conjunction with his Allies to go on with the expedition to Sicily or even to make an attempt upon Naples or the Milaneze, if it were practicable, this year, so His Majesty is equally disposed with any of them to settle the plan of operations for a general war the next.

The King cannot but think that in this view the gaining of the King of Sardinia ought to be our first point, and therefore you will see how much it is prest in the observations upon the *idées générales* &c. tho' His Majesty cannot but observe that by the way the Court of France propose to proceed in the negociation with him, there is great reason to fear that they are far from desiring that it should be soon concluded. For if the King of Spain's consent is to be previously had, it is probable from the answer he has already given upon it that it will be a work of great length and difficulty. But the King thinks that the treaty with the King of Sardinia should by no means depend upon the final adjusting of this plan, and that even it might be adviseable to conclude it without waiting for the consent of Spain. You will however take care to manage this so that Mr. Chauvelin may not take a handle from it to represent to the Court of Spain as if His Majesty were for excluding them from this negociation, which he will undoubtedly do if you mention this otherwise than as from yourselves, and with a view only to forward a negociation which is of such importance, of which the King is so much convinced that His Majesty is even willing to promise 160,000*l.* per annum, which was the subsidy paid during the last war, provided the other Allies consent to furnish troops or give subsidies in proportion to that sum, according to the regulation already mentioned to have been settled by the Treaty of Seville. But you will try to get off cheaper if you can, before you come up to this offer. If Your Excellencys look back upon what past in the negociation with His Sardinian Majesty when Mr. Hedges was at Turin, you will find that he would then

have been gained by subsidies alone, if England and France would have given them, and the King thinks it would be much better as well as sooner done, if a treaty could be concluded with him by granting him subsidies only with general assurances of future advantages in case of a war.

His Majesty could have wished that the reply given by the Allies to the Emperor's answer had been conceived in stronger terms. However His Majesty was glad to find that you had got such words added as have reference to a future answer to be given in justification of the conduct of the Allies.

(B.M., *Add. MS.* 32769, *fo.* 190.)

Windsor Castle, 24 August 1730.

. His Majesty could have wished that the paper which you communicated to Count Maffei had been first altered in the manner there proposed,¹ but Your Excellencies in the future progress of this negociation will endeavour to have it conducted as agreeable as possible to what was His Majesty's view in making those alterations, for I cannot conceal from you that by the late conduct of the Court of France, His Majesty has the utmost reason to be upon his guard and to take care that he is not further engaged than in reason and justice he ought to be, it being but too probable that M^r. Chauvelin's chief aim is to endeavour to make amends for doing nothing this year by offering great things the next, and that in such a manner as to lay the King under the difficulty of either refusing to come up to their terms, and thereby run the risk of disobliging Spain, or agreeing to measures which may be liable to the greatest objection on other accounts. In this view did he certainly propose the leaving out the words in the preamble *pour constater l'opposition &c.* and the insisting upon the article for not laying down our arms 'till the advantages proposed for the King of Sardinia should be procured for him ; the communicating the plan of operations to Spain in order that the Allies might be tyed down to the terms and conditions of it ; the supposing a possibility of attacking the Netherlands, for which he had prepared a scheme ; and lastly the pressing the King to conclude the treaty with the four Electors without any satisfaction upon the points in dispute, shew plainly that this is his design.

¹ To make clear that the cause of war would be a refusal to admit the Spanish garrisons (B.M., *Add.* 32769, *fo.* 117*v.* Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, Windsor Castle, 17 Aug. 1730).

For which reason, though His Majesty is very ready to go on with the negociation with the King of Sardinia, and also to concert the plan of operations, according to the instructions which Your Excellencies have already received, yet the King would not have anything finally concluded upon these heads, 'till you have His Majesty's further orders upon it, for experience has but too lately shewn that any acquiescence on the part of the King upon the most explicit declarations and explanations imaginable from the French themselves has only been turned to His Majesty's disadvantage, and made use of for purposes contrary to what had been agreed and the most foreign to His Majesty's intention.

Your Excellencies will be pleased to observe that Count Maffei lays the greatest stress upon the offer of subsidies, and indeed His Majesty is every day the more convinced that that will be the surest and best way of engaging the King of Sardinia. Since my last I have seen Mr. Hedges who intirely agrees with me that His Sardinian Majesty would, for subsidies, have entered into the measures of the Allies when the last negociation was on foot with him. He also told me that the King of Sardinia at that time exprest a great jealousy and suspicion of France and a resolution never to put himself in their power, which is a hint that may be of service in the conduct of the negociation with him. If the Court of France continue to insist that the Allies should be obliged to make war for the King of Sardinia, they cannot, in His Majesty's opinion, give a greater proof that in reality they do not mean that this negociation should succeed, and they seem already to be laying in for its miscarriage by proposing that in that case the Emperor should be attackt in the Netherlands; neither of which proposals can be consented to by the King or the States.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32770, fo. 122.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 19 November 1730.

. His Majesty looks upon it to be absolutely necessary that the answer should be made jointly by you all, and would therefore have Your Excellency press the French and Dutch ministers that you may all joyn in a general answer which in His Majesty's opinion ought to be such as may give entire satisfaction and security to His Catholick Majesty for the execution

of the Treaty of Seville. In order to which, His Majesty thinks that you should by the said answer declare: "That the Allies
"are ready without loss of time to enter upon the measures pre-
"scribed by the 6th. separate and secret article of that treaty
"for overcoming the opposition on the part of the Emperor to
"the introduction of Spanish garrisons, by concerting and fixing
"a plan of operations, by joining their forces and beginning the
"war as soon as the season of the year will permit." And that
there may no doubt remain of the sincerity of His Majesty's inten-
tions upon this head, Your Excellency is to acquaint Mo^r. Castelar
and the other ministers that you are fully informed of the King's
sentiments as to the measures that His Majesty thinks proper
to be taken for that purpose, and the share which His Majesty
is willing to bear towards them.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32770, fo. 126.*)

Whitehall, 19 November 1730.

Private.

. Your Excellency will take an opportunity of explaining
to Mo^r. Castelar His Majesty's conduct ever since the signing of
the Treaty of Seville, and at the same time shew that the non-
execution of it can by no means be attributed to the King, and
therefore how little His Majesty deserves either the reproaches he
has met with from Spain, or the hardships his subjects have suffered
by Spain's not executing their part of the Treaty of Seville.

The only project that was brought to any sort of consistency
last summer was the attempt upon Sicily, which had the approba-
tion of all the Allies, and particularly of His Catholick Majesty,
and without insisting upon His Majesty's readiness to have con-
tributed his part towards any other that was proposed, the King's
quota, both of ships and troops, was actually in the Mediterranean
time enough to have executed it, if the other Allies had thought
it proper, and as to what Mo^r. Castelar says of there having been
no notice given to Spain of His Majesty's ships being there to act
for the service of the alliance, or of M^r. Keene's having declared
that the land forces were not to act after the 15th of August, I
cannot conceive what he means: M^r. Keene having had no orders
to make any such declaration, nor having given any account that
he had done it.

It will be easy to shew Mo^r. de Castelar that the method the King has now suggested is the only practicable one of procuring the introduction of Spanish garrisons by force ; for the confining the war chiefly to Italy where that introduction is to be made, is not only the most natural, but what all the Allies can without any difficulty agree in ; whereas the proposing general and extensive plans, if not done purely to avoid doing anything, must create questions which will necessarily take up a good deal of time and may possibly be attended with unsurmountable difficulties ; and Mo^r. Castelar must himself see that the flinging out, as Mo^r. Chauvelin did, the proposal of attacking Flanders, so far from being a sign of their intention to do anything, is a plain indication of the contrary, for if England and Holland would consent, which they never can, to have any operations there, how would the introduction of Spanish garrisons be forwarded by it, especially when in all probability the Emperor would not give himself much trouble about what should be done in those parts, thinking the interests of the Maritime Powers more concerned in that question than his own ?

The proposing of an extravagant contingent to be furnished by His Majesty may possibly be done with the same view, and therefore Mo^r. Castelar should see that the insisting upon anything unreasonable is the sure way to have nothing done.

Upon the whole, His Majesty has gone as far as he can towards satisfying Spain, and if Mo^r. Castelar will judge coolly and not suffer himself to be led away by notions put into his head by those whose chief view is perhaps to do nothing, he must himself do the King justice upon this point.

. You will take care to let Mo^r. Castelar see, though not in a menacing way, that the King does and must insist upon an exact and full execution of the Treaty of Seville towards him and his subjects, not only as to the carrying on of their trade but also as to the restitution of their effects that has been stipulated.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 135.)

Whitehall, 19 November 1730.

Very private.

I am to acquaint Your Excellency that after what the Cardinal told you that he had absolutely refused Mo^r. de Castelar

to write hither for obtaining such orders to Your Excellency as he desired, His Majesty could not but be surprized to find that Mo^r. Chauvelin had done it. Mo^r. Chauvelin has no doubt done this at Mo^r. Castelar's instigation, and communicated the very letter to him before it was sent away, and thinks by this management to persuade the Court of Spain of their readiness to fulfill their engagements when probably they are only shifting off the blame from themselves by proposing to others what they think will not be consented to.

You may take notice to the Cardinal of this letter sent to Count Broglie, so different from his way of talking to Your Excellency, but this not by way of complaint, but only as what you presume they found it necessary to do in order to make Mo^r. Castelar easy, and you will observe to His Eminence that, though His Majesty might very justly have taken occasion from hence to have made insinuations not to their advantage, and to have retorted the same behaviour upon them, yet the King in the answer to Mo^r. Broglie has avoided it, and contented himself with justifying his own conduct.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32770, fo. 139.*)

Whitehall, 30 November 1730.

Most secret.

His Majesty, relying intirely upon your prudence and secrecy, has commanded me to acquaint Your Lordship in the utmost confidence that, as His Majesty has observed by the conduct of the Court of France ever since the signing of the Treaty of Seville, that they meant nothing less than the execution of it by force, as appears by their shifts and evasions, in rejecting whatever has been suggested that was reasonable and practicable for that purpose, and proposing wild and extravagant schemes only to amuse and flatter the vanity and ambition of the Queen of Spain without doing anything for her in reality, the King, upon some overtures that had been made to him from the Court of Vienna, has been willing to try whether His Majesty could not be able to procure with the Emperor's consent the full execution of the Treaty of Seville by the introduction of Spanish garrisons as therein stipulated. You may imagine that a negotiation of this kind, which has been and must be carried on with the greatest secrecy, would

require some time, and though I can by no means promise that it will at last succeed, yet I am far from being without hopes of it. However, as the execution of His Majesty's engagements to Spain in their fullest extent is the foundation of it, whatever turn it takes, His Majesty must be irreproachable towards the world, and, as Your Lordship sees by my last letters, no hopes or expectations of this kind have made the King delay one moment the sending you the necessary orders for entering into measures for executing by force the Treaty of Seville.

Your Lordship will easily conceive the importance of this secret, and the confidence the King reposes in you by trusting you with it. If either the French or the Spanish ministers should suspect anything of this nature to be carrying on and should mention it to you, Your Lordship will say that you have not had the least information of it, but that you are certain that the execution of the Treaty of Seville and of His Majesty's engagements therein taken is what His Majesty has the most at heart and is fully determined to see performed.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 262.)

HARRINGTON TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 14 December 1730.

Private.

. The account Your Excellency gives of what had past in the conference held the [18th N.S.] at Versailles confirms the King more and more in the opinion he has long entertained that the Court of France never sincerely intended to fulfill their part of the engagements entered into by the Treaty of Seville for the forcible introduction of the Spanish garrisons, but that they would, by making most ample but impracticable offers and schemes and by little artifices and even false insinuations and assertions, hope to persuade Spain of the contrary, and that the inexecution of those engagements ought to be solely imputed to His Majesty. It is with this view, and in order to dazzle Spain and flatter the wild and extravagant notions of Her Catholick Majesty that in every conference and in all their papers they make such a pompous parade of their numerous armies, of the fullness of their magazines, the compleatness of their artillery and their readiness and desire to enter immediately with their

whole force upon a general war, by attacking the Emperor in every part, with this seeming plausible condition only, that the rest of the Allies make proportionable efforts. But whenever they are called upon to ascertain and conclude anything, they are sure to get off by taxing the rest of the Allies with such proportions as they know to be not only most unequal, but absolutely impossible to be comply'd with.

A general war is what the Allies are not obliged to undertake by the treaty, and though it is now proposed with so much earnestness by the French, yet, when one comes to particulars, it is plain that they intend nothing by this proposal. For as to Italy, they have all along declared that they would not begin a war on that side, till the King of Sardinia were secured to the interest of the Allies; now they tell you that no application is to be made to that Prince 'till the war is begun, from whence it is evident that they have no intention of beginning the war in Italy. The doing it in Germany they represent as impracticable, since it would give the Emperor a fair handle to engage the whole Empire in his quarrel against the Allies, as Your Excellency will find Mo^r. Fenelon at The Hague has set forth in the memorial mentioned in one of your letters. The French therefore leave but one place where an offensive war could be begun, which is Flanders, and this they do, knowing that it is impossible for England and Holland ever to come into it, for reasons that have been sufficiently explained to them and have been allowed by themselves to be just and unanswerable; insomuch that they have often declared that if the war should extend to the Netherlands, France would never pretend to retain to itself anything that should be conquered there. So that upon the whole, when they thus offer a general war, and at the same time exclude every part in which such a war could be entered upon, it is evident beyond contradiction that in reality they mean nothing less and that all their proposals are meer amusements.

The King's conduct in the whole course of this negociation has been quite different, making no proposal but what was practicable, nor any offer but what His Majesty mean't to perform, and Your Excellency acted in a manner agreeable to His Majesty's sentiments and intentions in shewing the absurdity of the Cardinal's reasonings with relation to the quota to be furnisht by England, and the impossibility of the King's complying with what he required,

tho' as it was a new matter, and for the other reasons you give, it was not amiss to let the ministers who were at the conference go away with an opinion that you would send His Majesty an account of it, since you left them no room to imagine that those terms would ever be consented to, which it is impossible for His Majesty to do.

But there will now in all probability be no occasion for your giving any answer upon this proposal of the Cardinal's about His Majesty's quota, since the scheme Mo^r. Castelar¹ has formed and communicated to you, which he intended to annex to his reply, will have given this affair another turn. As he has made this confidence to Your Excellency, the King would have you acquaint him that, tho' His Majesty thought he had fully comply'd with his engagements by the offer you had made of so large a contingent on the part of England towards a war if necessary, yet that no proof may be wanting of the King's sincere desire that the Treaty of Seville may be fully and effectually executed, and of his friendship for Their Catholick Majesties, he is willing to go the lengths proposed by Mo^r. Castelar and to furnish the quota mentioned in his scheme, provided that France give theirs in the manner therein specified; for as His Majesty always lookt upon the war in Italy as the only natural and effectual means of executing the treaty by the introduction of the Spanish garrisons and has accordingly prest that the stress of the war should be on that side, His Majesty can come into no scheme by which the war should not be effectually carried on there, and therefore does and must insist upon it, as a condition *sine qua non* of his present offer, that the French shall furnish the 40,000 men for the embarkation in order to a descent to be made in Italy.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32771, fo. 211.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 23 January 1730/1.

I acquainted Your Excellency some time ago that the Emperor might be induced to agree to the introduction of the

¹ For providing by France 110,000 men; by Great Britain, 12,000 English, 12,000 Hessians, 20,000 Hanoverians, 12,000 Danes in lieu of subsidy to Sardinia, 4,000 others; by Holland 30,000, to be used as to 100,000 in Germany and 80,000 in Italy (Add. MS. 32770, fo. 256).

Spanish garrisons. As this affair begins now to be suspected His Majesty is apprehensive that it may be represented in a wrong light to the Court of Spain and has therefore commanded me to write the enclosed letter to Mr. Keene, and that there may be no possibility of any ill use being made to the Court of Spain of what Your Excellency shall be directed to say upon this subject at Paris before our courier arrives at Seville, you will take no notice of it 'till two days after his is set forward on his journey to Spain.

You will then acquaint the Cardinal in confidence that His Majesty being sensible how desirous all the Allies have been ever since the signing of the Treaty of Seville, to be able to execute the engagements of that treaty to Spain without coming to a rupture, and Mr. Castelar having declared in the most formal manner that whenever the introduction of the Spanish garrisons was effected, in whatever way it was brought about, the Treaty of Seville would be fully executed towards Spain, His Majesty has not declined making the proper use of any disposition that there may have been in the Court of Vienna to avoid coming to extremities, but that the enabling His Majesty and his Allies to perform the engagements of the Treaty of Seville is a condition from which the King neither has nor will depart; that though it is yet uncertain what success this affair may have, yet His Majesty has hopes that before the season for action comes, it may be brought about, especially if the Allies can be so happy to agree among themselves upon a practicable plan of operations which the Emperor shall see they are determined to put in execution if he does not consent. You will make this confidence to the Cardinal in the most affectionate manner you can, and endeavour to shew him that the difficulties about the plan of operations, notwithstanding His Majesty's readiness to agree to what shall be reasonable on his part, makes it very advisable for the Allies not to reject any means that may offer of executing fully their engagements to Spain; that the King knows how much His Eminence has wished to preserve the peace and procure a general pacification, and that therefore His Majesty is persuaded he will not disapprove the steps that His Majesty has taken for that purpose, since they are founded upon a punctual execution of our engagements to Spain, and that nothing will be askt of France that can bring them under any difficulty.

After you have had your conference with the Cardinal, you will go to Mo^r. Castelar and talk to him in the same manner that Mr. Keene is directed to do to Their Catholick Majesties and Mo^r. Patiño, so that I need not give Your Excellency any particular instructions upon that head.

You will say as much as you shall think necessary upon this occasion to the Garde des Sceaux and no more.

[A "very private" letter from Newcastle to Waldegrave on Castelar's declaration,¹ dated "Whitehall, Saturday, 4 o'clock," i.e. 23 January 1730/1, is in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 89.]

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32771, fo. 241.*)

Whitehall, 26 January 1730/1.

Most private.

Your Excellency will have seen by my other letter how much surprized and concerned His Majesty was at the unexpected turn that Mo^r. Castelar has taken in delivering his declaration. I cannot conceal from you that the King, laying the several circumstances together which are mentioned in your dispatches, and considering the particular passage in the declaration which points at His Majesty's negociation with the Emperor, and that this declaration was given in just before the meeting of our Parliament, His Majesty cannot but suspect that Mo^r. Chauvelin has been in great measure the occasion of it, not only with a view to prevent the success of what is doing at Vienna, but possibly with an intent to create a disturbance in His Majesty's affairs here. But the King is willing to hope that the Cardinal has no part in it, and therefore His Majesty is desirous that His Eminence should have all reasonable satisfaction as to what has passed between His Majesty and the Imperial Court.

You will therefore acquaint the Cardinal that His Majesty, perceiving that he had been under some uneasiness upon that head, and that he had even gone so far as to tell you that it was one motive for Mo^r. Castelar's delivering his declaration in so precipitate a manner, the King had ordered you to give him a full account of every thing that had past, and what had hindered His Majesty from communicating it before to him.

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. VI, p. 8.

The King had some time ago reason to think that the Emperor might consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons into Tuscany and Parma, provided England and Holland would guaranty to him the Pragmatick Sanction; that upon this foot only His Majesty began to treat, and sent directions accordingly to Mr. Robinson at Vienna; that the Emperor did then and does still insist upon its being kept an inviolable secret, and that His Majesty was so fully determined to do nothing but with the strictest regard to his engagements with his Allies, and particularly not to come to any agreement without obtaining for Spain the introduction of 6000 Spaniards; that the King was persuaded that whenever this transaction should come to be known, both France and Spain would be satisfied with it, and for that reason, His Majesty did agree to the keeping of the secret which had been demanded of him;

That His Eminence will also consider that if this negotiation had been known before it was brought to any sort of perfection, it must, in all probability, have been defeated, whatever may be the success of it now; that as the King did and does persuade himself the Cardinal must wish it may succeed, His Majesty hopes that His Eminence will not blame him for not risking the success of what must be so desirable to all the Allies by what the Cardinal can only think to be an omission of form; that His Majesty, when he orders you to open yourself thus freely to him upon this subject, is incapable of concealing from him any of the terms and conditions; that as His Eminence seemed to apprehend there may be something more than the bare giving the guaranty on the part of England and Holland on the one side, and the consent to the introduction of Spanish garrisons on the other, and that France was to be made a sacrifice by this treaty, you could assure him, in the most solemn manner, that there never was directly or indirectly the least thought of laying France under any engagement whatever by it, or of demanding or asking anything of them, but that they should not be dissatisfied with His Majesty for having procured a full execution of the Treaty of Seville in so honourable and advantageous a manner for His Majesty and all his Allies, without the hazard and expence of a war to which His Eminence has always been so averse;

That there are not wanting those who are desirous of creating divisions amongst the Allies, and to them is owing the false reports

that have been spread of the part that the King has been acting, but which His Majesty had flattered himself His Eminence would not have given credit to.

You will also acquaint the Cardinal that the King had indeed the greatest reason to believe that this negotiation would have succeeded, but that His Majesty cannot possibly say what turn the Court of Vienna may now take, when they shall see the disunion among the Allies by Mo^r. Castelar's declaration, and shall be informed of the jealousy and uneasiness the Court of France have conceived of His Majesty ; that the only way to retrieve it, in the King's opinion, is for Mo^r. Castelar to retract, or at least to explain his declaration ; that Mo^r. Castelar did let drop some expressions to you, as if he did not break off all negociation, and that he afterwards desired you to write into England that, notwithstanding his declaration, if the Allies had any scheme to propose, either jointly or separately, for the execution of the Treaty of Seville, and that such a scheme had it's effect, the King of Spain would remain under the same obligation to execute that treaty on his part as he was before this declaration ; which gives you reason to hope that, when he shall be fully convinced that the suspicions he has entertained relating to the King's negotiating with the Court of Vienna are entirely false, and that the introduction of the Spanish garrisons was a condition from which His Majesty would not depart, Mo^r. Castelar would himself see the rashness of the step that he has taken, and not wantonly fling away, by adhering to it, any further assistance from the Allies, for the security of Don Carlos's succession to Tuscany and Parma.

Were the King after this capable of disguising his intentions from the Cardinal and the Court of Spain, His Majesty's speech to his Parliament would be a sufficient proof to the contrary ; the performing His Majesty's engagements to Spain in the most punctual manner is the foundation of it, and such assurances given in it and measures taken upon it as ought to convince Their Catholick Majesties that if the introduction of the Spanish garrisons is not peaceably effected before the season for action comes, His Majesty is determined to do his part towards obtaining it by force.

I have now, my Lord, given you an exact account of this affair, by which the Cardinal will see the great confidence the King has in him, and His Majesty is persuaded that His Eminence will not

only be perfectly satisfied with His Majesty, but will also engage to Your Excellency not to take any notice of the communication that the King has made of it, which, if known, may entirely disappoint the success of our negotiation.

The King thinks it is of the last consequence that Mo^r. de Castelar's declaration should be kept secret, and has therefore desired Mo^r. Broglie not to mention it to any body, which he has promised ; and His Majesty recommends it in the strongest manner to Your Excellency, to engage the several ministers that are already informed of it at Paris to do the same.

When you have fully explained this matter to the Cardinal, you will then tell him that, though Mo^r. Castelar had declared that the King of Spain is free from all the engagements taken by the Treaty of Seville, yet that His Majesty hopes that the same union and concert will subsist among the other Allies that has hitherto done, and which is now the more necessary from the part that Spain has acted ; that therefore you have order to concert with His Eminence and the Dutch ministers what may be proper for the Allies jointly to do upon this occasion, and you will accordingly talk to the Dutch Ambassadors upon it ; that His Majesty thinks a handle should be taken from what Mo^r. de Castelar let drop to you, to dispose him to retract, or at least to explain his declaration, so as that the Allies may be encouraged to go on with the proper measures for the execution of the Treaty of Seville ; that orders should be immediately sent to our respective ministers in Spain to complain of the declaration given by Mo^r. Castelar, whereby His Catholick Majesty declares himself free from the engagements taken by the Treaty of Seville ; to know of His Catholick Majesty whether he persists in that resolution, and in what sense the Allies are to understand it, and how far the observation of former treaties is or is not to be comprehended in it ; and to learn at the same time whether the King of Spain conceives that the natural consequence of his sticking to this declaration must be the putting an entire stop to the measures now on foot for the introduction of Spanish garrisons into Tuscany and Parma, and to let Their Catholick Majesties see that, in that case, the Allies will be under a necessity of declaring themselves entirely discharged from all their engagements in favour of Don Carlos's succession.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 202.)

Whitehall, 23 February 1730/1.

. The King is glad to find that the Court of France seem to be coming into better temper than they have been of late and His Majesty is persuaded that whatever little uneasiness the Cardinal may have had, when His Eminence reflects upon the explanation Your Excellency has given him of our transactions with the Emperor, he will be convinced that so far from the King's acting contrary to his engagements, the execution of them is the foundation of all that His Majesty has been doing, and therefore the King hopes the negociations between the ministers of the Allys at Paris will be resumed without any difficulty, and will go on in the same manner that they did before.

The first point in the King's opinion to be considered is what should be done by the Allys upon the application made from Spain by the Marquis de la Paz's letter to the ministers of England, France and Holland upon the Duke of Parma's death, and for that purpose you will acquaint the French and Dutch ministers and Mo^r. de Castelar that in order to give immediate satisfaction to the Court of Spain, you have the King's orders to concert with them what measures are proper to be taken by the Allys, and therefore you hope that they will appoint a conference for that purpose, and the Cardinal having acquainted Your Excellency that Mo^r. Bussy is already directed to desire Mr. Robinson to concur in the representation which has been sent by the French Court to Vienna upon this subject, His Eminence can make no difficulty of consenting to it, but if, contrary to expectation, the French ministers should decline entering into any concert with you, His Majesty will have done his part, and the directions now sent to Mr. Keene will be a sufficient proof of His Majesty's readiness to have given the Court of Spain all reasonable satisfaction.

Your Excellency may in general acquaint the Cardinal with the substance of Mr. Keene's instructions and with the King's thoughts of the measures that should be taken upon this incident of the Duke of Parma's death, and when you meet at the conference, you will, I suppose, expect to hear from Mo^r. de Castelar what he has to propose on this occasion, since in the Marquis de la Paz's letter there is nothing particularly suggested by the Court of Spain.

But if he should decline giving his opinion and wait to hear the sentiments of the Allies, you may then acquaint them that you have His Majesty's commands to assure them of the King's readiness to give Their Catholick Majesties satisfaction upon the incident of the Duke of Parma's death and of the Imperial troops having taken possession of Parma and Placentia ; that as it appears by the Marquis de la Paz's letter that His Catholick Majesty was not then acquainted with the reasons and motives alledged by the Emperor for the step he has taken, it may not be improper to consider among yourselves the weight of them, which you apprehend have been communicated by the Emperor's ministers to the several Allys as well as by Count Kinsky here to His Majesty ; that indeed they do not appear to be sufficient since it is expressly said by the Quadruple Alliance " that it never shall be allowed, " during the lives of the present possessors of the Dutchies of " Tuscany and Parma, or of their male successors that any forces " of any country whatsoever, whether their own or hired, shall " either by the Emperor or the Kings of France and Spain or even " by the Prince appointed to the succession, be introduced into " the provinces and lands of the said Dutchies " except those stipulated by the treaty ; and as the possibility of there being an heir male on account of the pregnancy of the Dutchess ought to have the same effect as if there was one actually born, since it is possible that Don Carlos's succession may be sooner open, the sending Imperial troops into those states seems to be contrary to the Quadruple Alliance, that therefore you are ready to joyn in a proper representation to be made to the Emperor upon it, and at the same time to acquaint His Imperial Majesty with the fixt resolution of the Allies of Seville to support and maintain by a punctual execution of the Quadruple Alliance and Treaty of Seville the rights acquired to Don Carlos by those treaties ; that this in His Majesty's opinion is the proper method to be taken since the Allies will by this means know what the real intentions of the Emperor are with relation to Don Carlos's immediate succession to Parma and Placentia, and His Imperial Majesty on the other hand will be convinced of the firm resolution of the Allys to execute the engagements taken by the Quadruple Alliance and by the Treaty of Seville. But if any of the other ministers have anything else to offer, you are not only ready to receive it, but you are persuaded that His Majesty will concur in everything that shall be necessary

¹and reasonable¹ to be done upon this occasion ; and if there be no material difference between the King's sentiments and those of the other Allys, Your Excellency will joyn in what shall be proposed, and send Mr. Robinson orders accordingly, without waiting for any further directions from hence.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32771, fo. 403.*)

Whitehall, 23 February 1730/1.

Most private.

. The King was glad to find that His Eminence freely own'd to you that he believed the account you had given him of our negociation at Vienna, and had assured you that he desired the continuance of the union between the two Crowns. But that which gives the King the greatest hopes that His Eminence will return to his old way of acting with respect to His Majesty is what Your Excellency mentions in your letter to me in your own hand, that the Cardinal begins not to be so thoroughly satisfied with Mo^r. Chauvelin and that he has even promised you to keep any secret from him that you shall desire. In return for this sincerity of the Cardinal, the King is willing to make him the greatest confidence that he can of the negociation at Vienna, and I accordingly send you a copy of the project of the treaty which Your Excellency is to communicate to the Cardinal and even leave it with him 24 hours in case His Eminency will give you his word that he will return it to you without taking a copy of it or shewing it to anybody but to the French King.²

The Cardinal will see by this that as soon as His Majesty could be satisfied that he would keep the secret from everybody, and indeed particularly from Mo^r. Chauvelin, His Majesty has trusted him with it. And you may in a proper manner insinuate to him

¹⁻¹ Added in George II's hand.

² Cf. *Aff. Etr. Angl.* 375, fo. 95, Fleury to H. Walpole, Versailles 14 March N.S. 1731, for the comments of Louis XV and Fleury on this draft treaty, viz. that it did not say what the Austrian reply to it was, it said nothing about Mecklenburg and East Friesland nor about the marriage of Don Carlos with an archduchess. Finally as to the Pragmatic Sanction, Vous vous souviendrés s.v.p. aussi bien que mylord Harrington que nous conviunes verbalement à Compiègne en donnant à Mo^r. de Kinigsegg notre ultimatum que nous ne pouvions ni ne devons jamais consentir à donner cette garantie.
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that that gentleman's behaviour towards the King has been such that His Majesty was afraid that through his means a more early communication of what has been doing at Vienna might have disappointed a measure in which His Majesty thinks his own interest and that of all his Allies is concerned, and to which the King cannot but think the Cardinal must wish success. His Eminence will see that every article of the treaty is agreeable to the account in general which Your Excellency gave him of it, and you are also to assure the Cardinal that if any alterations shall be made to this project, they shall be immediately communicated to him. We have yet no final answer from Vienna, but expect in a few days to have one. Things in the main look hopeful, but what effect the delivery of Mo^r. de Castelar's declaration and the death of the Duke of Parma may have, cannot yet be known.

You will observe to the Cardinal that the declaration which he had so often made that France could never guaranty the Pragmatick Sanction is the reason that no application was made to him upon that head, though His Majesty did believe that he would not be displeased with this guaranty's being given by England and Holland, in order to procure the execution of the Treaty of Seville.

Your Excellency knows so well the reasons His Majesty has to be displeased with the conduct of Mo^r. Chauvelin that it will be unnecessary for me to repeat them to you, which upon fit opportunities and in a proper manner you may hint to the Cardinal, as also your apprehension that His Eminency's directions to Mo^r. Chauvelin may sometimes be executed in such a way as to take off the force and effect of them, which most probably is the case of the instructions sent to Mo^r. Bussi at Vienna; but all this you will do with so much caution and prudence as not to offend the Cardinal, but that His Eminence may see that it proceeds from His Majesty's great regard for him, and dependance and confidence in him.

[A despatch of Newcastle to Waldegrave, instructing him to communicate the treaty of Vienna to Fleury, Chauvelin and Castelar, dated Whitehall, 26 March 1731, is in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 109.]

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32773, fo. 429.*)

Hampton Court, 15 July 1731.

. The Cardinal's way of talking, as if he wished success to our endeavours, is so inconsistent with the manner in which Count Rottembourg acts at Seville and with the intrigues that *Mor^r* Chauvelin is carrying on in other parts to His Majesty's prejudice, that it is hard to make any judgement upon it. When His Eminence throws out his suspicions of engagements entered into about commerce &c. to the prejudice of France, Your Excellency will endeavour to make him explain himself, and as you are fully apprised of all that has past, you are very able to shew him how little foundation there is for any insinuations of this kind.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32774, fo. 1.*)

Hampton Court, 26 July 1731.

I herewith send you by His Majesty's command, copys of the treaty signed at Vienna the 11/22 inst. by His Majesty's minister with those of the Emperor and Spain,¹ and I heartily congratulate Your Excellency upon this happy event, which gives us so near a prospect of a final conclusion of affairs, so much to His Majesty's honour and to the advantage of his subjects and of all Europe.

As, ever since the making of our late treaty, and particularly in this last negociation, the King has had all imaginable reason to be pleased with the Emperor's behaviour, His Majesty is determined not to take any step relating to this matter but in concert with His Imperial Majesty or his ministers at the several Courts. Your Excellency will therefore, immediately upon the receipt of this letter, see Count Kinski and express to him the King's satisfaction with what has been done at Vienna, and particularly with the obliging manner in which the Imperial Court has behaved towards His Majesty, and that it being the King's resolution not to do anything in the affairs now depending but in concert with them, you are ordered to shew him those copys of the treaty and the separate and secret articles and declaration belonging to it, in case he has not already received them from Vienna, and to settle with him the manner of communicating them to the French ministers, which His Majesty thinks it will be right to do, since

¹ Pribram, *Oesterr. Staatsverträge, England*, Vol. I, p. 517.

as the whole is to be notified to the Grand Duke, and there is nothing in them of a secret nature, no inconvenience can follow from it, and it will serve to convince the Court of France and the whole world of the solid foundation upon which the union between His Majesty and the Emperor is built, as well as of the injustice of the insinuations that have been made, as if they had had any other view but that of securing if possible the publick peace and tranquillity ; that in order to this communication having the better effect, you hope he will joyn with you in it, or that if he does not think himself sufficiently authorised for that purpose, he will however agree to your making it, for that whatsoever may be the King's sentiments in this respect, you have His Majesty's positive orders not to do it without his concurrence or consent. Your Excellency will endeavour to persuade him to this but if, contrary to expectation, he should have any objection to it the King would have you forbear doing it till you shall have received His Majesty's further pleasure. . . . Whenever this communication shall be made to the French ministers, either in conjunction with Count Kinski, or by Your Excellency alone with his consent, you will take care to do it in such a manner as may convince them of the truth of the King's professions that His Majesty had no other design in his negociations but the preservation of the publick tranquillity of Europe and the performance of his engagements. Your Excellency is not to give them any copys of the treaty &c^a, but onely to read them over to them.

[A "most private" despatch from Newcastle to Waldegrave denying any idea of forcing France to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, dated Hampton Court, 16 August 1731, is in Coxe, *Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 120.]

(*B.M., Add. MS.* 32775, fo. 279.)

Whitehall, 9 December 1731.

Private.

. . . . As to the negotiations that France is carrying on with other foreign powers, particularly the Crowns of Sweden and Denmark, it is surprizing that the Cardinal could dissemble with you so far as with an air of confidence and sincerity to assure you of their having no treaty on foot with either of those powers, when besides what Your Excellency has learnt from Mo^r. Gedda, His

Majesty has unquestionable information and evidence of the contrary from the repeated accounts which he receives from his own ministers at those Courts, though the King has the satisfaction to find that all their attempts in Sweden are to no purpose and there is great reason to hope they will equally miscarry in Denmark ; and indeed the manner in which they negotiate with those Crowns is very improper to advance their affairs. When the French ministers give you assurances and make you professions of this nature, His Majesty would have you receive them in such a way, that they may see that you are not to be thus amused, and that His Majesty is not a stranger to what they are doing. If France has been using their (*sic*) utmost endeavours to gain those two Courts, whose interest it is most evidently to depend upon the King's friendship and remain united with His Majesty preferably to any other power, there is no doubt, were there no other evidence of it, but she has been doing the same with those powers whose views and interests may rather seem to incline them to an alliance with France ; and the intelligence you had from the Queen's family of her dissatisfaction that her father's interest was sacrificed to those new schemes and alliances, may probably be true. His Majesty is sensible of the difficulty of your penetrating into the negotiations carrying on with Bavaria and Saxony, but hopes it will not however discourage Your Excellency from using all possible means to get what light you can into them, of which you will not fail to send His Majesty an account. Mo^r. Gedda might be of use to you in this respect, but though he sincerely wishes us well, yet as he is a friend to France also, he is undoubtedly, where we are not directly in the question, partial to them, and I am persuaded Your Excellency talks to him under this caution.

I have avoided saying anything to you by the post upon Mo^r. Chavigny's subject, and indeed, as His Majesty was determined neither to encourage nor discourage his coming, I had no orders to send you upon it. What the Garde des Sceaux said to you, that he was to be here a meer spectator, was very extraordinary, and might have deserved a severer reply than Your Excellency gave it. That gentleman is too able and too active a minister to be sent hither only on such an errand. Dexterity, cunning and address are not the least of his talents, and whatever professions he may make to Your Excellency of his good disposition towards us, which might formerly have been true, it is scarce to be supposed

but he must enter into the spirit and way of thinking of those who employ him. However you will take the assurances he gives you in good part, and use your best endeavours to discover from himself or by what other means you can what his instructions are, and take particular care not to let him think you have the least suspicion of him.

I send you a copy of a very extraordinary letter from the Garde des Sceaux to Mo^r. Chammorel for your own information only, and which you will keep to yourself. It is in effect pleading guilty, for the Garde des Sceaux supposes, without any reason for it, that Mo^r. Chavigny's coming has given great uneasiness to the administration here, and does not enable Mo^r. Chammorel to remove it, which, if there were no foundation for it, he might easily have done.

His Majesty, from the long experience he has of the behaviour of the Sicilians, cannot think so hardly of them as the Abbé Rota seems to do. They have always appeared to be honest men, but may be imposed upon, as they undoubtedly are, by the Garde des Sceaux, when he makes them believe that France has no negotiation on foot with Bavaria or Saxony. Your Excellency will continue to make use of them, and you know how far you are to give credit to their informations. There may be more probability in what they reported to you to have been said by Mo^r. de Castelar, that he was at a proper time to treat with France upon a guaranty of Don Carlos's possessions in Italy. Though possibly there may be nothing of this kind transacting at present, yet you will always have a watchfull eye upon any negotiation of that sort.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32776, fo. 155.*)

Whitehall, 3 March 1731/2.

Most private.

. Your Excellency should endeavour to lead the Cardinal into another conversation upon Mo^r. Chavigny's conduct, and if he does not come naturally into it, you may bring it on by telling him that, as you thought the assurances he had given you on this head would be very agreeable to His Majesty, you had taken the first opportunity of sending an account of them to your Court, hoping Mo^r. Chavigny's conduct was conformable to them, but that by the answer you had received, you were sorry to find it

quite otherwise. You will acquaint the Cardinal that you have the King's orders to let him know that the instructions which he told you Mo^r. Chavigny had, are such as His Majesty had reason to expect had been given by His Eminence, but far from following them, that gentleman behaves in such manner as is by no means to His Majesty's satisfaction; that his constant conversation is with the known opposers of His Majesty's measures; that he is frequently with the late Lord Bolingbroke, Sir William Wyndham, Mr. Pulteney &c^a.; that he adopts their sentiments and talks in their stile, representing in the most false and disadvantageous light the situation of His Majesty's affairs and the conduct of his administration.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32777, fo. 72.*)

Whitehall, 18 May 1732.

Most private.

Your Excellency having been exactly informed of Mo^r. Chavigny's behaviour here will easily imagine that the King cannot but be very desirous that he should be recalled; and as His Majesty will be going shortly to Hanover and Mo^r. Chavigny proposes soon to follow, the King would be glad if that minister's journey thither might be prevented. Your Excellency will therefore take an opportunity of talking upon this subject to the Cardinal and to the Garde des Seaux, and observe to them that, considering the manner in which Mo^r. Chavigny has behaved, they cannot be surprized that the King should wish to have a minister at his Court from His Most Christian Majesty better disposed to keep up the good understanding between the two Crowns than Mo^r. Chavigny appears to have been since his last coming hither, and that as His Majesty has in France a minister of the first rank and distinction, it would have but an odd appearance if they should not have one with the same character here. But if Your Excellency should be of opinion that it is impossible for you in so short a time to prevent Mo^r. Chavigny's going to Hanover, you will then consider of the properest means in all events to hinder his coming back here upon His Majesty's return to England. There is indeed one circumstance which would rather incline the King to acquiesce in Mo^r. Chavigny's going to Hanover, however disagreeable his being there may be, which is, lest the Court of

France, who are disposed enough to be jealous of His Majesty's proceedings, should imagine that the King's desire to have M^r. Chavigni removed was from an apprehension that he might be able to discover whatever His Majesty might be transacting in those parts, and thereby create a suspicion in them that the King had something to do which His Majesty might be unwilling that they should be informed of.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32777, fo. 340.*)

Kensington, 6 July 1732.

His Majesty having received several applications from the Elector Palatine relating to the succession of Juliers and Bergues, and considering the consequences that any disputes thereupon might have with regard to the tranquility of Europe, and how much the interest of the Dutch is concerned in this question and also the near prospect of such an event from the age and infirmitys of the Elector Palatine, was pleased to order my Lord Harrington in his passage through The Hague to discourse with the Pensionary and the Greffier upon this subject. His Lordship found them much alarmed about it and as His Majesty has thought fit to order that Your Excellency should be instructed to inform yourself of the French ministers what part they will take in case such an event should happen, the Queen¹ would accordingly have you discourse with the Cardinal and Garde des Sceaux upon this subject, but you will rather seem to do it as from yourself than as having received direct orders from your Court upon it, which you may easily take an opportunity of doing, as this point is at present one of the principal objects of the attention of several powers in Europe. You will endeavour to discover what their true sentiments and intentions are upon this matter, whether they may wish upon this occasion to create confusion and disturbance which may end in a general rupture, and may hope to have an opportunity of revenging themselves upon the Emperor and get a footing in Germany without His Majesty or the Dutch being directly engaged to oppose them, or whether (which is the most probable) they may really wish in their hearts that this point may be previously so accommodated that they may not be under

¹ The Queen was acting as Guardian of the Kingdom during the King's absence in Hanover.

an obligation of performing by force the engagements of their guaranty to the Palatine family. . . . You will go no further than learning their sentiments, and by all means avoid giving them to understand, as the Pensionary proposed, "that His Majesty "and the States are disposed to act in concert with them for preventing any disturbances," since such an assurance might have a contrary effect to what the Pensionary expects from it, and instead of engaging the French to use their influence with the Elector Palatine to bring him to make some reasonable concessions, it might induce them to encourage him to stand out.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 350.)

Kensington, 6 July 1732.

Most private.

Her Majesty observed with great satisfaction in your most private letter of the 2/13th inst. by Brettell the strong assurances that the Cardinal has given you that whatever coldness there may have been between the two Courts, yet whilst our treatys subsisted he would not engage in anything contrary to them, and the repeated protestations he made that directly or indirectly he had not done anything nor listened to any proposal in favour of the Pretender were also very agreeable to Her Majesty. The Queen was also glad that he took in so right a manner the precaution that has been used here in manning our guard ships and had no alarm or jealousy on that account. His being so much in the dark about what is transacting between the Courts of Vienna and Seville did not displease Her Majesty, as it is an indication that there is no good understanding between France and Spain. Your Excellency will do all you can to keep His Eminence in the good disposition in which he appears to be to live well with England, and make him the proper compliments from the Queen upon what His Eminence has said to you on that head.

We had long ago from Mr. Robinson a copy of the project of a treaty between the Emperor and Spain delivered to the Duke of Liria. As I remember, there was nothing in it that could be any way prejudicial to us; however it is plain by Mr. Patino's discourse to Mr. Keene upon this subject that there is no great danger of these two Courts being upon too intimate a foot.

Her Majesty was glad to find that there does not appear to be

at present any negociation carrying on with the Grisons for obtaining a passage through their country for France and Spain. Your Excellency will continue to inform yourself whether there is any probability of this design's being renewed in any shape.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32779, fo. 27.*)

Kensington, 30 Oct. 1732.

Private.

. What the Cardinal said to you in conversation upon the affairs of Spain, that that Court is a riddle and that even Mo^r. Castelar knew nothing of what was doing there or what they intended to do, is very remarkable. One should imagine from the accounts that Mr. Keene sends; from Mo^r. Chavigni's behaviour and assiduity towards the Spanish Ambassador here, from the nomination of Mo^r. de Bissy ¹ to go and compliment Don Carlos on his arrival at Parma, and from several other circumstances that the Garde des Seaux is making his court in the strongest manner to Spain and leaves no stone unturned to gain her from us. Your Excellency will therefore at the same time that you encourage the Cardinal in the good disposition that he professes to you, continue to watch narrowly the motions of the Garde des Seaux and endeavour to find out the intrigues he is carrying on at the Court of Spain and elsewhere.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32780, fo. 24ov.*)

Whitehall, 2 March 1732/3.

Most private.

. Your Excellency will forgive me if I cannot help mentioning that in so critical and dubious a situation as our two Courts are (*sic*) with regard to each other, it is necessary that you should not content yourself with seeing the French ministers barely once a week on their publick days, or when you have particular business with them, which in the present conjuncture may not happen very often, but that Your Excellency should be with them as frequently as you possibly can, carefull and assiduous in endeavouring to discover from them as well as by

¹ Brother-in-law to Chauvelin.

other means, their sentiments and views on every point and with relation to every country.

The affairs of Poland, the disputes between the Emperor and Spain in Italy, the succession of Berg and Juliers, the difference between the King of Prussia and the Dutch, may all of them affect so essentially the present system of Europe that it is greatly to be wished that His Majesty should be informed not only of what part France is likely to take in relation to them, but what schemes they may be forming in those respects or what turn they may be desirous of giving to them. Their behaviour to Mo^r. Van Hoey upon his late application seems very extraordinary: however it is not amiss for us, since probably by this neglect they will have lost a favourable opportunity of laying a great obligation upon the Dutch.

By your frequent conversations with the Cardinal and the Garde des Seaux Your Excellency may also have an opportunity of observing what impressions are made upon them by the false representations of their ministers abroad. It would be a very great misfortune if, when we have no intention to hurt France or to give them any just cause of uneasiness, and when, if we may believe their professions, they are not disposed to break with us, yet that a rupture should be brought about between the two Crowns by the groundless suggestions of the French ministers employed abroad owing to misinformation, illwill or to a desire of making their court at home by writing what they fancy will be agreeable there, and so the two nations be written into a quarrel without either of them intending or desiring it.

I am sensible of the hard task it must be upon Your Excellency to be so very busy when in reality there is so little to be transacted between the two Courts, but you see that, as the case now stands, there is more need of activity than when we were on better terms and had more to do with each other.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32781, fo. 204.*)

Whitehall, 18 June 1733.

I have been so irregular a correspondent of late that I have no excuse to make but the hurry we have been in at the conclusion of the session of Parliament.

As [your letters] chiefly relate to the affairs of Poland and the
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situation of the Court of Spain, I have now His Majesty's commands to give Your Excellency all the lights you can have from hence for the better regulating of your future conduct, and in the mean time to acquaint you with His Majesty's approbation of the several discourses which you have had upon those heads with the French ministers and with Mo^r. Gedda.

His Majesty thinks that from your accounts there is great reason to believe that the Court of France now wish they had not made the declaration they did at first with relation to the election in Poland, and that this may have been occasioned by the firm and resolute answer they received from the Court of Vienna. How that election will end is yet very uncertain, the accounts from thence varying every day; however as it is of the utmost consequence to engage the Elector of Saxony to guaranty the Pragmatick Sanction, and consequently to come into the measures of our Treaty of Vienna, the Imperial Court are very zealous upon that condition to support that Elector's interest in Poland, and I may in confidence acquaint Your Excellency that there is a treaty on foot and very far advanced of reciprocal engagements between the Emperor and the Elector for that purpose. We are in great hopes that, though the Elector should not succeed in his views with regard to Poland, he will however come into the measures of the Court of Vienna. If this can be brought about, it will be a great discouragement to the Court of France from making the affairs of Poland a pretence for a general war, the chief view of which, whenever it happens, must be to defeat the Emperor's settlement of his succession upon his daughters, and to divide the succession by setting up a claim for the Josephine ArchDutchesses, which would be greatly invalidated if the Elector of Saxony, who upon that foot must have the best pretension, should himself guaranty the Pragmatick Sanction.

Your Excellency does extremely well in getting all the informations you can from Mo^r. Gedda. Whatever may be the inclination of his Court, or his own, for King Stanislaus, it is plain by their answers that they will not espouse his cause so as to encourage France to strike a blow upon this occasion.

As to the affairs of Spain there does not seem to be any disposition in them to create any real disturbance in Europe. They are and perhaps may continue out of humour with the Emperor, and possibly angry with us for not entring

warmly enough into their disputes ; but in their present circumstances, it is not probable that they will venture to carry it any further.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32781, fo. 214v.*)

Whitehall, 18 June 1733.

Most private.

. The notion in one of Mo^r. Chauvelin's letters that our standing by King Stanislaus is to be a *casus foederis*, and that their requiring it of us will give them an opportunity of pushing us to the wall and to make us declare whether we will or will not perform our engagements to France, is indeed very extraordinary. But in truth that whole correspondence is such a heap of blustering nonsense that, as there is no foundation for many of the facts upon which they argue, there is as little attention to the threats they fling out upon such suppositions. Chauvelin and Chavigni both agree to treat all powers but France with the utmost contempt, but the great figure they brag of making will very probably be only in their despatches.

(*ibid.*, fo. 236.)

Whitehall, 25 June 1733.

Private.

As Your Excellency may think it may be of service to read my other letter ¹ to the Cardinal, I would put nothing in it that might not be proper for you to shew him, and I have therefore reserved for this private letter some few observations which His Majesty thought it convenient that I should make to you.

In the first place I am to send you a copy of a letter from Mo^r. de Monti to Mo^r. Chavigni, by which you will find that the French Ambassador has been forced to make use of all his art to keep up the Poles to their mettle in favour of King Stanislaus and to give them the strongest assurances that France will stand by their declaration ; and it is very probable that one great view of the present application from France to His Majesty was in hopes of procuring such

¹ Containing news of a demand from Chavigny as to British intentions in the event of Austria and Russia violating the freedom of the Polish diet, and the King's answer.

an answer as would, upon His Majesty's declaring he would not assist the Emperor if he made use of forcible means, enable them to assure the Poles that the King would not stand by the Emperor in case force were to be employed, and for that reason the Emperor would not use any. If this was their aim, they have been defeated in it by the answer that His Majesty has given to Mo^r. Chavigni.

It is also possible that Mo^r. Chauvelin, or at least Mo^r. Chavigni, might have had another intention, which was to have got from the King such an answer as would encourage the Cardinal and, they might think, would justify France in coming to an immediate rupture with us, and in this likewise they will be intirely disappointed, for the answer was such as His Majesty would and must have made if he had been upon the best foot with France, unless His Majesty had been willing to disturb the publick tranquillity, there being as much good and kind advice in it to the Cardinal as possible, as well as the strongest professions of a desire to live well with France.

Mo^r. Chavigni told me that the same application would be made to the Dutch, and something to this purpose would be said at the Court of Vienna.

Your Excellency will inform yourself without loss of time of the real view and design of this application and what it is that the Court of France does actually intend to do. His Majesty in his discourse to Mo^r. Chavigni insinuated that it was a little strange that they alone should seem now so very forward to begin a war in Europe for the sake of the affairs in Poland, when, jointly with England and Holland, they would not act in behalf of Spain.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32781, fo. 240v.*)

Whitehall, 29 June 1733.

Most private.

. . . . His Majesty even wishes that you had ventured to be more explicite with the Marshal de Berwick, for in our present circumstances Your Excellency will allow me to say it is more eligible to go rather too far than by an over-delicacy to keep ourselves uninformed, it being necessary, considering the manner in which the Court of France acts, that His Majesty should have all

possible accounts of their motions, and lights into their designs, in order to form his own judgement and resolutions.

. I am very much afraid that the behaviour of the Dutch, in seeming to shew so much apprehension, and as it were to wish a neutrality from Flanders, will at this time have a bad effect and encourage France to attack the Emperor, since they may from thence flatter themselves that, if they do, the Republick of Holland, at least, may stand neuter.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32782, fo. 19v.*)

Hampton Court, 17 July 1733.

Most private.

. As to the Cardinal, His Majesty doubts not but he has still the same pacifick dispositions that he ever had ; but whether, if Mo^r. Chauvelin be in earnest for a war (which is not yet very clear) he may not get the better of the Cardinal's own disposition, is a question. By the account which Your Excellency gives of his Eminence's present ease and quiet of mind, it looks as if he did not think a war unavoidable, since he must be extremely changed indeed if the thoughts of one (though he was determined to undertake it) did not make him uneasy. Your Excellency will therefore take proper opportunitys to work upon both his passions : his love of peace, by which he has hitherto got so much reputation in keeping things quiet, and his fear of a war, the consequences of which you may easily shew him may be far different from what they may have been represented to him. The King of France's honour, which I suppose is the topick upon which they will endeavour to blow His Eminence up, is not at all concerned to support any measures or resolution taken by any party of the Poles previous to the election and inconsistent with the freedom of it, which the Emperor and the Czarina represent to be the case of the oath of exclusion, and as undoubtedly those who are for a war will endeavour to persuade the Cardinal that France runs no risque in attacking the Emperor, since they will have to do with him alone and that his Allies are neither willing nor able to come to his assistance, in which they will be greatly confirmed by the late behaviour of the Dutch, it will be easy to shew that this will probably not be the case, for if the Emperor be attackt, whatever be the pretence for it, things may be brought to such a

pass that the powers of Europe who are concerned to preserve the balance of power cannot out of regard to themselves and to their own security suffer the House of Austria to be overrun by France, though perhaps they may be very sorry for the occasion or even not approve of the measures that first caused the rupture.

The method of dealing with Mo^r. Chauvelin must be quite different. As all he says and does is with a view to bully all Europe, nothing but shewing him that they will not be bullied will have any effect upon him. And therefore whenever he talks to Your Excellency that "they must be at a certainty with regard to the measures we propose to take ; that if we do not stand by them in support of the King of France's honour, they may declare all the treaties void with us ; that we had it in our power to stop all this, but "now it is too late," Your Excellency may in return let him know that His Majesty has taken no one step that ought to give any offence to France ; that let Europe be engaged in a war to-morrow, no part of the blame can be imputed to the King ; that what relates singly to Poland is a very remote consideration for His Majesty ; that the measures the King will take for the future must depend upon the proceedings of other powers, and that His Majesty has acquainted them already that he is under no engagement with regard to the affairs of Poland ; that the other powers of Europe are as much concerned to avoid a war as the King is ; and that if His Majesty should ever be attackt himself, or the case of his treaties exist wherein his Allies, whoever they are, shall be intitled to demand his assistance, the King will not fail to perform punctually and faithfully his engagements to them.

This manner of discourse is the only right one to be held with one who thinks by his menaces to frighten all Europe, and instructs his correspondents to represent the several Courts they are at as unable to withstand the torrent of their power. This is what Mo^r. Chavigny is doing daily here, and if Mo^r. Chauvelin depends upon the accounts he receives from that minister of the disposition of the nation and His Majesty's credit and authority in it, he will find himself extremely mistaken. For as His Majesty is at present happily under no engagements but defensive ones equally with all the powers in Europe, except what particularly relates to the Pragmatick Sanction, which is agreeable to the constant principles

and practice of those in this country who have any concern for the general balance of power in Europe or the particular interest of this nation, His Majesty may assure himself of the chearfull and effectuall support of his people in any measures which their interest and security and His Majesty's engagements with his Allies for mutual defence may make necessary.

. As it is above all things material that His Majesty should know whether there is the least foundation for the report that the French and Spanish squadrons are to joyn in the Mediterranean, I am persuaded Your Excellency will get the best informations upon this head, and let me have the earliest notice of them. You will have seen that Mo^r. Rottembourg of late has received and sent several couriers to and from his Court. Your Excellency will endeavour to inform yourself of what has been the occasion of it.

[Postscript.]

23 July 1733.

. Your Excellency sees that His Majesty has already sent his orders to M^r. Robinson to dissuade the Court of Vienna from marching troops into Poland, and intends to repeat them; and I may in confidence acquaint you that, in order to give the greater weight to any advice that His Majesty may give to the Court of Vienna, M^r. Robinson will be directed to talk in such a way as that the Emperor's ministers may at least doubt whether His Majesty will think himself obliged by his treatys to come to the Emperor's assistance in case he should be attackt by France on account of his having attempted by force to prevent the election of King Stanislaus in Poland. As His Majesty's only view by this is to prevent the Emperor, if it be not too late, from taking such a step as France may determine to resent, so it is by no means proper that the Court of France should know that the King has done anything of this kind. On the contrary, Your Excellency in your discourses with the Cardinal and the Garde des Seaux will take quite a different turn and rather insinuate to them that in case any of his Allies come to be attackd, the King will then be obliged to perform his engagements to them Your Excellency will do this in such a way as may give the French ministers reason to apprehend the danger that they may possibly expose themselves to in case they attack the Emperor, but yet be very cautious not to say so much as to make them think that

His Majesty is determined to take part with the Emperor in case he should.

You will also see that the Court of Vienna reason pretty much in the same way that France does. The Emperor thinks that if his Allies would openly and avowedly take part with him and shew the Court of France that in case he were attackt they would make common cause, France would not venture a rupture. On the other hand the Court of France is persuaded that if the Emperor's Allies would declare that they would not concern themselves in anything that might be the consequence of what was done in Poland, in that case the Emperor would be discouraged from making use of any force there.

In these circumstances His Majesty thinks the most prudent measure is to leave both parties in suspense, and when they both have reason to apprehend the consequences of what they may do, they may probably think twice before they venture upon it.

I shall make but one more observation to Your Excellency. It seems pretty extraordinary, and will be thought so by everybody, to attack the Emperor for what the Czarina may do; but the notion of attacking the Emperor's Allies because they will not previously agree to a neutrality, before they know how far the case of their alliances may exist, is of all others the most absurd and unjust.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32782, fo. 45.*)

HARRINGTON TO WALDEGRAVE.

Hampton Court, 30 July 1733.

. The King having now received positive assurances that the Emperor, out of his desire to preserve the publick tranquility and in deference to the application of His Majesty and the States General, would not march a single man into Poland, with notice at the same time that orders had actually been sent for withdrawing the greatest part of his troops that were encamp't in Silesia. His Majesty has commanded me to dispatch this messenger to you that no time might be lost in acquainting the Cardinal with it, which Your Excellency will do accordingly, His Majesty not doubting but it will be very agreeable to him.

As the Emperor has now by these assurances the

election there will be entirely free and without restraint,¹ the King is too fully persuaded of the Cardinal's justice and the uprightness of his intentions to imagine that he can have a thought of advising that France should fall upon His Imperial Majesty upon no other pretence than that one of his Allies² is taking measures (if that should prove to be the case) in which by his conduct and behaviour it would be evident to all the world that he is so far from cooperating as not to leave in Silesia so much as a number of troops sufficient to countenance them by the prospect of assistance from him even in case of the utmost necessity.

If the Cardinal should insist that the Czarina is so much under the Emperor's influence that it is in his power to prevent her using force in the Polish election, Your Excellency will represent to him that Muscovy is too great a power to be under the direction of any other ; that the Court of Russia have their own separate interests and way of reasoning in this respect, as for instance, their apprehensions that if a King were chosen whose advancement were originally owing to the Swedes, he might in requital at one time or another, assist them in the recovery of the provinces that the Muscovites have got from them ; that King Stanislaus and Poniatowski by their personal credit at the Ottoman Porte might incite the Turks to a war against Muscovy ; that the Czarina has besides a separate view in relation to the Dutchy of Courland in which the Emperor is in no ways concerned ; and in short, that any application of this sort from him to the Czarina would come too late since, if the Muscovites are resolved to send troops into Poland they must before this time be on their march thither ; so that the Emperor's attempting to dissuade the Czarina from doing it would be to no other purpose than laying upon her the highest disobligation and perhaps losing the only secure Ally that he has against the Turks. And Your Excellency will also shew him that even though the Emperor should not have dissuaded or even not disapproved the Czarina's intentions to employ force, yet as he is tyed by no treaty or obligation to France for that purpose, it would be great injustice to make him answerable for her proceedings and make that a pretence for attacking him.

So unwarrantable a measure would by all mankind be lookt upon as an act of so great injustice that it could never be imagined the French Court would embark in an undertaking

¹ The defect in construction is in the original.

² The Russians.

so little to be justified and so hazardous, unless they were prompted to it by such views as must awaken the attention of every power that has at heart the preservation of the balance and of the tranquility of Europe. And this would at the same time give the Emperor a handle to call upon his Allys for the performance of their engagements by the defensive alliances they have contracted with him.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32782, fo. 285v.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Hampton Court, 28 September 1733.

. Yesterday the Chev^r. Ossorio notified to His Majesty in form the conclusion of a treaty between the King his master and His Most Christian Majesty which was signed the 26th inst. N.S.¹ Mo^r. Ossorio in his conversation with me attributed the part his Court had taken to the necessity of their affairs and to the unaccountable behaviour of the Court of Vienna towards them, but at the same time expressed a just sense of His Majesty's regard and the good offices he had been pleased to employ in their favour. He said the Court of France had spoke clearly, of which I told him I concluded we should soon see the consequence. He avoided entring into the particulars of the treaty but in discourse called it a defensive alliance, though in all probability the King of Sardinia would not have taken this step and exposed himself to the Emperor's resentment purely for the sake of a defensive alliance.

Your Excellency will endeavour to inform yourself of the contents of this treaty. It is probable we shall soon hear of the French army marching into Italy. I believe I may venture to affirm that when the treaty was signed with the King of Sardinia, the Court of Spain had not then determined to join; however things may be altered since.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32783, fo. 2v.*)

Hampton Court, 9 October 1733.

. I am now to acquaint you that last Sunday a courier arrived from Vienna with the Emperor's absolute consent to the

¹ The Treaty of Turin.

project contained in my letter to the Spanish Ambassador for accommodating the differences between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid,¹ and Count Kinski was ready to conform himself entirely thereto. We had flattered ourselves, notwithstanding the Court of Spain had not thought proper to declare that they would wait for the Emperor's answer, that now it is come so entirely to their satisfaction, Mo^r. de Montijo would have agreed to it; but when we acquainted him this morning that Count Kinski was ready to sign, he said he had now no authority to do it, but would send an account to his Court and expect their orders.

This unexpected turn in the Spanish Ambassador is owing in great measure if not altogether to the news of the French having passed the Rhine and actually besieged Fort Kehl; for ever since the conclusion of the treaty with Sardinia, he has seemed in a much better disposition than he is at present. I daresay Mo^r. Chavigni has employed all his skill and dexterity to dissuade him from signing by shewing him that France has now begun the war, and that therefore he should wait to know the sentiments of his Court upon that event. Mo^r. Chavigni said nothing in his audience of the King, or to me before, with regard to the part which His Majesty might think proper to take upon this occasion, so that as they have not made that demand at the time they communicated their declarations, it looks as if they had no design of doing it, at least at present.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 205.)

Whitehall, 15 November 1733.

. Whenever the French ministers mention the Polish affairs to Your Excellency you may with great truth assure them that the King had no share or took part in anything that could be alledged as a reason for the present disturbance or give any just cause of offence to France, His Majesty having not only not advised force, but actually in the strongest manner dissuaded the Emperor from making use of it. So that the insinuations to the contrary which are made by the several French ministers to their courts are entirely groundless. And you will see by the answer to the Emperor that it is asserted very positively that the King never did anything but employ his good offices with regard to

¹ See Vaucher, *Robert Walpole et . . . Fleury*, pp. 64-74.

that election, and His Majesty had the same right to wish well to one candidate as the Court of France had to any other.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32784, fo. 31.*)

Whitehall, 5 February 1733/4.

Private.

. It is some time since the States have proposed to the King that His Majesty and they should jointly interpose their good offices at the Courts of Vienna and France in order if possible to accommodate the present disputes and put an end to the war which has already broke out both in Italy and Germany, and that His Majesty, from his constant desire to act in perfect concert with the States General, as well as from his inclination to enter into any measure that may preserve or restore the publick peace and tranquility, gave into this proposal, but was at the same time desirous to know if the Dutch had thought of anything further than the bare interposition of good offices in order to make those offices the more effectual. It appears indeed by Mo^r. Hop's last memorial that the States themselves are of opinion that the animosities may be at present too great, and the resentments too warm to hazard with any probability of success any particular proposal of accommodation. However His Majesty thinks no inconvenience can arise from this measure, for tho' we shall not perhaps be able to put an end to the present differences, yet the Maritime Powers will from having thus felt the sentiments of the two Courts, be better able to judge of their views and intentions, and consequently form some opinion what future measures it may be necessary for them to take. And, what is of all things the most material, they will have given the Emperor and France a proof of their union and resolution to act in concert in the present conjuncture.

His Majesty is of opinion that Mo^r. Van Hoey and you should, in the execution of your orders, take particular care to avoid the appearance of offering His Majesty's and the States' mediation, which perhaps in the present circumstances might not be agreeable to France as well as be liable to other objections, till we know how this first step will be taken.

. If you should find the French ministers inclined to admit of the interposition of His Majesty and the States

you will then endeavour to learn from them what satisfaction they expect and what conditions would be accepted in order to enable His Majesty and the States to judge the better what sort of proposals to make. But if on the other hand you should find that all terms of accommodation would be for the present rejected, you will then take every care that they should not put a wrong construction upon this overture made them from His Majesty and the States, which is occasioned by that constant attention which the King and the Republick have for the preservation of the publick peace and tranquility and the friendship they are desirous of shewing upon all occasions (as far as is consistent with their engagements) to His Most Christian Majesty. And indeed that which makes the King and the States hope that the French ministers will take this in a right manner is some hints that have been flung out by Mo^r. Fenelon at The Hague, as if the Court of France would not be sorry if the Republick was to take some step towards an accommodation, provided the proposals for that purpose were not to come from them ; and what was more particularly said to Your Excellency by the Cardinal himself, that His Eminence wished that England and Holland would take no part, that they might be the better able to interpose with their good offices when they thought things were going too far on either side.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 43v.)

Whitehall, 5 February 1733/4.

Most private.

. It is extreemly to be wish'd that His Majesty could receive some account of the particular engagements enter'd into by the three powers,¹ that His Majesty might thereby know how far the general system of Europe will be affected by them ; how practicable it might be from the contradictory views of Spain and Sardinia to create a jealousy and dissension among them ; and lastly whether any engagements are entered into by France jointly or separately with Spain and Sardinia for the giving any disturbance to the King's dominions in favour of the Pretender, in case His Majesty does or does not take part in the present disputes.

Your Excellency will not be surpris'd that His Majesty is more

¹ France, Spain and Sardinia.

than ordinary anxious upon this head, when I acquaint you in confidence that the King has been able to procure the substance of a treaty said to be concluded between France and Spain, which, as you will see by the enclos'd copy of it, not only threatens the liberties of Europe in general by having for its foundation the aggrandisement of the House of Bourbon, but is particularly level'd at His Majesty and his dominions.¹ Your Excellency will find there is an express article for the recovery of Gibraltar, even by force, and this absolutely, and independant of any other consideration or of any part that His Majesty may take in the present disputes. The other stipulations relating to the suspension of the commerce of this Kingdom &^{ca}, tho' not absolute in all events, are of a nature to give the greatest offence to the King. And indeed it is hardly possible for a treaty, if it be true, to be more injurious to His Majesty than this is in every respect. It is scarce to be imagin'd that they would have gone so far without having some secret engagements in favour of the Pretender, especially since the Court of France may think that they can never secure that sovereignty over all Europe which by this treaty they seem to be aiming at unless they can also place the Pretender upon the throne of England.

. The Cardinal in his discourses with Your Excellency appears pretty well satisfied with the King; entirely approves His Majesty's answer to the Emperor; enters into the necessity for the King's arming himself that he may have more weight in Europe; wishes that England and Holland may not take any part that when they see the powers at variance carrying their arms too far, they may then interpose and put an end to the war, and in this view His Majesty's speech to his Parliament at the opening of the session cannot but be agreeable to him. But you will see at the same time from a letter which I send you in the utmost confidence from Mo^r. Chauvelin to Mo^r. Chavigny, that he treats any notion of the King's offering his mediation as a design to give the law to France, which they will not bear; writes in the most haughty and imperious manner imaginable; threatens every prince of the Empire with destruction that will not come into their measures, and expresses the greatest satisfaction with the King of Spain who acts for the honour and interest of the House of Bourbon; at the same time that the Cardinal talks so uncertainly about Spain and gives Your Excellency reason to imagine by his

¹ For the text, see A. de Cantillo, *Tratados de paz y de comercio*, Madrid, 1843, p. 277.

discourse that they have the greatest difficulty with regard to that Crown.

These are such inconsistencies as would induce one to think that all that the Cardinal and Mo^r. Chauvelin say to you of their desire to live well with the King ; of their concern at being forced into the war ; of their having no view of conquest for themselves, may be only pure amusement design'd to hinder His Majesty from taking part at present against them 'till they should have driven the Emperor out of Italy, and perhaps in some measure out of Germany also, and then be at liberty to make any attempt they may think proper against His Majesty and his dominions.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 205.)

Whitehall, March 1733/4.

Most private.

I have several letters from Your Excellency to acknowledge but I shall only mention in particular those of the 24th and 28th past by which you gave an account of your having executed jointly with the Dutch ambassadour the directions sent you to sound the French ministers whether the good offices of His Majesty and the States towards a pacification would be acceptable to the Court of France.

The answer itself is indeed very general and little can be infer'd from it. But when His Eminency is repeating so often to you that France is to reap no advantages to herself from the war ; that the *equilibre* should be preserv'd, that neither the house of Austria nor Bourbon should be too far reduced, which are the two main supports of it, &^{ca}, Your Excellency might take an opportunity to shew the Cardinal that this reasoning does not pass upon you ; that if the power of the house of Austria is so far reduced as to be liable to be overturn'd singly by France whenever they please, it is of little moment to the balance of Europe to whom the dominions taken from the Emperor are given, since he must equally remain at the mercy of the French, as if France was to possess herself of all the conquests that are made. And therefore the Cardinal should consider how far those powers who have hitherto taken no share in the present disputes, and, except they are forced by these considerations or others which more immediately concern themselves, have no inclination

to do it, may find themselves oblig'd for the preservation of the liberties of Europe which will then be in so imminent danger, to endeavour to stop the torrent of their successes and prevent the house of Austria from being overrun. These reflections made in a proper manner may have their weight with the Cardinal. But Your Excellency will take great care in making them to do it so as not to give him room to suspect from what you shall say that the King has hitherto taken any resolution to joyn with the Emperor or has yet determined whether the case exists in which His Majesty may be obliged to engage in the present dispute. Many circumstances confirm the probability that France has made some such treaty with Spain as that of which I sent you a copy. I now inclose in the utmost secrecy some farther advices of the same nature which give a very different account of the conduct of the French and Spanish Courts from what the Cardinal would insinuate it to be.¹

The beginning at this time to work upon the Spanish line before Gibraltar is so suspicious a circumstance, and so publick and notorious a fact that it furnishes Your Excellency with an opportunity of sifting the Cardinal about their engagements with Spain, especially as far as they may concern His Majesty. You might take notice to His Eminency that it is pretty extraordinary that the Court of Spain should be doing anything of this nature which they think will not fail of giving His Majesty some jealousy at a time when they have sufficient occasions for employing their men and money to their uses. You might then let fall some hint as if considering the present strict alliance between France and Spain, people would be apt to imagine the Spaniards would not take any step of this nature without the privity and approbation of the Court of France, since they must know the engagements France is under to His Majesty and particularly with regard to Gibraltar. And you may upon this occasion talk to him in such a way as may lead him to discover whether they have enter'd into any engagements with Spain with relation to Gibraltar or Minorca.

. It is very possible one so desirous as he [Chauvelin] is to give a malicious turn to everything that is doing by any of His Majesty's ministers may take a handle from a memorial Mr. Finch has lately presented to the Senate of Sweden to make the

¹ Cf. Horace Walpole to Waldegrave, 28 March 1734 in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 157.

Cardinal believe that the King is engaging Sueden against them. The truth is Mr. Finch has greatly exceeded his orders, and has presented this memorial out of his own head, having not the least direction for it. I send you a copy of the memorial, and if the Cardinal should say anything to you upon it you may say that His Eminency cannot but be surpris'd that as His Majesty has not yet taken any part in the present disputes, the King should be desirous to prevent those of his Allies who are at present in the same circumstances with His Majesty, from doing it, especially since the longer some considerable powers of Europe keep themselves disengaged, the more weight they will have in restoring the publick peace and tranquillity, which is what His Majesty has most at heart.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32784, fo. 204v.*)

Whitehall, 30 March 1734.

Most private.

. The Cardinal's discourse is indeed for the most part so extraordinary and so little conformable to the conduct of France in all parts that it must give great suspicions of his sincerity. It is not to be imagin'd but France would be glad to see the power of the Emperor so reduced as not to be a match for theirs, and therefore all that the Cardinal says on that head and with regard to the *equilibre* is at best but amusing you, which you should let His Eminence see you are sensible of. One may indeed infer from his discourse that he is not without his fears and his apprehensions, and Your Excellency should talk to him in such a manner as not altogether to remove them. And if he should renew his discourse to you again upon their sending their fleet to the Baltick and the jealousy His Majesty would or would not conceive at it, you may as from yourself say it is impossible for you to give any opinion about it 'till you know on what service they are to be employ'd. This perhaps may draw out of him something by which you may have a good guess at their designs that way. For Your Excellency will use your utmost endeavour to find out the condition of their naval force, what their preparations in their several ports are, and with what view probably they are made, of which His Majesty has hitherto receiv'd little intelligence from you. Your Excellency will also inquire whether the French are sending

any troops towards their coasts so as to give any reasonable cause of jealousy here.

. Your Excellency will easily perceive that you are to be very attentive to the motions of France and Holland upon this occasion, and you will particularly make it your business to find out whether there be any truth in what is now reported, that the French are to send a body of troops towards the Netherlands under the command of Mo^r. d'Asfeldt, or whether there is any separate negotiation going on between France and Holland for the security of the Dutch in the Low Countries or for preventing the Emperor from acting offensively in those parts.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32785, fo. 85.)

Whitehall, 23 May 1734.

. I cannot better explain to Your Excellency the sentiments of the King and the States and the orders that are to be sent to their respective ministers at Vienna and Paris than by sending you an extract of the resolution of the States General which His Majesty has agreed to without the least variation and will therefore serve as ample instruction to Your Excellency upon this occasion.

You will perceive that this resolution is taken in consequence of some conferences that had been held between His Majesty's ministers and the deputys of the States, so that it must be lookt upon as having been formed upon the most mature consideration of the present situation of affairs and therefore ought to be regarded as the plan and ground-work upon which England and Holland intend to proceed, on the one hand by not engaging themselves too hastily in the present troubles, and on the other by shewing a due concern for the libertys of Europe in general, as well as for their own particular interests and security.

Your Excellency will see that there is that spirit of peace and impartiality throughout the whole as should induce both the Emperor and France not only to accept the mediation of His Majesty and the States but to think their respective interests safe in their hands, and at the same time such a concern shewn for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe as ought to dispose those whose measures may tend to weaken it, to lay aside any thoughts of that kind.

The interpretation that the Cardinal gave to the answer of the Court of France in their own name and that of their Allies upon the offer that was made some time ago by His Majesty and the States of employing their good offices &c^a. and His Eminence's late acknowledgment to Your Excellency that His Majesty and the States General were in a capacity proper for mediators, leaves no room to doubt but that France will accept the mediation of His Majesty and the Republick and it is to be hoped considering the present situation of the Emperor's affairs and the earnestness with which the King and the States will apply to him upon this occasion, that His Imperial Majesty will understand his own interest too well to reject it, for he will see the handle that his refusal has already given to France, and that he cannot expect any positive answer from England and Holland to his peremptory demands of succours, till they know the event of these applications.

The reason mentioned in the enclosed resolution why His Majesty and the States have not sooner replied to the Court of France's answer to their offer of good offices, and the declaration that they are now using their utmost endeavours to induce the Emperor to come into this measure in which they hope to succeed, ought to induce them in the meantime to explain themselves upon the three points mentioned in that resolution.

As to the first, it is highly necessary that the King and the Republick should know whether the Court of France speak singly for themselves or in the name of their Allies also, since by the advices from Spain they seem to deny there their having had any hand or share in the answer lately given.

The concern which His Majesty and the States shew in the second point, independant of their engagements with the Emperor, lest the balance of power in Europe should be affected by the consequences of the present war, ought to dispose France without further delay to give satisfaction upon this head, and it is for this end proposed in the third point, that His Majesty and the States should be acquainted with the engagements lately entered into between France and her Allies, whereby the balance of power in Europe may be materially and essentially affected.

(B.M., Add. MS. 32785, fo. 237v.)

Whitehall, 20 July 1734.

. Your Excellency remembers that the paper deliver'd jointly by you and the Dutch minister, consisted of three principal points. The first, to enquire whether the Court of France in their former answer of . . . ,¹ spoke in their own name only or had authority from their Allies; the second, to express the apprehensions of His Majesty and the States General in regard to the *equilibre*; and the third, to desire to be inform'd what engagements France had enter'd into with the Allies, in order to remove those apprehensions.

To all this they are so far from giving an open and satisfactory answer, that they do not say a single word to any one of these points. They do not so much as accept in form of our mediation. They insinuate as if it were a doubt whether we were in the state of impartiality needed for mediators, and which we had expressly declar'd we were. They are so far from saying anything to calm the apprehensions which it is natural for the Maritime Powers to conceive from the late progress of the arms of France and from what one may naturally imagine to be the purport of their engagements with Spain and Sardinia, that their silence upon them cannot but very much increase those apprehensions.

How very different the King's behaviour has been with regard to them, Your Excellency must have observed. You will remember that the Court of France pretended to be uneasy at our naval preparations; to be apprehensive that we had enter'd into some new engagements with the Emperor; and to be alarm'd at our negotiations in the Northern Courts, and for these reasons doubted whether we were in the state of impartiality required for mediators. To all these points we have given such clear and explicate answers that they have own'd themselves to be satisfied with them. We declared that our preparations at home were for our defence and only intended to act as future events should make necessary; that we had enter'd into no new engagements whatsoever with the Emperor; and that whatever negotiations His Majesty might be carrying on with the Northern Powers for troops &c^a they were all founded upon the same principles with our pre-

¹ The Dutch paper appears not to have given the date of the French answer.

parations at home and lastly that the Maritime Powers had yet taken no part nor determin'd to take any, and consequently that they were in a state of impartiality and in a capacity to be mediators.

Could one have imagin'd that in return to this frankness on the part of His Majesty, after these *ecclaircissements* which they have acknowledged to be satisfactory, we should at last receive such a general and evasive answer, not more explicate than that which they gave six months ago to our general offer of good offices? One cannot avoid suspecting in some measure from their present behaviour, compar'd with what it was some few weeks ago, that the good dispositions which they then profess'd towards a peace might be greatly owing to the apprehensions they were under as to the events of the campaigns in Italy and on the Rhine, and that the late success of their armys had encouraged them to lay aside all thought of the mediation and to carry on the war at all events.

I cannot help just taking notice to you that it seems a little extraordinary to us that after Mo^r. Chavigni's formal declaration that their Toulon squadron was design'd to cruize against the Sallée men (which he said was a service that he thought we should be benefitted by) we should now receive news that it is coming to Cadiz to join the Spanish squadron there and perhaps afterwards to go to Brest.

It is amazing that the Cardinal should think to impose upon the world so much as to alledge that their apprehension of our squadron was the occasion of their abandoning Dantzick and Stanislaus in the manner they have done.

(*Ibid.*, fo. 244v.)

Whitehall, 20 July 1734.

Private.

. I am sorry to acquaint Your Excellency that the conversation and professions of His Eminence are so little supported by his actions that they have at present little weight here. And therefore his declarations of their being dispos'd towards a peace and of their being reasonable in the means to accomplish it, of their resolutions not to push their conquests in Germany and of their getting nothing for themselves &c^a., are thought to vary just as they find it for their interest and convenience, and to have no solid

foundation whatever ; and therefore all that Your Excellency can do in these circumstances is to endeavour to get the best information you can of their real designs and of their engagements with their Allies.

The Emperor's answer, I confess, is not such a one as we might have expected,¹ and would have been for his interest to have given. It is indeed rather a manifesto than an answer, tending to justify himself at the expence of others. But however, that is no excuse for what the French do. The circumstances of the Emperor are by no means the same with those of France. The Emperor desires only to keep what he had, and those who would take from him, should say what will satisfy them ; and if they have that confidence they pretend in the mediators, they would run no risque in doing it, provided their views were such as were consistent with the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. Their silence therefore cannot but give great apprehensions to the contrary.

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(B.M., Add. MS. 32785, fo. 291.)

Whitehall, 30 July 1734.

Most private.

. Mo^r. Chavigni having desired us ² to dine with him he began by observing to me that I had mentioned to him the generality of their last answer, and said : " Vous croyés " qu'elle ne dit rien : moy, je crois, que les dernières lignes, savoir, " *ce qui pourra y contribuer davantage, ce sera le succès des instances* " *de l'Angleterre et des Etats Généraux pour obtenir de l'Empereur* " *une semblable confiance*, disent beaucoup. Your mediation," says " he, is accepted, but till we know whether the Emperor will accept " it or not we cannot expose ourselves to a congress which is the " consequence of a mediation, without knowing upon what con- " ditions we may depend, or what is to be the consequence of such " a congress."

We told him that our mediation was not accepted in form, and that what he now mentioned were reasons for not accepting it ;

¹ Cf. *Réponse de la Cour impériale aux représentations de MM. Robinson et Bruining*, 30 juin 1734 [N.S.], and the Emperor's letter to Kinski of 31 July N.S. 1734, in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 170.

² Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole and Newcastle.

that he knew very well that preliminaries must be agreed upon between the parties before things could come to a congress ; that it was impossible for us to say anything as to the conditions upon which an accommodation could be made, till we knew their engagements with their Allies and what would satisfy them.

He said he believed we knew pretty near ; that they had declared they would get nothing for themselves ; that the Cardinal had often told my Lord Waldegrave their engagements did not relate to Germany ; that Italy did not concern the *equilibre* ; that we might easily believe that, whatever engagements they had entered into, their successes would not make them depart from them ; that if the King of Sardinia had the Dutchy of Milan, he would be the most powerfull prince in Italy ; that we should always have a hank over him, and he would always be attacht to the interest of England ; that what Don Carlos might have would be only magnificence and shew without any real strength. We askt him whether Don Philip, according to the reports from Italy, was to have Tuscany and Parma, or whether the Mantouan was designed for him : he protested he knew nothing of it, but upon the whole often said : " You see well enough what we mean." To which we answered very directly " that if we did, he saw plainly we did not like it." Upon which he would have insinuated as if we had in all our conferences with him, talkt of things upon the foot they are, *comme elles sont à present*, meaning, as we might easily perceive, upon a supposition that they were to retain what they are at present in possession of in Italy. This was so very contrary to anything that ever we have said that we thought it highly necessary to have it cleared up, and we begg'd him not to be mistaken, that we have never said anything to that purpose, or had entered into any particulars whatever, or were even now at liberty to do it. And if Your Excellency should find that Mo^r. Chavigni has conveyed any such opinion to his Court of what may have past here with the King's ministers relating to the terms of an accommodation, you will take care to remove it in the manner we have done ; for tho' His Majesty has hitherto declined taking part with the Emperor, it would indeed have been very extraordinary if, before the mediation was accepted by both partys or the King was at all apprised of the Emperor's thoughts as to the conditions for a pacification, His Majesty's servants should have taken upon them to have given France any such previous encouragement.

But at last Mo^r. Chavigni came out with his scheme, and taking a handle from the account that I had given him of a conversation that the Pensionary had had with Mo^r. Fenelon upon their last answer. . . . "I easily conceive," says he, "that England and Holland will not be mediators as was Sweden at the Peace of Ryswick; but why may you not agree with France as you did in the year 1668 with regard to the disputes then depending between France and Spain, upon such terms as you shall think proper for the maintaining of the *equilibre* and offer them jointly to the Emperor for his acceptance?" By which, as a natural consequence, I suppose he meant that, in case of refusal, we should oblige His Imperial Majesty to comply with them. He then entered into the history of those times: he said that when King Charles the 2^d had been obliged by the spirit that was then in the nation to make peace with the Dutch, meaning the Treaty of Breda, he owned to the French Ambassador, Mo^r. de Barillon, that "he had rather have had his hand cut off than have signed it or done anything that might separate him from France, but that it was not to be avoided; upon which Mo^r. Barillon" (with a dexterity which I suppose Mo^r. Chavigni would imitate) "thankt the King for his great desire to remain firmly united with the King his master; he said the union must not be broke, but that the King of England must be mediator for making up the differences between France and Spain" and accordingly a treaty between England and Holland, to which Sweden acceded, for reconciling those differences was made, and soon after a separate treaty was concluded at St. Germain between England and Holland on one side and France on the other, whereby the very conditions to be offered to the King of Spain were agreed upon, the suspension of arms was soon after prolonged, and the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle between France and Spain was made upon the terms previously concerted between the Maritime Powers and France; by which treaty, Your Excellency knows, great part of Flanders was given up to the French, "and," says Mo^r. Chavigni, "the King of Spain was as great a prince as the Emperor."

Your Excellency may easily imagine we did not enter at all into so wild a notion as this is; not so much as to observe how little parallel the cases are in several circumstances, what fatal consequences ensued from the then disposition in favour of France, and how little the example of those times would ever be followed by

His present Majesty. We contented ourselves with taking notice only that even then France did not pretend to retain all the conquests she had made and that there were concessions on both sides.

We parted very civilly without coming in the least to any conclusion or bringing things the nearer by what had passed at this conference, and we told Mo^r. Chavigni that as soon as His Majesty and the Dutch should have resolved what further steps to take upon the answers given, we would not fail to acquaint him with it.

His Majesty thought proper that I should give Your Excellency a full account of all that has past, that you might see what probably is or will be the scheme of France, viz^t. that the Maritime Powers should join with them to force the Emperor to consent to such terms as should be previously agreed upon between us and France. This is indeed going a great length, and one may easily judge how seriously they are disposed to a solid and honorable peace if they should propose the bringing it about in so dishonourable a manner for the Maritime Powers.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, no. 331, fo. 133.)

HARRINGTON TO WALPOLE [at The Hague].¹

Whitehall, 17 September 1734.

Most secret.

In answer to Your Excellency's most secret letters of the 17th and 21st inst. N.S., I have now the King's commands to acquaint you by this messenger that His Majesty was extremely surprised to find so great and essential a difference between the promise which His Eminency had authorised Mo^r. Gedda to make in his name and the contents of the Cardinal's own letter to you dated the same day, with that which you had before received from him, Mo^r. Gedda, and in which that promise was contained. The King observed with a great deal of disappointment that the Cardinal's assurance of "opening all his thoughts to you as well upon the conditions " of the desired peace as upon the engagements of France with her " Allies and the preservation of the balance of power," and that by a letter to be written by him to Your Excellency directly was now dwindled down to an offer either of "conferring himself with " such person and in such place as you shall think fit to appoint,

¹ The Jeannel negociation may be followed in Vaucher, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-123.

"or of sending to you, if you like that way better, a person of confidence in order to agree upon such expedients as shall appear to be the most proper for accelerating a negotiation the success of which is so desirable." And as to the points upon which the Cardinal had before engaged to open himself, they are by this letter, instead of a previous explanation from him upon "the terms of peace, the engagements of France towards her Allies, and the preservation of the balance," reduced to a "reciprocal eclaircissement upon what is reputed falsely to either party," which appears by the foregoing part of the letter to mean the "want of impartiality in the Maritime Powers and a design of making new acquisitions by conquest or destroying the balance of power in France."

Whether this sudden change of language in the Cardinal is to be ascribed to the subsequent representations that might have been made to His Eminency by Mo^r. Chauvelin or to any new accounts which they might possibly have received of a more favourable disposition in Spain, by which the apprehensions they before pretended to be under from that Crown may have been removed, it is certainly such a variation from His Eminency's first proposals as might give His Majesty a very fair handle to suspect that the whole was a mere amusement contrived for very different purposes than those which are pretended by the French ministers. However, as His Majesty is determined not to neglect any the least prospect of putting a stop to the present unhappy disturbances in Europe, and that the blame may not lie upon him if the Cardinal should at last entirely depart from his present pacifick professions, it is the King's pleasure that you should immediately dispatch an answer to His Eminency's letter in which, after having touched in a proper manner upon the differences abovementioned, you will let him know that the expedient of sending a person of confidence to The Hague is agreed to by His Majesty in a full expectation of his being commissioned to open to Your Excellency and the Pensionary, pursuant to the assurances given you on the part of the Cardinal by Mo^r. Gedda "all His Eminency's thoughts as well upon the conditions of peace as upon the engagements of France with her Allies and the preservation of the balance." The King prefers this method of proceeding to that of sending any body to confer with the Cardinal for the same reasons as were alledged by the Pensionary, and as the coming of such a person, if kept secret, does not seem likely

to be attended with any ill consequence, and it may be of use to see how far the Cardinal will go for the sake of setting on foot a negotiation, His Majesty thinks you should be careful in the wording of your letter, not to make that person's conforming to the Cardinal's first assurances an absolute condition of our consent to his mission, since such a limitation in your letter might possibly put it in the power of Mo^r. Chauvelin to dissuade His Eminency entirely from taking any farther step of any kind in this matter.

Upon the arrival of the person at The Hague, as his commission is understood to be to the King and the States in common, His Majesty is of opinion that to avoid misapprehensions, jealousies or other ill consequences, that the conferences to be held with him should not be separate either with Your Excellency or the Pensionary, but that he should both open his business and proceed in it in the presence of you both, and this Your Excellency will endeavour to bring about in such a manner that Mo^r. Slingelandt may not perceive that you have had such a caution given you from hence, or imagine that it proceeds from any distrust of him.

Your Excellency will easily believe that the King will be extremely impatient to be informed of all that the person abovementioned shall say to you on the part of the Cardinal, in order to send you his commands for your conduct thereupon, and you will therefore, I am persuaded, not lose a moment's time in despatching a messenger to me with a full account of the explanations he may give, and the propositions in general which he may be authorised to make to you and the Pensionary ; and the King thinks it would be a very right thing and might be of very great use, if you could prevail upon the person abovementioned to give what he may have to offer in writing, though His Majesty indeed apprehends that you will find this extremely difficult to obtain, and especially as one reason for the Cardinal sending him may perhaps be to avoid that way of explaining himself to us.

As to the Cardinal's postscript relating to Mo^r. Gedda, though the leaving that gentleman for the future out of the secret may be at first attended with some inconvenience, yet as the French ministers must be allowed to open themselves in their own way, and seem determined to exclude him, the King does not see how it can be prevented, though His Majesty thinks you should suggest to His Eminency the necessity of doing it by gentle degrees that he may not be too much shocked at finding a confidence which it

does not appear, at least to us, that he has made any ill use of, at once withdrawn from him. And the King is farther of opinion both with regard to that gentleman and to my Lord Waldegrave, that, as they were both admitted into the secret as to the beginning of this transaction, either by the Cardinal himself or by his express approbation, it might not be amiss to inform them likewise of the design of sending a person to The Hague, and when that is done, it appears to His Majesty that there will be no difficulty in limiting the confidences to be afterwards made to either of them to any degree that may be thought necessary.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32785, fo. 470.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 24 September 1734.

Most private.

Having had no occasion to send a courier lately to Your Excellency I have said nothing to you of the Cardinal's offer by Mo^r. Gedda of opening himself in a confidential letter to Mr. Walpole, both as to their engagements with their Allies and the sentiments of France for a general pacification; nor of the alteration the Cardinal has since made in what he at first seemed to intend, by excluding Mo^r. Gedda absolutely out of the negotiation and proposing to send a person of confidence to Mr. Walpole to agree upon expedients that might facilitate the negotiation.

You may easily imagine that this sudden alteration both as to the manner and substance of what was proposed could not but very much surprize the King, and give great reason to apprehend that His Eminence either intended nothing at first but mere amusement or has since been influenced by Mo^r. Chauvelin to put this affair in such a method that very probably little or no good can arise from it.

I send Your Excellency in the utmost secrecy a copy of a letter lately received from Mr. Walpole whereby you will see the little dependance that is to be had upon the sincerity of the French ministers. When at the same time that the Cardinal pretends to be opening himself in the greatest confidence to His Majesty, Mo^r. Chauvelin is in this private manner setting on foot a secret negotiation with the Pensionary, directly exclusive of His Majesty, and with a design to separate the Dutch from the King; which cannot

but give the justest suspicion of the uprightness of their intentions in the pretended overture the Cardinal is now making.

P.S. Your Excellency will endeavour to get as early information as possible of the person the Cardinal designs to send to Holland, and without appearing to be at all inquisitive or desirous of knowing anything, you may perhaps get some notion of his instructions.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, no. 333, fo. 23.)

HARRINGTON TO H. WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 8 October 1734.

1st Most Secret.

. His Majesty observed with great concern the suspicious behaviour of the French ministers and the many strong indications not only of a design in the Garde des Sceaux to withdraw the Cardinal by several contrivances from the thoughts of fulfilling the promise he had given, but likewise of His Eminency's having himself fallen into the same management and being actually endeavouring, notwithstanding his solemn protestations of the contrary to Mo^r. Gedda, to free himself from the obligation which he lies under of opening himself to His Majesty and the States. This beginning of the negociation on their part by loading an unconditional promise with such preliminaries as those mentioned by the Cardinal to Mo^r. Gedda, gives us but a very melancholly prospect of the success of it, and cannot but fill us with apprehensions that the whole is no more than an artful invention to amuse and sooth the Maritime Powers with specious professions of the pacifick dispositions of France, while the real view of that Crown may be only to divert us from putting ourselves in such a posture during the winter as might enable us to oppose any such dangerous designs as they may have projected for the next campagne, or perhaps by a dextrous management of their present transaction with us, to find means of lessening that happy confidence between His Majesty and the States, which in the present situation of affairs is possibly looked upon as the only remaining security to the liberties of Europe.

But notwithstanding these appearances of a disingennuous proceeding, as it may be certainly of the greatest use and importance to the King and the States to have an authentick information of the real views of France, that so they may be in time provided against all

events, as it can hardly be doubted but that Mo^r. Chauvelin, who appears already to have brought the Cardinal so far as to annex conditions to his promise, would, in case of our absolutely rejecting those conditions, as easily bring him to depart entirely from the promise itself, and as in that last case the King apprehends that the French ministers might colour their breaking off all farther negociation by representing us as having acted very unreasonably in expecting to be trusted with the secret of France and at the same time refusing to give any manner of assurances by which they might be secured that, even after they had proposed to us a reasonable scheme of accommodation whereby however they must certainly risk the disobliging some or others of their Allies, and after their having given us sufficient securities with regard to the preservation of the ballance of power, we should not even then turn their confidence in us against themselves by betraying their plan of peace to their confederates and joining with the Emperor against them ; for these reasons His Majesty is of opinion that we should go as far as can be reasonably expected from us towards a compliance with what appears at present to be the design of the French ministers to propose by way of preliminary, and His Majesty therefore recommends it to the Pensionary's consideration whether in case, upon the arrival of the Cardinal's person of confidence, he should insist absolutely upon the two previous conditions repeated in Your Excellency's letter, there would be any danger in our declaring to France that, if after having opened herself fully to His Majesty and the States, her terms of peace should appear so reasonable and her designs so unexceptionable as to be approved by the Maritime Powers, they would in that case use their utmost endeavours to get them accepted by the Court of Vienna, and in case of their being refused, would not oppose such measures as might be thought necessary by France for putting the said plan in execution, provided sufficient and satisfactory security were given by that Crown to His Majesty and the Republick, that they would not, as they have often declared it was not their intention, make any conquests for themselves nor in general take any step in the execution of the said plan which might in the apprehension of the Maritime Powers, be prejudicial or dangerous to the *equilibre* of Europe.

Your Excellency will observe to Mo^r. Slingelandt that the King's inducement to come into such a declaration as this is, that we should not thereby in reality engage ourselves to anything towards France

nor run the least risk, since our consent to her taking the measures abovementioned for the execution of the plan in question would depend upon two conditions, the interpretation of which would be always reserved to His Majesty and the States, who must be the only judges how far the plan proposed had their approbation, and whether the securitys offer'd by that Crown were satisfactory or not, and would consequently be always masters of the negotiation and might put a stop to it whenever they thought fit by rejecting either the plan or the securitys offered by France. The King does not indeed himself expect such a reasonable scheme of pacification from the Cardinal and Mo^r. Chauvelin in their present dispositions, and is far from thinking that England and Holland can ever agree to see the armys of France in the heart of the Empire and in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, or that any security that can be thought of for her resisting so dangerous a temptation as that of making conquests there would be sufficient and satisfactory to the Maritime Powers, but His Majesty is at the same time very desirous of putting the French ministers to the test and of avoiding the odious imputation of having only encouraged this transaction with them for the sake of betraying it to their Allies, which, as I have before hinted, they would not fail to throw upon us, if, after having gone so far in it already, we should now break it off upon any point which it might afterwards appear that we might in some measure safely have complyd with, whereas by this apparent acquiescence in their demands, as farr as it could reasonably be expected from us, we shall either have the advantage of knowing their terms of accommodation, or shall have put them in the wrong if they refuse to proceed farther with us, and shall be able either way by their conduct herein to form a better judgment of the sincerity of their professions.

Besides the reasons which are abovementioned, I may acquaint Your Excellency in confidence that His Majesty has still another of great weight, which is that as you were of opinion that this preliminary would appear very plausible in Holland, the King apprehends that his absolutely rejecting it might create a difference between himself and the States.

With regard to the second proposition relating to Spain, the King thinks Your Excellency has judged very rightly as to the tendency and meaning of it, and if that likewise should come to be insisted on in the name of the French Court, His Majesty is

of opinion that you and the Pensionary might answer thereto that it is entirely in the power of France to fix the negotiations of the Maritime Powers to their own channel only by opening immediately such a plan of pacification as they may concur in without apprehension for the balance of power, but that it is unreasonable to expect that, under the uncertainty of the particulars of that plan, the King and the States will tie up their hands, and preclude themselves from using their endeavours towards procuring an accommodation wheresoever they may have any prospect of succeeding ; though His Majesty is at the same time willing to concur in giving the strongest assurances to the French ministers that no ill use shall be made of the confidence they may repose in the Maritime Powers, either by creating jealousies between them and their Allies or in any other manner whatsoever.

As to Mo^r. Chauvelin's declaration that France cannot, ought not, and will not be the first to project the conditions of peace, and his attempt through Mo^r. Fenelon to turn the task of explaining from the Cardinal to the Pensionary, all that the King has to observe upon it is, that if the French ministers persist therein, the negotiation seems to be at an end ; His Majesty and the States must then think of other methods of proceeding and the Cardinal must remain not only under the suspicion of having formed such designs as he dared not to produce, but with the reproach likewise of having departed from his word so solemnly given, and so often repeated ; for the King will by no means desist from claiming His Eminency's positive promise, nor consent upon any consideration to form a project of pacification himself. For which reason likewise it appears to His Majesty to be unnecessary to send you his thoughts as yet upon the plan transmitted in yours of the 31st of August, the King expecting that whatever is proposed of that kind should arise from France, after which it will naturally come to be considered by himself and the States General.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, *no.* 334, *fo.* 27.)

Whitehall, 29 October 1734.

Most secret.

I laid before the King some time since, as Your Excellency has been before informed, your most secret letter of the 29th inst. N.S. inclosing that from the Cardinal to you of the 20th [N.S.] together

with his billet, by which he promised to write again to you in two or three days time. But as His Majesty had no particular remark to make upon the contents of those pieces, I did not think it necessary to trouble you with a letter expressly upon them, and especially as His Eminency's confidential dispatch of the 24th and 25th inst. N.S. which was therein referred to, followed them so soon. I am now therefore to send you the King's sentiments as I promised Your Excellency by my last, upon the subject of that dispatch, from which you will be able to collect what sort of answer His Majesty would have you return to it in concert with the Pensionary.

In the first place Your Excellency may let the Cardinal know that the King was extremely pleased with the confidential manner in which he expresses himself to you, and that from the good opinion which the King has always had of the Cardinal's pacifick dispositions and fair way of proceeding, nothing could have been more agreeable to His Majesty than to see his secret correspondence carried on by His Eminency without the intervention of any other person whatsoever except the King his master. To which Your Excellency may add the strongest assurances that can be framed, of the most inviolable secrecy being observed upon this whole affair, and that no ill use shall ever be made in all events, of anything which His Eminency either has already, or may in the course of this transaction think fit to trust you with ; and you may declare to him that you will on your part make suitable returns of confidence and openness, upon everything that the Cardinal shall propose or suggest to you for restoring the publick tranquillity, maintaining the ballance of Europe and laying the foundation of an honourable, solid and lasting peace.

The King was no less satisfied with the strong professions of His Most Christian Majesty's and the Cardinal's sincere inclination to peace, whatever differences there might be in the French Council as to that article. And you may assure His Eminency that the demand of his opening himself upon his engagements was never made by His Majesty out of any curiosity to know the secrets of France, and much less with a design of making an ill use of the discovery ; but the only view the King had was to be thereby enabled to form a better judgment upon the conditions on which the peace of Europe might be restored.

His Majesty was extremely pleased with the manner in which the Cardinal has now open'd himself upon the said point of his

engagements, and could have wished he had been as explicit as to the conditions upon which he may propose that a peace should be made, for though he has touched upon some points relating to it, and has indeed just hinted at some expedients to save the honour of France in relation to Poland, as likewise at the conduct to be observed towards the King of Sardinia, yet His Majesty can by no means judge sufficiently from thence of the Cardinal's project of accommodation, nor how far the terms which would satisfy France might be probably admitted either by the adverse party or by his known Allies.

The only point which the Cardinal has entered into is that of the satisfaction of Spain by means of a marriage between the 2^d Archdutchess and Don Carlos, which plan, though His Eminency indeed affects to speak slightly enough of it at first, though he states several objections against it and endeavours at taking off only one of them, and though he quotes an instance of his having been formerly against it himself, yet perhaps, upon comparing the whole carefully together, one might infer from it that he was not unwilling we should think that he might now be brought to concur in such a scheme. And as he seems at the same time desirous of knowing how far the King might himself give into it, His Majesty thinks the most prudent answer you can make to this part of his letter will be to let him know that before the King can give any direct opinion in an affair of so great importance, he must desire the Cardinal will open his thoughts more explicitly as to what will have always great weight with His Majesty, both as to the practicability of that project, and, in case it should appear feasible, whether the strong objections stated by His Eminency against it are such as in his opinion ought to outweigh the bringing about by that means a general pacification if no other method should appear equally conducive to that end.

What His Eminency says about Leghorn being only introduced as a part of the plan abovemention'd, there is no need of entring particularly into it till His Eminency shall have explained his sentiments farther as to the manner in which he would be desirous to have that place disposed of, which he might likewise be desired to do with regard to the Dutchy of Tuscany itself, since he makes not the least mention of it in his letter. Perhaps what he says there of a *prince peu puissant* may be intended by His Eminency to be combined with the expedient hinted at above in favour of

King Stanislaus, and I need not observe to Your Excellency that if the Cardinal has really any view of fixing His Most Christian Majesty's father in law in those parts, we could not look upon Leghorn in his hands to be at all exempt from the objections started by His Eminency in case of its being put into those of Spain or the Emperor.

As to the paragraph concerning Embden, Your Excellency will settle with the Pensionary what answer should be given to it. If what has been lately done at Vienna with relation to the affair of Oostfrise be as satisfactory to the States General as Mr. Robinson assures us it is to the deputys of Embden, I should think it might not be improper to hint as much to the Cardinal that he might see that that stumbling block between the Emperor and the Republick was removed.

By what follows, and indeed by the whole tenour of the letter, His Eminency seems to be laying in for a departure from his promise of opening his terms of pacification to the Maritime Powers, and to be throwing that task upon Your Excellency and the Pensionary. But you are already so well acquainted with the King's sentiments upon that way of proceeding that it is unnecessary to repeat what has been the subject of my former letters.

The King approves the Cardinal's proposition with regard to our respective allies, and will not fail as soon as anything shall have been agreed on in this confidential way between himself, the States and France, to use his utmost endeavours and influence and persuasion for prevailing upon the several parties to concur in it.

We must wait for Your Excellency's first dispatches after the arrival of Mr. Jannell before I can send you any new commands from the King concerning him. His Majesty hopes in the meanwhile that, though he is not authorised to treat, he will have instructions to propose a plan of pacification, which we always looked upon as the object of this mission, but as to anything that it may be proper to say to the Cardinal upon that subject, Your Excellency and the Pensionary will best judge of it upon having seen in your conferences with him the extent of his commission. With regard to preliminaries, till we can see distinctly what is expected by France, I can add nothing to what I have wrote already to Your Excellency upon that point of the negotiation.

In answer to the Cardinal's P.S. of the 25th, His Majesty can only

say that he is very glad to see those dangerous intrigues which were imputed to Mo^r. Villeneuve at the Porte, so strongly disavowed in part by the French Court.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 84, no. 334, fo. IIIv.*)

HARRINGTON TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 8 November 1734.

Most secret.

[After saying no instructions can be sent until he has heard from ministers who are out of town] There is one part of the negociations upon which His Majesty thinks it of consequence that you should immediately know his thoughts I mean the preliminary which it appears probable that France will insist on, viz^t our consenting to her executing by force the plan that may be agreed on between that Crown and the Maritime Powers. In relation to this preliminary I am to inform you that the King very much approved the manner in which you and the Pensionary talked to Mo^r. Jannel upon it in convincing him of the absolute impossibility of our joining with France to force the Emperor and referring the whole consideration of that affair till after the conditions of peace shall have been settled between His Majesty, France and the Republick. And I am further to inform you that in case of the Emperor's refusal to accept it, His Majesty will expect that the said Crown should reciprocally engage, in case her Allies should not comply with it, that she will not give them any farther assistance against His Imperial Majesty, since it would be highly unreasonable and unjust both towards the King and the Republick and towards the Emperor that, whether that prince consents or not to what we may agree upon, he should be equally left exposed to the arms of his enemies, whilst the Maritime Powers would have gained nothing by this negociation but the seeing themselves made subservient to the views of France and the aggrandisement of her confederates.

[For the most secret despatch of Harrington to Walpole, dated Whitehall, 19 November 1734, see Coxé, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 226.]

(P.R.O., S.P. 84, no. 336, fo. 29.)

HARRINGTON TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 6 December 1734.

Most secret.

. The first and third articles of the Cardinal's plan, requiring a general acknowledgment of the validity of King Stanislaus's election, the assembling of the Diet by universals to be by him publish'd and the re-electing of the Elector of Saxony will most certainly, as the Pensionary apprehended, be subject to very great difficulties, as well from the repugnance that may be expected on the part of the Emperor and the Czarina to the disavowing of those principles upon which they have hitherto acted, as from the execution itself and especially if it be true, as the Cardinal observes, that the Elector is so extremely hated in Poland. It is therefore His Majesty's opinion that these difficulties should be represented in the strongest light to His Eminency, and if, notwithstanding all that can be said to dissuade him from it, he should absolutely insist upon such terms, we must then endeavour to obtain all possible securities for the certainty of the re-election, and that no advantage shall be taken from any division that may happen in the voices upon that occasion, and as the retreat of the Muscovite and Saxon troops is by another article to be stipulated, that should be expressly agreed to be deferr'd till after the reelection, which we may likewise, I think, take for granted to have been the Cardinal's own intention, by his manner both of placing and wording that article.

As to the point of confirming the grants made by King Stanislaus, considering that those who are in possession of them can never be look't upon by the Elector of Saxony, who is to remain King of Poland, as friends to his government, and that they, as well as the persons to whom he has already given the same posts, have the patents for their lives, the King fears it will never be possible for him and the States to get such an article accepted.

His Majesty is willing to concur in all the others relating to Poland.

With relation to Italy, Your Excellency is already in a great measure apprized of His Majesty's intentions which are in general to endeavour to settle the new dispositions to be made there, in as favourable a manner as possible for the Emperor.

If the Cardinal insists absolutely upon the indemnification for

the Duke of Guastalla, the King and the States may engage to endeavour to bring the Emperor to agree to some article in favour of that prince, founded upon the stipulations of the Treaty of Rastadt. But as that is an affair entirely foreign to the matters at present in dispute, His Majesty hopes you will be able to dissuade the Cardinal from embarrassing this negociation with it, which argument may be equally used with respect to the two following articles touching the Emperor's power in Italy and his renunciation to Castro and Ronciglione.

Your Excellency's observations as to the Italian fiefs is extremely just and all that His Majesty as a prince of the Empire can concur in proposing in relation thereto, is that the Emperor should be restrained from the exercise of any power not warranted by the constitutions of that body.

The King intirely approves of your remarks upon the article in favour of the Pope, and thinks, if we should come into it, we must endeavour to obtain from the Cardinal in exchange some security that His Holiness's behaviour towards His Majesty shall be for the future more modest and inoffensive.

The King still continues to hope that the exclusion of the younger branches of the Lorrain family will not be insisted on, and is confirmed therein by the Cardinal's making no mention of it in all that he says concerning the Pragmatick Sanction. Your Excellency already knows the King's pleasure upon that affair, and as to the rest, I may acquaint you that His Majesty is willing that the plan should be form'd upon the supposition arising from His Eminency's letter, of France's guarantying the Emperor's succession exclusive of all future acquisitions.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, *no.* 337, *fo.* 129.)

Whitehall, 24 December 1734.

Most secret.

I received on Sunday last in the afternoon Your Excellency's dispatches of the 30th inst. N.S. by Carrangton, together all the several inclosures, and having laid them immediately before the King, I have now the satisfaction of acquainting you that His Majesty was pleased to approve in the most gracious manner Your Excellency's indefatigable endeavours for bringing this negotiation to a happy issue.

The King will in all probability have an account in a very few days directly from Paris of the manner in which the Cardinal will have received your letters of the 29th inst. with M^r. Jannel's report of what had passed at The Hague, and I may thereby be enabled, if any difficulty should remain with His Eminency, to send you the King's instructions more distinctly and particularly upon such points as may then appear to require them. In the meanwhile however I would not omit taking His Majesty's eventual commands upon the cases stated in Your Excellency's letter, wherein you apprehended they might be necessary for your future conduct.

I shall begin by informing Your Excellency that the King entirely approves and will be ready to ratify the whole plan of articles, if accepted by France, in the manner they now stand settled in the papers marked 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and His Majesty agrees to the alteration made in the Pensionary's plan relating to the guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction in case of the Emperor's refusal, as contained in no. 13, His Majesty understanding the state of that affair to be as follows, that if the Emperor accepts our plan, the guaranty of France to his succession immediately takes place; but in case he rejects it, that the said guaranty is notwithstanding to be given whenever the peace is concluded.

The King was very much concerned to see that the exclusion of the whole Lorrain family would in all probability be insisted on, and approved the way in which Your Excellency and the Pensionary have endeavoured to obviate that difficulty by referring it to be solved by some proper expedient that may be thought of at the time of the general negociation. This is what the Cardinal, as His Majesty hopes, will be induced by Your Excellency's letter, to admit; but as it is necessary that you should know the King's sentiments as soon as possible upon the question put in your letter, whether you are to "break the whole negotiation rather than consent to such a general exclusion," I am to acquaint you that His Majesty does not look upon that point to be of sufficient importance to authorise our taking such a dangerous step, for though the King's compassion for that family prevailed on him to send you very positive orders for using your utmost endeavours in their favour, yet as the exclusion demanded by France is not supposed to take place but upon a Prince of Lorrain's becoming Emperor, and is only asked as a condition of the guaranty of that Crown

to His Imperial Majesty's present possessions, and as it would be in the power of the said prince, when Emperor, to indemnify the younger branches of his family by settling some other less exceptionable estates upon them, the hardship therefore and injustice which seemed to attend this proceeding when taken in a more general view, appears so far to be removed by this consideration, that His Majesty is of opinion an article might be framed in imitation of our separate one with the Emperor, which might answer the demand of France, and be reasonably proposed by himself and the States at the Court of Vienna. The King's meaning is that the said article should be drawn in such a manner as to make the guaranty of France conditional upon the possession or renunciation to the Dutchy of Lorrain in case of the accession of any of that family to the Imperial dignity, so that France, in guarantying the Pragmatick Sanction, may at the same time stipulate that so long as any prince of the House of Lorrain, being Emperor, or any of his family should remain in the possession of the said dutchy, France should be bound by her guaranty. And this His Majesty thinks, as I have above hinted, we may fairly propose to the Court of Vienna, since, as the guaranty of France is a matter of favour and not of right, she is certainly at liberty to annex such conditions to it as she may judge necessary for her own security, and since the Duke of Lorraine, if he should come to the Imperial throne, will be hereby left to his choice either of holding his hereditary possessions and renouncing the said guaranty, or of embracing the benefit of that stipulation and providing otherwise for those princes in the line of his own succession who would be thereby dispossessed.

The other point upon which Your Excellency desires the King's immediate directions is that of the Cardinal's insisting, as you and the Pensionary are of opinion he will do, upon the Emperor's not having, in case of his rejecting our offers and continuing the war, the same advantageous terms in Italy as are now to be proposed to him. Upon which question I am ordered to let Your Excellency know, that though His Majesty extremely approves your endeavors to preserve the same plan of concessions in the Emperor's favour invariable in all cases, yet, if the contrary should be absolutely required by France, as the possessions in Italy seem less than any others to affect the balance of Europe, as it may seem unreasonable that after the risk and expence of a continued

war, occasioned purely by the Emperor's obstinacy, France should be bound to give him the same advantages then as she now offers him, and as you think the States themselves would not be very ready to support such a demand, His Majesty therefore, if the Cardinal consents not to assist the Allies of France in case of their refusal (as there is reason to hope he will do from Mo^r. Jannel's discourses as stated in Your Excellency's account of the conferences) and also to restore all that shall have been taken in other parts from the Emperor or Empire, will not insist upon the Emperor's having the same advantages in Italy in case of his refusal, as are intended for him on his acceptance. But if Mo^r. Jannel should receive orders to insist that the Allies of France, notwithstanding their rejecting our plan, should have still the same concessions in their favour secured to them, the King must in that case expect that the engagement should be reciprocal, viz^t. that if France will reserve the whole to her Allies, the whole should be likewise reserved for His Imperial Majesty in case of their respective refusals, or if she should demand that a part only of their advantages should be secured to them, a proportionable part of those stipulated for the Emperor should in like manner be ascertained to him.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32786, fo. 388.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 24 December 1734.

Private.

. Your Excellency will be now perfectly apprised of everything that has passed. You will see how far Mo^r. Jannel was empowered to go, and the little difference that there is in the several points as now proposed by the Pensionary and Mr. Walpole from what were the Cardinal's sentiments.

The necessity of the alterations is so well explained by Mr. Walpole that it is unnecessary for me to add anything upon that subject. They seem chiefly to be reduced to three, viz^t.:

- 1st. The variation in the affair of Poland;
- 2^{dly}. The condition with regard to the house of Lorrain; and
- 3^{dly}. The giving or not the same conditions to the Emperor, tho' he should at first refuse the plan but afterwards accept it.

They are all taken by Mo^r. Jannel *ad referendum*, and I hope will be by him recommended to his Court.

What relates to Poland Mo^r. Jannel seemed to think would be agreed to.

As the exclusion of the house of Lorrain from that dutchy in case any of the family comes to be Emperor was never mentioned in any of the Cardinal's private letters and seems harsh in itself and very difficult to settle, since it has never been hinted how the dutchy of Lorrain, even in that case, should be disposed of. It is to be hoped the Cardinal will not insist upon it, or at least will consent to it's being referred to the general pacification, when an expedient may be found out to remove any jealousy or apprehension that France may have upon that occasion.

What is desired as to the Emperor's having the same conditions tho' he should not at first accept the plan, is not out of regard to the Emperor, who by his behaviour perhaps may not deserve that attention, but for the preservation of the balance of power in which the Maritime Powers are so much interested, and in consideration of their agreeing not to assist the Emperor in that case. In all events, the Maritime Powers must insist that, whatever shall be taken from the Emperor or Empire, in the Emperor's hereditary dominions, or in any part of the Empire should be immediately restored upon the Emperor's acceptance. You will be pleased to talk to the Cardinal as from yourself and not as having received any orders from hence which will naturally be sent to Holland; you will hasten his answer to M^r. Walpole's letters and the dispatching the full power to Mo^r. Jannel.

This great work is brought now so near to a conclusion that I cannot but hope His Eminence who by his steadiness and prudence and by his influence and authority in the French King's councils has brought it to the situation it is in, will not suffer it to miscarry for punctilios about Poland (which cannot be complied with considering the present circumstances of that kingdom) or any other small alterations which cannot in the main be essential or material to France, if the Cardinal is, as His Majesty is persuaded, firmly disposed to make peace upon the principles and foundation of his own letters. I need not observe to Your Excellency how necessary it is that this great affair should be settled between us and France without farther loss of time.

(P.R.O., S.P. 84, no. 340, fo. 63v.)

HARRINGTON TO WALPOLE.

Whitehall, 15 January 1734/5.

Most secret.

. Count Kinsky had declared to us that he had received the most positive orders from his Court to wait only eight days after the King's speech should have been made to the Parliament then in case there was nothing in it that might shew His Majesty's resolution of assisting the Emperor, to present a memorial immediately by which he should declare all treaties with England to be null and void. As the King therefore foresaw that this step of the Imperial Court must, if taken at this juncture extremely embarrass the measures he is proposing to enter into in concert with the States General for setting on foot a treaty of peace, and perhaps, make the proceeding farther in them absolutely impracticable, His Majesty thought himself obliged to find some means for obviating that inconvenience without loss of time, and nothing having been suggested which appeared more effectual for that purpose than the said communication,¹ he was prevailed upon to suffer it to be made, though it gave His Majesty great uneasiness to be forced to take such a step before anything had been finally settled with the States and without a previous concert with the Pensionary

(Ibid., fo. 68.)

Whitehall, 15 January 1734/5.

Most secret.

. Your Excellency should use your utmost endeavours to settle and sign with Mo^r. Jannel, and if you can do it in conformity to what you know to be the King's pleasure upon the whole, and not according to the Cardinal's new restrictions, you should then lose no time in dispatching the plan to the respective Courts in order to be there propos'd in form by the ministers of the Maritime Powers. But if, on the contrary, as there seems reason to apprehend, you will not be able to conclude with Mo^r. Jannel, you will then be pleas'd to frame a plan with the Pensionary in which His Majesty approves of your inserting the Cardinal's

¹ See Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, 234.

new terms with respect to Poland as they are demanded by his letter of the 13th inst., and in which the King would have everything relating to the Emperor put in as favourable a manner as we are authoriz'd to do by any of his former letters, since His Eminency by the last paragraph of that beforemention'd, promised to confirm the whole of what he had ever consented to. And as soon as Your Excellency and Mo^r. Slingelandt have agreed upon such a plan, the King would have it sent over hither by a messenger for his express approbation before it is transmitted as the act of His Majesty and the States, to the several Courts.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 84, *no.* 340, *fo.* 100.)

Whitehall, 17 January 1734/5.

Most secret.

. There is but one single point upon which I have any instructions for you from His Majesty. I mean that of the convention of neutrality the acceding to which is demanded of the King and is what Your Excellency thinks will be supported by the Pensionary. This however His Majesty hopes will not be the case, since it appears to him to be impossible that he should come into that article which contains no sort of restrictions in any case whatsoever upon France, whether her Allies accept or refuse, but seems intended by that Court to tie up His Majesty and the States absolutely in all events, for the King does not see from what part of the said article it was inferr'd by the Pensionary that it was to take effect only upon the Emperor's refusal. The interpretation of it would certainly be in the power of that Crown who might put such a sense upon it in the manner it is worded, as to make their allowing the same terms in the end to the Emperor, depend upon our absolute neutrality in all cases. But Your Excellency already knows that the King looks upon the tying up his own hands, even in the case of the Emperor's refusal, without a reciprocal restriction on the part of France with respect to the refusal of her Allies, to be unjust and unreasonable, so that it is not necessary for me to enter any farther into this subject.

(P.R.O., S.P. 84, no. 341, fo. 35.)

Whitehall, 31 January 1734/5.

Most secret.

. It only remains therefore at present to answer the question which Your Excellency now puts as to the convention of neutrality, viz^t. "whether, if the French agree to the reciprocal "neutrality, His Majesty's name should be again inserted as it "was in Mo^r. Jannel's counter project with respect to the said "convention, you should let it pass or break off the whole rather than "consent to it," upon which I am to let Your Excellency know that the King's instructions to you as contained in my letter of the 17th were given upon the article produced by Mo^r. Jannel, whereby His Majesty's accession to the convention for the neutrality of the Netherlands,¹ would have been general and in all cases the same, so that His Majesty justly apprehended that, if he had pass'd that article, it might not have been afterwards in his power to give such an explanation to the engagement he should have thereby taken as might restrain it to the Emperor's refusal only. But as the question is now plainly and clearly stated and all that is asked of the King appears to be to consent that the Low Countries should remain exempted from the war in case the non acceptance of the Court of Vienna should occasion the continuation of it against His Imperial Majesty, the King, who has already in that case agreed to a neutrality for the whole, can have no objection as to one part only, and therefore makes no difficulty of authorising Your Excellency to admit of that condition, provided the reciprocal neutrality be stipulated on the part of France.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 207, fo. 48.)

PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES, EARL WALDEGRAVE, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.

St. James', 17 February 1734/5.

You having in obedience to Our commands laid before Us a particular account of your transactions at the Court of France, where you have resided as Our Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and Our service now requiring your immediate

¹ Of 24 November N.S. 1733 (Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IX, pp. 461-4).

return thither in the same character, We have ordered these Our instructions to be delivered to you.

As there has been for some time past a secret negociation carried on at The Hague between Us and the States General on the one part and His Most Christian Majesty on the other, in order to accommodate the present disputes in Europe and to restore the publick peace and tranquillity, We have ordered copies of the papers relating to the negociation, and particularly of all the most secret letters that, in concert with Mo^r. Slingelandt, Pensionary of Holland, have passed between Our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Councillor Horatio Walpole, Esq., Our Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary at The Hague and the Cardinal de Fleury to be put into your hands ; by which you will be fully informed of the rise, progress and present state of the said negociation.

When you shall have received these Our instructions with the papers above mentioned which We have ordered to be delivered to you, you shall forthwith repair to the Court of France, and you shall take the first opportunity in a conference with the Cardinal de Fleury to express to him Our great concern and surprise to find that, after the secret negociation proposed by him, and accepted by Us and the States General in a full persuasion of the sincerity of his intentions, had been carried on so far that We promised Ourselves a speedy and happy conclusion of it, the last instructions sent by him to the person of confidence chose by himself to negotiate this great affair with Our said ambassador and the Pensionary, were so directly opposite and contradictory to the letters which he wrote at the same time to Our ambassador with respect to the conditions which were to form the plan of accommodation ; and that he had raised new difficulties upon points which he had either himself proposed or had appeared to be fully satisfied in, and by that means, not only made it impossible for Us to conclude the convention as We hoped to have done, but also must give reason to suspect the sincerity of his disposition to put an end to the war upon just and honourable terms in concert with the Maritime Powers, unless he will come to a steady resolution to agree to and sign the conditions which he has so often and so solemnly promised both in His Most Christian Majesty's and his own name.

You shall represent to the Cardinal the facility that has been shewed by Us and the minister of the States General in order to bring this negociation to a happy conclusion, and the readiness

with which We came into the expedient for saving the honour of France in the manner proposed by himself relating to Poland, the point upon which he chiefly insisted, as well as to give all reasonable satisfaction to the Allies of France in the distribution that was proposed to be made (according to his own suggestions) of some of the Emperor's estates in Italy, in which points you will be fully instructed by the papers that will be delivered to you. You will observe by them the particular difficulties which have hindered Us from concluding the convention, and you will endeavour, by enforcing all such arguments as you shall find contained in those papers and such others as may occur to you, to dispose the Cardinal to return to what he has promised, and to engage him (if possible) to conclude without loss of time, the secret convention with Us and the States General for fixing the terms of a general peace and for obliging the several parties in the said convention not to assist their respective Allies in case they should refuse the terms of accommodation, when offered to them.

If the Cardinal should persist in refusing to consent to this reciprocal obligation of not assisting the Allies on each side in case of their refusing to accept the terms of the plan, you shall then desire to know of him what he intends to do if the Emperor should accept the plan and the Allies of France should refuse it, and you shall in that case represent that it would be highly unreasonable and unjust that France should continue to carry on the war against the Emperor after His Imperial Majesty shall be willing to consent to such terms as have been agreed to by France; and you shall particularly observe that the carrying on the war on the side of Germany or in the Empire, especially considering the conquests already made in those parts by France, must affect to such a degree the balance of power in Europe that it is scarce to be expected that the Maritime Powers (when the Emperor shall have agreed to the terms proposed by them) can sit still and see such extraordinary measures pursued without any other security for the *equilibre* (and consequently for their own safety) but the bare declaration of France for restoring everything that shall be taken from the Emperor on that side. And as this is a point of the greatest consequence, you shall endeavour by all means to procure a full and satisfactory explanation upon it, and to learn from the Cardinal how and by what concert of measures between Us and France he proposes to have this plan executed.

For if the Cardinal will not consent to an article for a reciprocal neutrality to be observed on both sides, as the case of acceptance or refusal shall exist, he should think of some means to be concerted in order to prevent that power from being a sufferer who shall shew a disposition for peace, and to give the Maritime Powers sufficient security for the execution of the plan. For otherwise all the pains that have been taken for negotiating these terms and adjusting them between the Maritime Powers and France will be entirely lost, and of no effect.

As the King of Sardinia will have by this plan all that the Cardinal has thought proper to ask for him and even more than was at first proposed or than he could, upon a general pacification, well expect, there is little reason to doubt of His Sardinian Majesty's concurrence, especially if he can by any means obtain an encouragement from France for his doing it. You will therefore represent to the Cardinal how necessary it is that he should insinuate by some means or other to His Sardinian Majesty or his ministers, his willingness that the said King of Sardinia should accept the proposals made to him. And you will consult with the Cardinal how and in what manner that concurrence on the part of the King of Sardinia may be made most usefull for bringing about a general acceptation of the plan, and particularly whether the Court of France may not with great strength and reason insist that Spain should be satisfied with the cession of Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos in exchange for the Dutchies of Parma and Placentia and the reversion of Tuscany ; since it would be unreasonable for Spain to expect that France should continue the war in Italy singly for them, when the King of Sardinia is actually satisfied on the one side, and Naples and Sicily secured to Don Carlos on the other, which Kingdoms are so much more valuable than what is proposed by the plan to be given to the Emperor in consideration of them.

You shall farther represent to the Cardinal that unless a general suspension of arms be consented to by the powers at war, in all probability the campaign will soon be opened ; that, as all hopes of an accommodation for the present will be by that means at an end, the Maritime Powers may be obliged to declare themselves, and that he should consider what will be the probable consequences, when they shall see that the reasonable and equitable terms proposed by the Cardinal himself are now rejected, which

must encrease their apprehensions with regard to the *equilibre*, in the preservation of which they are so nearly concerned, and for which they can otherwise have no sufficient security.

If the Cardinal should after all continue to refuse to sign the article for a reciprocal neutrality, it will be the more necessary to agree upon a suspension of arms, and therefore in order to get the consent of all parties to it, you will represent to the Cardinal that in case the King of Sardinia should accept the plan, he, the Cardinal, might suggest to Spain that the French troops in Italy, being under the command of the King of Sardinia and actually joined with the forces of that Prince, it will be impossible for them to act without his consent and concurrence; and if the King of Sardinia should be satisfied with the terms of peace as settled by the plan, and the Emperor should also concur in them, the French troops under His Sardinian Majesty's direction can in that case no longer continue to act offensively against His Imperial Majesty; by which means Spain will be unable singly to maintain the war in Italy and will be the more easily brought to consent to a suspension of arms.

You shall particularly inculcate to the Cardinal the entire union and correspondence between Us and the States General, and how much he may find himself mistaken if he should depend too far upon the aversion of Holland to a war.

You shall endeavour, by carefully observing the manner in which the Cardinal receives what you shall say to him, and by the answers he shall return, to find out the true cause of the variation that has lately appeared in his proceeding with regard to the negotiation abovementioned; whether it may be owing to his having had originally no design to come to a conclusion, but only to amuse the Maritime Powers with the hopes of an accommodation; or whether his good intentions have been defeated by the credit and influence that Mo^r. Chauvelin may have over him. And you shall particularly endeavour (if possible) to discover whether the Cardinal's several private letters to M^r. Walpole were communicated to Mo^r. Chauvelin, and how far that minister is acquainted with the proposals that have been offered, and the concessions that have been made by the Cardinal in the said private correspondence during the course of the negotiation.

You shall be very diligent and assiduous in observing all the Cardinal's motions, in order to make the best and most immediate

use of any good disposition you may perceive in him ; and you shall learn from him in what manner he may now propose to sign the convention, should he be brought to consent to the conditions of it, Our Ambassador with whom it was negociated not being at present at The Hague. But if the Cardinal should be disposed to sign, you may easily agree with him upon some method of doing it.

You shall talk very plainly but in a friendly and prudent manner to the Cardinal with regard to the Garde des Sceaux, and endeavour to make him sensible how ill he is treated by that gentleman. You shall concert with the Cardinal what conduct you should hold towards Mo^r. Chauvelin, and if you should discover any appearance of a good disposition in that minister, you shall endeavour by all possible means to cultivate and improve it.

We have ordered to be delivered to you the plan of accommodation as settled and adjusted between Us and the States General,¹ which has been delivered here and at The Hague, to the ministers of the several powers engaged in the present war, and which you shall in a proper manner and jointly with Mo^r. van Hoëy, who will receive orders for that purpose from Holland, support in your discourse with the French ministers, acquainting them that We and the States General, from Our earnest desire to accommodate the present unhappy disputes in Europe, and in consequence of the acceptation of Our good offices by all the parties engaged in the war, have concerted this plan, to be laid before them as a basis for a general negociation of peace, in which the honour and interest of all parties have been consulted as far as the circumstances of time and the present posture of affairs would permit.

You will take particular care not to let Mo^r. van Hoey into any part of the secret negociation between Us and France. And if the Cardinal should shew any dislike to Our method of proceeding in presenting the plan, you shall express to him Our extream surprise at his shewing any disapprobation of a step that was originally proposed by himself ; that it was absolutely necessary for Us to proceed in this manner from the acceptation of Our good offices by all the powers engaged in the war and from Our declaration thereupon in concert with the States General, of the 17th December 1734. You will let him know that most of the ministers of the powers concerned have expressed a great impatience to receive something of the kind from Us, and you will observe

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. X, p. 463.

to the Cardinal that it was the more incumbent upon the Maritime Powers to take this step towards a general pacification, since the succours demanded of them by the Emperor have been refused, but a positive answer upon that point only deferred till it could be seen what success might be hoped for from their joint good offices for an accommodation.

You shall send Us constant accounts of everything that comes to your knowledge that may relate to the present situation of the affairs of Europe, particularly of the motions of the French armies, and of the military preparations that may be making in France; and you shall transmit to Us an exact relation of the state of the naval force in the several ports of that Kingdom.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 207, fo. 294v.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 3 April 1735.

. As by the Cardinal's late unaccountable conduct everything for the present seems to be at an end with regard to our negotiation with him, I have no particular commands from His Majesty to send you. You will continue to live with the French ministers as you used to do, and as you know the Cardinal in his letter to Mr. Walpole before he left Paris, endeavour'd to make him believe that he had still an intention to come to an agreement, if the terms of the plan could be a little chang'd, and that he would in a short time signifie to you the few alterations he should propose to be made in them; tho' His Majesty thinks very little weight is to be laid upon His Eminency's professions at present, after his having so often and so lately broke thro' the most solemn promises, you will, as often as you can, put yourself in the Cardinal's way, that he may never want an opportunity if he should have an inclination to talk with you as he has promis'd.

You will continue to press him in the strongest manner to agree immediately to an armistice which you will always represent as an essential point, and that unless they consent to it, and that soon, it will be in vain to entertain hopes of an accommodation. This therefore you will insist upon as the necessary means to procure a peace and to gain some credit to their professions of a disposition for it.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 208, fo. 36.)

HARRINGTON TO WALDEGRAVE.

Hanover, 6/17 June 1735.

Your Excellency has inclosed the copy of a resolution concerted¹ between the King and the States General by which you will see that it has been agreed to make fresh applications to the respective powers with regard to the plan of pacification and to offer at the same time some proposals for facilitating the conclusion of the armistice. Your Excellency will therefore use your utmost endeavors for obtaining from the Court where you are a favourable answer upon the points abovementioned, pursuant to the contents of the said resolution. . . .

(Ibid., fo. 52.)

Hanover, 8/19 June 1735.

Most secret.

. . . . The King was perfectly pleased with the manner in which you conducted yourself in your conference of the 6th inst. with the Cardinal, and in particular with the pains you took to discover whether what His Eminency said concerning the Dutchies of Lorrain and Tuscany proceeded from any real intention of proposing such an alteration in the plan or was to be looked upon as mere conversation. The approbation given by the Cardinal to the ideas abovementioned of removing the Lorrain family into Tuscany and giving the former of those dutchys to France was certainly very remarkable, and as he hung so long upon that point, and seem'd so solicitous to refute all objections that might be made to it, the King cannot but suspect that there must be some particular meaning in this behaviour, and that His Eminency may perhaps have formed in his own mind some new scheme of pacification wherein the exchange which I just spoke of may make a principal part. It would therefore be very agreeable to His Majesty that Your Excellency should endeavour to discover how far this may be the case and to find out whether they have in reality any thoughts at the Court of France of offering such an amendment to the plan and of proposing to accept the rest of it with that single alteration. . . .

¹ On 7 June, N.S.

(Ibid., fo. 124v.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 17 June 1735.

Most secret : to be opened by himself.

. You will be fully apprised of all the information that His Majesty has receiv'd relating to the affairs of Italy and the reason there is to apprehend that the accession of Spain to the treaty of Turin will be soon concluded.

These advices seem to be confirm'd by the union that there is at present between the Allies in Italy and by the concert with which the operations of the campaign are carried on there. It is indeed too probable that before the end of the summer something decisive will be done with regard to the Emperor's fate in that country, and I wish there was more reason to hope than I am afraid there is, that the siege of Mantua was as impracticable as you say it is look'd upon to be in France.

The King of Sardinia may have been sincere in the apprehensions he express'd as to his future security in case the Emperor should be drove out of Italy ; but it is much to be fear'd that he has now taken his party by putting himself entirely into the hands of France and Spain, and must run the risk of it.

Your Excellency will see that Her Majesty was of opinion that these accounts from Mo^r. Ossorio, and what the Cardinal said to you, that Spain and Sardinia were come to his terms and that their ministers had orders to act in concert with Mo^r. Fenelon, confirm each other (tho' by a letter from M^r. Walpole just now receiv'd, I find Mo^r. Ossorio absolutely denies that Mo^r. Canal has received any such orders). And you will also find that we are not without our fears that the Cardinal's new scheme of pacification may be founded upon driving the Emperor quite out of Italy and giving Lorrain to France in exchange for Tuscany.

I send Your Excellency in the same confidence a copy of a letter of a very extraordinary nature from the Emperor to Mo^r. Wasner at Lisbon with the inclos'd papers as they came to my hands, as also of my several letters, inclosing them to Lord Harrington and M^r. Walpole. Her Majesty is far from thinking it certain that a private negotiation is actually carrying on between the Emperor and the Cardinal. But as it appears to have been proposed by

His Eminency, and that His Imperial Majesty has given his consent that a person of confidence should be sent to Vienna, it is very material to know if anything has been done in consequence of it. Such a negotiation might be attended with the most fatal consequences to the *equilibre* and liberties of Europe, especially if the object of it should be the giving up Flanders to France, as the Emperor has sometimes insinuated that he might be forced to do. The Queen therefore thinks that too much diligence cannot be employ'd to get if possible to the bottom of this affair, if it could be done without discovering our having any apprehension or suspicion of this nature.

. . . . It might not perhaps be impossible to lead His Eminency to talk upon the several ways of putting an end to the war. The mediation of the Maritime Powers has been tried, and there is little appearance of its being very succesfull. The obliging the Emperor by force of arms to come to their terms is what seems to be their present scheme and design. But in discoursing upon these two methods you might possibly be able to guess whether the Cardinal may not have a third, viz. the setting on foot a private negotiation directly with the Court of Vienna, which, you will find by the inclos'd advices, His Eminency has insinuated to be more likely to succeed in that manner than if it were carried on by the interposition of the Maritime Powers.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 208, fo. 280.)

Whitehall, 18 July 1735.

. . . . The chief occasion of my dispatching this messenger is to send you by the Queen's order, for your information only, a copy of Mr. Walpole's letter to Lord Harrington of the 22nd inst. N.S. in which he gives a very particular account of what had passed in Holland in the several conferences that he had had there upon the receiving the answer from France. You will see the opinion that the Dutch ministers themselves have of it, and how little satisfactory they think it, tho' the Cardinal has represented it as answering every end proposed, and Mr. Chauvelin has called it their *dernier mot*. And you will find that instead of it's being received in the manner the French ministers expected, it has produced in the States of Holland something like a resolution of vigour which, if rightly followed, might have a good effect.

Your Excellency will be very diligent in procuring the best

information you can of the accounts that the French ministers receive from M^r. Fenelon upon this occasion. It is probable, as you observe, that their view in hastening the answer, was to prevent the States from coming to any satisfactory resolution upon M^r. Walpole's memorial, and, by an armistice (if they suppose it could take effect upon such conditions) to secure the Elector of Bavaria from those dangers to which they might think him exposed. But I am, in great confidence, to acquaint you (of which however you will take no notice) that Her Majesty has received advice that the Elector of Bavaria, upon the approach of the Russian troops, has not only signified his granting the passage required by the Emperor, but likewise his resolution of paying his share that is due in the Roman months, and of sending his contingent of forces to the Imperial army.

If you should have any account of this from any other hand, you will endeavour to find out what effect it has upon the French ministers, and to what cause they attribute it. It must have an influence upon affairs in those parts, and, if stuck to, greatly tend to the disappointing any views that France might have had against the Empire and the Emperor's hereditary countrys, and therefore, one should imagine, would make them more reasonable in their demands upon a general pacification.¹

¹ Newcastle's own opinions are set out in a letter to Waldegrave marked "Private and particular, and to be opened by himself," and dated the same day:—" The conduct of Holland makes it almost impracticable to engage in the war, and upon this, I am persuaded, is the Cardinal's chief dependence. Could the Dutch be brought to shew some appearance of vigour, it might facilitate a general or particular pacification. The indefatigable pains of M^r. Walpole give now and then some glimmering hopes that this might be done.

As to a general pacification, I must freely own to you that the late answer of the Allies puts almost an end to all hopes of it at present. If the Pensionary and M^r. Basseccour can have nothing to say in defence of it, sure it must be a bad one indeed and since it is not a good one, perhaps the worse it is, the better. For I am apt to hope and believe that the reception it has met with in Holland (tho' not attended with the vigour and spirit that one could wish) will however begin to alarm the Cardinal. It is amazing how His Eminency could have the weakness, or (to use an harsh expression) the impudence to talk of it as he did. One would have imagin'd that it had contain'd an absolute consent to an armistice, with indications of the Allies being come to a more reasonable disposition for a general pacification, whereas, if you examine it, it differs from the last only in explanations that must clog and disappoint both armistice and pacification.

Tho' I must own I never had any great notion that the bare exchange of

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 208, fo. 348v.)

Whitehall, 29 July 1735.

Most private.

. . . . Your Excellency will see the Queen's sentiments upon the proposals¹ as well as Her Majesty's just diffidence of the Cardinal's sincerity and the method Her Majesty has suggested for putting it immediately to the test.

Tuscany for Lorrain would make the Cardinal accept the plan of pacification, yet it is now evident, by his declining to enter into that affair when you put him upon it, that it is very far from his present intention; and indeed if you consider that his fear of disobliging Spain was one of the chief reasons that made him reject his own plan of pacification, it is not to be imagin'd that he would expose himself to the hatred and reproach of that Crown by accepting the plan of pacification which the Cardinal out of complaisance to Spain had so much exclaim'd against, with only this alteration in favour of France. . . . The jealousies and differences between Spain and Savoy, relating to the distribution of the conquests in Italy may be a real foundation for dividing the Allies, and the difficulties that actually attend the undertaking of the siege of Mantua, together with the late discourses of Mo^r. Patino to Mr. Keene, do give reason to beleive that the Emperor might (if he does not let slip this favourable opportunity) by a marriage of his second daughter with Don Carlos, detach Spain effectually from the alliance and recover almost all his dominions in Italy except Naples and Sicily, which might in that case go as a portion to his second daughter.

I do admit that great and real objections may be made to this scheme, but great advantages may come from it also, if it divides the house of Bourbon, as for the present, it undoubtedly will . . . but I own freely to you, if the Emperor and Spain come to such a reconciliation as we can agree to, I have no notion that we can avoid supporting it. But this is only between you and I (*sic*).

You will see by my other letter the accounts we have had about the Elector of Bavaria. Should they prove true and this resolution not taken in concert with France or by their consent, sure it must create a great change in their councils, and Mo^r. Chauvelin's favourite scheme of reducing, as he calls it, the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, not so glib as he thinks. . . .

There are private letters from France which say that the general talk in Paris is the getting Flanders for Don Philip of Spain, and that Cardinal Richelieu is the pattern that Chauvelin has set himself and is determin'd to pursue; and that Spain is the power from whence he expects the greatest opposition to his *vast* projects. And by the way, this agrees perfectly with what Mo^r. Montijo said to Sir R. Walpole and me, and with the late discourses of Mo^r. Patino and Mr. Keene, and therefore makes the reconciliation between the Emperor and Spain both more necessary and more practicable. . . .'' (*B.M. Add. MS. 32788, fo. 221v.*)

¹ See the despatch from Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris 2 Aug. 1735, N.S., in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, Vol. III, p. 265.

But before any judgement can well be made of what has been thus flung out to you by the Cardinal, it will be necessary to have some points clear'd up, and therefore Her Majesty would have Your Excellency take an opportunity (as from yourself) to endeavour to bring the Cardinal to some precision upon the several points that are contain'd in his proposal, in order to enable you the better to inform the King of His Eminency's present disposition.

The first and principal point (and without which indeed it will be of no consequence to enter into any discussion of the others) is to bring the Cardinal to a clear and positive declaration that when we shall be agreed upon a reasonable scheme of accommodation, he will abandon his Allies in case they or either of them should refuse to concur in it, and that the mutual and reciprocal guaranty of the execution of the plan should be equally binding on all parties. Her Majesty indeed concludes from what the Cardinal has already said, that this point is to be considered as a condition *sine quâ non*.

The proposal of the exchange of the Duchy of Tuscany for that of Lorrain will stand in need of explanation as to the time of its taking place, which cannot be but upon the death of the Grand Duke, and when the House of Lorraine can be put in possession of the Duchy of Tuscany.

As Parma and Placentia were always propos'd by the Cardinal to be yielded to the Emperor in exchange for Naples and Sicily, even when there were thoughts of giving His Imperial Majesty Tuscany also, it would be highly unreasonable for the Cardinal not to insist with Spain that the Emperor should have Parma and Placentia when Tuscany is to be given to another prince in order only to procure the Duchy of Lorrain for the Crown of France.

As to the advantages propos'd for the King of Sardinia, Your Excellency knows that the behaviour of that Prince towards the Emperor has given such great and just offence to His Imperial Majesty that the part of the plan which concern'd the interests of that Prince met with greater objections and was consented to with more difficulty at the Court of Vienna than any other, and therefore it is to be fear'd that, however desirous the Emperor may be of peace, he will very hardly be brought to give any more considerable advantages to him than those propos'd by the plan, and therefore you will use these arguments with the Cardinal, as

from yourself, to confine what is to be given to the King of Sardinia to what is allotted him by the plan.

With regard to the places on the coast of Tuscany, they being not very considerable in themselves, it may not seem of any great importance to whom they shall be allotted; but as this project of accommodation is propos'd (as His Eminency professes and as His Majesty undoubtedly will desire) in order to secure a solid and lasting tranquility in Italy as well as in other parts of Europe, you will offer it to His Eminency's consideration how far that great and desirable end is likely to be obtain'd by leaving those places in the hands of a Prince, to whom they may prove a temptation in future times to extend his dominions, which, whenever it should be attempted, could not fail to raise new troubles and commotions in Europe.

The absolute guaranty of the Pragmatic Sanction is also a condition *sine quâ non*. Your Excellency will endeavour to get the Cardinal to explain himself so upon every article that you may be able as soon as you have left him to take minutes of the whole, and you will particularly inform yourself in what manner His Eminency proposes this shall be executed, and what sort of separate convention should be previously sign'd with France for that purpose. . . .

As it will be some time before we can hear from Hanover, and as you will have already seen by Lord Harrington's letters that the King is inclined to prefer this scheme of accommodation to any other, the Queen would be glad to have things in such a forwardness that in case the King should be for going on with this proposal, Her Majesty might from the lights Your Excellency shall procure in the mean time, be able to send the King the earliest account what the Cardinal's proposal really is, and what sort of credit is to be given to it. Whatever is to be done must be done at once, for the King will certainly not expose himself to be amused and trifled with a second time.

But whatever the Cardinal's real inclination may be, experience has shewn that Mo^r. Chauvelin can, whenever he pleases, defeat any scheme that he is not acquainted with and a party to. And therefore some way (if possible) must be found out, and that soon, to get Mo^r. Chauvelin into the concert, which Her Majesty thinks might be done by way of compliment to the Garde des Sceaux and to the Cardinal too, by Your Excellency's expressing an in-

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clination that that gentleman should immediately be admitted into the secret, in whom you know His Eminency has so great a confidence.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 209, fo. 96v.*)

Whitehall, 15 August 1735.

Copy.

. The Queen would have you immediately acquaint His Eminency that in case he will reduce to a certainty the terms and conditions upon which His Most Christian Majesty is willing to come to an accommodation, and those terms shall be such as His Majesty shall approve, Your Excellency will (upon a proper assurance on the behalf of the States General of their concurrence) be immediately authorised to sign a secret convention with France for the reciprocal execution of what shall be so agreed.

(*Ibid., fo. 100.*)

Whitehall, 15 August 1735.

Most secret, to be opened by himself.

. But as there is actually at this time a person at Vienna from the Court of France who has already (as appears by these accounts) ¹ open'd some part of his commission, the great thing to be apprehended, and to be prevented if possible, is that when the Emperor shall be pressed by His Majesty to come to an accommodation, and shall find that the assurance which by Mr. Robinson's accounts he seems at present to expect (*viz^t*. that if the accommodation should not succeed, he may in that case depend upon His Majesty's assistance) cannot be given him, His Imperial Majesty may then rather chuse to go on with his separate negotiation, and at any rate and upon any terms make up with France exclusive of the Maritime Powers. But the difficulties are so great that must attend such a project (particularly it would be so hard for France to recover for the Emperor his dominions in Italy) that it is to be hoped it can never take place.

¹ Robinson's despatches.

(P.R.O., S.P. 43, no. 16.)

HARRINGTON TO WALDEGRAVE

Hanover, 22 August 1735 N.S.

. His Majesty saw that Your Excellency had at last found the opportunity which you had so long waited for of executing his orders as contained in my most secret letter to you of the 8/19 June.¹ ²The intelligence which you then sent would have been much more useful to the King if Your Excellency had obtained of the Cardinal upon that favourable occasion, a more explicit and precise declaration of the particulars upon which he would actually conclude, that His Majesty might have known positively whether the peace might be had or no upon the foot of the plan of pacification with the single alteration mention'd in my said letter of the 8/19 June, and if not, might have had an exact description of such additional ones as would be absolutely insisted on. But it is the less necessary for me to enter now into this matter as I find by a dispatch from the Duke of Newcastle to Your Excellency of the 19th past O.S. that you will have received the Queen's orders for endeavouring to obtain a further *eclaircissement*, and I have therefore nothing farther to add at present, but that His Majesty would have you do all in your power to keep the Cardinal in the same pacifick temper, till you have farther orders from the King, and that if you find it necessary for that purpose to intimate to him that in your opinion His Majesty might not perhaps disapprove his scheme for the exchange of Lorraine and Tuscany, supposing that to be the only deviation to be demanded from the plan of the Maritime Powers, Your Excellency need not make any scruple of doing it.²

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 209, fo. 242v.)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 8 September 1735.

Most secret.

. I send you a copy of Lord Harrington's letter to me on the 4th inst. N.S. containing an idea which had arisen for combining together and uniting the two negotiations now depending (viz. that carrying on between the Cardinal and Your

¹ See above, p. 164.²—² Cypher.

Excellency, and the secret one between His Eminency and the Court of Vienna) in such a manner that a new Quadruple Alliance might be immediately enter'd into between His Majesty, the Emperor, France and the States, by which they should oblige themselves to support one another against any power whatsoever that might oppose the execution of what shall have been so settled amongst themselves, or (which perhaps would be subject to less inconvenience and difficulty) to engage only to abandon that power that should not concur in it, as also the instructions propos'd to be sent to Your Excellency for that purpose. All which however His Majesty has been pleas'd to leave to the Queen's approbation and determination, so that Your Excellency will follow such directions as I have now the honour to send you from Her Majesty, which, you will see, are founded upon what is suggested from Hanover, tho' the Queen for the present does not think it advisable to go so far as is propos'd in Lord Harrington's letter, or to suggest the thought of a quadruple alliance which may expose the King to the resentment of Spain for having made such a proposal, in case the negotiation should not succeed and the French should acquaint the Court of Spain with it And Her Majesty thinks it will be time enough to determine what it may be proper to do in this respect when the Emperor and France shall have propos'd it, and it shall appear that the treaty cannot be perfected without it.

[A private letter from Newcastle to Waldegrave dated Whitehall, 8 September 1735 on the subject of bribing Chauvelin will be found in Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 275.]

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 210, *fo.* 23.)

Whitehall, 25 September 1735.

Most secret.

. As Her Majesty observed by Your Excellency's letter¹
 that the French ministers did then suppose that the King had consulted the Emperor about this secret negotiation without pretending to blame such a step in His Majesty, Her Majesty

¹ Waldegrave to Newcastle, Paris, 21 Sept. 1735 N.S. most secret (Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 276):

thinks it may not be improper that you should, in your conference with the Cardinal and Mo^r. Chauvelin, give them to understand that, in consequence of this supposition of acquiescence on their part, the King will make the best use he can at the Court of Vienna of the knowledge His Majesty has of the sentiments of the French ministers for an accommodation, and, as far as is consistent with justice and reason, will endeavour to procure it upon the principles of their plan ; that in order thereto, His Majesty will do his utmost to bring the Emperor to consent to reasonable conditions, and that the King hopes by their complying with what Your Excellency is now directed to repeat to them in His Majesty's name, to be enabled to do it with success ; that they cannot doubt of His Majesty's sincere disposition to procure an accommodation between the Emperor and them, and that, if they are equally disposed to it on their part it is in their power to furnish His Majesty with the means to bring it about.

You will then proceed to acquaint the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux that the Queen took great notice of the concern that they expressed lest the siege of Mantua should be undertaken and by that means the accommodation rendered more difficult, and that Her Majesty was glad to find that they had already taken measures in order to delay it.

That the backwardness of the King of Sardinia with relation to it is known everywhere ; that the Queen thinks they may with the consent of that Prince make use of his unwillingness to go any farther with respect to Mantua, and let Spain see they cannot, and ought not, to force His Sardinian Majesty to do what he has no inclination to do.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 210, fo. 89v.*)

Whitehall, 3 October 1735.

Most secret.

. Mr. Robinson proposed of himself the combining the two negotiations, and seems pretty sanguine that he shall be able there to bring things soon to some certainty. The two points which he thinks would do the whole and are looked up by him hitherto as necessary conditions are : Tortona, and the not obliging the Duke of Lorrain, when Emperor, to give up Tuscany. And if a facility in those two conditions and in the disposal of

the *Stati di Presidii* (the giving of which to Don Carlos would be highly imprudent and improper) would bring the Cardinal's plan to bear, with the previous consent of the Emperor and the Duke of Lorraine and the acquiescence of the King of Sardinia, (for France is entirely master of him and he would be glad to have the guaranty of England, the Emperor and France for what is proposed for him) in which case Spain would be left alone if she did not comply. Would the Cardinal then, after all his professions for peace, for the sake of gratifying the King of Sardinia with Tortona and preventing a remote inconvenience that he may suppose from Tuscany's being in the hands of an Emperor hereafter, continue the war without any prospect of putting a speedy end to it ; forego the advantage of procuring Lorraine to France ; run the risk of engaging the Maritime Powers against him, and lastly, expose himself to the probability of a separate peace being made between the Emperor and Spain upon conditions not agreeable to him and which he cannot prevent, whenever the Emperor shall find that he is not to expect any tolerable conditions from France ?

The Queen is persuaded Your Excellency will make a prudent use of these advices. You may talk with more certainty of the secret negotiation than you have hitherto done, though the French ministers have thought proper not to own it to you. You may shew the necessity of combining the two negotiations as formerly proposed ; and you may let the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux know that, if they on their part will shew the necessary facilities by receding from the point of Tortona (which Your Excellency knows there is some reason to think they may be brought to do) and by the other concessions mentioned in the former part of this letter, the King will use his utmost endeavours to dispose the Court of Vienna to agree to the armistice upon the foot of the *statu (sic) quo* ; and that you believe that His Majesty, upon a persuasion that they will be easy in these points, is already preparing the Court of Vienna for it.

Should the French ministers renew their protestations after all the proofs the King has of it, that there is no negotiation going on, it would give great reason to suspect their sincerity. However, if the Court of Vienna behave in the manner Mr. Robinson promises himself they will, the whole blame and load, if this negotiation miscarrys, must lie upon France.

Should the siege of Mantua be undertaken, after the assurance

the Cardinal has given you to the contrary, the Queen would justly suspect every other profession he has made to you, and therefore you will be very express with him and the Garde des Sceaux upon that head, and procure from them a renewal of that assurance in as positive a manner as you are able, as well as that, during the armistice, if there be one, the necessary provisions for the subsistence of the place should be suffered to be carried in without interruption.

Your Excellency cannot be too particular with them in insisting with them that they should explain to you their scheme for executing their plan, and when and how they propose to procure the compliance of Spain; and in case of a refusal from Their Catholick Majesties, which is much to be apprehended, what methods they would suggest for procuring by force the execution of the plan, and what part they would themselves take in it.

If the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux are sincere, they have it in their power (if M^r. Robinson guesses right) immediately to conclude, and that almost upon their own terms. If they design nothing but amusement or scrupulously insist upon every point of their plan, tho' never so unreasonable, they must lay aside all thoughts of the peace being made hereafter by a previous concert with them, and they may be assured that the Emperor will immediately reconcile himself to Spain in the best manner he can, which he will always have it in his power to do. And therefore that cannot, in a proper manner, be too strongly inculcated into the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux.

You have in all appearance a fair field before you. This negotiation cannot subsist for ever, and the sooner you brought it to a point the better.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32789, fo. 341.*)

Whitehall, 5 December 1735.

Secret and apart.

. . . . Sir Thomas Fitzgerald, the King of Spain's agent here, has received a courier from his Court, with orders to inform the King of the communication that the French ambassador at Madrid has made to His Catholick Majesty that preliminary articles¹ were agreed between the Emperor and France, by which the King of

¹ For the text of the preliminaries see Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. X, p. 519.

Spain found that Don Carlos was to be deprived of what he called his hereditary dominions, and that his Catholick Majesty therefore desired to know the sentiments of the King our master upon this occasion.

Sir Thomas Fitzgerald mentioned also the conversation that Mr. Patiño had with Mr. Keene, which, Your Excellency will remember, was to know since this new event "upon what footing" they were to remain with England "and that" "as all their treaties" and declarations were founded upon the guaranty and possession "of Parma, Placentia and Tuscany, those foundations being swept away, they should be glad to stand."

As to the first point, His Majesty ordered me to acquaint Sir Thomas Fitzgerald that the King of Spain must be sensible by the part His Majesty has taken since the breaking out of the war, of the great desire His Majesty has had to see the publick peace and tranquillity restored.

That the plan of pacification offer'd by His Majesty and the States contained His Majesty's sentiments of the terms on which that might be brought about, and therefore if the conditions agreed on between the Emperor and France do not materially differ from them (especially as to what relates to Spain) His Majesty does not see how he can, consistent with the part he has formerly acted, disapprove them ;

And as to the latter point that, had the King of Spain thought proper to remain under the guaranty of Parma, Placentia and Tuscany, the guarantying powers would not have suffered him to be molested in them ; but that His Catholick [Majesty] chose, contrary to the King's advice, rather to run the risk and hazard of the war.

Your Excellency will easily see that by this answer His Majesty must have entirely destroyed all hopes in the Court of Spain (if they had any intention or desire of that kind) of the King's joining with them to oppose the execution of the agreement between the Emperor and France, provided (as the King has the greatest reason to think) the conditions of it do not materially differ from the plan offered by His Majesty and the States. And therefore the Court of France will have the greatest reason to be satisfied with this early mark that the King has given of his desire to see their agreement perfected and to remove all obstacles and difficulties that might retard the execution of it.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 211, fo. 63.)

Whitehall, 22 January 1735/6.

. Mr. Azevedo came to me yesterday and talk'd in a pretty strong manner, hinting that if His Portuguese Majesty could not obtain satisfaction in his disputes with Spain by the means of the mediators, he might be oblig'd to procure it by such other means as he had it in his power and which out of attention to them, he had hitherto not employed.¹

His Majesty would have you immediately talk to the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux upon this affair ; and, as it is probable, from the disposition that Spain has shewd to accede to the preliminaries, that His Catholick Majesty will have no objection to the continuance of the mediation upon the foot it now stands, Your Excellency will without further loss of time concert with the French ministers the time and place and the other necessary steps for proceeding in it in such a manner as may be most likely to bring it to a speedy conclusion, and you will learn the sentiments of the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux as to what it may be proper to propose at first to the parties concern'd. You cannot be too expeditious in the execution of these orders, as this matter has been long depending, and the Court of Lisbon are extremely pressing to have it brought to an issue.

(Ibid., fo. 154.)

Whitehall, 27 February 1735/6.

. I send Your Excellency an extract of a letter which I received on Wednesday from Sir John Norris. You will see by it the reason there is to fear that the Portuguese may either have laid hold of a very slight occasion to commit hostilities against the Spaniards, or would themselves make some attempt upon the River Plata, which might (as they think) necessarily bring the disputes about the limits which had been depending ever since the Treaty of Utrecht, under present consideration, and is probably designed to oblige the mediators to determine those disputes at the same time with the affair of the affront, which the Court of Portugal does not see at present likely to be done. His Majesty therefore thinks you should lose no time in concerting with the French ministers and Mr. Van Hoey, the sending proper directions

¹ For the Spanish-Portuguese dispute see Vaucher, *Robert Walpole*, pp. 136, 178-84.

to the ministers of the mediators both at Madrid and Lisbon to procure forthwith the consent of the respective Courts to an act for preventing all *voyes de fait*.

You will acquaint the French ministers that this is the more necessary since some little disputes that have lately happened between the Portuguese and Spaniards upon the River Plata and at Nova Colonia (where the Spaniards had taken a Portuguese ship) give reason to fear that without some such act as this, hostilities may be commenced between the two Crowns which, when once begun, may make it difficult for the mediators to put an end to them. But you will take great care not to let the French ministers have any knowledge of the secret Mo^r. Mendonça entrusted Sir John Norris with, viz. that His Portuguese Majesty designed to send a fregate to attack a Spanish town upon the River Plata.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32790, fo. 271.*)

Whitehall, 27 February 1735/6.

Private and particular (to be opened by himself).

I have in my other letter transmitted to you in form an account of the confidence that Mo^r. Patiño had made to M^r. Keene of the project of a treaty¹ proposed to them by Mo^r. Vaulgrenant, with His Majesty's general directions to you for endeavouring to learn the truth of this extraordinary transaction.² If it should appear upon enquiry³ to be as Mo^r. Patiño has represented, Your Excellency will then find out if possible, whether this overture was made in concert and with the knowledge of the Court of Vienna.² It is very remarkable that this project of a treaty was only called a *declaration for the execution of the preliminaries, with the reciprocal guaranties of the Emperor, France and Spain*, and that Mo^r. Vaulgrenant read this project (which he then found to be a plan of a formal treaty and calculated directly against the interests of England) to Mo^r. Patiño, even after the arrival at Madrid of the declaration signed at Vienna.

Your Excellency will see of how great importance it is that this affair should be sifted into.

¹ A suggested alliance between France and Spain.

²—² Cypher.

³ From de Bussy.

I perceive by a letter from Mr. Villettes of the 18th inst. N.S. that the French are endeavouring to persuade the King of Sardinia to withdraw his forces out of the Milanese in order to make room for their troops that are to evacuate the neutral provinces, but that His Sardinian Majesty declines it and has answered that before the evacuation takes place, the preliminaries must be signed by him on the foot he has proposed and by all the parties concerned. The French ministers are said to have expressed great surprise and concern at the two memorials presented by Mr. Solar.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 211, *fo.* 290.)

Whitehall, 30 April 1736.

. Your Excellency will take an opportunity to talk very seriously to the Cardinal who, the King hopes, is sincerely disposed to prevent a rupture between Spain and Portugal which, His Eminency must be sensible, might at once defeat the general pacification. You will shew him how far short this proposal,¹ if it succeeds, will be of the King of Portugal's expectation, who has hitherto been so far from admitting any blame on his part or on that of his minister, that he has even thought the violences committed upon Mr. Belmonte so great as to entitle him not only to insist with the mediators that he should have satisfaction for that affront, but even to demand that his former differences with Spain, which have subsisted ever since the Treaty of Utrecht, should be adjusted at the same time. The Cardinal must have seen how far the King has been from encouraging the King of Portugal in any extravagant or unreasonable views, on the contrary that His Majesty has always endeavoured to convince him of the necessity of reconciling himself to Spain upon moderate terms, and that he was not to expect the King's assistance or support if he acted contrary thereto.

The great danger is lest, in the present situation of the Court of France with regard to Spain, they should hope by sacrificing Portugal to soften the present resentment of the Spanish Court against them, and at the same time perhaps be glad to lead the King into any measure which they may think or hope would lessen His Majesty's credit at the Court of Lisbon.

¹ Of Chauvelin's. See Vaucher, *Robert Walpole*, p. 180.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 212, fo. 71.)

Whitehall, 21 May 1736.

. I am persuaded I need not observe to you how much more advisable in all respects the proposal made by Mo^r. Patiño is than that formed by Mo^r. Chauvelin, and lately sent to the ministers of the mediators at Madrid ; especially as it is absolute and final, and if accepted, will put an end at once to the whole dispute, which Mo^r. Chauvelin's project possibly was not intended to do, or at least would hardly have done.

. His Majesty would have you go to the Cardinal and you will then proceed to acquaint him that His Majesty has received letters by a courier from M^r. Keene in which that minister, reasoning on the affair of Portugal and on what had lately passed between the ministers of the mediators joyntly, and Mo^r. Patiño, on that head, gives His Majesty reason to think that if a proposal was made to the Court of Spain to the following effect it might be accepted by them viz^t. : that the King of Portugal should send a minister to Madrid to declare to His Catholick Majesty that he was sorry for the accident which had given occasion to the steps that had been taken and to the misunderstanding that subsisted between the two Courts, and that the King of Spain on his side should send a minister to declare on his part that he was sorry for what had passed at Madrid in consequence of the conduct that had been held by the domesticks of Mo^r. Belmonte, that these ministers should set out on the same day from their Courts ; or that they should arrive on the same day at the Courts where they were to be employed and that the prisoners on both sides should be released on the arrival of the ministers.

You will inform the Cardinal that these conditions being in the King's opinion so much more honourable for both parties than those lately sent in concert by the mediators to their ministers in Spain His Majesty thinks no time should be lost in making the proposal. But you will at the same time acquaint him in the greatest confidence that the King has good reason to believe that this proposal would be more likely to succeed if offered to the Court of Spain singly by His Majesty than if it were to be at first the joint act of the mediators.

If you shall be able to procure the Cardinal's consent to

His Majesty's making this proposal separately, you will in that case immediately send on this messenger to Spain. But if after all you are able to say to him, the Cardinal should refuse his consent you will then in the first place insist that this should remain an entire secret, and you will immediately send forward this messenger to Mr. Keene with an exact account of all that shall have passed between you and the Cardinal, together with the enclosed dispatches which contain provisional orders for his conduct in either case.

Your Excellency will perceive that this is a very nice and delicate point. Things seem to be in a very fair way, and the reconciliation will be as good as made if the French Court by an unnecessary stiffness in a point of form, does not prevent it. The difficulty lies only in the method of proceeding, which you are to endeavour to make as palatable to France as you can, though it is to be feared after all we can do, that Mr. Chauvelin will fly out, and you will therefore be careful above all things to manage the concert there has been in this affair between Mr. Patiño and Mr. Keene.

. It is very plain that the dissatisfaction of the Court of Spain with France is at present in the highest degree, which is in the King's opinion one great motive for the particular attention that has been shewed on this occasion to His Majesty and therefore Your Excellency may possibly find an opportunity of touching this point in such a prudent manner to the Cardinal as may make His Eminency sensible that in their present circumstances it is natural to imagine that any expedient going through His Majesty's hands in the first instance singly may meet with a better reception, and therefore that if the Cardinal be sincerely disposed to make up the dispute between Spain and Portugal the King cannot think he can have any objection to His Majesty's proceeding in the manner proposed.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 43, no. 18.*)

HORATIO WALPOLE, VICE-SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
WALDEGRAVE.

Hanover, June 18/29, 1736.

[Cypher.]

. In your discourse with the Cardinal, as occasion may offer, upon the prospect of all matters being soon finally completed,

the King would have Your Excellency as from yourself and as a matter of curiosity only, without seeming to shew the least uneasiness, sound His Eminence whether he will look upon the execution of the preliminaries according to the last convention with what shall be determined for the immediate cession of Lorraine as a perfect and solid establishment of the peace without the form of a more solemn and definitive treaty by the participation or accession of other powers.

(*Ibid.*)

Hanover, July 9/20, 1736.

[Cypher.]

. The answer which the Cardinal made you when you endeavoured to sound him whether he looked upon the execution of the preliminaries according to the last convention with what shall be determined upon the immediate cession of Lorraine as a perfect and solid establishment of the peace without the form of a more solemn and definitive treaty by the participation and accession of other powers, the King thinks was very vague and general, and his insinuating to you at last his desire that you would learn whether His Majesty would be disposed to come into a general guaranty with France and the Emperor in favour of France, Spain and the King of Sardinia pursuant to the preliminaries &c. was done with no other view, in all likelihood, but to evade your question for fear of being surprised into the saying something that he would not be afterwards able to retract, and at the same time to draw from you His Majesty's sentiments without discovering his own.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 212, fo. 248v.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 17 August 1736.

. Her Majesty is of opinion that it will be very difficult (if possible), to bring the Court of Portugal to to accept the terms of accommodation propos'd by the mediators before the King of Portugal shall be secure of having restitution and satisfaction for the hostilities committed upon him in the Indies; and, as the preventing hostilities or the putting an end to them (if commenced) between Spain and Portugal is the principal view of

the mediators, Her Majesty thinks that joint orders should immediately be sent to the ministers of the mediators in Spain to insist with that Court that, there being now certain accounts of hostilities committed in the Indies by the Spaniards upon the Portuguese directions should be immediately sent to the King of Spain's officers there that all hostilities should cease and every thing be put upon the foot it was between Spain and Portugal before these disturbances happend it being to be apprehended that the King of Portugal will not be induced to accept the terms propos'd to him by ministers of the mediators 'till things are restor'd in the Indies to the condition they were in before the late hostilities begun there, and that the mediators may be forthwith empower'd by the Court of Spain to declare to the Court of Portugal that those orders are sent and, if possible, to procure duplicates of them, to be by them deliver'd to the Court of Lisbon and from thence transmitted to the Indies.

Your Excellency will therefore take the first opportunity after the receipt of this letter to communicate to the Cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux the account of what has pass'd in the Indies, and you will shew the Cardinal and Mr. Chauvelin how difficult it will be in the Queen's opinion to procure any satisfactory answer to our joint instances 'till the King of Portugal can have from the mediators some security that everything shall be restor'd and that Her Majesty is therefore of opinion that the orders abovemention'd should be sent jointly without loss of time to the ministers of the mediators at Madrid.

[For a despatch of H. Walpole to Waldegrave, Hanover, 8/19 August 1736, most private, on Fleury's offer of an alliance, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, 352-6.]

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 212, fo. 284v.)

Whitehall, 27 August 1736.

Private.

. As to His Eminency's disposition to come to a closer union with His Majesty as necessary for the further security of the peace of Europe, Your Excellency has already acquainted him pursuant to the orders received from Mr. Walpole with His Majesty's

firm resolution to preserve a good understanding and friendship with the Most Christian King. But as the Queen finds that His Eminency thinks that something more than the barely remaining united with France upon the present foot of friendship may be necessary for the future preservation of the peace of Europe, and that he has particularly hinted at a stricter union with some of the northern Crowns in order to prevent the ambitious views of the Emperor, the Czarina and Spain, the Queen would be glad that he would in confidence explain himself further to Your Excellency upon this head, of which you may give him the strongest assurances that His Majesty is incapable of making any ill use, that His Majesty will acquaint him with his sentiments upon what shall be so suggested and by that means such a concert may be establish'd as may not only hasten the conclusion of His Eminency's present scheme for a general pacification but also lay a foundation for such future measures as may at any time appear necessary for the preservation of it.

And to give His Eminency the greatest proof of His Majesty's disposition to cultivate and improve the friendship and correspondence with the Most Christian King, you may assure him that His Majesty neither has nor is dispos'd to enter into any measures or engagements that may be disagreeable to or give just cause of offence to them.

. I am to acquaint you for your private information that it is not Her Majesty's intention by this to enter into an immediate negotiation for a particular alliance with France, but purely to give so much attention to what the Cardinal has said so often to Your Excellency upon that subject as may convince him that His Majesty has no design of entering into any engagements against them and divert him from any thoughts he may have had of a closer union with the Court of Vienna, founded upon a supposition that his overtures to you have been coolly receiv'd and consequently that there is nothing to be expected from them.

Her Majesty is sensible that this is a very nice affair ; but depends upon Your Excellency's prudence and discretion in the conducting of it.

[For despatches of Newcastle to Waldegrave, dated Whitehall, 8 October, and 29 October 1736, most secret, on the incident of

the Pretender's letter, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, pp. 408-12, and 438-9.

For a despatch of Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave, London, 29 October 1736, secret, accepting Fleury's advances for a secret correspondence, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, pp. 384-6.]

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 43, *no.* 19.)

HORATIO WALPOLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Hanover, 5/16 November 1736.

The King having observed that the Cardinal seemed uneasy at the treaty which he had been informed was renewing between His Majesty and the King of Poland, and finding that the Queen deferred sending you any orders upon this point untill His Majesty's pleasure should be known, I am commanded by the King to acquaint you that that treaty is only a defensive alliance by which the King and His Polish Majesty engage as Electors to assist each other in case they should be molested or attacked by any power whatsoever; that it contains no new engagements, but is purely a renewal of a former treaty which expired some time since, and which His Majesty declined renewing untill the late troubles in which the King of Poland was involved were over, that he might not give umbrage to the French Court at that time; with which you will take a proper opportunity to acquaint the Cardinal whom His Majesty does not doubt but Your Excellency will hereby be enabled to make perfectly easy on this head, by removing any jealousy he may have conceived at a transaction which in its nature is no more, as you well judged, than a private convention between two powers for their mutual security and defence.

[For letters from Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave, dated London, 30 December 1736/7 on Chauvelin and the proposed secret correspondence with Fleury, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, pp. 448-50. For a letter dated London, 7 March 1736/7, private, on the dismissal of Chauvelin, see *ibid.* p. 458.]

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 214, fo. 203.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 8 March 1736/7.

Very private.

Though I have acknowledg'd all Your Excellency's letters and sent you in general His Majesty's commands upon them and directions for your behaviour upon the removal of Mo^r. Chauvelin, yet I have not been able, by the hurry we have been in with our parliamentary affairs, to send you His Majesty's thoughts so particularly upon it as I shall now do ; and indeed I have been in hopes of having from Your Excellency some further lights into the Cardinal's sentiments and intentions than I have yet had, as to the measures His Eminency intends to pursue with regard to the general affairs of Europe and especially as to the final conclusion of the pacification and the foot he is desirous of remaining upon with the several Courts and particularly with His Majesty, since, whatever his former views and intentions upon any of these points may have been, they were constantly obstructed by Mo^r. Chauvelin.

Your Excellency will therefore take an opportunity to acquaint His Eminency that His Majesty having now the satisfaction to see him, by this wise step that he has lately taken, entirely master of his own conduct, and the King having been ever persuaded of his good intentions as well for establishing the publick tranquillity upon a lasting foundation as for preserving a most perfect union between His Majesty and the Most Christian King, His Majesty would be glad to know his thoughts in what way he intends to conclude the general pacification, whether by a definitive treaty which should comprehend all parties, and particularly the Maritime Powers, and by which the several treaties enter'd into between the parties concern'd in the late war may be made one common and general work of all those powers who are dispos'd and engag'd in interest to support and maintain the publick tranquillity (which has all along seem'd to be His Eminency's own view and intention, and by the advices which His Majesty receives from the Court of Vienna is represented to be no less theirs) or whether His Eminency thinks that the particular treaties and conventions already made and executed may be sufficient for that purpose. And in your conversation you will follow those instructions which have been already sent you upon this head, and particularly those contain'd

in my letter of the of October last, and Your Excellency will also see whether the Cardinal has any view of renewing the treaties at present subsisting with His Majesty or any scheme for putting the correspondence between the two Crowns upon a better foot than it has been for some years. But in this you will take care rather to hear the Cardinal than to say anything yourself that may either shew an apprehension that some new act or convention may be necessary for confirming the present engagements between the two Crowns or lay His Majesty under any difficulty about entering into stricter engagements with France than he is at present, which His Majesty may not think proper or necessary to do.

And in talking upon the situation of affairs between His Majesty and France, the King leaves it to you whether you may not now think it proper to make an entire confidence to the Cardinal of the incident of the Pretender's letter which Mo^r. Chauvelin by mistake put into your hands. You will easily shew him the reason you did not then do it as well from the promise Mo^r. Chauvelin exacted from you as out of regard to the Cardinal himself who seem'd unwilling to be drove too home upon that gentleman's subject. And the doing this now will not only give you an occasion of being perfectly inform'd of every circumstance relating to that letter (particularly by whom it was deliver'd to Mo^r. Chauvelin, what answer was given to it, or whether any transaction in consequence of that letter or of any other application from the Pretender has been had between the Courts of Vienna and Paris ; all which the Cardinal may be the more willing to discover to you now, since the blame may justly be laid upon Mo^r. Chauvelin) but will also enable you to make a better judgment what other applications have been made from the Pretender to France and how and in what manner they have been receiv'd. But in doing this you will take great care not to let His Eminency imagine that His Majesty has the least suspicion of His Eminency's good intentions upon this head, or that the King is not perfectly satisfied with the declarations which he has so often made to you upon this subject.

Your Excellency will also endeavour to learn what the Cardinal's views and designs are with regard to the Courts of Vienna and Spain, and the several Northern Courts, whether their alliance with the Emperor is upon any other foot or has any other tendency than that which publickly appears and is profess'd by the Cardinal, and particularly whether His Eminency has any notion that by

keeping a strict union with the Court of Vienna they may be able as it were to give the law to other powers or, at least, be less solicitous upon what foot they are to remain with them ; and whether any closer intimacy is intended with the Court of Spain than has lately been, either with or without the Court of Vienna.

His Majesty has order'd me to fling out these things to you not as what he suspects, but as points upon which from the late alteration in the French ministry you may naturally have an opportunity to learn the Cardinal's sentiments, and which it is very necessary for His Majesty to be inform'd of for his future direction and conduct.

There is one thing which the Cardinal has often mention'd to you with a seeming concern, and as it was entirely groundless, was owing to the artifices of Mo^r. Chauvelin and of the creatures employ'd by him ; which was, that His Majesty's ministers in the several Courts of Europe were constantly thwarting his measures, and His Eminency carried it so far as to imagine that they even endeavour'd to disappoint the pacification, than which nothing was more false. For though His Majesty had no immediate concern in the measures they thought proper to take for the execution of the preliminaries, the King wish'd so well to the general pacification and to the success of the Cardinal's scheme for that purpose, that, if ever His Majesty's ministers did interfere, it was always with a view to promote it, and of this you may give the Cardinal the strongest assurances.

This will naturally bring you to discourse of the characters of the several French ministers employ'd by Mo^r. Chauvelin in foreign courts, and of shewing the Cardinal the necessity of having such as he can depend upon, and particularly upon the veracity of their reports. The King has, himself, no personal objection to Mo^r. Vaulgrenant, though, as long as he was under Chauvelin, he certainly acted as Chauvelin would have him. But the principal engine by which Mo^r. Chauvelin work'd, and by whom he defeated more the Cardinal's views than by any other, was Mo^r. Chavigny. He wrote the Cardinal into the war, and would have prevented his getting out of it if he could ; and therefore His Eminency will consider whether this gentleman is proper to be employ'd in any place of consequence, who will certainly retain his old principles, however he may endeavour to make the Cardinal believe that they shall be subservient to his. I must own we here thought that his

fall would be certain with Mo^r. Chauvelin's. His Majesty is very far from wishing or desiring, notwithstanding his behaviour here, that any hurt should be done to him, but only that he should not be put into a capacity of doing more mischief by being employ'd ¹either as one of the principal *commis* for foreign affairs where he could do very great mischief at home or¹ in some foreign Court of consequence, and therefore you will endeavour, if you can, to prevent his being sent to Denmark, for which Court he was nominated by Mo^r. Chauvelin with a view to kindle new disturbances in the north, which with the assistance of Mo^r. Casteja in Sweden, he might be able to do ; or at least, ill-intention'd as he undoubtedly is to the King, he would be giving the Cardinal constant jealousies with regard to His Majesty, and fill his head with suspicions, when there is not the least foundation for them.

I gave you a hint by the post in cypher with regard to Mo^r. Gedda. M^r. Finch is very positive that if there is any secret transaction carrying on between France and Sweden, it is by that gentleman's canal. The King thinks you may easily find it out either by the Cardinal or Mo^r. Gedda.

The Cardinal has sometimes talk'd to you upon the affair of Berg and Juliers. You will have seen the resolutions of the States ² relating to it, and will, by my other letter, receive directions for your conduct thereupon. But as the Cardinal told you that he was on one side for lowering the demands of the King of Prussia, and on the other for getting the Elector Palatine to go further towards complying with them than he has already done, the King would be glad to know what His Eminency's thoughts are on this subject, and in what manner he intends to conduct this affair.

You may also in your conversation feel him upon the war between

¹—¹ In the King's hand in m.

² I send you inclos'd two resolutions of the States of the 26th past, and of the 2nd inst. As to the former which is for pressing the Elector Palatine to explain himself upon the offers and proposals made by the King of Prussia, His Majesty would have you concur with M^r. Van Hoey in any instances he may make at the Court of France to that effect. But with regard to the latter which was occasion'd by the King of Prussia's having represented that the Elector Palatine was about to exact an eventual oath of fidelity from the inhabitants of Berg and Juliers to the Prince of Sultzbach, I have as yet no orders from His Majesty to send you (*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 214, fo. 194, Newcastle to Waldegrave, Whitehall 8 March 1736/7.)

the Muscovites and the Turks and what his own thoughts and inclinations are upon it

[For letters and despatches from Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave, dated London 23 March 1736/37, private, and May — 1737, secret, on the proposed secret correspondence with Fleury, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, pp. 460, 469, 470.]

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32795, fo. 99v.*)

Whitehall, 9 June 1737.

Private and particular. In Cypher, to be opened by himself.

. . . . Your Excellency will have seen that we had some suspicion here that the copy of the treaty given by 101 [Bussy] to Sir Robert Walpole might possibly not be authentick, from the difficulty that there was to account for the manner of his coming by it. But if this should not be exactly the treaty as it is now agreed or sign'd, it is in all probability agreeable to the instructions sent from M^r. Chauvelin to M^r. du Theil, and therefore the utmost diligence should be used to find out what parts of it are omitted or alter'd, and particularly whether there is any private article of commerce of the same nature with that given by 101.

The treaty between the Emperor and France as communicated to Your Excellency and of which you sent the substance in your most private letter tho' plainly design'd to be the definitive treaty, cannot be supposed to comprehend all the engagements enter'd into between the Emperor and France, so that there certainly must be some secret articles; and the point therefore is to know what they are, without which no certain judgment can be made of this transaction.

His Majesty observes that the Pragmatick Sanction is guarantied by France in the strongest terms and in the fullest manner; that the Quadruple Alliance is also specifically renew'd, which was a point much contended for by the Emperor and will not be agreeable to Spain; and as these two articles are much in favour of the Emperor, the question is what concessions may have been made to France in order to obtain them, and whether the article above mention'd relating to commerce,¹ or that for giving one another

¹ In a despatch dated Whitehall April 1st (4th in the endorsement) 1737 Newcastle had commented on Bussy's draft as follows:—

“The separate article relating to commerce, by which it is to be agreed

notice of anything that should come to the knowledge of either of them to the disadvantage of the other, be some of the inducements with the Court of France to have agreed to the publick treaty in the manner that it is.

Your Excellency remembers that France is under a secret engagement to the Emperor with regard to the allodials,¹ which is still in favour of the Emperor; and there seems to be at present such a perfect concert in every thing between the two Courts that it is hardly to be imagin'd that each of them have not in their own opinion found their advantage in the present transaction.

It is very probable that there is some secret article with relation to Berg and Juliers in which the Emperor may have given in to the views of France, and it is not impossible from what the Cardinal let drop to you that "the Queen of Spain, tho' she had hitherto "carried almost all her points, would, he beleiv'd however, miscarry "in that of the marriage of Don Carlos with the second Arch-Duchess," that there may be some secret engagement or promise relating to that matter.

Your Excellency will endeavour to find out upon what foot the Cardinal is with the Court of Spain and how Their Catholick Majesties relish this treaty between the Emperor and France. You will have seen that Mr. Keene says that Their Catholick Majesties seem'd to be very much pleas'd with it, and His Majesty

that the French not only in the Milanese but in all the hereditary countries of the Emperor shall, with regard to their trade, be put upon the foot of the most favoured nation is very material, and may if concluded be extremely prejudicial to the commerce of His Majesty's subjects. I do not perfectly know what duties the English pay in the Emperor's dominions, but I have been informed that the duties upon the French commodities in those countries are much higher than upon the English. And as this article will extend to Flanders and the Low Countries, it must in all probability greatly affect the English and Dutch merchants, and is contrary to the treaties subsisting between the Emperor and the Maritime Powers. But this is too nice a point for you to touch to the Cardinal, since it has the appearance only of putting the trade of France upon the same foot with that of other nations, tho', with regard to the Emperor it is very injurious to the Maritime Powers, and some means should be found to prevent it, if possible." (To Waldegrave, private and particular, in cypher, to be opened by himself, *B.M. Add.* 32794, fo. 295.)

¹ Belonging to the house of Farnese in Naples. (Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IX, pp. 1-129.)

has an account from Vienna that when Mo^r. Fuenclara had been in a great rage at his not being call'd to assist at the conferences with Mo^r. du Theil, Count Sinzendorf said that the Spanish Ambassador would be easy upon the arrival of the first courier from his Court, which look'd as if there was some secret transaction going on between the three Courts relating to the treaty between the Emperor and France.

[For a letter of Sir Robert Walpole to Waldegrave dated London 7 August 1737, secret, about Henry, Duke of York, see Coxe, *Sir Robert Walpole*, III, p. 486.]

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 216, fo. 252.)

Whitehall, 30 December 1737.

I send you enclosed, by His Majesty's command, a paper containing the substance of the orders which Prince Cantemir has just received from his Court, as he explained them to my Lord Harrington, whereby you will see that the good offices of the Maritime Powers are required in conjunction with those of France, for obtaining a renewal of the Congress and negociation; and a declaration on the part of the Czarina that when that is done, she will accept the mediation of France jointly with that of the Maritime Powers.

His Majesty, who has been desirous from the beginning of the war to contribute his best endeavours to the bringing about a reconciliation between the contending powers, has readily consented to what is askt of him, and the King has ordered instructions to be sent to Sir Everard Fawkener to act accordingly, in case the States General shall send the like orders to their Ambassador at the Porte.

(*B.M.*, *Add. MS.* 32796, fo. 324.)

Whitehall, 30 December 1737.

Private and particular. To be opened by himself.

I am now to send Your Excellency His Majesty's commands upon your private and particular letter of December 28th N.S. giving an account of the confidential discourse you had with the Cardinal upon the situation of Europe and His Eminency's proposal

of a private treaty between England and France for the reciprocal guaranty of each other's possessions, and for the maintaining a just balance of power. His Majesty thinks this an affair of so much consequence that he would not delay sending you his commands upon it as soon as possible, as far as is necessary for Your Excellency's present conduct.

The King thinks there can be no inconvenience in encouraging the Cardinal's notion of making a private treaty between England and France so far as to procure from him a project of such a treaty, that His Majesty may be able to discover the real view and design in it. If it shall then appear that the project of the treaty is calculated to preserve to each crown their own and to maintain a just balance in Europe, and to put it out of the power of any hereafter, as far as it can be done by treaty, to overturn the present system, His Majesty may then be induced with proper precautions to come into it. But in that case, such a treaty ought to be so satisfactory to the other powers of Europe that His Majesty would hope that in the course of the negotiation, His Eminency might be persuaded that this end would be more effectually attained if, before or after the conclusion of this treaty, it should be communicated to the Court of Vienna which would prevent any distrust that the concealing it might create. But I only fling this out to Your Excellency that you may see the King's way of thinking, and not that any thing of the kind should be hinted or suggested to the Cardinal at present, which perhaps would defeat the whole.

When the King mentions the present system of Europe, it is to be understood according to the lights that His Majesty has receiv'd, relating to it. For if there should be any secret engagements that may any ways affect it, which have not been communicated to the King, it is not to be expected that His Majesty can take any final resolution regarding to this matter 'till he is perfectly satisfied upon that head. And therefore Your Excellency will not only renew your instances to the Cardinal in the most cordial and confidential manner to explain himself thoroughly with regard to that point, but take this opportunity to press him to give you a full information relating to the present state of the definitive treaty, how far it is completed, and what, if any, obstacles retard the conclusion of it.

On the other hand, should the Cardinal design nothing but

amusement, and begin this negotiation with the King in order to defeat some schemes which he may apprehend are carrying on by other powers, such as the marriage of the ArchDuchess with Don Carlos, which might end in a closer union between the Emperor and Spain than he would like to see, by giving thus far into His Eminency's proposal we shall soon find out whether that be his intention, and His Majesty will always have it in his power to proceed or not as, by the progress of the negotiation, he shall find it to be most for his own interest and that of all Europe. I must however observe to you that weak as the Cardinal may be by his age, it is hardly possible for him to be so much so as to be serious when he talks of the dangers from the exorbitant power of the Emperor, when in the same breath, he values himself upon the obligations that the Emperor has to France for bringing him out of the late war and the occasion he has for their assistance to extricate him out of the present one with the Turks. But it is possible, as Your Excellency observes, that the Cardinal may hope by this alliance to make the present peace more lasting than it would otherwise be after his death.

These being His Majesty's thoughts, Your Excellency will acquaint the Cardinal that you having sent the King a particular account of the confidential discourse he had with you, and of the scheme which he had suggested for maintaining a just balance of power in Europe by a firm union between England and France, you had receiv'd His Majesty's directions to return the Cardinal his thanks for this mark of His Eminency's confidence, and for the disposition the Cardinal has shew'd for a closer union between His Majesty and the Most Christian King, and to desire His Eminency to digest his thoughts into the form of a treaty, that His Majesty being then fully apprised of the particulars of which His Eminency would have this treaty consist, and the manner of doing it, might make his observations upon it; that His Majesty agreed that it was the joint interest of England and France to keep what they both had without aiming at any further acquisitions; that the renewing the former treaties, the guarantying each others' possessions; the preserving and defending their reciprocal commerce, according to the treaties now subsisting, against all encroachments and innovations even by force if necessary, and the maintaining the system of Europe upon the foot it was settled at present, the King thinks ought to be the view and design of this treaty, in which

His Majesty agrees with the Cardinal, the States of Holland must be included.

As many things will come under consideration in the course of this affair till something is put down by way of draught or broüillon, it will be impossible for His Majesty to say anything further at present, and the Cardinal having with so much frankness and good disposition suggested to Your Excellency the substance of this treaty, it will be very easy for him, if he thinks proper, to frame a project thereupon.

Since writing what is above, I have receiv'd Your Excellency's letter of the 4th inst. [*sic* for January] N.S. If the apprehension of the marriage with the ArchDuchess was an inducement to the Cardinal to set on foot at this time the negotiation with the King, we may perhaps now see him slacken in it, upon the conclusion of the marriage of Don Carlos with the King of Poland's daughter.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, fo. 12v.*)

Whitehall, 6 January 1737/8.

Most secret, to be opened by himself.

. I am in confidence to acquaint Your Excellency for your own information only that there is a negotiation carrying on at Vienna for the joint guaranty of the Emperor and France for the possession of Berg and Juliers to the house of Sultzbach, independant of the negotiations at The Hague, which shews that the Cardinal has his reserves even in points which he is actually negotiating with the Maritime Powers ; and Your Excellency may be assured that he has had his reserves also in the confidence which he has made you about the Turkish mediation.

(*Ibid., fo. 150.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES EARL WALDEGRAVE, AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN
KING.

St. James', 10 April 1738.

Whereas some disputes have lately arisen between Our subjects and those of Our good brother the Most Christian King in America with regard to their respective navigation in those parts, occasion'd chiefly by a certain edict or ordonance of Our said good brother

the Most Christian King dated October [] 1727,¹ amongst other things authorising and empowering the governors of the several islands in America belonging to the said Most Christian King, to sieze and confiscate any ships belonging to Our subjects that shall sail within the distance of one league from the coasts of any of the said islands &c^a, and whereas it has been represented to Us that some ships belonging to Our subjects have been taken by the French in consequence of the said edict ; and whereas Our Governor of the Leward islands in America has caused to be pass'd an act by the assembly of Our island of Montserrat,² laying down the same rules and restrictions with regard to the navigation of the French in those parts, in consequence of which also it has been represented to Us that several vessels belonging to the subjects of the Most Christian King have been taken and confiscated, and whereas the conditions of the said edict or ordonance and of the said act of the assembly of Montserrat do contain restrictions upon the liberty of navigation allow'd to the subjects of the respective Crowns by the Treaty of Neutrality concluded in the year 1686.³

We have for the better explaining the said Treaty of Neutrality and accommodating the differences now subsisting relating to the sense and meaning thereof, thought proper to order that there should be herewith put into your hands the draught of a convention for that purpose which it is Our pleasure that you should forthwith communicate to the French ministers and endeavour to procure the consent and approbation of Our good brother the Most Christian King, thereto, that this affair may be dispatch'd and the proper orders sent to the respective governors and officers in the West Indies to conform themselves to what shall be stipulated by this convention.

And whereas a paper relating to these disputes with the draught of a letter proposed to be wrote by the Most Christian King to his governors in America, was put into your hands by the French ministers in order to the accommodating the differences between Our respective subjects above mention'd, you will shew the insufficiency for the ends proposed and the reasons that We have to object to what is therein contained, which will sufficiently appear by the several reports of Our commissioners of the Admiralty and of Our commissioners for Trade and Plantations, which We have order'd

¹ I have not found this edict quoted with a precise date.

² *Acts of Assembly, passed in . . . Montserrat*, London, 1740, p. 107.

³ Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, Vol. VII, pt. ii, p. 141.

to be herewith deliver'd to you, and you will represent in the strongest manner, that as the Treaty of Neutrality abovemention'd had been observed without complaint for many years as the rule for navigation between the subjects of both nations in America, that treaty is made, as the Court of France themselves propose, the foundation of the project of a convention herewith deliver'd to you, and consequently there can be no reasonable objection to it.

But whereas the negotiation of this convention and the settling these disputes for the future may take some time, and the proprietors of the ships taken on both sides in consequence of the edict or ordonance of the [] of October 1727 and of the act of the assembly of Montserrat abovemention'd, may suffer greater hardships by the further delay of the restitution of the ships and effects taken from them, you are to propose that mutual restitution be immediately made of the ship *Scipio* which was taken by a French vessel and carried into Martinique, and of the French ship *Fleurion* of St^t. Malo, and that the security given by the master of another French ship call'd the *Fortune* for the value of the said ship and cargo to Our governors of the Leeward Islands shall thereupon be deliver'd up, pursuant to Our order of Council of the 8th of last month, a copy of which We have directed to be forthwith put into your hands, and that reciprocal directions should be forthwith given for that purpose. And you will also propose the reciprocal restitution of all ships that may have been taken on either side, contrary to the Treaty of Neutrality abovemention'd.

Whereas you had Our orders before you left Paris to communicate to the Cardinal de Fleury the just reasons we had to complain of the repeated insults and depredations of the Spanish *Garda costas* in America upon the ships and effects of Our subjects in the exercise of their lawful trade and navigation there; and whereas you had Our directions to communicate to the said Cardinal de Fleury for the information of Our good brother the Most Christian King, the orders sent to Our minister in Spain to make the proper complaints and representations thereupon, by a memorial to be presented to the Catholick King, which memorial was also communicated to the said Cardinal de Fleury; and whereas the said Cardinal de Fleury did at the same time express to you his sense of the justice of Our complaints, and gave you to understand that the subjects of the Most Christian King had in some instances met with the same usage from the Spanish *Garda costas*, We have

thought fit to order to be put into your hands a copy of a letter wrote by Mons^r. de la Quadra, Secretary of State to the Catholick King, to Our minister in Spain, in answer to the memorial by him presented, and the draught of an answer which We have order'd Our said minister to return to M. de la Quadra's letter abovemention'd, by which the insufficiency of the answers of the Court of Spain upon the repeated grievances and complaints of Our subjects will fully appear, and the little reason that We have to be satisfied with them, as well as the unjustifiableness of the new and unheard of pretension with regard to the restriction upon the navigation of Our subjects in the West Indies,¹ which We can never submit to, as being directly contrary to the law of nations and treaties subsisting between the two Crowns, and founded upon a supposed sovereignty of the Crown of Spain in the American seas, which it is equally the interest of all powers that have settlements and colonies in those parts to oppose.

We have likewise order'd to be put into your hands a copy of the fresh directions sent to Mr. Keene for renewing his applications to the Spanish Court to obtain immediate satisfaction to Our injured subjects in the cases mention'd in the memorial presented the 10th of December last, which you have already communicated to the Cardinal de Fleury.

In laying these papers before him you will make the proper instances for the concurrence of Our good brother the Most Christian King in these representations and in such measures as may be necessary for procuring satisfaction for the grievances which Our subjects have respectively suffer'd from the Spaniards, and securing the quiet enjoyment of those privileges to which they are entitled by treaties and the law of nations, as being a matter of common concern in which We ought, agreeably to the treaties subsisting between Us, to support one another.

Whereas you have from time to time receiv'd Our directions to be watchful of any new work that may be carrying on at Dunkirk or in the neighbourhood of that place within the limits prescribed by the treaty concluded in 1717 commonly called the Treaty of Triple Alliance, whereby the port and harbour of Dunkirk may be restored contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht in the year 1713 or of the said Treaty of Triple Alliance,² We do hereby renew Our orders and directions to you to make the best inquiry into the present condition of the said port and harbour

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil*, Vol. IX, pp. 265 *et seqq.* ² See below, pp. 244-5.

of Dunkirk ; and, if you should find that anything has been done or is attempted to be done contrary to the stipulations of the treaties abovemention'd, that you should make the proper representations and remonstrances against it, and particularly that if any new works are carrying on within the limits prescribed by the said treaty, contrary to the stipulations therein contain'd or which may any way affect the port or harbour of Dunkirk, that you shall forthwith present a memorial complaining in a proper manner of the carrying on the said works, contrary to the treaties abovemention'd and insist that an immediate stop may be put thereto.

You shall constantly correspond with one of Our Principal Secretaries of State and you shall follow such further orders and instructions as you shall receive from Us or from one of Our said Principal Secretaries of State.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, fo. 159.*)

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES EARL WALDEGRAVE, &C.

St. James', 10 April 1738.

Whereas the Cardinal de Fleury, minister of State to Our good brother the Most Christian King has frequently express'd to you the desire of the King his master to confirm and strengthen the union and friendship between the two Crowns, and for that purpose to enter into a new defensive alliance with Us, for renewing all former treaties, for guarantying our respective rights and possessions, and for preserving the tranquility of Europe upon the foot it is now established ; and did at your departure from France put into your hands for Our consideration certain heads of articles for a treaty of defensive alliance,¹ which said project or heads of articles We have order'd to be herewith deliver'd to you, We having duly weigh'd the said proposal for a defensive alliance and the great use and service it may be to our Kingdoms, and considering that the entring into a defensive alliance with Our said good brother the Most Christian King under proper terms and stipulations to which other powers of Europe, and especially Our good friends and allies, the States General of the United Provinces, may either be original parties or afterwards admitted as shall be hereafter agreed, may be a means of better securing the tranquility of Europe

¹ See Introduction, p. xxxii, and *P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, ff. 126 and 194.*

and the balance of power there ; and Our said good brother having by the treaty lately concluded with the Emperor guarantied the order of His Imperial Majesty's succession as regulated by the Imperial declaration of 1713 and receiv'd in the house of Austria, commonly call'd the Pragmatick Sanction, on the due observation of which the future tranquility of Europe so much depends, in the same manner as by the treaty concluded between Us and the Emperor at Vienna in 1731 We thought fit to give Our guaranty of the said Pragmatick Sanction, and considering also that the conclusion of a defensive alliance between Us and the Most Christian King may be a means of better securing the due performance of the said respective engagements, We have thought proper to cause to be prepared a counter project for a treaty of defensive alliance agreeable to these views and ends, which We have order'd to be deliver'd to you with these Our instructions, as also a paper setting forth the several variations of the counter project from the sketch or heads of articles put into your hands by the Cardinal de Fleury and the reasons for making such variations.

And as you will be thereby fully informed of the conditions upon which We are disposed to enter into a new defensive alliance with France, you shall upon your arrival at the French Court acquaint the Cardinal de Fleury and M^r. Amelot, Secretary of State to Our good brother the Most Christian King, that We received with great satisfaction the assurances you gave Us of the disposition of Our said good brother to enter into a new defensive alliance for guarantying the respective rights and possessions of each Crown, that We look upon the sketch or heads of articles for such a treaty which was put into your hands by the said French ministers for Our sentiments thereupon (notwithstanding the objections which occur against some particulars therein contain'd) as a proof of the good disposition for that purpose, that We had accordingly order'd a counter project to be prepared which we had directed you to communicate to them, and which, We conceive, is agreeable to the principles upon which this new alliance was proposed.

You will observe that, as by this treaty, We shall lay Ourselves under a new obligation to France by guarantying the duchy of Lorrain as now settled, it is but reasonable that all the rights and privileges belonging to Our subjects, particularly those relating to commerce and all Our possessions as well in Europe as in America, (which are included in the former treaties subsisting between the

two Crowns) should be strongly, clearly and explicitly guarantied and secured to Us by this treaty.

And you will further observe that as the maintaining the tranquillity of Europe and the balance of power there in the manner it is now settled is equally the view of Us and of Our good brother the Most Christian King, and as We are under the same engagements in the principal points that relate to it, care has been taken in forming the counter project not to insert anything that can give any just cause of offense to any power whatever. And you will therefore represent to the French ministers the necessity there is that the States General of the United Provinces should be included in this treaty, which may be done by leaving room for them to come into it as original contracting parties in the manner proposed to you, or by an article specifying a particular invitation of them ; but care must be taken to have a separate article declaring that although the States General should delay or refuse to become parties to it, the treaty should nevertheless remain in full force between the two Crowns.

You shall transmit to Us or to one of Our Principal Secretaries of State for Our information an account of the sentiments of the French ministers upon the counter project, and upon what you shall say to them in consequence of it ; and as this negotiation shall advance, We shall from time to time send you such further instructions as We shall think proper, and particularly as to the time and manner of communicating this treaty to such powers as may be thought proper to be acquainted with it or to be admitted as parties to it.

Whereas We have in Our instructions, sign'd this day, given you full directions to acquaint the Cardinal de Fleury with the steps that have been taken with regard to the depredations of the Spanish *Garda costas* in the West Indies, you will represent to him in the most serious and friendly manner the obligations that the Most Christian King is under, by the treaties subsisting between the two Crowns, to join in such measures as may be necessary for the procuring justice and satisfaction on this head ; that he cannot but be sensible of the great moderation We have used, notwithstanding Our repeated provocations in this affair ; and that it is the interest of the French King as well as of all other powers, to put a stop to these violent proceedings of the Spaniards in the West Indies. And you will sound the disposition of the

French ministers whether they would be inclined to join in the representations and instances that are now to be made to the Court of Spain, and in case they have not their desired effect, to concur in such measures as may be jointly concerted with Us for procuring satisfaction for the several grievances that each power has suffer'd from the Spaniards in this respect and preventing the like for the future; and you will acquaint Us with what you shall be able to discover relating to this affair and what part the Court of France may be disposed to take in it.

Though We have thought proper to direct you by these Our instructions to communicate Our thoughts only to the Cardinal de Fleury and Mo^r. Amelot, yet if you should find that it might be for Our service to discourse with any other of the French ministers upon these subjects, We leave it to your discretion to do therein as you shall think proper.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, fo. 168.*)

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR JAMES, EARL WALDEGRAVE.

[St. James'] 10 April 1738.

Whereas it has been represented unto Us by the well-intention'd of the council and other members of the Republick of Geneva that it would greatly contribute to the restoring the peace and quiet of their Republick if We would be pleased to accept of the submission of the Sieurs le Fort and Chouet, two of their members, as a satisfaction for the affront offered to Us in the person of Our minister, the Count de Marsay, by the said Le Fort and Chouet¹ (of which you have been fully informed by Our order) you will, in case the minister of the said Republick residing at Paris should apply to you on this account, acquaint him that, although We can by no means look upon such submission as a satisfaction adequate to the offence that has been given Us in the person of Our said minister nor sufficient to induce Us to renew a correspondence with the said Republick, yet considering how necessary Our condescending to what is proposed may be for attaining the salutary ends intended thereby, and being desirous to promote so good a work, if the said well-intentioned members of the Republick will make it their request to Us, and will engage that the submission of the said Le Fort and Chouet be made in the most ample and satis-

¹ These syndics of Geneva had issued a libel on Marsay in 1734 and negotiations for satisfaction to Marsay had been in progress ever since.

factory manner, We will excuse what has passed and restore the said Republick to Our former friendship and regard.

You are also informed of the just reasons We have to be highly displeased with the late indignity offered to Us by the Republick of Venice by their having shewn particular and extraordinary honours to the son of the Pretender to Our Crown;¹ and as the Ambassador from the said Republick at Paris has heretofore made several overtures to you in confidence and in his private capacity for inducing Us to be reconciled to that Republick, and lastly, before you set out from thence, spoke to you in the name of the Senate of Venice and expressed their earnest desire to be restored to Our amity and friendship, and declared to you that the Republick would do anything in reason to shew that nothing had been farther from their thoughts than being wanting in the respect due to Us, and the said Ambassador of Venice having insinuated to you that a declaration in writing in the name of the Republick might be deliver'd by him to you or be conveyed to Us by any other proper channel, disclaiming all manner of thoughts that the treatment given by some of their nobles to the son of the Pretender to Our Crown whom the Republick could never look upon but as a private person, would have been resented by Us, concluding with strong assurances of the desire of his superiors to cultivate Our friendship and to have this matter forgot, but as the said ambassador would not go farther nor even engage for the performance of the foregoing offers on the part of the Republick, unless he was assured that these terms would be accepted by Us as satisfaction, and the Republick be thereby restored to Our friendship and her resident be permitted by Us to return to his station here; and whereas you undertook to make a verbal report of this conversation to one of Our Secretaries of State and learn Our sentiments upon it, which at your return to France you would communicate in confidence to the said ambassador, and as it is probable the said Ambassador may upon your return apply to you on this subject, you will in that case acquaint him that as the said Republick has not sent an Ambassador to Us since Our accession to the Throne, as they have done to most other princes, if they will take this opportunity of sending an Ambassador with instructions to make Us proper excuses for their late extraordinary conduct abovementioned, We will excuse it and renew our former friendship with them.

¹ The Young Pretender had been received with Royal honours in the Great Council on 2 June N.S. 1737.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 217, fo. 172.)

PRIVATE AND SECRET INSTRUCTIONS TO JAMES, EARL
WALDEGRAVE.

St. James', 10 April 1738.

Whereas Mo^r. de Cambis, Ambassador at Our Court from Our good brother the Most Christian King hath informed Us that his Court had received advices that the King of Prussia has a design to send a considerable number of troops into the Duchy of Cleves, to be in a readiness, on the death of the Elector Palatine, to take possession of the Duchies of Juliers and Berg, and that they were desirous to know what were Our intentions on such a supposition, and whether We would give passage to the Prussian troops through Our countries, you are to acquaint the French ministers, in case they should mention this matter to you, that considering Our present situation and the inequality of Our forces in those parts, it cannot be expected of Us to refuse passage to the said Prussian troops, which would expose Our countries to the greatest and most imminent dangers, and therefore We cannot come to any other explanation on a matter of so much importance to Us, until We see what farther measures may be proposed by the Emperor and France and settled in concert between the four powers concerned for preventing *voyes de fait* on account of the disputed succession of Berg and Juliers in consequence of the last answers which the Courts of Berlin and Manheim have returned to the proposals that had been made to them for that purpose.

Whereas We have ordered to be herewith put into your hands a *pro memoria* setting forth Our title and pretensions to the principality of Ostfrise, and whereas the Cardinal de Fleury has formerly on several occasions shewed a disposition to favour Our said pretensions, you shall, upon your return to Paris, acquaint the said Cardinal how kindly We take the marks that he has given Us of that favourable disposition, and you shall endeavour to get the Cardinal and the French ministers to explain themselves how far and in what manner they are or shall be disposed to second or support Our pretensions to the said principality.

And whereas the Cardinal de Fleury has formerly mentioned to you the separating Embden from the other parts of the principality of Ostfrise and leaving it to the States General, you shall represent to him that as Embden is a town belonging to the

Empire, it is neither in Our power nor in that of the Emperor to separate it from the Empire, and it would be impracticable to get the consent of the Diet for it ; but that We are willing to give the States General all the satisfaction that they have ever asked of the Prince of Ostfrise and particularly to consent to their keeping a garrison at Embden or to any other security that they shall think necessary for answering the ends proposed by their having a garrison for so many years in that town, which We hope will answer the Cardinal's end in making the States General easy. And you shall endeavour to engage the Cardinal de Fleury and the French ministers to employ their good offices at a proper time and in a proper manner at the Court of Vienna, that this matter may be settled to Our satisfaction, and to induce the States General to agree to it, and to accept the security We are willing and desirous to give them for adjusting hereafter the points which are now in dispute between them and the Prince of Ostfrise in such manner as may fully answer all that they can reasonably desire and expect.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 218, fo. 64v.*)

NEWCASTLE TO WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, 11 May 1738.

Most secret.

. His Majesty was sorry to find that the Cardinal was so much prepossess'd on the subject of the act pass'd by the Parliament of Ireland¹ relating to inlisters into foreign service. Your Excellency will continue your endeavours to remove his wrong notions upon that point and to make him see the justice and necessity of that law.

(*Ibid. fo. 70v.*)

Whitehall, 11 May 1738.

Most private.

. The King observ'd that the chief objection which the Cardinal made to the counterproject was the extension of the guaranty in the second article so as to include our dispute with

¹ 11 Geo. II, c. 7. See Introduction, p. xxxiv.

Spain relating to the right to the colony of Georgia, and that that objection may be effectually removed, His Majesty would have Your Excellency propose that the second article of the treaty should remain as it is in the counterproject, but that the colony of Georgia should be expressly excepted out of the general guaranty by a separate and secret article which will as fully answer the Cardinal's end as if that exception were inserted in the body of the treaty.

And as the Cardinal has also assured Your Excellency in the strongest manner that he would not join with Spain in the present quarrel occasion'd by the depredations, in case it should come to an open rupture, His Majesty thinks also that that should be stipulated in the same separate and secret article, and the King has commanded me to prepare and transmit herewith to Your Excellency a draught of a separate and secret article for these purposes.

You will observe to the Cardinal that the first part which relates to Georgia is entirely agreeable to what he himself proposed, and that the latter is founded upon His Eminency's promise; that with regard to Spain there is a perfect reciprocity observ'd; that in the first case (*viz.* that of Georgia) if Spain should attack the King, though His Majesty is in actual possession (and that by right) of Georgia, France is discharged from giving any assistance to His Majesty; that in the latter case, if the King by a refusal of justice and satisfaction on the part of Spain should be obliged to come to extremities with that Crown (in which case also France in strictness would, by the guaranties now subsisting and proposed to be renew'd, be obliged to take part with the King) His Most Christian Majesty by this separate and secret article engages only that he will not assist or join with the King of Spain.

His Majesty having thought proper to make these concessions, the King cannot doubt of the Cardinal's ready compliance and conclusion of this treaty, if His Eminency has been at all sincere in the professions he has made to you of his desire to come to a closer union with His Majesty by a new defensive alliance for that purpose; and His Majesty hopes that the French ministers will not make any difficulty in consenting to the American convention in the manner it was proposed by His Majesty which Your Excellency will also get concluded as soon as possible.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 218, fo. 174v.*)

Whitehall, 2 June 1738.

Most private.

. In this situation the King cannot but suspect the affected delays of the Cardinal in coming to a determination upon the negotiation depending for a defensive alliance between His Majesty and the Most Christian King, and his having been so long without acquainting you with his sentiments upon the project of the separate and secret article relating to the neutrality of France. And indeed the Cardinal's late discourses with Your Excellency upon the subject of our disputes with Spain and his seeming inclination to erect himself into a kind of mediator, join'd with what Mr. Champeaux said to Mr. Keene upon the orders he had receiv'd from his Court, and the alteration Mr. Keene thought he perceiv'd in the Court of Spain upon the arrival of La Mina's courier, gives reason to fear that the Court of Spain may have been encouraged to stand out by hopes or promises of France joining with them or at least underhand assisting them in case matters should come to extremities with England.

As it is of the utmost importance for His Majesty to know what he has to depend on in this critical conjuncture, the King has orderd me to dispatch this messenger on purpose to Your Excellency to direct you to take the first opportunity to see the Cardinal and Mr. Amelot and acquaint them that the King is very impatient to know their sentiments upon the counterproject and project of the separate and secret article. But however if the Cardinal is not yet come to a determination upon the defensive alliance, His Majesty would have Your Excellency press him to come to an immediate agreement for a neutrality with regard to the present disputes between His Majesty and Spain and Your Excellency may assure the Cardinal that this agreement shall be kept an entire secret between the two Crowns.

(*Ibid., fo. 372.*)

Whitehall, 31 July 1738.

Most secret.

. As to the Cardinal, the King looks upon him to be almost gone, and though there may be sometimes some little

alteration for the better, his age and infirmities whilst he lasts will make him entirely susceptible of any impression which those that are about him may think proper to give him. The Cardinal's own behaviour in rejecting the private alliance which he himself proposed, and in refusing to stipulate a neutrality with regard to His Majesty's disputes with Spain, tho' he himself declared so often that he would on no account take part with that Crown, and the conduct of all the French ministers in the several Courts of Europe, shew but too plainly that the views and measures of the Court of France are the same as they were in Mo^r. Chauvelin's time, and that His Eminency is governed by those whose chief point it is to make him ill with us. And as to the inclination of the other French ministers, they seem now to be bad with regard to the King.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 219, *fo.* 42.)

Whitehall, 30 August 1738.

. His Majesty perceives that the Court of France have agreed to the project proposed by Your Excellency with some few alterations which the King does not think of consequence enough to hinder the conclusion of this agreement. And therefore His Majesty does consent that Your Excellency should sign with the French ministers the Act or declaration for regulating the navigation in America in the manner and form in which it was transmitted by you and Your Excellency will take care to insert in the instrument or instruments to be so signed by you and the French ministers on this occasion, the draught of the letter to be wrote by His Majesty to his governors in the West Indies in consequence of this agreement.

(*Ibid.*, *fo.* 47.)

Whitehall, 30 August 1738.

. I send open for Your Excellency's perusal my letters to Mr. Keene. The messenger Haite is to go in company with Mo^r. Geraldino's courier, and as soon as you have had time to peruse his dispatches you will send him forward to Spain. It is His Majesty's pleasure that you should keep the contents of these dispatches entirely secret, but when the two couriers shall have

been some time set out from Paris to Spain, you may in confidence acquaint the Cardinal that you had received advice from your Court that we had signed an agreement with the Spanish minister here for satisfaction for our losses already suffered, and for referring to plenipotentiaries the regulating the future security and adjusting the other points in dispute according to the treaties subsisting between the two Crowns.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 219, fo. 206v.*)

Whitehall, 13 November 1738.

Most secret.

. As Your Excellency in some of your letters has mentioned Prince Cantemir, the King has order'd me to hint to you that though that gentleman's behaviour during his stay in England was in general agreeable to His Majesty, yet there was from time to time reason to think that he was disposed to promote a good understanding between his Court and France, having been brought into that way of thinking by Mo^r. Chavigny whilst he resided here. You will therefore be very careful to watch Prince Cantemir's motions and endeavour to learn what passes between the French and Russian Courts, for I need not observe to you that His Majesty would be very sorry to see too good an understanding established between those powers. The accession of the Czarina to the definitive treaty seems to be a sort of prelude to such an union.

(*Ibid., fo. 151.*)

Whitehall, 13 November 1738.

The reason of my having so long delayed sending you His Majesty's commands upon your dispatch of Oct^r. 8, N.S. and directions for signing the American convention is what has happened with regard to the capture of the ship *Elizabeth* by a French vessel near Donna Maria bay. As this incident has very much alarmed the West India merchants here and especially those concerned in the trade to Jamaica, they have on this occasion represented in the strongest manner the great importance and even absolute necessity of their ships continuing to enjoy the liberty of going into Donna Maria bay which they are in possession of by virtue of the Treaty of Neutrality of 1686.

The merchants alledge (and it is confirmed by those of the Admiralty whom the King has ordered to be consulted on this point) that all vessels bound from Jamaica to Europe or North America, and those bound from North America to Jamaica which go through the Windward Passage (that being the shortest and most commodious navigation) are under a necessity of sailing near the island of St. Domingue, and that the ships are generally as long beating through this passage as in all the rest of their voyage; and this appears to have been the case of the ship *Elizabeth* which had been near five weeks in sailing from Jamaica to Dona Maria bay, so that the excluding our ships from touching or anchoring at Dona Maria bay in order to their taking in water, which from the length of the passage may be absolutely necessary for their subsistence, would be in effect absolutely discouraging them from attempting to go through the Windward Passage, especially those ships bound from Jamaica to England where the passage or track carries them as near to Donna Maria bay as possibly they can. And as Dona Maria bay is so convenient for that purpose and neither is nor ever was a place of trade, but an uninhabited part of the island, there being no inhabitants within twenty leagues of it any way, it can be no prejudice to the French to leave the use of that place to the English vessels purely and solely for their taking in wood and water.

Your Excellency will take an opportunity of talking very seriously to the Cardinal and such other of the French ministers as you shall think proper, upon this point and represent to them in the strongest and most effectual manner the several arguments by which they will be convinced of the impossibility of His Majesty's consenting to give up the liberty that the ships belonging to his subjects have constantly enjoyed of going into Dona Maria bay, which, it is apprehended, would be in effect destroying the Jamaica trade, and which there are not wanting people here to say is the view of the French Court in insisting upon this prohibition.

The liberty proposed by the French to be allowed of coming into this bay in cases of necessity will be of little advantage, since it is clogged with a condition of giving notice to a governor; and as there is no French Governor within many leagues of this place, a ship may be lost before the Governor can have notice or grant the permission to come into the bay.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 220, fo. 5.*)

Whitehall, 5 January 1738/9.

I have laid before the King Your Excellency's letters of Dec^r. 13th N.S. with the several papers inclosed relating to your negotiations with the French ministers upon our American affairs, and the offer made by them of the port of Grand Anse for our ships to touch at instead of Dona Maria bay which they continue to refuse.

His Majesty having order'd that Sir Charles Wager should be consulted with regard to this proposal, I send Your Excellency inclosed a copy of a letter that I have received from him on this subject, which you will see fully confutes everything advanced by Mo^r. Maurepas in the paper sent by him to Your Excellency relating to the pretended advantage of the Grand Ance as well as the groundless assertions about the course of our navigation through the Windward Passage, the illicite trade said to be carried on by our ships in Dona Maria bay, and the settlements pretended to have been made near to it.

As it appears that there is so little foundation for the arguments on which the French ministers ground their refusal of Dona Maria bay, and as it is the opinion of the King's Admirals that their design must be merely to obstruct our Jamaica trade, and as Your Excellency has the same apprehensions, His Majesty can by no means consent to give up this point, which is of so much consequence to his trading subjects. The King could not but observe with some surprise that the French ministers talk to Your Excellency on this subject as if it were a favour you was asking of them, and Mo^r. Maurepas in his paper mentions *the desire of His Most Christian Majesty to favour the lawful commerce of the English*, whereas what is insisted upon is a right which His Majesty's subjects are entitled to by the Treaty of 1686 ¹ and have enjoyed ever since, and which, so long as that treaty subsists, France can have no pretence or power to deny. The original error in this affair was that France pretended by the edict made in 1727 to alter a solemn treaty, which edict, though it is binding to the subjects of France, can not extend so far as to affect any liberty that His Majesty's subjects enjoyed by vertue of a treaty between

¹ The apposite articles are the 6th, 7th and 8th (Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, Vol. VII, pt. ii., p. 142).

the two Crowns, or to repeal or alter any article in that or any other treaty.

In this sense therefore Your Excellency will talk to the French ministers. As to what Mo^r. Maurepas advances with regard to illicite trade, you will see that Sir Charles Wager represents it to be more for our interest to prevent such illicite commerce than for that of the French, and consequently, if the liberty of putting in at Dona Maria bay were not necessary for our lawful trade, it would not have been so much insisted on. As to the searching and examining our ships, nothing of that kind which is not founded upon the treaty of 1686 can be admitted.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32800, fo. 24v.*)

Whitehall, 5 January 1738/9.

Private and particular. To be opened by himself.

. The King is glad to find that the two Imperial ministers, Prince Lichtenstein and Mo^r. Schmerling seem now to be sensible of that which all the world have seen ever since the conclusion of the late treaty between the Emperor and France, viz. that the French Court have been all along amusing and deceiving that of Vienna; and it is but too evident that France has been making use of the absolute authority which they have over the Imperial Court, to form such alliances and establish such a power both in the North and elsewhere (and that with the appearance of the Emperor's consent) as may enable them to disappoint the views of the House of Austria with regard to the Emperor's succession and future interest, and to attempt, whenever they think proper, the overturning of the balance of power in Europe.

The first and most effectual step for this purpose was the working upon the Emperor's unjust resentment, and confirming his jealousy and suspicion of the Maritime Powers, foreseeing that, when once they had been able to bring that about, they would be (as they have since been) entirely master of the Emperor's councils.

The use that they made of this was the excluding the Maritime Powers, with the Emperor's consent, (and by his means getting the Czarina's also), from the Turkish mediation, whereby France has been able to manage that negotiation so that the Emperor's and the Czarina's strength should almost be quite exhausted by the war, and yet both powers be so intangled as to depend almost

absolutely upon France for a peace with the Turk which is so necessary for them; and by this means, France has been able to delay the peace, and may still do it, 'till those two powers from whence she might have expected opposition to her great views, shall be left not in a condition to give her any. And this one fatal step with regard to the Turkish mediation has hitherto, and may still, make it very difficult for the other powers who are concerned for the preservation of the balance of Europe, to do anything effectual for the support and maintenance of it.

The Court of France, not content with having gained this point, has made use of this interval to be carrying on such negotiations in other Courts whilst the Emperor was not in a situation to oppose them, as might be the most probable to put him out of a condition to do it hereafter.

The first thing to be done for that purpose was to engage him in the affair of Berg and Juliers, independent of, and contrary to the advice and opinion of the Maritime Powers, whereby, in effect, the Emperor is engaged to support in all events the guaranty of that succession to the House of Sultzbach, which guaranty France had given some years ago, directly in opposition to the Court of Vienna, in order by that means to attach the House of Palatine to itself, which it has effectually done.

From what has been said, there is too much reason to apprehend that the view of France by their several negotiations is, first, to divide those powers from whom they may expect any considerable opposition to their designs, and then to gain all others that they can attach to their party; not perhaps with an intent to make any immediate attempt upon the tranquility of Europe, but to be in a condition to do it now or hereafter, according as events shall arise either in the north or south, and to put it out of the power of others to give them any opposition therein. And it is for that reason that His Majesty is to be excluded out of all these negotiations, as the power that they know would not be imposed upon to give into any schemes that may hereafter affect the balance of Europe, and from whom they expect opposition to any attempt they shall make against it. And let the Cardinal make what professions he pleases of his desire to continue the peace, it is plain his views are as much to increase and advance the power of France, and perhaps with more effect than if he were actually beginning a war for that purpose. He is erecting himself into

a general arbitrator of all differences that have or may arise (*sic*) between the other powers of Europe, and putting himself in a condition to decide them which way he pleases, and his measures for that purpose, instead of being designed for the preservation of the peace, must be looked upon as productive of the most certain and dangerous war, if some stop cannot be put to the torrent of their success at present.

Under these circumstances it is not His Majesty's intention that Your Excellency should lay any of these considerations before the Cardinal, which might rather confirm him than otherwise in his measures ; but however the King has thought proper that you should be thus fully informed, that you might see how necessary it is that you should get the best lights possible as to the future success of these dangerous negotiations or any measures relating thereto ; and that being perfectly apprised of His Majesty's thoughts, you may be the better able in your conversations to talk in a proper manner to the several foreign ministers residing at the Court where you are, without however dropping anything that they may take an advantage from, or make an ill use of by repeating it to the French ministers, which, it is to be feared, most of them would be too ready to do.

His Majesty has seen by experience how unsafe it is to trust to the Court of Vienna with either advice or information that may immediately concern their own interest, they having upon some occasions made so unworthy an use of it as to communicate it to the very power that was most concern'd in it. For this reason Your Excellency must have a caution whenever you talk to the Imperial Ministers upon this great and important subject, and you may even assign that as the cause (if you should think proper) why His Majesty has been, and must continue to be, extremely reserved with regard to their Court.

Your Excellency can best judge how far Prince Lichtenstein may be sincere in the jealousy and suspicion that he expresses of the present conduct of the Court of France. As for M^{or}. Schmerling (however he may have alter'd his tone of late) he has contributed all in his power to engage his Court in that subjection she is under at present to France, and to widen the differences between His Majesty and the Emperor ; and therefore he must be extremely altered indeed, if any reliance is to be had upon what he says. Yet if Your Excellency is persuaded that Prince Lichtenstein or

even Mo^r. Schmerling is fully convinced of the fatal tendency of the measures of France, and how far their own Court has been amused and abused by them, His Majesty leaves it to Your Excellency to talk, as from yourself only, upon this great subject to Prince Lichtenstein or even to Mo^r. Schmerling in such manner as you shall think safe and advisable. And as they are upon the spot and are eyewitnesses of the measures carrying on by France, they may perhaps be the better able to disabuse their Court, and to dispose them to return to their true friends, if they are inclined to do it. And it is to be supposed that they are too well acquainted with the hazard that their letters would be exposed to, ever to write upon such subjects as these by the ordinary post. But Your Excellency will take great care not to say or advance anything upon this subject which the Imperial Ministers may represent to the Cardinal as overtures from you to detach the Emperor from their alliance.

Whatever just reason His Majesty has to be offended with the Court of Vienna, the King has that real regard for the liberties of Europe, in which the interest of His Majesty's own Kingdoms is so closely concerned, and is so desirous that the house of Austria should not be swallowed up by France, that, if any proper means could be found out of doing it (which, during the present situation of the war with the Turks, would be very difficult to find) His Majesty, on his own part, would be willing and desirous to renew the former friendship with the Emperor, and to enter into such measures with His Imperial Majesty and other powers as might be for their mutual interest and defence and the good of Europe. But any overture of this kind from His Majesty, instead of contributing to the end proposed, would immediately be communicated to France, in order to procure better terms and conditions from them.

I have mentioned nothing to Your Excellency with regard to Spain or to the negotiations supposed to be carrying on by the French Ambassadors there or the apprehensions of the Imperial Ministers relating thereto. 'Till we see what turn that Court will take in our own affairs, it is impossible to make any judgment relating to their general views and designs. We are in daily expectation of M^r. Keene's courier, which we have reason to think and hope, will bring good news. But however, upon this head also, Your Excellency need not lessen the apprehensions that the

Imperial Ministers are under. For besides the accounts that Mr. Keene sends of the ideas that some have there of offers being made by the French Ambassadour to the Queen of Spain relating to Parma and Placentia, ¹and the advices Your Excellency has procured from 101 [Bussy] of a defensive alliance being in negotiation between France and Spain¹ and besides the current report at Paris relating to the double marriages, I have an account from the Consul at Genoa that it is said there that there is a great body of troops assembling in Catalonia, which, if true, looks as if some attempt was intended against some part of the Emperor's dominions in Italy.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 220, *fo.* 173.)

Whitehall, 8 May 1739.

Most private.

. . . . His Majesty observes by the accounts that Your Excellency gives of your conferences with the Cardinal that His Eminency seems as ill humour'd as possible in everything that relates to His Majesty and this country; and the King is not certain that the indifference which the Cardinal has shew'd of late in everything relating to our disputes with Spain, may not proceed from the conclusion of their late supposed offensive alliance with that Crown.

Your Excellency will however take all proper opportunities of talking to the Cardinal as from yourself upon the general situation of affairs, the appearances and tendency of their negotiations in all parts of Europe, which cannot pass unobserved and must give room to think that His Eminency has departed from those just and pacifick dispositions which he shew'd in the first part of his administration, and that however he may be able to keep things within bounds during his time, he will lay such a foundation for quarrels in Europe hereafter as may overturn all those pacifick schemes which he had once so much at heart. And Your Excellency will do this in order to get what lights you can out of the Cardinal with regard to his present views and designs.

You did very well in retorting their treaty with Sweden upon him when he mention'd His Majesty's late alliance with Denmark,²

¹—¹ Cypher.

² See Vaucher, *Robert Walpole*, p. 226.

and you may possibly have a proper occasion of bringing into discourse their late correspondence with the Court of Berlin which is so much talk'd of in Holland. But you will take particular care that all these discourses may seem to arise naturally from yourself, and that the Cardinal may not imagine that you have received any orders to talk to him in this manner.

You will also observe to him the ill appearance that the distinction that has been lately shew'd to Cardinal Tencin must have in England, and the concern with which Your Excellency observes that he is upon every slight occasion so easily work'd up against us. The renewing of the discourse upon the Irish bill which has been so long over, when His Majesty had reason to expect His Eminency's thanks for the civility that has been shew'd in giving the Irish officers in the French service passports to go to Ireland whenever the French Ambassador has desired it, provided they do not act contrary to the laws of that Kingdom; the talking of our thwarting them in their negotiations, when it is notorious that their chief view in every Court of Europe is to destroy His Majesty's credit and influence there, are the greatest proofs of the Cardinal's present ill humour and of his being prejudiced in everything against the King.

You may also, as from yourself, mention the quartering their Irish troops over against our coasts, and without shewing any uneasiness or making any complaint, endeavour to see what sort of intercourse the Jacobites have at present with the Cardinal, and what, if any, encouragement His Eminency has given them.

Upon the whole, the present situation requires Your Excellency's most active attention. The uncertainty of the success of our negotiation with Spain, the probability of their offensive alliance with France, the rumours that are daily spread of the hopes and expectations of the Jacobites, and (as they give out) of their certain dependance upon some assistance from those two Crowns, even for an attempt upon His Majesty's dominions; these circumstances, I am persuaded, Your Excellency will think of such consequence that you will use your utmost care to send the King constant informations of all that you shall be able to learn relating to them.¹

¹ For the question at large see H. W. V. Temperley, *The causes of the war of Jenkins' ear, 1739*, in *Transactions R. Hist. S.*, 3rd series, Vol. III.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32800, fo. 362v.*)

Whitehall, 8 May 1739.

Private and particular. In Cypher. To be open'd and decypher'd by himself.

. The King has thought proper to allow me to acquaint Mr. Keene in my private and particular letter (with the utmost charge of secrecy and in the greatest confidence) that His Majesty has reason to think that there is an offensive alliance carrying on between France and Spain, the terms and conditions of which seem to be agreed, tho' the treaty may not yet be sign'd. But that Mr. Keene may not suspect from whence this intelligence comes, he is directed not to say anything of it to Your Excellency and not to leave any letters that he may write relating to it open for your perusal. And as Mr. Keene has himself opportunities sometimes of being inform'd in the most secret manner of what passes at the Court of Spain, it is very likely that he may be able to give us some further lights, either with relation to the contents of this treaty or to the signing and executing of it. But as it is extremely material for His Majesty to have as full information as is possible relating to it, Your Excellency will contrive to put such questions to *IOI* [*Bussy*] as may get the most perfect knowledge of all the circumstances that it may be for His Majesty's service to be informed of.

You will for this purpose take an opportunity to let him know that you are glad to find that His Majesty's late generosity to him has had so good an effect upon him; that the advices that he has now communicated are of the utmost importance and that it is not to be imagined that he can know so much without being perfectly acquainted with all the particulars relating to this secret transaction.

It may possibly be of some service upon this occasion that I should observe to Your Excellency that many of the articles of this supposed treaty which has been given you by *IOI* are the same with those which were communicated to His Majesty in the year 1734, as what had actually been then concluded and signed between France and Spain, of which Your Excellency was informed by His Majesty's permission. It is therefore material to know of *IOI* whether this be a new treaty now concerted, or whether it may not have been some former one concluded between France and

Spain during the Polish War, and on a supposition that England might take part with Emperor in that war.¹

You will also endeavour to find out whether the treaty is actually signed or not ; about which 101 does not seem to be at all clear. For he says "That this is a project which, after many alterations " by both parties, had been brought to this conclusion, and which " was not likely to be signed, unless Spain gave France all the " advantages for their commerce at our expence." You will also learn what answer the Court of Spain has sent to the project of the treaty of commerce lately proposed by France to them, and you will inquire of 101 whether France has at any time enter'd into engagements with Spain for preventing illicite trade, and what those engagements are.

It will be further necessary to know whether this offensive alliance is to take place only on condition of our coming to a rupture with Spain, or whether, tho' we should be able to make up our present disputes with that Crown, the other engagements enter'd into by France relating to Gibraltar and the future exercise of our trade and commerce with Spain, are to subsist and be supposed to be executed.

The wording of the article about Gibraltar is very remarkable, where, though France is not to desist 'till Gibraltar is given up, yet the two Crowns are to consider, of a proper time, the disposition of the ministry and of the Parliament and the situation of affairs in order to regulate their proceedings relating to it. And you will therefore examine 101 particularly upon this and find out whether this be a real article, or turn'd so by him in order to give the treaty a greater air of probability and reality.

A courier, as I hear by Mo^r. Geraldino, came last week from Spain to France, so that in all probability he brought answers upon the points depending between the two Crowns ; and what those answers were, you will endeavour to inform yourself from 101.

You will also talk with him very seriously upon the general views of the Court of France at this time, as well with regard to the affairs in the North as the general affairs of Europe : whether he is sure that the treaty with Prussia is ratified ; ²what are the conditions of that treaty, and² how the French propose to satisfy

¹ In point of fact, negociations for a treaty between France and Spain broke down.

²—² In m. in George II.'s hand.

the Palatine Court, and whether the Court of Vienna be not really offended at their concluding this negotiation without them ; whether any other negotiations are carrying on with any of the powers in the North ; and what the real view of their sending four or five ships to join the Swedish squadron is ; whether there is anything to be undertaken by the French and Swedish squadron against Muscovy or any other power ; or whether they are only sent to parade in the Baltick without any intention of acting.

You will particularly inform yourself how the Court of France is at present with Russia, and whether the treaty with Prussia is likely to have any other consequence than what relates to Berg and Juliers.

You will inquire also into the march and destination of the French troops upon the Moselle and upon the coasts opposite to England ; and you will in a prudent manner learn of 101 whether he apprehends that there are any particular transactions carrying on at this time in favour of the Pretender.

Upon the whole, as the present is a most critical situation, and the views of France appear and are universally acknowledged to be very extensive ; and as His Majesty has received advices that the interests of the Pretender are mixed with them, and that even the present situation is not thought by the Jacobites an unfavourable one for some attempt to be made upon His Majesty's dominions in which both France and Spain are represented to concur, the King is persuaded, from Your Excellency's zeal for his service and from your attachment to His Majesty's person and government that you will exert yourself with more than ordinary activity upon this occasion, and that you will omit nothing that may tend to procure His Majesty the most perfect informations either from 101 or from any other way of what the Court of France is doing. And it is His Majesty's pleasure that you should endeavour to have persons in the several ports of France where ships are fitting out, and to get constant accounts of the preparations that are making, and where design'd ; and above all, that you should be very diligent in watching the motions of Obrian and the Jacobites, as well with relation to their proceedings at the Court of France, as to their correspondence here. And, as 101 must be very useful to you in all these inquiries, you will do everything that is necessary to keep him in good humour, and to make him disclose to you all that comes to his knowledge.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 220, fo. 228.*)

Whitehall, 7 June 1739.

Most private.

The time for the payment of the ninety five thousand pounds on the part of Spain towards satisfaction for the many injuries and losses sustained by His Majesty's subjects from the Spaniards in the West Indies having expired on the 25th day of last month, and neither the payment made nor any notice taken of it, or any reason alledged by His Catholick Majesty for not complying with his engagement, the King cannot but look upon this behaviour as a violation of the late convention and an indignity to his Crown and Kingdom. And at the same time that His Catholick Majesty thought proper to break so solemn a treaty, so lately made, Your Excellency will see by the inclosed advices which came yesterday by the Spanish post, that orders have been given some time for rearming all the men of war in the several ports of Spain, which confirms and explains the views and intentions of that Court in the non payment of the money.

Under these circumstances Your Excellency may easily imagine that His Majesty is making the necessary preparations for his own defence, as well as for the vindicating the honor of his Crown and supporting the interests of his people; and as His Majesty is willing to give the earliest notice to the Cardinal of the usage that he has met with from the Court of Spain, it is the King's pleasure that you should acquaint His Eminency with the fact as I have related it in the beginning of this letter. You will accompany it with the proper expressions of His Majesty's regard for His Eminency and dependance upon his justice and friendship upon this occasion; you will shew him how desirous the King has been to avoid coming to extremities with the Court of Spain, that notwithstanding the repeated provocations given for many years by the unjust captures and seizures of the ships and effects of His Majesty's subjects in the West Indies, by which the King might have insisted that His Catholick Majesty had (as undoubtedly he did) violate (*sic*) the treaties subsisting between the two Crowns and have called upon his Allies for their assistance, yet His Majesty, upon the least appearance of a disposition on the part of Spain to do justice, rather chose to try whether those grievances could not be removed by an amicable accommodation, than to take the

forcible measures for procuring it which the very treaties themselves prescribed, and the King did indeed hope that there was the same disposition in both parties when the late convention was concluded; but that, to His Majesty's great surprise and concern, that convention had been violated in the strongest and most provoking manner, and the violation attended with a general armament in the several ports of Spain, which leaves no room to doubt of the resolution of the Court of Spain not to perform their engagements; that the Cardinal knows too well what a Sovereign owes to himself and his subjects to think that His Majesty can any longer submit to the repeated infractions of the most solemn treaties or to suffer his Kingdoms to be exposed to any insult or attempt.

Your Excellency will not fail to use such arguments as must occur to you upon the occasion, to shew the Cardinal that, His Majesty being entitled by the behaviour of Spain to call upon France for their assistance, pursuant to the treaties subsisting between the two Crowns, the King must depend upon the assurance which His Eminency has so solemnly given you, that they will not take part with Spain against him; and you will make such insinuations as may be most likely to prevail with him, either by flattering his justice and inclination to peace, or by shewing him the dangers of a general war. But this you will do in the most prudent manner, and His Majesty leaves it entirely to your discretion to act in it as you shall think proper.

As the Cardinal was so very explicate last year that he would not take part with Spain against us, the violation of the late convention on the part of Spain, the King thinks, must make him ashamed of doing it.

Your Excellency may assure the Cardinal that His Majesty had no thoughts but of proceeding upon the foot of the convention, that the King had punctually complied with it, and that therefore the King of Spain cannot have the least pretence to justify the breach of it on his part.

¹ I may in confidence acquaint Your Excellency for your own information (but you are to take no notice of it) that His Majesty has ordered proper directions to be sent to Admiral Haddock for his behaviour in these circumstances, that His Majesty will

¹ Cypher begins.

forthwith make a very considerable augmentation of his forces by sea and land.

I need not, I am persuaded, repeat to Your Excellency the necessity that there is that you should inform yourself forthwith of any preparations that may be making in the ports of France. We have an account that there are four ships fitting out at Brest, which are said to be design'd for the Mediterranean, which fact it will be very material for His Majesty to be inform'd of.

Your Excellency cannot be too alert in this critical conjuncture, and you will therefore have persons in the several ports of France to send you constant advices ; and it might not be amiss if you employ'd proper persons all along the coast to be viewing and observing the motions of the Irish regiments, that upon the least appearance of anything that may give a jealousy, Your Excellency might send His Majesty notice of it. We shall have a considerable squadron at home, which if there should be any design of making any attempt either from France or Spain, will be able upon the least hint from Your Excellency, to dispose itself so as to defeat any enterprise of that kind.

You will endeavour to inform yourself by 101 [Bussy] and by all other methods possible of the part which the Court of France may probably take upon this occasion, whether they will really observe a neutrality or not ; or, if they do take part with Spain, whether they will undertake anything this year or not ; and if they do, in what manner it is most likely they will act ; or whether the Cardinal will begin by offering the interposition or mediation of France, for which Your Excellency will not give him the least encouragement.

Your Excellency will see that things are now come to be very serious, and a great deal will depend upon your being able to procure the earliest and best intelligence of what may be designed, and His Majesty is persuaded he may depend upon your care and vigilance. Every circumstance at such a critical time as this, is material for the King to be inform'd of, and a delay of a few days only may sometimes be of consequence ; and therefore Your Excellency will dispatch a messenger directly hither whenever you shall have anything that may the least deserve His Majesty's attention. And above all, I must recommend to you the procuring the best information you can of the motions and designs of the Jacobites and those that are employed by the Pretender in France.

There is a report come from Spain, and indeed from many places abroad that one of the French King's daughters is to be married to the Pretender's eldest son. The King looks upon this as a most idle story, but perhaps it may be a pretence for you, as from yourself, to talk to the Cardinal upon the subject of the Pretender.

It has been often reported here that the late Duke of Ormond was dead. This may have been given out in order to conceal his leaving of Avignon when anything should be in agitation, and therefore Your Excellency will have an attention to his motions at this time.

His Majesty will be very impatient for an answer to this letter, which I hope will be to His Majesty's satisfaction.¹

June 8th.

I was just sending away last night the messenger with this letter, when Haite arrived with the extraordinary and voluminous dispatches from Mr. Keene. As Your Excellency has already perused them, I have very little to add upon them but that their contents confirm the justice and necessity of the measures which His Majesty is now taking, and which will be carried on with all imaginable expedition and vigour. The insolent demand of the recall of His Majesty's fleets from his own ports and harbours before the Court of Spain will perform a clear, unconditional stipulation made by them in the late convention, is a fresh indignity added to breach of faith and treaty, and as such Your Excellency will speak of it to the Cardinal. And the false assertion that they had made that declaration by their plenipotentiaries in a conference some time ago is such a mean, low artifice as shews that they are drove to the last shifts and extremities, which Your Excellency will also explain to His Eminency. Though they had made the recall of His Majesty's fleets from his own ports and harbours or from the Mediterranean and American seas (where the King has as much right to have a fleet as any other power), a condition of the payment of the money, His Majesty could not on any account have submitted to a condition so unjust in itself and so contrary to the honor and dignity of his Crown, and Your Excellency will be pleased to remember that the recall of His Majesty's fleet from the Mediterranean was never mention'd during the time that the convention

¹ Cypher ends.

was in negotiation and that there is not one word in the convention relating to it.

I send you an extract of that part of the letter from His Majesty's plenipotentiaries (dated the 18th March N.S.) which gives an account of Mo^r. Quintana's declaration to them, by which you will see that, so far from making the continuance of His Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean a reason for the nonpayment of the money,¹ there was not one word relating to the payment of the money mention'd, and indeed the inference to be made from that declaration, if any, was rather that the money would have been paid, since Mo^r. Quintana said that "As long as the squadron "should continue in the Mediterranean, we were not to expect "any facilities in the conferences *but the most rigid justice*," and the payment of the money could not be refused without acting contrary to the most rigid justice. And the declaration of Mo^r. Quintana was understood to relate to the points to be settled in the future treaty, for, as M^r. Keene very well observes, it was absurd to be talking of facilities to be shew'd in conferences to be held by virtue of the convention, if that convention was to be broke by the Court of Spain's not complying with the first condition of it.

² But there is too much reason to apprehend that this extraordinary resolution on the part of Spain is taken in concert with France, and that the reason that nothing was said by Mo^r. Villarias at the opening of the conferences relating to the nonpayment of the money was that they had not then received their answer from France upon it. Your Excellency will endeavour to find out by your discourse with the Cardinal whether there is any foundation for this conjecture and how far France has been consulted by Spain in this extraordinary step which they have taken.

Upon the whole, if, after this, the Cardinal can make a difficulty of repeating his assurances to Your Excellency that he will not take part with Spain against His Majesty, the King must conclude (though you will not say so to him) that he is at the bottom of this whole affair however he may be willing for the present to disguise it.²

I have only one observation more to make to Your Excellency of which you will make the proper use, which is that the King of Spain's obliging himself by the convention to pay the sum of ninety five thousand pounds over and above the sixty thousand

¹ The restraining orders to Haddock were issued on 10/21 March.

²—² In cypher.

pounds claim'd to be due to him for satisfaction for the losses and injuries sustained by His Majesty's subjects by the Spanish depredations in the West Indies, is an admission that that satisfaction was due from Spain to His Majesty, and consequently the nonpayment of the money on the part of Spain is a denial of that satisfaction which the King of Spain has acknowledged to be due.

¹ By a letter which I have received from Mr. Keene in cypher I find that he is of opinion that the offensive and defensive alliance between France and Spain call'd *Pacte de Famille* and the treaty of commerce were both signed at the same time with the contract of marriage for Don Philip which went some time ago by a courier to Mr. La Mina.² This seems very probable and if it is true, 101 is either not in the secret or desires to impose upon us, so that you will endeavour to find out the truth of this fact.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 221, fo. 49.)

Whitehall, 27 July 1739.

Most secret.

. His Majesty does not take what the Cardinal said to Your Excellency upon the alarms of the French merchants from the supposed doings of His Majesty's squadrons to waylay the azogues as any declaration or representation that requires an answer in form from the King. Your Excellency did very well in refuting the absurd proposition "that the galleons and azogues "were to be look'd upon as a sort of privileged ships and different "from the common ones as being a kind of *depositum* of the "treasure of all the trading powers of Europe, and that the "Spaniards themselves look'd upon them to be neutral ships, for "the security of which all those powers whose subjects had any "share in them were mutually concerned." And if the Cardinal should resume this discourse again, Your Excellency will inforce your arguments to prove His Majesty's right to take without distinction any ship under the colours of a nation that the King is at variance with, and indeed His Majesty would be on a very unequal foot with Spain, if they were to be at liberty to take all the ships of His Majesty's subjects, let them be ever so richly laden without distinction, and the King out of regard to other powers, be restrain'd from making reprisals upon the only ships

¹ The remainder from here is in cypher. ² See above, p. 220.

of value belonging to the Spaniards that can possibly fall into His Majesty's hands.

If the Cardinal should be inquisitive whether Your Excellency had inform'd the King of what he had said to you upon this subject and what were His Majesty's thoughts thereupon, you will then let him know that His Majesty having order'd you to acquaint him, the Cardinal, with the just reasons that the King had to resent the conduct of the Court of Spain and with His Majesty's resolution to take such measures as were necessary for vindicating the honor of his Crown and procuring satisfaction for his injured subjects, the Cardinal could not think that His Majesty could be restrain'd from doing it by any complicated interests which other nations may have with the Spaniards but that however, if any measures which the King shall find himself obliged to take against Spain should in the event affect the properties of the subjects of France, His Majesty would in such a case, be always ready to shew the greatest regard to his Allies as far as the rules of justice and equity in their utmost extent could require it of him. And this in the King's opinion is all that is proper to say in order to remove the present uneasiness that the Cardinal and the French merchants seem to be under.

I send Your Excellency inclosed an extract of a letter from Mr. Keene relating to the behaviour of the French Ambassador at Madrid and to the expectations of the Court of Spain and the general notion of the people there with regard to the part that France will act upon this occasion. You will see that Mr. la Mark has told Mr. Keene that the Cardinal had said to Your Excellency "that he could not enter into any detail upon the disputes "between His Majesty and Spain because neither side had required "it of him; but that he must declare to Your Excellency that "France could not consent to the King's attacking the possessions "belonging to His Catholick Majesty either in Europe or America," which declaration he, Mr. la Mark, told Mr. Keene that he had also made to the Court of Madrid. This, Your Excellency will perceive, is going much further than the Cardinal has ever hinted to you, or than you have ever collected from his discourse, and you may perhaps make a good use of it to get some further light into the instructions sent to Mr. la Mark and into the part the Court of France intends to take.

I must own to Your Excellency the Cardinal's present behaviour

appears to the King very unaccountable. By his discourse to you it should seem as if he was desirous to keep out of the quarrel, and yet at the same time, though it is absolutely in his power to do it, it is more than probable he will not. Can anything be so absurd as to say that we put it out of his power to keep out of the war? Is there anything His Majesty so much desires as that France should not take part with Spain? Can the war become general any other way than by France taking part in it? and would anything put so immediate a stop to it as France declaring, and keeping, an absolute neutrality with relation to it?

The Cardinal owns that Mo^r. de la Mina has drawn the Queen of Spain into this measure by buoying her up with assurances that France would support her and that he, la Mina, has grounded those assurances from his, the Cardinal's, greatest enemies, the supporters of Chauvelin; and yet he will not undeceive the Court of Spain with relation to those assurances which have encouraged them to act in the manner they have done, and therefore 'till he does that, let him say what he pleases to Your Excellency, His Majesty cannot think him in earnest to keep out of the war or to have a speedy end put to it.

If he should talk again to Your Excellency in this manner, viz^t. that we will not let him be neuter, you may, as from yourself, ask him what His Majesty can do to engage him to it, and if he has anything to propose that will not in its consequences turn to the advantage of Spain and the disadvantage of His Majesty, you may very safely say that you are persuaded the King will very readily come into it. But if the neutrality of France is to be obtained by taking away from the King the means of hurting Spain, that is what His Majesty cannot consent to.

It is plain the Cardinal has from the beginning been wishing to introduce his mediation, and in that case, I am afraid, the honour of His Majesty's Crown and the interest of his subjects would not be in very favourable or impartial hands. One sees a little the Cardinal's notion by imagining that His Majesty could be satisfied with the payment of the ninety-five thousand pounds. Your Excellency did extremely well to assure him of the contrary, and to give him to understand that the doing things by halves would be exposing us to new insults every day, and that it was not possible to make up this matter without such a satisfaction as would give Spain a distaste from playing tricks with us any more.

Upon the whole when the Cardinal talks of his dread of a general war and musters up the several points which he thinks must produce it, it is but too apparent that he himself, if there should be a general war, will be the sole author of it, for although each of those points should occasion particular disputes between the parties concern'd, yet all of them together would not produce a general war, except the Court of France should foment it.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 221, fo. 204.*)

Whitehall, 8 October 1739.

(All in cypher.)

. The King was very much surprised that the Cardinal should compare the proceedings of Rear Admiral Haddock with regard to the French vessels which he met at sea to the stopping and searching of the ships belonging to His Majesty's subjects in the West Indies by the Spanish *garda costas*, and insinuate that he had the same right to complain of the one as His Majesty had of the other. It is impossible to think that the Cardinal could be serious in what he said, since it is so easy to make it appear that the cases are no ways parallel; the proceedings of the Spaniards being contrary to the freedom of navigation to which we have a right by the law of nations established and confirmed by express treaties, and what Mr. Haddock did being no more than what is in some measure practised by all nations in the like cases, by stopping and examining ships which he might suppose were carrying provisions or intelligence to the enemy. It is very extraordinary that the Cardinal should talk in this manner after the answer which has been returned to Mr. Cambis's memorial upon these complaints, and that he should take no notice to Your Excellency of that answer, either by making objections to it or expressing (as might have been expected) his satisfaction in it. And if the Cardinal should at any time resume this conversation (as he probably may) you will endeavour to convince him that His Majesty has done all that can in reason be expected of him to satisfy them upon this point as far as the King is hitherto informed of it.

(Ibid., fo. 356.)

Whitehall, 27 December 1739.

Most secret.

. It does not seem by the advices that you have sent as if there was any immediate design in the Court of France to join Spain or to make use of their naval preparations at present against His Majesty or his subjects, but it is most probable that, if the Court of France should determine finally to take part with Spain, they may begin by attempting either to convoy the flota from Cadiz to the West Indies or to send a number of ships to the West Indies with a view either to convoy the galleons home or to take the effects that were to have been carried by them and bring them on board French ships to Europe, and it is even possible the Cardinal may think of doing the latter without openly taking part with Spain under pretence of securing the French effects only.

Your Excellency will therefore make the strictest enquiry by all the possible means you can, whether any of these things are intended, what is the real design of the French preparations and when their men of war will be ready to sail, in case they should have any orders for that purpose, for though it appears by your advices that there are some ships ready in most of their ports, yet as we have not heard that any of them are man'd or officer'd, it must be some time before they can put to sea. The late augmentation made to their marine (tho' a small one) looks as if they design'd to have some ships ready to put to sea immediately, or at least that they have a mind it should be thought that they had.

When the Cardinal expresses his apprehensions of what His Majesty's forces may do in America as a matter which would touch France more immediately, it is in effect saying that if we do anything that can really hurt Spain, France will be affected by it, and therefore if he should repeat this kind of discourse to Your Excellency, you may, as from yourself, treat it in that manner.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 222, fo. 73.)

Whitehall, 22 January 1739/40.

Private.

. As to the Cardinal's insinuating that if we made ourselves masters of anything considerable in the West

Indies he could not then help taking new measures, it is easy to see the Cardinal's great partiality to Spain by this sort of discourse, since he seems to desire that they should be attacked in those parts only where he himself acknowledges they cannot suffer much. And I must upon this occasion observe to Your Excellency that in all events the justice of His Majesty's cause and the force which the King has in his hands, must be his support against all those that shall injuriously think of molesting His Majesty and his subjects.

It appears to be the universal opinion in France that in case His Majesty should be so happy as to gain any considerable advantage in the West Indies, the mediation of that Crown would be immediately proposed. Your Excellency is already perfectly well acquainted with the King's sentiments upon this subject, and if the Cardinal should insinuate anything of that kind to Your Excellency, I am persuaded you will not fail to discourage it, as you have always hitherto done.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 222, fo. 131v.*)

Whitehall, 27 February 1739/40.

. His Majesty is disposed to think that the present view and aim both of France and Spain, by their motions, is to intimidate and prevent His Majesty from sending an expedition to the West Indies, but as they will soon see themselves disappointed in that expectation, Your Excellency will be able to discover by the manner in which the preparations go on in France, whether the French have any real intention to make use of them or not.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32802, fo. 128.*)

Whitehall, 18 April 1740. ¶

Most secret.

. I have laid before the King your most secret letter of the 18th inst. N.S. relating to Mo^r. Assebourg's negotiation at the French Court, and a minute which Mo^r. Assebourg put into your hands, containing a proposal for His Majesty to lend or advance to the King of Sweden £50,000 sterling on account of any future treaty or alliance to be concluded between the King and His Swedish Majesty as Landgrave of Hesse Cassel.

His Majesty would have Your Excellency acquaint Mo^r. Assebourg that the King is ready to do anything in his power and that can reasonably be expected of him to prevent the conclusion of a treaty between the King his master as Landgrave, and the Crown of France, but that His Majesty cannot, untill a treaty shall be actually signed and ratifyed between His Majesty and the King of Sweden, advance the sum of money proposed by him, meerly upon the precarious prospect of a future treaty. However you will tell Mo^r. Assebourg that His Majesty, in order to give a fresh proof of his real regard and friendship for the King of Sweden, is ready to conclude immediately by the treaty of subsidies with His Swedish Majesty and to keep it entirely secret as long as shall be possible, and that as soon as this treaty shall be signed and ratifyed, the King will forthwith advance to His Swedish Majesty the fifty thousand pounds desired by Mo^r. Assebourg on account of the subsidies which will become due in consequence of such treaty.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32802, fo. 158.*)

Whitehall, 15 July 1740.

Secret (to be opened by himself).

The occasion of my dispatching this messenger to Your Excellency is to acquaint you with some circumstances that have occurred which may possibly deserve immediate attention, and to make some observations upon your last private letter to me of the 8th inst. N.S. in your own hand, which, tho' wrote in that manner, I thought of such importance as to communicate it to His Majesty's servants here who are entrusted with his most secret affairs, and to send a copy of it to my Lord Harrington at Hanover for His Majesty's information.

Tho' Your Excellency in your private letter abovementioned gives an account that the Cardinal had said that "as long as we did not make ourselves masters of any of the Spanish possessions in the West Indies, and did not offer at keeping them as our own, he had nothing to say to us; but if we did, as such a step could not but be a great detriment to France and curb to her trade in the West Indies, he should be forced to take a share in the war," yet the King's servants here do not think that even what was thus said by the Cardinal does import a resolution to make any declaration or demand relating to my Lord Cathcart's expedi-

tion, previously to his going from hence. But as it has been strongly reported here that a declaration to that purpose has actually been made by the Cardinal to Your Excellency, ¹and as many of the foreign ministers' letters both to and from this place are full of the same accounts and even Mo^r. Bussy himself mentions the report in one of his letters to Mo^r. Amelot, as what is thought very natural to have happened, and as Mo^r. Amelot in one of his letters to Mo^r. Bussy which Your Excellency knows we have an opportunity of seeing, has this remarkable paragraph, viz. "Si l'es-
"cadre qui se prepare en Angleterre regarde réellement l'Amérique,
"il faudroit considérer cette entreprise comme une indication
"certaine que les Anglois veulent rompre avec nous, vous jugés
"combien il est important que vous puissiez acquérir sur cette cir-
"constance des notions certaines," ¹ we could not but think it for His Majesty's service at this critical conjuncture that Your Excellency should be informed of these circumstances, that you may redouble your attention in an affair that is of such infinite consequence to His Majesty and his Kingdoms.

I must own I can hardly think it possible that after the Cardinal has so long known that Lord Cathcart's expedition was designed for the West Indies and that it was to go as soon as ever the season of the year should make it proper, he would stay till within a few days of its sailing and then make a declaration to the purport abovementioned with any hope of preventing it; and I can less beleive that, after all he has said to Your Excellency, and the confirmed opinion you seem to be in from his discourse and behaviour, that he continues in the same pacifick disposition he has hitherto been in, that he would venture at once, without having made some such previous declaration, to commit any overt act against His Majesty or abruptly begin hostilities either by attempting to join the Brest squadron with that at Ferrol, or to fall upon my Lord Cathcart in his passage to the West Indies. ¹But as there can be no certain dependance upon the Cardinal's professions, and as the most effectual way to prevent our keeping anything in the West Indies, might be to hinder our making any acquisition there if they could, ¹His Majesty will have a force sufficient in all parts to put it out of their power to obstruct those measures which the King may think proper to take for procuring satisfaction from his enemy for the injuries offered to his Crown

¹—¹ Cypher.

and Kingdoms. I may in confidence acquaint Your Excellency for your information only, that Sir John Norris waits only for a fair wind to put to sea with a squadron, consisting of one ship of an hundred guns, seven of eighty, six of seventy, seven of sixty and two of fifty guns besides fireships and other small ships, ¹a force, I hope, sufficient to deal both with the squadron at Brest and Ferrol, though they should be united ; and in all probability Sir John Norris will soon be before Ferrol.¹

The departure of M. d'Antin for Brest, the putting the squadron there in an immediate condition to go to sea, the falling of the French actions, the reports of a declaration made to Your Excellency by the Cardinal, all these things put together deserve some attention. You will therefore make the best inquiries you can into what is the real design of the French preparations, ¹and you will let me know your opinion whether any declaration of the nature of that abovementioned will be at present made by the Court of France. You will particularly take care not to shew any uneasiness in your behaviour to the Cardinal, nor ask any questions of him with relation to their armaments that may make him think you have received any directions relating to them.¹ But if you should at any time get any certain knowledge about them you will send away a messenger immediately with an account of it hither, ¹and it would be of infinite service if you could at the same time (tho' it must be very difficult) find a secure way of sending the same by a person that you can trust, by sea, in some neutral or English ship, to Sir John Norris, who will be off Ferol, and whatever you shall send of this kind to Sir John Norris, you will put in cypher.¹

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32802, fo. 187.*)

Whitehall, 5 September 1740.

Private and particular, to be opened by himself. In cypher.

I am in this private and particular letter to acquaint Your Excellency that on Wednesday morning last, before I received your letters, 101 [Bussy] came to me and communicated to me a letter which he said he had received by a courier from Mo^r. Amelot, acquainting him with the departure of their squadrons from Brest and Toulon, and containing directions for his behaviour on that

¹—¹ Cypher.

occasion. He gave me in writing the substance of Mo^r. Amelot's letter, which tho' it is not an exact copy, contains every thing that is material in the original letter, which I read over very carefully in his presence more than once. Your Excellency will also see 101's own reasonings upon this extraordinary event.

Your Excellency will endeavour if possible to find out whether the treatys that have been so long in negociation between France and Spain are actually signed or not: if they are, the present conduct of the French Court will be easily accounted for.

(P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 224, fo. 5.)

Whitehall, 5 September 1740.

I cannot sufficiently express to Your Excellency the surprise of His Majesty's servants here at the contents of your letters of the 11th inst. N.S. which I received by express on Wednesday last at noon, so extraordinary in themselves and so different from what you had given us reason to expect in your several late dispatches. And you will allow me to observe that we were a little concerned that Your Excellency had contented yourself with hearing the Cardinal's discourse without either observing to him the injustice of his proceeding or particularly asking him whither the squadrons were going or on what particular service they were to be employed. For tho' there is the greatest reason to think from the Cardinal's conversation that one or both of them are gone to the West Indies, yet had Your Excellency put that question to him, we might in all probability have had a more certain knowledge of the fact than we have at present. However, the Lords Justices have given the proper directions upon that supposition by having ordered a very considerable naval force to be sent thither with Lord Cathcart.

Your Excellency may imagine that we shall not presume here to give any answer to so extraordinary a declaration before we receive His Majesty's orders upon it, but you are sufficiently apprised of His Majesty's sentiments and the firmness with which the King will always maintain his own authority and the rights of his subjects, not to imagine that it will cause any alteration in the measures which His Majesty may have thought proper to take against his enemies.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, no. 224, fo. 56.)

Whitehall, 15 September 1740.

. . . Their Excellencies were a little surprised to find that the destination and service of the French squadrons should be so little known in France when you will see by the inclosed papers (which I send you for your own information only and of which you will take no notice) that Mo^r. Fenelon made a formal communication of them to the States General on Wednesday the 2/13 inst. by a memorial sign'd by himself, accompanied with a draught of the manifesto to be publish'd by Mo^r. d'Antin in the West Indies. I cannot yet acquaint you how this extraordinary declaration has been received in Holland, except that it has occasion'd an universal astonishment there, and I am willing to hope that the Republick is not yet reduced so low as to be lull'd into its own ruin by such artifices as these. . . .

It is very extraordinary that Mo^r. Bussy has yet made no declaration here, and gives out that he has no orders from his Court. One can hardly conceive the reason why the Cardinal should tell Your Excellency that orders were actually sent to him to make a declaration here and that none should have been made.¹

I am apt to imagine the contents of that made to the States General were so offensive to His Majesty that they are under some difficulty how to say the same thing personally to the King, and perhaps they may want to know how their measures are relished in Holland before they say anything about them here.

There is nothing so idle and so grossly imposing as for the Cardinal to say and pretend that "nothing is further from his thoughts than going to war with England," when it appears by the very terms of his declaration that their squadrons are sent to the West Indies to make actual war upon His Majesty by assisting the King's enemies against him and by endeavouring (if they can) to deliver the Spanish dominions from the dangers with which they are threaten'd; and the Cardinal is so sensible of this himself, notwithstanding the discourse he flings out, that he is preparing for war in every part of France by appointing their Generals, augmenting their forces, fitting out more ships and repairing their fortifications in their sea-ports, and even (as you will see is said

¹ For the reason, see Introduction, p. xxxix.

in the inclosed letter from Dover) by endeavouring to repair the harbour of Dunkirk.

Your Excellency will make the best inquiry you can into the truth of these accounts and particularly as to what is said relating to Dunkirk.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 224, fo. 68.*)

Whitehall, 20 September 1740.

. I have wrote this night to My Lord Harrington giving a full account of what passed between Mor^r. Bussy and me when he communicated to me the orders which he had received from his Court.

Your Excellency will see that Mor^r. Bussy refused leaving anything with me in writing, that he asked me what I had to say to him upon it, and that I did not think it proper to say anything but that I would transmit an account of it to the King and receive His Majesty's orders upon it. And Your Excellency will make the same answer if anything should be said to you upon this subject.

I need not make any observations to you upon this offensive behaviour on the part of France, which is little less than an actual declaration of war, but I cannot forbear taking notice of that part which personally concerns yourself, which is so contrary to what I am persuaded was the truth and to what (as appears by Your Excellency's letter mentioned in mine to my Lord Harrington) Your Excellency ever understood to be the meaning and design of the Cardinal.

Whether (as circumstances now are) you may have an opportunity of talking with the Cardinal upon this subject, I know not ; but to him and to everybody else I doubt not but Your Excellency will, when you have an opportunity and when this becomes publick, as it soon will, express your sense of the ill treatment that you have met with from the Cardinal and expose the falsity of the fact in the manner it is represented in Mor^r. Bussy's declaration.

I shall not trouble Your Excellency with any farther observations upon the Cardinal's behaviour and discourse but I must only beg that you will give me leave to observe that what the Cardinal calls his moderation is the most offensive behaviour towards His Majesty that can be imagined, by declaring that France

would not suffer His Majesty to make new establishments in America and at the same time pretending that they have not the least thought of a rupture when they are preparing for it by every measure they are taking in all the parts of France and by the motions of their troops and the preparations in their ports.

As Mo^r. Bussy has now made his declaration, tho' verbally only, and as it is of such a nature that we are not to determine what His Majesty may think proper to do upon it, it will be best for Your Excellency to take the pretence of your health (which I am heartily sorry to see by your letter is in so bad a state) to remain at Paris and not follow the Court to Fontainebleau. And your chief attention should now be given to the works and fortifications that may be carrying on in the French ports, to the condition of their marine, and the motions of their land forces.

(*P.R.O.*, *S.P.* 78, *no.* 224, *fo.* 123.)

NEWCASTLE TO THOMPSON.

Whitehall, 30 September 1740.

The ill state of poor Lord Waldegrave's health having obliged him to ask leave to return to England for the recovery of it, the Lords Justices have been pleased to desire that I would acquaint you with their directions that, during my Lord Waldegrave's absence, you should transact the necessary business between the two Courts with which Lord Waldegrave will acquaint Mo^r. Amelot by letter. I am also to let you know that the Lords Justices doubt not but you will exert your utmost diligence and attention to procure the most early intelligence of the preparations, motions and designs of the French, and particularly of the number of ships remaining or fitting out in any of the French ports and the destination of any that may put to sea: and for this purpose, whatever necessary expence you shall be at, you are directed to draw as usual for it and your bills shall be immediately answered.

(*B.M.*, *Add. MS.* 32802, *fo.* 253.)

Whitehall, 13 August 1741.

Most private.

. You will accordingly give him [101, Bussy] the following points, viz^t.

1. Whether he is to go to Hanover and with what instructions, and what has hitherto delayed his journey.

2. What orders the armys under Mo^r. Belisle have, and where and in what manner they are to act in conjunction with the Elector of Bavaria, in support of his pretensions.

3. When, where and what number of troops are to be assembled under the command of Mo^r. Maillebois, what is the principal view of that army, whether to remain in Flanders to keep the Dutch in awe, or to march into Germany to keep such of the princes of the Empire in awe as may be supposed not to be well inclined to the Elector of Bavaria, and to influence the election of an Emperor.

4. What are the views of France with regard to the election of an Emperor; when to be brought on and in favour of whom.

5. What declarations, if any, have been made or are to be made to the States-General, the Electors and Princes of the Empire or at the Diet, relating to the motives that have induced the French King to send two such considerable armies into Germany.

6. What is the particular view and interest of the Elector of Cologne's army.

7. How the French squadrons at Brest and Toulon are to be employed.

8. Whether the expedition into Italy goes on; by what powers to be undertaken, and where the attempt is to be first made.

9. Whether there is any design to come immediately to a rupture with England, in what manner and upon what pretence, and whether any camp is to be formed in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and with what view and intention.

I think, after what I have said, it is unnecessary to shew how incumbent it is upon all those who have the honour to be employed by the King to procure in their several stations the best intelligence they possibly can.

You are at a Court from whence every thing springs that may affect either the interest of Europe in general or the particular one of His Majesty and his kingdoms; and from you therefore more must be expected than from any other person. You have always had a liberty to be at any expence that the importance of the intelligences you should procure, might deserve, and considering what little advantage we have hitherto had from them, His Majesty

has been very liberal on this head. But I am now to let you know that you are to spare no expence that may any ways tend to the getting information upon the material and important points above-mentioned, and whatever sums you may have occasion to draw for, for that purpose, shall be immediately answered. But you will remember that the consideration must always be in proportion to the importance and certainty of the advices.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 229, fo. 173.*)

Whitehall, 3 February 1743/4.

I received on Tuesday last your letter of the 7th inst. N.S. with an account of the arrival of the Pretender's eldest son at Antibes. His Majesty had before had certain intelligence of the departure of that person from Rome on the 27th or 28th of December O.S., and that it was known that he was gone for France.

You will receive herewith a letter in French¹ which His Majesty has ordered me to write to you on that subject. You will upon receipt of it immediately go to Mo^r. Amelot and acquaint him that in order to avoid all mistakes in an affair of so delicate a nature, you will read to him the orders you have received from His Majesty, which you will accordingly do, and you will immediately redispach this messenger to me with the answer you shall receive from Mo^r. Amelot.

If that minister should make any difficulty or affect any delay in receiving a visit from you, you will send him a copy of my letter to you, with a few lines from yourself acquainting him with the occasion of taking that method and desiring a speedy answer; and whatever the answer is that Mo^r. Amelot shall give you, you will beg leave, for the help of your own memory, to take it down in writing, which you will transmit to me, without however letting Mo^r. Amelot know that you do it.

(*Ibid., fo. 231.*)

Whitehall, 6 March 1743/4.

I have received your letter of the 14/25 past containing the answer which Mo^r. Amelot told you he had the French King's order to return to the representations His Majesty had directed you to

¹ Calling for the expulsion of the Young Pretender in accordance with the treaties.

make upon the arrival of the Pretender's eldest son in France, and having laid it before the King, His Majesty has ordered me to dispatch this messenger to you to acquaint you that after this injurious and offensive answer of the French Court (upon which you will have seen the sense of both Houses of Parliament) on a point which so nearly concerns His Majesty's person and government, and after the known preparations that have been making at Dunkirk for an invasion of this kingdom in favour of the Pretender to His Majesty's Crown, the King thinks it inconsistent with his dignity that you should remain any longer at that Court. You will therefore immediately set out for England without taking leave of the Court where you are, and return with all possible expedition into His Majesty's presence.

APPENDIX

(*B.M., Add. MS. 33006, fo. 70.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN ARMSTRONG APPOINTED TO GO AS COMMISSARY TO DUNKIRK.

Hampton Court, 18 July 1728.

Whereas upon the information lately received both here and in Holland that the inhabitants of Dunkirke were carrying on certain works for the reestablishing of the port and harbour there in breach of the treaty of peace between Our Crown and that of France concluded at Utrecht the 31 March/11 April in the year 1713 and the treaty of alliance between Our late Royal Father and Our good friends and allies the Most Christian King and the States General of the United Provinces, made at The Hague the 4th of January 1717 N.S. We directed Our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the French Court to make the proper representations thereupon to the said Most Christian King and his ministers, which he having accordingly done, an answer to the informations abovementioned was put into his hands by the Cardinal de Fleury, who at the same time assured him that the people of Dunkirk had no manner of intimation or encouragement from the French Court for what they had done, and proposed the sending of commissaries if it were necessary, on Our part, and that of the States General to enquire more fully into this matter, and We having accordingly thought fit to make choice of you for that purpose and the said States who are equally concerned in point of interest, and on account also of the last mentioned treaty made in the year 1716/17 have appointed Mr. Cronstrom, Governor of Furnes, to be their commissary.

You are therefore to repair forthwith to Dunkirke, and upon your arrival there to give immediate notice to Mr. Constrom (*sic*) at Furnes, and to desire him to come forthwith and join you. You will also send an account of your arrival at Dunkirk to Horatio Walpole, Esq. Our Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and if the person whom We expect the Most Christian King

will have appointed to be his commissary to act with you shall not be arrived at Dunkirk, you will desire Our said Ambassador to use his utmost endeavours to hasten his departure thither, and you shall act with the utmost concert, friendship and confidence with the said Mr. Cronstrom, or any other person whom the States General shall think fit to employ on this service.

You shall in conjunction with the commissaries on the part of France and Holland carefully and strictly view and examine the several works of what kind or nature soever that may any way conduce to the reestablishing, cleansing, or deepening the harbour of Dunkirk or the old or any chenal or inlet of the sea leading thereto, and make your report thereof; and if you find that any have been left standing or erected or made anew, contrary to the express words or to the intention or meaning of the treaties above recited or either of them, you shall take particular notice of it in your said report, and likewise propose what you think proper to have done, in order to the reducing that harbour to the state it ought to be in by virtue of the abovementioned treaties.

You are to draw your said report in writing and to sign the same jointly with the said French and Dutch commissaries, or if the French commissary shall refuse to sign the same, then you shall sign it together with the Dutch commissary only.

As soon as your said report is finisht you shall send it to one of Our principal Secretaries of State to be laid before Us, whereupon you will receive Our further pleasure. You shall also send a copy thereof to Our said ambassador for his information.

You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as We shall send you under Our Royal Sign manual or by one of Our principal Secretaries of State, with whom you shall constantly correspond.

(*B.M., Add. MS. 32766, fo. 238.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THOMAS LASCELLES APPOINTED TO GO AS COMMISSARY TO DUNKIRK.

St James', 6 March 1729/30.

Whereas by the treaty of peace concluded at Utrecht 31 March/11 April in the year 1713 between Our late Royal Predecessor Queen Anne and the late Most Christian King Lewis the 14th, the following article was among others concluded and agreed, viz^t.

"9. Curabit Rex Christianissimus ¹"

¹The French text is to be found in Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, Vol. VIII, part i, pp. 340-1, and H. Vast, *Les grands traités de Louis XIV*, 1899, Vol. III, p. 76.

And by the treaty of defensive alliance made at The Hague the 4th day of January in the year 1717 N.S. a further stipulation and agreement was made in the words following, viz^t.

" 4. Rex autem Christianissimus sincerâ mente cupiens ¹"

And whereas We have received informations, that since the execution of the above recited articles, the inhabitants of the town of Dunkirk have opened again and deepned part of the old harbour and chenal of the town, by repairing or erecting one or more sluices appointed by the said treatys to be demolished and by other works made and carried on for that purpose, and upon the representations that have by Our order been made from time to time, by Our several Ambassadors, to the Most Christian King and his ministers of such works being carried on, frequent assurances have been given Us that if any thing of that kind had been done, it should be rectified according to the treatys, and lastly the said King has given his positive orders in that behalf in the words following, viz^t.

" De par le Roy.

" Il est ordonné au Sieur Capitaine des ses Vaisseaux de se transporter incessamment au port de Dunkerque pour y dresser un estat exact de la scituation actuelle du chenal et du port de ladite ville, et en faire procez verbal, Enjoint Sa Majesté audit Sieur de faire démolir tous les ouvrages qui pourroient avoir esté construits en contravention du traité d'Utrecht et de La Haye, dont il trouvera cy-joint copie, Mande et ordonne Sa Majesté au Gouverneur Commandant de la place, Intendants Ingénieurs et à tous autres ses officiers et sujets de donner les secours nécessaires pour l'exécution du présent ordre en cas de besoin. Fait à Versailles le 27 février 1730. Signé : LOUIS, Et plus bas : PHELYPEAUX."

And whereas at the same time that this order was communicated to Our Ambassador by the ministers of the said King, it was proposed by them on his part, that if We should think fit, We might send a person to Dunkirk to see these orders executed, who should readily be admitted there for that purpose, and We having accordingly made choice of you to be employed on this service,

You are therefore to repair forthwith to Dunkirk, and upon your arrival there to give immediate notice thereof to Our Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiarys residing at the French Court. You shall wait upon the Governor or other officer commanding in chief at Dunkirk and acquaint him with the occasion and intention of your being sent thither, and you shall also meet and conferr with Captain Blandinière who, as We are informed, is the officer sent thither by the Court of France, to put in execution the above recited order of the Most Christian King.

You shall carefully view, inspect and examine the present condition

¹ The French text is in Dumont, *ut sup.*, p. 485.

of the old port, harbour and chenal of Dunkirk, as also the said town of Dunkirk and the canal of Mardyck, and the adjacent parts within two leagues of either of those places ; and if you shall find any sluices, jettées or other works, of what kind or nature soever, repaired, erected or made anew, contrary to the express words or to the meaning and intention of the above recited articles of the Treatys of Utrecht and The Hague, or that may not have been demolished pursuant to the said treaties, you shall insist with the said Captain Blandinière, or such other officer as shall be charged with the execution of the Most Christian King's order above recited, that he cause them to be forthwith demolisht in pursuance of the said order, and agreeable to the treaties ; and you shall carefully and diligently inspect such demolition, and see that it be perfectly and effectually performed, and that all things, and particularly the old chenal and port of Dunkirk, be reduced to the state and condition they ought to be in by virtue of the above-mentioned treaties.

As application will be made to Our good friends and allys the States General to send a commissary on their part to Dunkirk, you shall communicate to such commissary these Our instructions, and desire his concurrence with you in the execution of them.

You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as We shall send you, under Our Sign manual, or by one of Our principal Secretaries of State, with whom, and with Our Ambassadors at the French Court, you shall constantly correspond, giving them a punctual account of all your proceedings in the execution of these Our instructions, and of all such other matters as shall occur relating thereto.

(*P.R.O., S.P. 78, no. 195.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COLONEL THOMAS LASCELLES.

Windsor, 12 October 1730.

Whereas We have from time to time repeated Our orders to Our Ambassadors at the French Court to insist upon the speedy and effectual demolition of the Sluice of Furnes, the jettées and other works at Dunkirk that have either been left standing or that have been repaired or erected by the inhabitants of that place in contravention of the Treatys of Utrecht and of The Hague, and upon the instances which Our said Ambassadors have accordingly made for that purpose, orders have been given by that Court for the effectual demolishing of the said jettées, but as to the said sluice it has been alledged by the French ministers that the Vanne de Kestelort, by which they would understand the Sluice of Furnes, has never been demolished and is of no manner of consequence as to the reestablishing of the old port and chenal of Dunkirk, and that if it were destroyed

it would certainly make that town uninhabitable and occasion a plague, as they say former experience has shewn ; and it having been proposed on the part of our good Brother the Most Christian King that commissarys should be named on both sides to examine into that matter, and to agree upon the most proper expedients for the mutual satisfaction of both Crowns, We have thought fit to nominate and appoint you to confer with the person or persons that shall be named and appointed by the said King for this purpose.

You shall therefore accordingly meet the French commissary or commissarys so to be appointed, and, in conjunction with him or them, view and examine carefully the Sluice of Furnes and the said Vanne de Kestelort, which, as We have been informed, has been added thereto since the demolition of the works at Dunkirk, and you shall in the first place make a true and exact state of the case mentioning the condition in which the Sluice of Furnes was left at the time of the demolition, the alterations that have been made to it since that time and the consequences that have followed either from its having been formerly demolisht or from any repairs or additional works that may have since been made to it, as well with regard to the opening anew and keeping up the navigation to Dunkirk by way of the old port and chenal, or as to the town's being, on account of the said Sluice and Vanne, more or less subject to pestilential distempers and thereby made uninhabitable : all which particulars you will set down with the greatest care and exactness from your own knowledge and observation, and the best information that you shall be able to procure.

If any expedient shall occur to you or shall be proposed by the French commissarys whereby the said navigation of the old port and chenal of Dunkirk may be totally and effectually destroyed and yet at the same time the town not become liable to infectious or pestilential distempers, you shall take care to have it clearly and particularly set forth, that in case We shall be fully convinced that the said expedient will effectually and intirely answer the terms and intention of the abovementioned treatys, and We consequently shall think fit to consent to it, there may not hereafter any dispute, doubt or cavil arise on account of the ambiguity or uncertainty of such proposal or of any part of it. But you are above all things to be mindful not to admit or give the least encouragement to any expedient whatever that may be proposed, which, if put in practise, would not as effectually destroy the old chenal and port of Dunkirk as the demolition of the said sluice and vanne would do, or that might in the least contribute to the reestablishing with greater facility the said port and chenal hereafter, it being Our fixt and unalterable resolution never to consent to, or even to connive at anything that may now actually, or by it's future consequences conduce in any manner to the rendring that

port or chenal anyway navigable which, by the express words and intentions of the treatys are never to be reestablisht.

You shall prepare a report expressing at large the several particulars abovementioned with your opinion upon the whole, in which, if the French commissary or commissarys shall agree with you, you shall joyntly with him or them, sign two copys thereof, one to be laid before Us, the other for his or their use, and you shall thereupon receive Our further pleasure, for you are by no means to settle or determine anything finally in relation to the premises without Our particular order for that purpose. If the French commissary or commissarys should differ from you, and refuse to sign a report in the terms that you shall think agreeable to truth and to reason and justice, you shall however prepare one yourself, and having signed the same, you shall transmit it to one of Our principal Secretaries of State, to be laid before Us for Our information.

You shall send to Our Secretary of State, to be laid before Us, constant accounts of the manner in which the demolition of the jettées before mentioned is carryed on, together with your opinion how far the same will contribute to the preventing of ships from navigating in the old chenal and port of Dunkirk, and what else may be necessary to be done for the reducing of that port and chenal to the condition in which they ought to be according to the treatys. Besides what relates to the demolition of the Sluice of Furnes, you shall employ your greatest care and endeavours to have all this performed with the utmost dispatch, and particularly you shall make your report upon the affair of the Sluice of Furnes, and the Vanne de Kestelort with all possible expedition, that We may be able to judge what further orders shall be proper to be sent you upon this head.

You shall observe and follow such further orders and instructions as We shall send you under Our Sign manual or by one of Our principal Secretarys of State, with whom, and with Our Ambassador at the French Court, you shall constantly correspond ; giving them a punctual account of all your proceedings in the execution of these Our instructions, and of all such other matter as shall occur relating thereto.

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